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Abstract 
The role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in economic growth is well documented in the 
literature. Various studies have established that FDI contributes both directly and indirectly to 
economic growth of the host country, especially, in the developing countries. Despite the 
proven benefits of FDI to developing countries, Africa continues to account for less than six 
per cent of the global stock of FDI. To uncover why developing countries (especially 
countries in Africa) are less attractive to inflow of FDI, a number of studies have been 
conducted.  
In most of those studies, the role of macroeconomic fundamentals is presented as the major 
hindrance to the developing world in attracting FDI. However, the fact that some developing 
countries (particularly in Asia and South America) falter on these considerations and still 
manage to attract inflow of FDI begs the straightjacket validity and appropriateness of those 
postulations. This new line of thought motivates the interest in looking at other set of 
variables that are capable of influencing the attractiveness of countries (especially developing 
countries like those in Africa) to inflow of FDI.  
This study investigates the effects of capital market development on inflow of FDI to African 
countries. The reason for undertaking the study is because of the proven benefits of FDI to 
the host country, which include economic growth, enhanced industrialisation capacity, human 
capital development, and technological spillover, amongst others. It is thus considered 
important to investigate the role of capital market development on the attractiveness of Africa 
to inflow of FDI. In this study, we presented material on the measurable indicators and 
determinants of FDI flow. Most of the documented studies argue that FDI flows to countries 
with high purchasing power, better infrastructure, resource endowment and developed human 
capital. The role of capital market development on inflow of FDI is rarely researched.  
In addition, there is no documented study yet that investigates the role of capital market 
development on inflow of FDI on regional basis in Africa. More importantly, the importance 
of institutional framework to capital market development in Africa has not been documented. 
Further, documented studies on the role of institutional framework on the attractiveness of 
Africa to inflow of FDI are rare, and studies that look at these dynamics on regional basis are 
rare. This study fills these missing gaps in the academic literature. Using annual data from 
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various sources from 1980 to 2012 in a dynamic panel environment, the findings of the study 
are as follows: 
Capital market development is an important determinant of inflow of FDI to Africa. 
Specifically, the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks 
as a share of GDP, equity capitalisation, stock turnover rate, and claims on domestic real 
nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP are important determinants of 
inflow of FDI to Africa. This finding is also corroborated by the regional analysis. Further, 
this study establishes the importance of institutional framework on capital market 
development in Africa, especially corruption, the rule of law, regulatory quality, inflation as 
well as polity.  
Furthermore, it is suggested, through the impulse response approach, that one standard 
deviation innovations shock on capital market variables would lead to moderate improvement 
on inflow of FDI to the selected African countries in the short run and the improvement 
becomes more substantial in the long run. Similar result is recorded for the regions as well. 
The impulse response result also suggests that the regulatory quality in the selected African 
countries as well as the regions is weak. The finding indicates that one standard deviation 
innovations shock on this variable will negatively affect inflow of FDI and the development 
of capital market. The negative effects are smaller in the short run as compared to the long 
run. Further, improvement in corruption perception, political environment and the rule of law, 
in general, are found to positively influence capital market development as well as the 
attractiveness of Africa to inflow of FDI.  
The causality tests that attempt to ameliorate shortcomings regarding institutional framework 
may enhance the development of capital market on the continent. In addition, one of the most 
important components of the capital market (BANK)) is also found to directly Granger cause 
the inflow of FDI to Africa. Incidence of corruption, rule of law and the quality of regulatory 
framework are also identified as the most important institutional frameworks that determine 
the attractiveness of Africa to inflow of FDI. The study thus suggests the need for African 
countries to initiate policies that are capable of improving the institutional environment as a 
way of enhancing the efficiency of the capital market, and ultimately, enhance the 
attractiveness of the continent to inflow of FDI.  
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Chapter one  
Introduction and background to the study 
1.1 Introduction 
Capital market development is crucial for attracting foreign direct investment. The 
development of the capital market, which is a measure of the improvement in the functional 
efficiency and relevance of the capital market system, plays a crucial role in generating 
surplus funds and channelling it through the market agents, to the deficit units of the 
economy (Madura, 2001). A developed capital market serves as a conduit through which 
foreign capital flows into an economy and it is an indication of a market's viability to absorb 
structural financial shocks. After the initial capital commitment of multinational firms, MNCs 
are expectant that subsequent long term investment is sourced from the domestic capital 
market to enhance the operational sustainability of the multinational corporation in the host 
country (Caves, 2007). A well-developed capital market signals to the foreign investors that 
complementary domestic capital is available to tap for further investment and for portfolio 
risk diversification (Jeffus, 2004).   
This study is underpinned by Caves (1974; 1982; 2007) theory of investment behaviour of 
firms. The theory postulates that multinational corporations venture abroad to reap location 
specific advantages, of which financial gains are paramount. The theory further 
acknowledges the role of local capital market as a major determinant of the destination of 
FDI. This postulation has been supported by some studies as well (Baker, Foley & Wurgler, 
2009; Chousa, Vadlamannati & Tamazian, 2008; Hailu, 2010; Vladimir, Tomislav & Irena, 
2013). According to the theory, multinational corporations would most likely chose to invest 
in countries with developed capital markets in order to diversify portfolio risks by raising 
capital from the domestic capital market, especially for future expansion (Jeffus, 2004).  
For multinational corporations, the main roles of the capital market in international business 
operations are the efficient transfer, allocation and repatriation of financial resources. These 
roles are achievable only in a well-functioning and efficiently supervised capital market (Ito, 
1999; Lee & Chang, 2009; Vladimir, Tomislav & Irena, 2013). In addition, because of the 
high risks of socio-political and economic failures in developing countries, MNCs minimise 
their offshore financial commitments in developing countries by adopting various portfolio 
management strategies (Froot & Stein, 1991). Evidence suggests that multinational 
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organisations generally seek to finance part of their investments with external debt capital or 
sell equity in capital markets, especially in the host country (Jeffus, 2004; Baker, Foley & 
Wurgler, 2009). In a way, foreign investors explore the possibility of matching foreign 
currency assets to foreign currency liabilities to offset, among others, foreign exchange 
exposures, which are widespread in the developing countries.  
The rationale for this financial strategy may be premised on Modigliani and Miller’s theory 
of capital structure (the capital structure “relevance” principle), which suggests that firms will 
seek a capital structure that minimises their weighted average cost of capital (Modigliani & 
Miller, 1958). According to this theory, debt financing are less costly compared to equity 
financing, given that interest expenses are largely tax deductible. However, there is always 
the need to balance the organisational capital structure in a way that leverages the positive 
effects of both debt and equity financing (Robb & Robinson, 2010). This form of portfolio 
management strategy has increased the need for the development of domestic capital markets 
as a possible means of attracting foreign investments, especially in developing countries 
(Hope, 1999; Binswanger, 1999; Azman-Saini, Law & Ahmad, 2010). 
Research also finds that a liquid capital market accelerates growth, as they enhance efficient 
resource allocation (Levine & Zervos, 1998; Rousseau & Wachtel, 2000). In particular, 
healthy capital markets have been observed to enable investors rebalance their portfolios 
quickly and cheaply (Bencivenga, Smith & Starr, 1996). Therefore, as capital market 
development mobilises investible capital, it also reduces portfolio risks. Along this line, 
empirical evidence suggests that a well-developed and efficiently supervised capital market is 
capable of attracting inflow of foreign direct investment (King & Levine, 1993c; Levine & 
Zervos, 1998; Wurgler, 2000; Rajan & Zingales, 2003; Acemoglu, Johnson, & Mitton, 2005; 
Antràs, Desai & Foley, 2008).  
Capital market stability is therefore considered an essential consideration for the destination 
of foreign direct investment. Although, FDI is more resilient to capital market crises, as 
compared to foreign portfolio investment (Fernandez-Arias & Hausmann, 2001), the fact that 
FDI is not as easily reversible as other forms of capital inflows (such as portfolio investments 
of short and long-term loans, currency denominated deposits, and other accounts receivable 
and payable) (Ito, 1999; Madura, 2001; Gullapalli, 2013) allude to the cautious premonition 
of foreign investors.  
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Despite concerted efforts to attract foreign direct investments by African countries, investors 
are largely reluctant to commit long-term production activities to Africa, especially in the 
form of greenfield investments. A larger portion of investments to Africa is directed to the 
commodity sector, and a few others come in via mergers and acquisitions (UNCTAD, 2013). 
For example, FDI inflow to Africa only grows by 3.7 per cent in 2012 (which accounted for 
barely 5.6 per cent of global stock). Latin America and the Caribbean recorded an increase of 
13.5 per cent in inflow FDI in the same year; while Asia recorded 28.4 per cent; South, East 
and South-East Asia recorded 22.2 per cent increase over the same period (UNCTAD, 
2013:Xiii). 
One of the reasons attributed to the reluctance of MNCs to invest in less developed countries 
(particularly countries in Africa) has been identified as risk aversion (Allen & Ndikumana, 
2000; Asiedu, 2002; Lamont & Polk, 2002; UNCTAD, 2006). The political economy of most 
African countries remain shaky, while African capital markets are generally regarded as 
fledgling and lacking the requisite supporting infrastructures that could aid their viability 
(IMF, 2008).  
Arguably, volatility in the macroeconomics of a country may trigger a worrying volatility in 
the equity value of the locally listed firms. This problem may be compounded by market 
inefficiency that characterise many capital markets in the developing countries (Rangan, 
1989; Lamont, 1997; Fauver, Houston & Naranj, 2003; Jeffus, 2004; Vladimir, Tomislav & 
Irena, 2013). However, these trends are changing in Africa. Capital market development in 
Africa is on the increase and improvement in their performance has been noticeable. Table 
1.1 shows the Top 5 stock market performers for Year 2010 in Africa: 
Table 1.1: The Top Performers in Africa Stock Markets, 2010 
Value Traded (USD million)  Volume Traded  
(million shares) 
Market Capitalisation  
(USD million) 
JSE (451, 762) NSE (93, 335) JSE (1, 012, 070) 
EGX (55, 361) JSE (71, 251) Namibia SE (173, 438) 
Casablanca SE (10, 898) EGX (33, 429) EGX (84, 103) 
NSE (5, 365) Namibia SE (7, 545) Casablanca SE (69, 286) 
Bourse de Tunis (1, 912) Zimbabwe SE (6799) Botswana SE (67, 497) 
Source: Author’s compilation from data generated from African Securities Exchanges Association, 2013 
From Table 1.1, it is evident that Africa now boasts some relatively developing stock markets 
in terms of viability. Notable among these stock markets are those of South Africa (JSE), 
Nigeria (NSE), Egypt (EGX), Casablanca (Casablanca SE), Namibia (Namibia SE), Tunisia 
4 
 
(Bourse de Tunis), Ghana Stock Market (GSE) and Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe SE). However, 
apart from the South African stock market (JSE), trading on most of the other African 
markets is sparse and just a few companies dominate the markets (ASEA, 2013). Although, 
the JSE is the most advanced stock market in Africa, it is still dominated by a few mining 
corporations (JSE, 2013).  
The increase in the number of stock markets in Africa and their improving viability can be 
attributed to the recent financial sector reforms undertaken by a number of African countries 
over the past decades (Ntim, 2012), and the reforms are evidently still on-going across the 
continent. Because of these reforms, African capital markets are fast becoming one of the top 
performers in the global capital markets. According to Ventures Africa (2013), African stock 
markets are world best performers in early 2013, when Egyptian Exchange (EGX) recorded 
49.56 per cent yield-to-date (YTD) return on investment, while Kenya Stock Market and 
Nigeria Stock Market yielded 39.32 and 35.45 per cent respectively to come second and third 
in this regard. 
1.2 Capital market development and FDI inflow (a synopsis)  
Africa’s poor economic development has been a source of worry for scholars, policy makers 
and international organisations (Amsden, 1985; UNIDO, 1988; Haggard, 1990; UNECA, 
2006, 2012; Easterly, 2007). More importantly, Africa has lagged behind other developing 
regions in attracting the requisite foreign capital of various forms, and the continent has not 
been able to participate competitively in international trade - the two major drivers of long-
term and sustainable economic growth (UNCTAD, 2005; Martin, 2008).  
Despite the challenges of institutional efficiency on the continent (Bates, 1981; World Bank, 
1997; IMF, 1999), it must be pointed out that African economies have made significant 
efforts to attract various forms of capital, but their efforts have been relatively disappointing 
(UNCTAD, 2005). For example, most countries in Africa pursued the comprehensive 
macroeconomic policy reforms under the IMF structural adjustment programs (SAP) that 
were introduced in the 1980s. Informed by their desperation to attract foreign capital, they 
agreed to economic and financial market liberalisation without adequate consideration for the 
establishment of export capacity and possible safety nets to accommodate the effects of 
foreign competition on the domestic markets (Stiglitz, 2002; Martin, 2008).  
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As expected, the policy culminated in crowding out most of the fledgling firms in African 
manufacturing sector, and the few survivors are operating below their optimal capacity 
(Stiglitz, 2002). There are evidence (Stiglitz & Charlton, 2005) to suggest that the unintended 
negative consequences of unguided economic liberalisation in the face of low manufacturing 
capacity, weak institutions and low safety nets that characterised almost all the countries in 
Africa at the time (and even now) have contributed to the present state of underdevelopment 
on the continent.  
To address some of the bitter lessons learnt through the SAP programme, some African 
countries have been particularly diligent in establishing stock markets, and the banking 
sectors have undergone considerable reforms to ensure their sustainability (UNCTAD, 2013). 
Further, African leaders have been undertaking reforms needed to provide favourable 
investment climate more than any other developing countries outside of Asia, without 
attracting the expected FDI (Hallward-Driemeier, 2003). Although the stock of FDI in the 
region has increased significantly since the 1980s, Africa still account for less than six per 
cent of the global stock of FDI (UNCTAD, 2013: xiii) while the OECD countries alone 
account for almost 80 per cent of the sock of global FDI (OECD, 2013).  
Evidently, multinational corporations are largely regarded as the key conduit for channelling 
foreign direct investments (FDI) (UNCTAD, 2008). When foreign capital flows into an 
economy, the flow usually takes the form of share purchases from the listed firms 
(acquisition). This leads to the capitalisation of the particular firm that is attracting the 
foreign interest. The capitalisation of a number of firms in the country, therefore, may lead to 
capital market development in that particular country (Temple, 1999; Enisan & Olufisayo, 
2009).  
Companies operating in that economy can therefore raise large sums of money on the equity 
platform to expand their operations, as an alternative to sourcing expensive bank loans. 
Although risk aversion is one of the primary concerns of multinational corporations in Africa, 
the possibility of raising future expansion funds through domestic capital market is an 
important determinant of the destination of the offshore subsidiary of multinational 
corporations (Caves, 2007; Chousa, Vadlamannati, & Tamazian, 2008; Hailu, 2010; 
Vladimir, Tomislav & Irena, 2013).  
Given that firms can only raise future expansion capital through efficient capital market 
platforms, the state of underdevelopment that have pervaded many capital markets in Africa 
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since their political independence have hindered this financial strategy of multinational firms 
in the affected countries (Kumar, 1984; Jefus, 2004; Kok and Ersoy, 2009), thus hindering 
the attractiveness of these countries to inflow of FDI. However, these challenges are 
improving as African leaders are continuously striving towards creating enabling investment 
environment to boost capital market efficiency and to attract inflow of FDI. It is therefore 
essential to benefit from a clear understanding of these new developments (improving capital 
market environment) through recent dataset and apposite methodology, as they affect the 
efficiency of the capital market and the attraction of Africa to inflow of FDI.  
1.3 The problem statement  
Countries or regions with developed capital markets are able to attract funding for 
development projects. This finance for development could come from internal sources 
through household savings, domestic investment in shares, government bonds and so on 
(Madura, 2001). A peculiarity of less developed capital market is the inability to generate 
domestic funding for development projects. The inability to mobilise domestic savings could 
be due to many reasons, such as high household consumption, government preoccupation 
with nation formation, and insufficient ability to create and subscribe to government bonds 
(Ito, 1999).  
Another problem is that in most of the developing countries, investments tend to have short-
term horizon and market participants are more interested in short-term gains (Jeffus, 2004; 
Vladimir, Tomislav & Irena, 2013). The short-term drive for investments is underpinned 
largely by the risk profiles of the capital markets in the developing nations (including 
countries in Africa). As such, capital market development is essential for long-term 
development and provision of infrastructure that are crucial to economic productivity 
(Khamfula, 2005). 
Capital market development is a growing area of research interest, especially in the African 
context. Over the past few decades, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of stock 
markets and improved capitalisation, as well as improving bank efficiency on the continent. 
To this extent, African capital markets are gradually being seen as viable and capable of 
supporting a meaningful level of real economic activity. For instance, a number of African 
countries such as Ghana, Malawi, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zambia, amongst other 
developing nations have established stock markets, as a means of staying competitive in the 
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global capital market (Yartey & Adjasi, 2007). By 1960, eight of the oldest African stock 
markets have been established.  
Between 1989 and 2007, the number of national stock markets in Africa grows from nine to 
16 (ASEA, 2013). To buttress this trend, the IMF (2007) notes that the capitalisation of 
African stock markets more than doubled between 1992 and 2006, from US $113 billion to 
US $245 billion. Today, there are 29 exchanges in Africa, representing 38 nations’ capital 
markets of which 21 are members of the African Stock Exchange Association - ASEA 
(ASEA, 2013).   
The increasing number of national equity markets in Africa coupled with their increasing 
market capitalisation and high turnover rates have the potential to provide an avenue to 
generate necessary investible capital in foreseeable future (Singh, 1999; Fauver, Houston & 
Naranj, 2003). This is expected to motivate foreign investments as these capital markets 
mature enough to assure investors of market stability, efficiency and liquidity (Levine, 1997; 
Temple, 1999; Baker, Foley & Wurgler, 2009).   
Equity markets generally provide domestically listed firms with the opportunity to raise funds 
for expansion at a relatively lower cost than in inadequately spanned financial markets (Ojah 
& Pillay, 2009). This reduces the dependence of large firms on bank financing, thereby 
reducing investors’ exposure to credit rationing (Caporale, Howells & Soliman, 2004). The 
regulatory framework that governs the operations of the financial system also provides 
mechanisms that foster efficient allocation of resources by capital markets and the requisite 
operational discipline. This framework, especially the corporate governance aspect, ensures 
that stock market liquidity is managed efficiently to avoid allocating funds to inefficient 
projects, as the possibility of adverse selection and credit rationing are mitigated 
concomitantly (Froot & Stein, 1991; Binswanger, 1999; Durham, 2002).  
On its own, a developed capital market encourages domestic savings, thereby providing 
investable capital needed to fund further expansion of existing production capacity and 
ultimately enhancing economic growth (Kumar, 1984; Enisan & Olufisayo, 2009; Vladimir, 
Tomislav & Irena, 2013). The more the capital in form of FDI flows into an economy, the 
more the economy grows. The resultant virtuous cycle of investment is underpinned by the 
costly-state-verification models of Townsend (1979), which explains the financial 
organisation of firms by way of information asymmetries. Townsend argues that the more 
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efficient a market becomes, the lesser the cost of capital, and the more attractive the market 
becomes for investment.   
Froot and Stein (1991:1193) further developed Townsends’ model where they established 
that “increases in wealth stimulate agents’ demand for investment”. This process also 
increases the efficiency of capital market intermediation, thereby expanding the investable 
capital base (Temple, 1999). As a result, the development of capital markets in Africa would 
serve as an important mechanism for generating expansion capital for local industries 
(including foreign investors) while accomplishing the portfolio diversification agenda of 
MNCs concomitantly. Given these compelling potential benefits of viable capital markets, it 
becomes puzzling as to why African countries are not initiating more capital markets and/or 
developing further the already established ones. The problem that now arises is how best can 
Africa improve the capital market framework as a strategy for attracting the needed inflow of 
FDI in order to growth the economy, and ultimately, alleviate poverty on the continent.   
1.4 Research questions 
The recent increase in the stock and flow of foreign investments and the marked increase in 
capital markets development are clear indications of the changing world economic order 
(Bhagwati, 1998; Kok & Ersoy, 2009). Evidence suggests that capital flows to the developing 
world has been increasing steadily over the last decade (UNCTAD, 2008). It is crucial for 
Africa to utilise the benefits of these global trends to achieve a sustainable capital inflow, and 
ultimately economic growth and development. To this effect, this research answers the 
following general and specific questions: How can African countries achieve a meaningful 
capital market development that is capable of enhancing inflow of FDI? The main research 
question encompasses the following sub-questions: 
1 To what extent does capital market development influence the inflow of foreign 
direct investment to Africa? 
2 What are the institutional factors that militate against capital market development in 
Africa? 
3 What are the impacts of institutional framework on the attractiveness of Africa to 
inflow of FDI? 
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1.5 Research objectives 
The main objective of this research was to establish the relationship between Africa’s capital 
market development and the attractiveness of the continent to inflow of foreign direct 
investment. The research sub-objectives are as stated below: 
 To analyse the causal relationship between Africa’s capital market 
development and inflow of foreign direct investment to the continent, 
 To analyse the causal relationship between institutional framework and capital 
market development in Africa, 
 To analyse the causal effect of institutional framework on the attractiveness of 
Africa to inflow of FDI.  
1.6 Motivation for the study 
Previous studies that specifically focus on the relationship between capital market 
development and inflow of FDI to Africa are limited. For instance, in the study conducted by 
Jeffus (2004) on the relationship between stock market development and FDI inflow, the 
focus was on four Latin American countries. In a similar study conducted by Chousa, 
Vadlamannati, and Tamazian (2008), they investigated the implications of capital market 
growth and quality on firm level FDI in emerging economies with firm level mergers and 
acquisition bias. In that study, only South Africa was included in the nine most-emerging 
economies studied. Vladimir, Tomislav and Irena (2013) investigated the impact of stock 
development and inflow of FDI to Croatia.   
In addition, Baker, Foley and Wurgler (2009) investigated the impact of stock valuation in 
the United States as a determinant of inflow of FDI from the OECD countries, where the 
impact of stock market was found to be significant. Hailu (2010) focussed his study on the 
relationship between capital market development and inflow of FDI to Africa between 1980 
and 2007 in cross-country fixed effect estimation. The study included all African countries 
but nine in the estimation.  
The fact that the study included countries that do not have stock markets suggests a serious 
estimation bias. Further, the two equations estimated in that study (on page 110 of that study) 
is susceptible to endogeneity problem given that all the explanatory variables were entered 
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into the regression together. The endogeneity problem was not discussed in the study and no 
attempt was made to investigate individual effects of the variables used in the study. These 
methodological weaknesses that are inherent in that study ultimately subject the findings of 
the study to validity and stability questions.  
Vladimir, Tomislav and Irena (2013) investigated the relationship between stock market 
development and the attractiveness of Croatia to inflow of FDI. Using VAR and cointegration 
techniques, these authors were able to establish the statistical significance of stock market 
development on the attractiveness of Croatia to inflow of FDI. However, that study was 
restricted to stock market, and the other capital market components were ignored. 
From the on-going, this study departs from previous studies as its novelty contributes to our 
understanding of salient issues on capital market development in Africa. This contribution is 
achieved by presenting new perspectives that combine recent aggregate data that covers the 
six oldest capital markets on the continent in a panel environment, and analysing them using 
some of the recent econometric instruments. In addition, this study explores the regional 
effects in a comparative manner that has not been done before in any documented literature.  
1.7 Limitations of the study 
This study focuses on the relationship between capital market development and inflow of FDI 
to Africa. The study further investigates the possible role of institutional framework on 
capital market development as well as the attractiveness of the continent to inflow of FDI 
using dataset from 1980 to 2012. One of the major limitations of this study is the sample size. 
The study only covers the six oldest (and by extension, the largest) capital markets in Africa. 
Although, two of the six countries in our sample (South Africa and Nigeria) account for more 
than 60 per cent of Africa’s GDP, the fact still remains that countries are different and a 
larger sample size might have changed the findings of the study.  
Further, data limitation is an important consideration in this study. Our inability to generate 
usable dataset for more than the period covered (32 years) is of concern. The result might 
have been different if a wider period is covered. More importantly, some of the variables that 
should have been used (variables such as improvement in FDI regulatory framework, 
institutional reforms to improve capital market development, improved business environment 
and economic reforms) are very difficult to measure and finding adequate proxies for them is 
also problematic.   
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1.8 Organisation of the study 
The next chapter (chapter 2) reviews the existing literature on the conceptual framework of 
capital market development and presents various viewpoints on the theories of capital market 
development. The chapter also presents material on the capital market components namely 
the equity and banking sector with specific reference to the selected countries, and a special 
focus on African dynamics in general. Chapter three contains literature on the conceptual 
appraisal of FDI, as well as the determinants of its direction. The chapter looks at the impact 
of institutional framework on the attractiveness of countries to inflow of FDI, and it 
incorporates African dynamic into the discourse. The chapter concludes by drawing on the 
relationship between capital market development and inflow of FDI.  
Chapter four contains the methodology that is used in the research. It states the research 
hypotheses, and it explains the methodology used in the specification of the models. This 
chapter also defines the variables used in this research, and it describes the type of data as 
well as the sources of the data used. The chapter also presents information on the sample size 
and the motivation for the sampling method. The justification for the econometric techniques 
that were applied in this research is also stated. The chapter concludes with the explanation of 
error correction techniques that were applied to ensure reliability of the findings.  
Chapter five contains the estimation processes and outputs. The econometric models 
specified in chapter four are estimated using the methods described in chapter four. The 
findings of the analyses are presented, and brief explanations of the analyses are given.  The 
chapter concludes with the recap of the findings of the study, as they relate to research 
questions, objectives and the stated hypotheses. The last chapter of the study (chapter six) 
recapitulates the findings of the study, presents the policy implications and summarises the 
study. In conclusion, possible recommendations were also suggested as informed by the 
findings of the study and the limitations of the study were further highlighted. 
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Chapter two 
The conceptual appraisal of capital market development  
2.1 Introduction 
Most of the countries in Africa are struggling to emancipate from the devastation of poverty, 
and its antecedent social maladies. Studies suggest that shortfall in capital supply is the main 
culprit for low economic growth in Africa (Allen & Ndikumana, 2000; Asiedu, 2002; Adams, 
2009). Although, portfolio investment is an important component of the stock of foreign 
capital flow, the fact that it is easily reversible negates its appropriateness for long-term 
investment that is needed to grow an economy in a sustainable manner, as compared to long-
term capital commitment in the form of FDI. This motivates the preference for FDI over 
foreign portfolio investment (FPI) in most developing countries (Meyer, 2004; Hill, 2013).  
The realisation that domestic economy is not viable enough to generate the requisite funds to 
grow the economy in a manner that reduces poverty level, lends credence to the strategic 
interventions of African leaders.  For decades, African leaders have continuously initiated 
regulatory reforms to attract more inflow of foreign capital, especially in the form of FDI. 
However, this effort has not yielded the anticipated results mainly due to poor local capital 
market development as the case in other developing countries (Chousa, Vadlamannati 
&Tamazian, 2008; Hailu, 2010; Vladimir, Tomislav & Irena, 2013), and institutional 
deficiency on the other (Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet & Mayer, 2007; Ayaydin & Baltaci, 2013). 
After committing the initial capital in establishing an overseas subsidiary, multinational 
corporations (MNCs) would prefer an offshore location that is viable enough to raise 
requisite funds for the subsidiary’s sustainability and future expansion (Meyer, 2004; Jeffus, 
2004; Baker, Foley & Wurgler, 2009). To that extent, the capability (level of development) of 
the local capital market becomes an important determinant of the attractiveness of a country 
to inflow of FDI. It thus becomes important to investigate the roles played by African capital 
market as a determinant of FDI inflow to the continent.     
This study is underpinned by the theory of investment behaviour of firms (Caves, 1974; 
2007). According to Caves, investors’ motives in offshore locations are primarily to reap 
location specific advantages (with specific emphasis on shareholders wealth maximisation). 
Further, Caves (2007) argues that offshore expansion strategies of multinational corporations 
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are always influenced by two considerations – the cost of capital and expected cash flows 
from the offshore project.  
In the first hand, Caves observes that the cost of capital to multinational corporations is 
influenced mainly by the efficiency of the capital market. From an earlier study conducted by 
Townsend (1979), it was observed that supervision of the capital market aids its efficiency 
(state-verification model) and lowers the cost of capital. According to Townsend’s state-
verification model (1979), information on the financial instruments will be more easily 
accessible (at a lower cost) in an efficient capital market, as compared to a less efficient one. 
Townsend’s model further proposes that the problems associated with inefficient capital 
market (moral hazard and information asymmetry) have the tendency of raising the cost of 
capital in the domestic market. 
On the other hand, Caves (2007) observes that the expected cash flow from a foreign 
subsidiary may also be influenced by the efficiency of the capital market. For example, an 
efficient capital market is deemed capable of steering wealth creation through efficient 
allocation of funds, thereby enhancing the purchasing power of the people through economic 
growth. Where the possibility of wealth creation is limited in an offshore market, the 
competitiveness of such a market to attract inflow of FDI will be limited. To that extent, it 
could be argued that the efficiency of a capital market (which is an important indicator of 
capital market development), is an important pull factor for multinational corporations to 
invest in a foreign country.  
According to Caves (2007:170), “Foreign investors borrow heavily from host national banks. 
Offsetting exchange rate risks provides an obvious explanation...if the developing financial 
system can only provide a limited supply of funds; local borrowers may be inefficiently 
excluded”. This quote gives credence to the postulation that the efficiency of the host 
country’s capital market is an important determinant of the attractiveness of the country to 
inflow of FDI.  Caves’ (2007) emphasis on the role of capital market as a determinant of FDI 
destination was also buttressed by Jeffus (2004) who proposes that the strength of host 
country’s capital market is a major determinant on whether or not a multinational corporation 
will be able to achieve its portfolio risk-diversification target in the host market.  
Portes and Ray (2001) employed a gravity model to explain investment behaviour of United 
States originated multinational corporations and found that the ‘distance’ term in the 
estimation, which accounted for information cost was significant. In that study, the authors 
14 
 
were able to establish that market capitalisation of the stock market (in the host European 
countries) plays a significant role in determining the location of foreign subsidiaries by the 
American multinational corporations. In a related study, Baker, Foley and Wurgler (2009) 
investigated the role of stock market valuation in the United States on the decision of 
multinational corporations from the OECD countries to invest in the United States. In that 
study, the role of stock market was found to be significant.      
The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows: section 2.2 presents a review of capital market 
system, followed by section 2.3 that presents the synopsis of capital market development. 
Section 2.4 looks at the capital market environment in Africa, where the trend in capital 
market development is presented. Section 2.5 surveys available literature on the capital 
market development in the selected African countries, while section 2.6 looks at the 
determinants of capital market development, from the market imperfection perspective. The 
last section (section 2.7) summarises the chapter.  
2.2 A review of capital market system 
2.1.1 Introduction 
As stated earlier, the components of a capital market can be many and diverse depending on 
the country under investigation, as well as the purpose of the study. However, the main 
components of a country’s capital market have been identified by various authors as the 
equity market (stock exchanges, investment banks, and other related equity markets) and the 
credit market (banks, bond markets, insurance houses, and other financial intermediaries) 
(Frankel, Montgomery, Friedman, & Gertler, 1991; Levine & Zervos, 1998; Levine, Loayza 
& Beck, 2000; Madura, 2001; Barrucci, 2003).  
To that extent, this study focuses primarily on stock markets and banks, and their role in 
influencing Africa’s attractiveness to inflow of FDI. This choice of the capital market 
institutions is premised on the fact that banks and equity markets dominate the bulk of 
institutions that channel capital flows to production units essentially in Africa (Levine & 
Zervos, 1998; Ito, 1999; Allen & Ndikumana, 2000; Kok & Ersoy, 2009, UNCTAD, 2009).  
While a few factors (such as the number of listed firms, the stocks turnover rate and the 
capitalisation of the stock market) are used to measure the efficiency of a stock market, the 
efficiency of banks on the other hand, are measured through capital adequacy ratio and credit 
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turnover rate (Allen, 1995; Black & Gilson, 1998). Contextually, bank loans can be 
channelled to two deficit units in the economy, namely the nonfinancial private sector of the 
economy or the public sector.  
Arguably, channelling credit to the public sector or state-owned enterprises reduces the pool 
of capital funds accessible to the private sector that are regarded as being more productive 
and efficient. Research suggests that correlation between capital market development and 
economic growth have been significantly high in countries where funds are channelled to the 
nonfinancial private sector of the economy (Crowley, 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 
2008).   
2.1.2 The bank as a component of the capital market 
Early economists such as Schumpeter (1934) identified the role of banks in enhancing 
technological capacity through their intermediation role in the economy. He postulated that 
technological diffusion is achieved through efficient allocation of savings by identifying and 
funding entrepreneurs with a high possible success rate in implementing innovative products, 
and by improving production processes. Several empirical tests (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 
1973; Fry, 1988; King & Levine, 1993a), which were conducted to ascertain the validity of 
Schumpeter’s postulation, have been in the affirmative. Giving that low (or lack of) economic 
growth is the primary culprit for the lack of socio-political and human development in 
African countries, the overarching importance of capital allocation and productivity becomes 
imperative.   
2.1.2.1 The strategic importance of banks in an economy 
According to Mayer (1974:236), “a banker is a man that makes a living loaning other 
people’s money”. This author contends that the primary role of a bank is to provide credit 
flow from lenders to borrowers at agreed terms (repayment condition and the interest rates). 
Crossley and Blandford (1975) buttress this viewpoint as they identified intermediation as the 
cardinal success factor of the Barclays bank
1
 and other banks in the same era as Barclays 
bank. These authors noted that the need for Barclays bank to expand overseas was borne out 
of the predictive ability of the then managers of the bank to foresee the need to generate 
                                                 
1
 The then Barclays bank contained the Dominion, Colonial and Overseas branches. All these international 
branches conducted their respective businesses purely through the Barclays office in United Kingdom.  
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additional credit to finance the post-war industrial activities in Great Britain. In specific, 
these authors observe that: “In the coming struggle for the markets of the world, the 
manufacturers of Great Britain will look to their bankers to assist them to a greater extent 
than hitherto” (Crossley & Blandford, 1975:1).  
The roles played by banks in modern economy have evolved through the same historical path 
as suggested by Crossley and Blandford (1975). According to Boyd and Prescott (1986:1), 
financial intermediates
2
 are known for five major roles in a real economy. These roles are 
identified as follows:  
 Financial intermediaries borrow from one subset of agents in the economy and lend to 
another. This role helps to bridge the capital gap between lenders and the borrowers 
and nurtures national wealth creation in the process.   
 Both subsets (borrowers and lenders) are typically large. Thus, to the extent that 
numbers represent diversification, culminating in a situation whereby financial 
intermediaries are generally well-diversified on both sides of the balance sheets. 
 Financial intermediaries deal with borrowers whose information set may be different 
from theirs. In practical terms, this means that would-be borrowers often have better 
information concerning their own credit risk than do the intermediaries. 
 Financial intermediaries produce costly information on the attributes of would-be 
borrowers. This information is used to allocate loans and set terms. 
 Financial intermediaries issue claims that have state contingent payoffs different from 
claims issued by ultimate borrowers. 
According to Boyd and Prescott (1986), the importance of banks and related institutions in 
any economy is to provide credit facility to borrowers (individuals, government or corporate 
entities/bodies) efficiently and profitably, in accordance with necessary state regulatory 
provisions. For the banks to be able to play these roles efficiently and effectively, they should 
be capable of “ameliorating asymmetries and facilitating transactions” (Levine, Loayza & 
Beck, 2000:32). This expectation presupposes that banks as institutional lenders are expected 
to militate against principal-agent problems such as moral hazards and adverse selection 
                                                 
2
 The authors define financial intermediaries as institutions that source funds from excess owners and lend same 
fund to interested borrowers at a pre-determined terms and conditions. These institutions include commercial 
banks, thrift institutions, loan companies, consumer finance companies – all of which they termed as asset 
transformers.   
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(Lucas, 1990) – all that may result in inefficient capital allocation, and ultimately, lower 
capital productivity gains.  
Various studies further lend credence to the role of banks identified above. For example, La 
Porta, et al. (2000) observe that privately owned commercial banks, especially in Germany, 
play important roles in channelling funds to industries. Riding on the findings of 
Gerschenkron (1962), La Porta et al. (2000) contend that banks in the developing economies 
play crucial roles in the economic development of such countries. These authors further 
postulate that governments of developing countries intervene in banking through its 
institutions, to jump-start both the economic and financial development of the country.   
Banks, especially state-owned banks, are popularly known for inefficient allocation of credit. 
This has been documented not only by the most recent evidence, but historical as well. Citing 
the specific example of Russia, Gerschenkron (1962) observes that low savings and moral 
hazards hinder the capability of banks to attract the required level of funding that may 
influence economic performance. The impact of government intervention in a way that 
breeds corruption, opportunistic behaviour and inefficiency in the management and 
appropriation of financial resources was observed by Gerschenkron (1962) as the main 
reasons why banks in the developing economies are less developed and incapacitated to 
perform their expected growth-driven roles.  
This argument was further emphasised by Mookerjee and Yu (1995). These authors contend 
that inefficient allocation of credit, which was conspicuous in China (and other emerging 
economies) at the time of their study, led to economic crises like budget deficit, inflation 
pressure, and macroeconomic instability. They contend that by inefficiently directing credit 
to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the central bank and other sectoral banks pacify the 
political agenda of the political rulership, at the expense of national economic interests. To 
avert the inefficiency that characterised the banking sector as a way of achieving stability in 
the capital market, the Chinese government in 1994 adopted capital market reform. The most 
prominent aspect of the reform was the establishment of the stock market as an additional 
source of capital to SOEs, but with a more sophisticated market discipline and supervisory 
mechanisms.  
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2.1.3 The equity market 
Equity markets are generally regarded as organised process through which stocks are traded, 
on exchanges and over-the-counter. Those markets consist of both the primary markets
3
 and 
the secondary markets
4
. The origin of the modern equity market can be traced to medieval 
Italy, specifically the city states of Venice, Genoa, and Florence. Specific reference is made 
by Ranald (2006) to the forced loan that Venice imposed on its inhabitants in 1171–1172 in 
attempt to raise funds to finance an on-going war at the time.  
In return for the transferable compulsory loan, the government promised to pay interest on 
the amount borrowed until such money is redeemed, and creditors were allowed to convert 
the bonds to cash with any other interested ‘buyer’ of the security. During that period, 
according to Ranald (2006:17), “Advances [in capital market development] included such 
developments as deposit banking, marine insurance, bills of exchange, joint stock companies, 
and transferable securities”. As economic activities gained momentum between countries in 
the Eastern and the Western countries, the earlier financial system becomes modernised to 
accommodate various corporate activities.   
Largely, the stock markets are developed to address the inherent shortfalls in the process of 
credit allocation. Banks are known to be biased in credit allocation, especially in situations 
where the government exercises a tight control over the ownership of banks. Research 
indicates that a well-organised and efficient stock market stimulates investment opportunities, 
especially in developing economies, by identifying and channelling funds into growth-
inducing economic activities (Mookerjee & Yu, 1995; Caporale, Howells & Soliman, 2005).  
Levine (1997) also identifies channels through which stock markets induce economic growth. 
According to Levine (1997), in an ideal economy with efficient access to information, stock 
markets provide individuals with the opportunity to choose less risky and liquid productive 
                                                 
3
 Primary markets are financial markets where enterprises issue debt and equity securities (Initial Public 
Offering – IPO) if for the first time, directly to the general public/investors for subscription. While the newly 
issued shares go directly to the subscribers/investors, the fund generated from the process goes directly to the 
underlying company/entity that offers the bonds/shares for sale. This market offers the issuing company/entity 
the only moment to receive cash proceeds in exchange for selling securities to the general public/investors.  
4
 Secondary markets are financial markets where securities are traded after they have been offered initially in the 
primary market. Evidence suggests that most trading is done in the secondary market, and with the advent of the 
Internet, most trading in the secondary markets are conducted electronically. In any secondary market trade, the 
cash proceeds go to an investor directly rather than to the underlying company/entity. 
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investments, given that adequate information are made available and well communicated to 
investors at lower costs, as compared to banks.  
The information asymmetry thesis, as contained in the work of Roberts (1959) and Fama 
(1965), introduces the economic concept of 'efficient stock market', to justify the importance 
of ‘communication efficiency’ as a measure of the quality and effectiveness of 
communication that is made available to investors. According to Philippatos and Wilson 
(1973), communication theory, which is often used synonymously with information theory, 
provides us with a collective appraisal of the overall effectiveness of communication.  
That is, this theory espouses the quality of information or uncertainty that characterise the 
entropy of the source of a message, the channel of communication, and the capacity of both 
noiseless and noisy channels, and the efficient encoding of messages so as to approach an 
error-free transmission. According to these authors, “The probabilistic approach used in 
measuring the effectiveness of information, captures the content of the message sent as 
opposed to the message received, and the amount of information lost in the transmission 
process” (Philippatos & Wilson, 1973:525).  
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) reinforced the information adequacy hypothesis, and 
established a link between information efficiency and growth. They corroborated earlier 
studies (such as Theil, 1967; Philippatos & Wilson, 1973; Philippatos & Nawrocki, 1973), as 
they contend that investors respond (both positively and negatively) to movements in the 
headline index of a firm. According to these authors, investors respond positively if the 
headline index of the firm improves and they respond negatively if the headlines index 
regresses.  
This vacillation portends a monitoring mechanism of the firm’s managerial performance, 
because the stock price incorporates performance information that cannot be extracted from a 
firm’s current or future data. Therefore, the poor or potentially poor performance of the 
management may hurt the profitability of the firm, thereby making the firm susceptible to 
takeover. In essence, the share price of a firm provides the basis for determining managerial 
incentives, corporate governance and reporting, thereby fostering corporate productivity and 
the overall economic growth.  
In line with the foregoing, Mishkin (2010) suggests that efficient stock markets are capable of 
diversifying portfolio risks and facilitating exchange of goods and services in a better way 
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than banks. Moreover, Vazakidis and Adamopoulos (2009) argue that stock markets facilitate 
the mobilisation of domestic savings as they expose investors to alternative financial 
instruments thereby providing investors with the opportunity to diversify portfolio risks. They 
argue that, by so doing, stock markets provide an important source of long-term capital at a 
comparatively low cost. These authors further observe that efficient stock markets enhance 
the liberalisation (privatisation) policies of governments by providing appropriate guidelines 
as regards the issuance and repurchase of government securities.  
Furthermore, Nieuwerburg, Buelens and Cuyvers (2006) identify some crucial roles played 
by the stock market towards fostering economic growth. According to them, a well-
functioning stock market is capable of identifying and financing productive projects that lead 
to the overall national economic gains. Given that bank credits in most developing countries 
are the sole province of a few privileged individuals and government (Shahbaz, Ahmed & 
Ali, 2008), the stock market provides alternative source of funding for long-term projects. 
These authors further observe that stock markets are more capable as agents of the capital 
market, to mobilise domestic savings. They argue that this objective is achieved when issuers 
provide adequate information that motivates investors to commit financially to share 
purchase, thereby supporting an identified project financially. 
Likewise, the equity market helps investors to diversify portfolio risks and it facilitates asset 
allocation in ways that ameliorate systemic risk, especially those attributed to bank failures. 
While bank failures are more rampant in the developing world, recent experience suggests 
that these developing economies are at the same time, not immune to the contagion effects of 
market failures that originate from the advanced economies. The frequency and the ultimate 
effect of bank failures have been identified as a prime factor that discourages savings in 
developing economies, especially given the weak regulatory and supervisory mechanisms in 
these economies (Black & Gilson, 1998; Khamfula, 2005; Enisan & Olufisayo, 2009).  
Shahbaz, Ahmed and Ali (2008:183) sum up the roles of the equity market in economic 
growth as follows: 
 Stock markets increase economic growth by increasing the liquidity of the financial 
assets. These they accomplish by pooling long-term capital from investors, and 
managing such capital in a way that maximises investors’ interests. The pool of long-
term investible capital allows for necessary liquidity (at minimal transaction costs) 
that oils the wheels of productivity and the overall economic growth.  
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 Promote wiser investment decisions by providing not only alternative investment 
portfolios, but also useful information to guide the investors in making their choices. 
 Enhance the compliance of corporate bodies to corporate governance and social 
responsibility. By publishing information about the activities of a firm, the equity 
market provides investors with the basis to adjudge the responsiveness of the 
organisation to social and environmental issues, thereby influencing their investment 
decisions.  
It is worth noting that equity markets are not a panacea for economic development. This is so 
because equity markets have demonstrated its exposure to market failures over time. 
Research suggests that equity markets as financing platforms, are capable of harming 
economic development because of their susceptibility to market failure (Bhide, 1993; Singh, 
1997; Naceur & Ghazouani, 2007). This occurs because of volatility that characterises share 
prices, especially in the less developed stock markets. Given this incidence of volatility in 
share prices, stock markets may reduce the incentives for savings by artificially increasing 
investment returns through speculation (Theil, 1967; Philippatos & Wilson, 1973; Mishkin, 
2010). This has resulted in boom and burst (and in some cases, crashes or swindles) of the 
financial/economic cycles in the past.  
The preceding discourse focussed on the role of each of the components of capital market in 
line with the objectives of this research. It is now considered important to establish the link 
between capital market as a whole and economic growth. That discussion is presented in the 
following paragraphs.  
2.3 Synopsis of capital market development 
Following from the importance of capital market that is identified in the preceding 
paragraphs, it is arguably logical to suggest that the need for capital markets is premised on 
the roles they perform in facilitating the growth of a country’s economy. For analytical 
purposes, it is considered important to re-examine the issue of causality that is synopsised in 
the preceding paragraphs. A few factors have been identified as the drivers of capital market 
development, of which more emphasis has been placed on the market mechanisms of demand 
and supply. According to Patrick (1966), the direction of causality is best observed through 
the twin aisles of supply-leading and demand-following hypothesis. Mckinnon (1988) 
buttressed this postulation.  
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Expressed in the context of dominant relative activity between the real economy and the 
national financial market, Patrick (1966) suggests that, when causal relationship runs from 
financial development to growth, it is termed supply-leading causality. This is based on the 
premise that the activities of financial institution increase the supply of financial services, 
which in turn creates economic growth (Mishkin, 2010). Conversely, when the growth within 
the economy results in increase in the demand for financial services and this leads to financial 
development, then it is regarded as demand-following hypothesis. However, some scholars 
are of the opinion that causality can run in both directions simultaneously instead of being 
unidirectional at different stages of the economy (Demetriades & Hussein, 1996; Shan & 
Jianhong, 2006).  
According to research, the formation and development of financial markets hinge mainly on 
the demand for such markets. This school of thought sees demand as the “prime driver of 
financial development” (Rajan & Zingales, 2003:6). Demand in this context is viewed as the 
level of a nation’s industrial or economic development at large; that is, the level of positive 
change in the entire national production capacity. The relevance of demand may be viewed 
from the simple economic principle that espouses demand as the predictor of supply. In this 
regard, service providers act on available demand to create supply, whose utility is expected 
to satisfy specific customers’ expectations (Hope, 1999; Todaro & Smith, 2009).  
However, the theory of demand alone is inadequate to explain low capital market 
development across-board. This position is based on the premise that demand itself is a 
function of supply. For the deficit units to access funds, there must be surplus units. In 
essence, for effective demand for capital to take place there must be a source that is capable 
of effecting the required supply (Hope, 1999). The argument advanced to counter the 
demand-inclined supposition is further reinforced by the argument that some countries, such 
as United States and France, which have been experiencing the same level of economic 
development since 1913, differ widely in capital market development (Rajan & Zingales, 
2003). As a result, a further search is required to unearth a fuller explanation of determinants 
of capital market development, especially in the African context. Being the focus of this 
study, the dynamics of capital market development in African context will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs.  
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2.4 Capital market development and institutional framework in 
Africa 
The issue of capital market development is very important in every economy, be it developed 
or developing. Capital market plays a critical role in the functioning of a country’s economy 
(Adjasi & Biekpe, 2006; Baker, Foley & Wurgler, 2009; Ayaydin & Baltaci, 2013). As a 
channel through which investible funds are generated and disbursed, its viability and 
efficiency become important as a source of confidence building for both investors and 
borrowers (Atje and Jovanic, 1993; Jeffus, 2004). This section looks at the trend of capital 
market development in Africa, in order to analyse the development of capital market, and to 
investigate the major challenges that hinder the advancement of Africa capital market.  
The focus on Africa capital market has been receiving intensive attention over the past few 
decades. The continued realisation of the importance of capital market development have 
prompted sustained efforts by political leadership of many African countries to initiate policy 
reforms towards creating new capital market platforms or to develop existing ones (Alfaro, et 
al, 2004). Noticeably, these efforts have been successful in improving the dynamics of capital 
market in some parts of the continent. For instance, from as little as nine stock markets in 
1992, the number of stock markets in Africa has grown to 29 domestic and two regional 
exchanges by 2013 (The African Business Review, 2013). In sub-Saharan Africa alone, the 
number of active stock exchanges has increased from five (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya, 
Nigeria and Uganda) to seventeen between 1989 and 2013 (MFW4A, 2013).  
Further, the performance of these stock markets (in terms of year return) has been improving 
over the past years. For example, Ghana Stock Exchange topped the global list of top yield-
to-date performer in 2004 with percentage return of 144 per cent, which was far beyond the 
performance of leading Stock Markets in the advanced economies (Adjasi and Biekpe, 
2006:145). In addition, the four best performer stock markets in 2012 were all from Africa. 
Venture Africa (2013) reports that the Egyptian stock market was the most appreciating stock 
market in the world in 2012. According to this source, the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) 
rewarded investors with 49.56 per cent yield-to-date in dollar returns during the 2012 
financial year. The Kenyan stock market came second with 39.32 per cent yield-to-date 
return, followed by Nigeria and Ghana bourses that recorded 35.45 per cent appreciation 
respectively.  
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Although, stock markets in Africa has been outperforming the more resourced Western 
markets in recent years, various problems have been identified as creating hindrances to 
Africa capital market and thus preventing it from fully exploiting its potentials. According to 
Adetunji (1997: 21-22) the major problem that inhibit investment in African capital markets 
is the negative perception of the continent by the outside world as a haven of instabilities, 
such as “conflicts, wars, coups, disease and poverty”. This author further contend that the 
continent is less attractive to inflow of foreign capital given that less is known about the 
occurrences on the continent and investors’ decisions were based on perception. As stated in 
chapter one, Africa has recorded significant improvement on democratisation and the poverty 
level on the continent is reducing.  
According to the African Development Bank (2011:1), the number of people in the middle 
class category on the continent had risen to 34 per cent of Africa’s population. The source 
contends that “nearly 350 million people - up from about 220 million people or 27 per cent in 
2000” have risen to the affluent middle class category on the continent as at 2011. The 
growth rate of about 3.1 per cent in middle class growth is observed to be higher than the 2.6 
population growth on the continent (African Development Bank, 2011:1).  
Deloitte (2012:1) further corroborates this proposition as it observes, “Africa’s middle class 
has tripled over the last 30 years, with one in three people now considered to be living above 
the poverty line - but not among the wealthy”. The source further forecasts that “African 
middle class will grow to 1.1 billion (42 per cent) in 2060” (Deloitte, 2012:1). According to 
this source, the trickling down effect of  GDP growth of between 7 and 10 per cent in most 
African economies results in Africa now having the fastest growing middle class in the 
world.  
Another hindrance to the development of stock market on the continent is small market size. 
The size of most of the stock markets on the continent is small. According to Dahou, Omar 
and Pfister (2009), the size of Africa’s stock market remains about the smallest globally. For 
instance, the market capitalisation of the leading stock market in Africa (JSE) is about US$ 
$887billion (The Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2013), which is less than two per cent of 
global equity market capitalisation (The World Federation of Exchanges, 2013).  In addition, 
a good number of stock markets in Africa only boast few listed firms. For instance, the 
Rwanda bourse has only three listed firms on its platform and trading is rarely conducted. 
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The situation is worse in the Central African stock exchange that contains no single listed 
firm on its platform (The African Business Review, 2013).  
According to Adetunji (1997), the legal and regulatory environments in many markets are 
still very weak and lack transparency. Except for the JSE that is regarded as the best 
regulated and supervised stock market in the world (The World Economic Forum, 2013), 
other capital markets on the continent remain poorly regulated. Some of the main weaknesses 
in the regulatory environment are poor policy formulation capacity, weak legal framework 
and insufficient capacity to implement judicial proclamations (Yartey and Adjasi, 2007). 
Because of weak institutional framework, it becomes challenging to build confidence in both 
domestic and foreign investors. Further, the inherent weaknesses in the regulatory framework 
arguably, culminate in corrupt practices that further unnerve skittish investors. According to 
Transparency International (2012:7), more than 90 per cent of sub-Saharan African countries 
score less than 50 on corruption perception index. This low score normally suggests that most 
of the countries in the region are very corrupt.  
Additionally, the macroeconomic environment of most African countries remains largely 
unstable. For instance, “high inflation and exchange rates as well as unpredictable interest 
rate regimes have tended to expose capital investments to unmanageable risks, as real returns 
are usually heavily eroded by these factors” (Adetunji, 1997:23). Dupasquier and Osakwe 
(2006), further reinforces the negative impact of macroeconomic instability, especially high 
inflation and exchange rates, as well as unstable interest rates regimes. According to 
Dupasquier and Osakwe (2006), macroeconomic instabilities unnerve investors as negative 
market behaviour reduces (and sometimes erode) incentives for investments.  
Further to the problems identified above, Audu and Apere (2013) observe that transactions 
costs on African stock exchanges are among the highest in the world. According to these 
authors, the variety of fees charged which include stock flotation costs, stamp duties, 
brokerage fees, stock exchange fees, regulatory fees and compensation fund fees, all 
culminate in making Africa capital market less attractive to foreign investors. 
Aside the stock markets on the continent, the banking sector have also witnessed considerable 
improvement over the past decades. Since the 1990s, financial sector reforms initiated in 
many sub-Saharan African countries have contributed significantly to the development and 
efficiency of the financial - and particularly banking systems (European Investment Bank, 
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2013). Consequently, according to this source, “commercial banks’ capital bases have 
strengthened and their risk management practices have improved; credit to the private sector 
has risen, albeit from a low base; and most of the sub-Saharan African banking systems have 
proven resilient to the recent events of global financial stress” (European Investment Bank, 
2013: 5). However, there remain substantial challenges to achieve the full viability of this 
sector on the continent.  
One of the major challenges identified by the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (2012) is infrastructural inefficiency. This source observes that it would require an 
estimated US$ 93 billion per year in order to address infrastructural challenges on the 
continent (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2012:57). This source further 
identified telecommunication technology and energy as the main hindrances to banking 
development on the continent. Given that these technologies are critical for automated 
banking systems; their inefficiency would dampen the effectiveness and development of the 
banking system.  
Although, mobile phone penetration rates have increased substantially from less than two per 
cent in 2000 to more than 60 per cent in 2013 (UNDP, 2013:33), problems of accessibility to 
telephone lines still persists in many African countries, and the financial cost of access to 
mobile telephones still ranks amongst the highest in the world. The same report further 
observes that transportation remains a major deterrent to economic growth on the continent. 
According to the report, “more than 70 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa’s rural population, for 
instance, lives more than two kilometres away from an all-season road”. These challenges 
rank African as one of the least attractive investment destinations even among the developing 
nations.  
The development of these infrastructures requires long-term commitments that may span in 
excess of many years. Recent efforts to promote public private partnership (PPP) are an 
attempt to address these problems (such as BOT that was adopted by the South African 
government to build the Gautrain, the railways refurbishment policy in Nigeria and Uganda, 
to mention a few). These form of agreement between the government and private sectors are 
beginning to reshape the infrastructure development in Africa, and because the projects are 
financed through the capital market, they are promoting long-term and sustainable economic 
growth. For example, the recent telecommunication development in Africa such as MTN, 
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Vodacom, Glo (to mention a few) have substantially improved telecommunication 
throughout the major cities on the continent.  
It is observed in the literature survey presented in the preceding sections that African 
countries lack the ability to mobilise domestic funding in order to provide necessary facilities 
and infrastructures needed by related and supporting industries to function (facilities such as 
power generation, good road network, communication technology, amongst others). This 
capital gap in the African economies needs to be complimented by the attraction of foreign 
investment. Foreign investment in the form of FDI is therefore, crucial in this regard, for 
countries and regions that are not able to mobile domestic resources (such as Africa).  
It must be pointed out, however, that recent policy reforms on the African continent have 
starts to generate investor confidence in Africa’s capital market. For instance, the Dangote 
Group recently signed a US $3.3 billion financing deal in Nigeria to build one of the biggest 
refineries in Southern hemisphere. The funding arrangement is co-ordinated globally by 
Standard Chartered, and in Nigeria by Guaranty Trust Bank (Financial Times, 2013). In 
addition, Total Exploration & Production Nigeria Ltd. and Total Upstream Nigeria Ltd 
(subsidiaries of TOTAL South Africa Petroleum and Oil Company) are in the process of 
raising US$ 7.5 billion from eight lenders within the domestic capital market to finance their 
expansion strategy in sub-Saharan Africa (Business Day, 2013).  
These examples are clear indications of the continued confidence in the ability of the African 
capital market to provide funding for investments with small short-to-medium term returns. 
These investment opportunities would not have been possible without the support of the 
capital market, and these capital formations are deemed capable of improving the investment 
environment of Africa, and ultimately the continents attractiveness to inflow of FDI.  
Another major hindrance to the viability of the banking sector on the continent is the weak 
regulatory environment. According to Mihasonirina and Yartey (2009), supervisory capacity 
is weak in many countries, because of poor resourcing of supervision activities and deficient 
legislative arrangements. Most of the specific institutional weaknesses are weak creditor 
rights, and judicial enforcement mechanisms (Khamfula, 2005). Where capital market 
supervisory laws exist, their application is poor and the administration of judicial processes or 
judgements is ineffectual (Audu and Apere, 2013). It could then be reasonably suggested that 
the challenges that hinder capital market development in Africa applies in similar dimension 
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to both the stock and banking sectors and the other measurable indicators of capital market 
that are used in this study. 
One more important hindrance to capital market development in Africa is market 
liberalisation. According to Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001), the initiation of regulatory 
reform towards affording foreign investors the opportunity to invest in domestic capital 
market is an important motivation for foreign investors to penetrate the domestic market as 
the reforms enshrines investors’ rights and protection. This protection therefore, engendered 
their interest to transact in foreign equity securities. These authors cite the examples of 
Brazil. According to the authors, Brazil amended its capital market-related laws in 1991 not 
only to liberalise the market but also to reinforce investors’ protection. 
With regulatory intervention that allows about 49 per cent voting ownership and as much as 
100 per cent arms-length investment, the country was able to improve its attractiveness to 
inflow of foreign capital. The same regulatory reform was embraced by South Korea in 1992, 
and its impact on the stock market development was noticeable. Bekaert and Harvey (1995) 
investigate the impact of market integration on capital market development. According to 
these authors, foreign investors will be motivated to venture into an offshore market if the 
market is liberalised and foreign ownership of equity stake is permissible. This proposition is 
also buttressed by Han and Vijay (2000). In a study of 20 emerging countries including 
Nigeria and Zimbabwe (the two African countries in the study), these authors found that 
stock returns increases immediately after the sampled economies were liberalised, especially 
because none of the countries at the time were susceptible to contagion effects. These authors 
conclude that the efficiency of stock markets will improve if the markets are liberalised. 
However, contrary to the good impact of financial market liberalisation that has been 
proposed above, capital market liberalisation can be counterproductive. In a study of 
Indonesia between 2002 and 2007, Rhee and Wang (2009) investigate the relationship 
between inflow of FDI and stock market liquidity. Empirically, they find that even after 
controlling for stock market characteristics such as trading, the ownership structure of the 
market was found to be negatively related to stock market development. That is, the 
liberalisation of the market was found to be counterproductive in Indonesia over the period 
studied.    
As indicated in section 2.5, most of the capital markets in Africa have passed through various 
stages of liberalisation, essentially in conformity with the requirements of becoming members 
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of global capital market associations. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001:54) document the 
implementation dates of capital market reforms in some of the capital markets in the world 
(including some African countries). According to the illustration provided by these authors, 
all the capital markets sampled in this study have initiated liberalisation reforms at one point 
or another. Further, there is evidence of foreign ownership (and in some cases, controlling 
voting stakes) in all the capital markets sampled in this study. As such, this variable will not 
be considered in the estimation.   
2.5 Capital Market Development in the Selected African Countries 
As stated in the preceding paragraphs, this study covers six countries in Africa. To 
understand the intricacies of capital market development in the sampled countries, it is 
considered important to review existing literature on the dynamics of capital market 
development in the countries. In the paragraphs that follow, the review will be done in 
alphabetical order (Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia).  
2.5.1 Capital market development in Egypt 
The Egyptian capital market is considered to be among the oldest capital markets in the 
world, and about the oldest in the North Africa region. The development of the capital 
markets (both securities and exchange markets, and the banking sector) date back to the 19
th
 
century in Egypt. More precisely, the securities and exchange markets in Egypt dates back to 
1888, when Alexandria Exchange platform was established. This was closely followed by the 
establishment of Cairo Exchange in 1903. Since their inception, these two securities 
exchanges platforms were actively utilised by investors that continued to grow in number and 
capitalisation.  
The continued growth in the number of listed firms on the platforms, coupled with the 
increasing capitalisation, eventually led to these platforms being ranked in the top five global 
exchanges in the 1940s.  However, government intervention in the form of market regulation 
introduced in the mid-1950s hindered the functionality of the platforms, thereby rendering the 
platforms redundant until new forms of reforms were adopted in the 1990s. The reforms of 
the 1990s precipitated the rejuvenation of activities on the platforms and that growth 
continued until 2011 when the “Arab Spring” debacle offshoot the present instability that 
pervades the country.  
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The most important policy intervention in the stock and exchanges markets in 2007 was the 
amalgamation of the two previously distinct exchanges (Alexandria Exchange and the Cairo 
Exchange) into a single platform (called the Egyptian Exchange - EGX), which becomes the 
only registered securities exchange in Egypt. As a result of the amalgamation, a body tagged 
the capital market regulator was established. The functions of this body include: 
“promoting and underwriting in securities, securities brokerage, portfolio management, 
mutual funds, fund management, venture capital, advisory services in relation to securities, 
management services in relation to mutual funds, settlement and set-off services in relation to 
securities transactions, margin trading services and intraday trading services” (Abbas & 
Hazzaa, 2012:57).  
According to the brief of the Stock market and Exchanges regulatory body, efforts were 
required to ameliorate the increasing scepticism of investors in the volatile Egyptian equity 
market. It must be said, however, that the reform has not been able to convince new investors 
to list on the platform. For instance, the number of listed firms on the Egyptian Exchange 
reduced from 595 in 2006 to 435 in 2007, 373 in 2008, 306 in 2009 and 232 in 2011 and 203 
in 2012.  
The development of banking sector in Egypt slightly precedes the establishment of the 
securities and exchange markets platforms. The first bank ever to be established in Egypt 
(The Bank of Egypt) was established in 1856 with its headquarters in London. The bank 
established its main office in Alexandria, and it also had a branch office in Cairo for easy 
banking activities. This bank was established to perform the principal role of a Central Bank, 
especially given the intensive commercial activities between Egypt and the Western 
countries, which was dominated by cotton production and sales. The establishment of the 
Bank of Egypt was later followed by the establishment of National Bank of Egypt (NBE), 
which is largely regarded as the oldest commercial bank in Egypt. It was established on June 
25, 1898.  
The full-fledged Egyptian Central Bank was established in 1961 with its headquarters in 
Cairo (Central Bank of Egypt, 2014). Although, there were so many commercial banks that 
perform various capital market intermediary and capital deepening roles, the establishment of 
a regulatory body in the form of an apex bank becomes inevitable after political 
independence. The Law 117/ 1961 that established the Central bank also provided for the 
nationalisation of all banks in Egypt.  
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The Egyptian banking sector expanded markedly in the mid-1970s. This remarkable 
improvement in the functionality and capacity of the banking sector was facilitated by the 
policy reforms initiated by the government, especially the banking reforms tagged the “open 
door policy” (El-Shazly, 2000). Under the auspice of the Law 43/1974, capital market 
liberalisation was adopted by the government in contrast to the 1961 nationalisation of capital 
markets agenda. This policy was aimed at startling the private sector, especially the 
commercial banks, to actively participate in economic activities as a way of driving 
sustainable economic growth. The initiative was outward-looking as it crafted specific roles 
for the commercial banks, which are growth-inducive. To ensure adequate participation of the 
banking sector in the new policy, banking law was enacted in 1975 (Law 120/1975). The law 
clearly enumerates the nature and mode of operations for all banks. It identified three types of 
banks: 
(i) Commercial banks, which usually accept deposits and provide funding for a wide 
variety of transactions.  
(ii) Business and investment banks, which carry out medium- and long-term 
operations such as the promotion of new businesses and financing of fixed asset 
investments. They may also accept deposits and finance foreign-trade operations. 
(iii) Specialised banks, which carry out operations serving a specific type of economic 
activity. They may accept demand deposits. 
Banks operating in Egypt can also be classified as public sector, private and joint venture, or 
foreign-owned, depending on the ownership structure. It must be pointed out, however, that 
all specialised banks are state-owned and are assigned the task of providing long-term 
financial supports for some sectors that are identified as growth-drivers. Such sectors include 
real estate, agricultural, and industrial development. The continued drive to further capital 
market development led to additional reforms in 1996 that allowed for more than 49 per cent 
equity stake by foreign investors in the banking sector. Further reforms include the Electronic 
Signature Law 15/2004 and the Unified Tax Law 91/2005, all that were aimed at making 
banking more accessible to the people by simplifying the operational processes of the sector.  
The capital markets in Egypt are regulated by the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority 
(EFSA). The EFSA officially began operations on 1 July 2009 when it replaced the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA) - the former capital markets regulator that was established in 1992 
under the Capital Markets Law No. 95 of 1992.  
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2.5.2 Capital market development in Kenya 
Kenya has witnessed noticeable level of capital market development over the past decades. 
Being the oldest, largest and most vibrant capital market in East Africa, equity trading began 
in Kenya since 1920s when the country was still under the British rule (Nairobi Securities 
Exchange, 2014). To formally coordinate all trading activities, the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange (NSE) was established in 1954 as a voluntary association of stockbrokers. 
Although, various equity trading activities began before Kenya’s independence in 1963, these 
activities were restricted to the residents of the European community.  
The government intervened in various ways to dispel the scepticism of traders on the 
platform with little success until in 1988 when 20 per cent of government stakes in the 
country’s commercial banks took effect. This process did not only increase the capitalisation 
of the NSE, but also increased trading activities on the platform (Ngugi, Amanja & Maana, 
2009). The government recognised the need to improve economic growth through capital 
market efficiency, especially by imbibing thrift culture in the Kenyans. To that effect, the 
government established the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) in 1988. This body was 
charged with complementary responsibility (with the Central Bank) to provide an enabling 
environment necessary to improve the capital efficiency in the country. Despite this 
intervention, activities on the stock market remained low.   
To further address the inefficiency that characterised the equity market, the government 
amended the Capital Markets Act in 2000 (The Capital Markets Act, 2000). This amendment 
was aimed at encouraging a culture of thrift among the Kenyans and to improve access to 
finance. The amendment further provides for alternative source of long term financing for the 
economy, particularly as the commercial banks were incapacitated to garner requisite funding 
to galvanise desirable level of economic development. This Act was further amended in 2003 
to charge both the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) and the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) 
towards creating a robust regulatory environment that depicts the NSE as a key equity market 
in the region, Africa and the world at large. 
These series of policy interventions have increasingly yielded dividend. For instance, the 
capitalisation of the equity market as a percentage of GDP increased from about 32 per cent 
in 2005 to about 56 per cent in 2013. So also was the number of listed firms that increased 
from 48 in 2005 to 61 in 2013 (African Securities and Exchanges Association). The viability 
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of the equity trading platform has also been bolstered by the privatisation of various 
government interests, such as the Kenyan Airways that was privatised in 1996, which saw the 
KLM acquiring 25 per cent stake in the company while a whopping 51 per cent went to the 
general public.  
Further to improving the equity trading platform of the NSE, the automated trading system  
(ATS) was adopted in 2006 and the trading hours was increased from two to three (from 10 
am till 1 pm), coupled with cross listing agreement between the NSE and Uganda Securities 
Exchange. Further, the Complaints Handling Unit (CHU) was introduced in 2009 to facilitate 
arbitration processes between the market participants and, also to create a communication 
channel through which aggrieved persons can lay official complaints with the regulatory 
authority. The most recent reform to the platform was the change of name that took place in 
2011 when the Nairobi Stock Exchange Limited was renamed as the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange Limited. This change of name was intended to reflect the new dimension of the 
NSE by incorporating service securities exchange business line that supports trading, clearing 
and settlement of equities, debt, derivatives and other associated instruments (Nairobi 
Security Exchange Limited, 2014).  
The other component of capital market in Kenya (the banking sector) is also the most 
developed in East Africa. Banking activities in Kenya dates back to 1863 when the National 
Bank of India set up an offshore office in Zanzibar. This offshore office was meant to provide 
banking services for the entire East African Protectorate under the British rule. The first 
commercial bank in Kenya, the Kenya Commercial Bank was established in 1896. The 
bank’s Kenyan branch opened in Nairobi in 1904 in order to cater for the growing needs of 
banking services in the country.  
The drive to achieve better financial deepening through capitalisation necessitated the merger 
agreement with Grindlays bank in 1957 (The Kenya Commercial Bank, 2004) and the 
government acquired controlling shares in the bank in 1970, which led to the name being 
changed from the National Bank of India to Kenya Commercial Bank. Quite a number of 
other commercial banks also sprang up in the 1900s. For instance, Standard Chartered Bank 
Kenya Limited was established in 1911, closely followed by the establishment of Barclays 
bank of England, which established its Kenya branch in 1917.  
The need to strategically and centrally coordinate the activities of financial institutions in 
Kenya led to the establishment of the Central bank of Kenya in 1966 under the Central bank 
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of Kenya Act of 1966 (Central Bank of Kenya, 2014).  The Central Bank of Kenya, alongside 
the Capital Markets Authority, jointly regulates the operational environment of the capital 
market in Kenya and, creating an enabling environment to facilitate capital market efficiency 
is constitutionally central to their roles.  
2.5.3 Capital market development in Morocco 
Capital markets in Morocco have gone through a series of reforms over the past decades. 
While some of the efforts to improve the efficiency of the market have been successful, quite 
a lot other interventions have faltered on the platter of institutional inadequacies and 
regulatory weakness.  
The banking sector in Morocco is highly diversified and extensive in its intermediation 
functions. According to Echchabi and Abdul Aziz (2012:850), “eight commercial banks 
(Attijariwafa Bank (AWB), Banque Populaire du Maroc (BPM), Banque Marocaine du 
Commerce Exterieur (BMCE), Banque Marocaine du Commerce et de l’Industrie (BMCI), 
Societe Generale Maroc (SGM), Credit Agricole du Maroc (CAM), Credit Du Maroc (CDM) 
and Credit Immobilier et Hotelier (CIH) dominate the banking sector in Morocco”. These 
banks collectively account for more than three quarter of the capitalisation of the entire 
commercial banking sector in the country (Reille & Lyman, 2005).  
Apart from these large commercial banks, various other financial institutions that perform 
commercial banking roles are in existence and functional. According to Reille and Lyman 
(2005:3), there are five specialised financial institutions owned by the government and other 
44 nonbank financial companies owned by shareholding interests. The impact of Barid-al-
Maghreb, the state-owned postal parastatal, in enhancing financial deepening in the country is 
also of significance. The postal service operates in every nooks and crannies of the country to 
complement the financial activities of the commercial banks – in additional to its 
conventional postal services brief (Reille & Lyman, 2005). This form of extensive 
diversification in the banking sector enhances financial deepening and relative inclusiveness 
that purportedly bolsters access to banking for the larger part of the market agents, essentially 
the deficit units.  
The first commercial bank in Morocco was established in 1904. Having gained notable 
commercial grounds in Algeria, the French international bank, Compagnie Française de 
Crédit et de Banque, extended its Algerian footprint to Morocco as the first commercial bank 
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in the North Africa country, under the trading name of Compagnie Algerienne de Crédit et de 
Banque (CACB) (Financial Times, 2014). Another commercial bank was established in 
Morocco in the same year that Attijariwafa bank was established. As a result of the increasing 
demand for banking services, the Banque Commerciale du Maroc or B.C.M. was founded in 
Morocco in 1911, with its headquarters in Casablanca. Riding on the laurel of its success in 
household banking in the country, the B.C.M eventually acquired control and effective 
ownership of Wafabank in 2003, and the new amalgamation began to trade as Attijariwafa 
bank in January 2004 (MENAFN Press, 2014). Today, Attijariwafa bank is the largest 
commercial bank in Morocco and the third largest bank in Africa (Financial Times, 2014).  
 The establishment of the State Bank of Morocco manifested in 1906 as the outcome of a 
world reformation conference that was held in Casablanca between January and April of that 
year. However, the Bank only attained issuance status in 1911 shortly before the 
commemoration of the Protectorate Treaty in 1912, which eventually curtailed the 
functionality of the Bank as a national central Bank. However, the central banking system 
was rejuvenated in 1959 after the political independence of Morocco, and the central Bank 
was then renamed as Bank Al-Maghrib.  
According to a World Bank Report (2000), the post-colonial independent Morocco has 
witnessed various financial sector reforms. The report suggests that the World Bank backed a 
series of capital market reforms (essentially in the 1990s) to ensure greater capital market 
liberalisation at various sectors of the capital market. The process of capital market reform 
began with the banking sector (1991-1995), through to savings institutions such as insurance 
and pension funds in 1998. As a part of these reforms, the government divested from the 
leading banks in the country thereby allowing for their listing on the stock market. The World 
Bank report (2000) further suggests that the banking sector accounts for nearly half of the 
capitalisation of the stock market, suggesting a high degree of interdependence between the 
banking sector and the equity market.  
The developmental process of equity market in Morocco follows the same trend as the other 
North African countries. The Casablanca Bourse was established in 1929 under the auspice of 
“Office de Compensation des Valeurs Mobilières”, which is translated as the Office for 
Clearing of Transferable Securities (The Casablanca S.E, 2014). Given that the banking 
sector has been well-established before the equity market platform, the growing need for risk 
diversification and exploitation of an alternative source of funding culminated a wide-spread 
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reception of the equity market. The attractiveness of the equity platform to the domestic 
investors and the growing interest in the stock market investment precipitated the 1967 
capital market reforms that become essential to reinforce the legal and technical frameworks 
of the market (The Casablanca S.E, 2014).  
The inherent shortcomings in the 1967 reforms culminated the privatisation and economic 
liberalisation program of 1989. These sets of reforms were aimed at improving the functional 
efficiency of the capital market towards reducing the operating costs on the platform and 
revise the ownership structure of the market. In specific, according to Ghysels and 
Cherkaouithe (2003:172), the capital market reforms of 1989 focussed on (1) The 
liberalisation of interest rates, (2) changes in monetary policy, (3) a decrease in the 
government access to credit, (4) major regulatory changes of the banking sector, and (5) a 
fundamental change in the operations of the stock market. These reforms proved effective as 
the privatisation efforts boosted the capitalisation of the equity market through the I.P.O 
offerings on previously-owned state assets. The equity market becomes essentially appealing 
to investors as a result of the 50% tax break on equity returns that accompanied the over-
subscribed I.P.Os that ensued from the privatisation process.  
The drive to continuously make the platform competitive and appealing led to further reforms 
in 1993. The 1993 reforms (amongst other things) established the independence of the CSE 
from the Ministry of Finance by establishing the securities commission (Conseil 
Déontologique des Valeurs Mobilières or CDVM) (The Casablanca S.E, 2014). This 
commission serves as the watchdog for the equity market and its brief includes the possible 
imposition of disciplinary sanctions on market agents that flout the regulations of the 
platform, especially the public disclosure provisions. The severity of the disciplinary action 
could be as much as ultimate de-listing.  
However, the series of reforms adopted by the Moroccan government failed to yield the 
anticipated dividend as a result of institutional weaknesses. According to Gentzoglanis 
(2007), corruption, disorganisation and lack of respect for the rule of law are the main 
culprits for the lingering inefficiencies in the Moroccan equity market.    
2.5.4 Capital Market Development in Nigeria 
Nigeria’s capital market is one of the biggest in Africa. Owing to the country’s history of 
political and institutional instabilities, the capital market has undergone some notable reforms 
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albeit with minimal accolade of success. The first commercial bank (The African Banking 
Corporation) was established in Nigeria in 1892 with its headquarters in Lagos (National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2014). In 1894, the Bank of British West Africa took over the Africa 
Banking Corporation. The Bank of British West Africa remained the only bank in Nigeria 
until 1912 when Barclays Bank (now Union Bank) was set up. 
Given that the country was still under colonial tutelage at the time, a number of capital 
market activities were regarded as the sole province of the colonial masters. For example, 
local investments of currency reserves were prohibited, access to banking by indigenous 
locals were prevented and the entire monetary policies were determined in England (Uzoage, 
1962). To ensure efficiency of the growing banking needs in the country, the British colonial 
government established the West African Currency Board in 1912 (Central Bank of Nigeria, 
2014). The establishment of the Board was mainly intended to further facilitate exports 
financing by empowering the Board to issue a West African currency that is convertible to 
the British pounds sterling. 
The establishment of the Board and the introduction of the local currency led to rapid 
expansion of banking activities in the country, which culminated the creation of more foreign 
banks in the country. By 1952, three foreign banks (the Bank of British West Africa, Barclays 
Bank, and the British and French Bank) and two locally-owned banks (the National Bank of 
Nigeria and the African Continental Bank) were in operation (Bureau of statistics, 2014). The 
increasing agitation by the growing number of elites in the country for active participation in 
the banking activities as well as the increasing need to coordinate the activities of the 
growing numbers of commercial banks eventually led to the introduction of the first set of 
banking regulations in the country by 1952 (Uzoage, 1962).  
The banking sector ordinance of 1952 was promulgated to regulate some of the critical 
activities in the banking sector, such as the establishment of operational standards, the setting 
of cash reserve ratio and the creation of banking supervisory platforms (Austin & Uche, 
2007). More importantly, the ordinance accorded the indigenes the privilege to participate in 
banking activities.  
To redress the inherent laxities in the 1958 ordinance, the Central Bank Act was promulgated 
in 1958. The Act was fully implemented on 1 July, 1959 to accord the Bank a full 
institutional status (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2014). The Bank was established in a mirror 
image of the North American and Western European Central Banks. The Bank was charged 
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with the responsibility of issuing the Nigerian currency that is convertible to other major 
currencies in the global capital market. The Bank was also charged with the responsibility of 
controlling, regulating and supervising the banking system in the country, serve as banker to 
other banks in Nigeria, and implement relevant government economic policies through 
complementary monetary initiatives (Austin & Uche, 2007).   
 The efficiency of the banking sector in Nigeria was highly affected by the indigenisation 
Decrees of 1973 (which required 40 per cent state-ownership of foreign investments in the 
country), as well as the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1976 that required state-
ownership of 60 per cent of foreign investments in Nigeria (Austin & Uche, 2007). These sets 
of policy initiatives affected not only the capital structure of the banks but their operational 
processes as well. To forestall the possible effects of market failure on the banking sector, the 
Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) was established in 1988. The corporation 
was created to advance investor confidence in the banking industry, in order to improve 
domestic savings.  
 Evidence (Austin & Uche, 2007) suggests that various regulatory reforms adopted by the 
government have contributed to the popularity of banking activities in the country. For 
example, apart from the commercial banks that are more than 20, there are also a number of 
government-owned specialised development banks that targets strategic government business 
interests. These banks include the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank, the Nigerian Bank 
for Commerce and Industry, the Nigerian Agricultural Bank, the Federal Savings Banks and 
the Federal Mortgage Bank. Also active in Nigeria were numerous insurance companies, 
pension funds, and finance and leasing companies.   
The establishment of equity trading platform began in the country in 1960 when the Lagos 
Stock Exchange was established. The bourse changed its name to Nigeria Stock Exchange 
(NSE) in 1977. After its inception, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) immediately 
established the Capital Issue Committee in 1962. The committee was established as an 
advisory body to the CBN on the listing process and the supervision of the functionality of 
the equity market - aimed at aiding the viability of the market (Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2014). The Committee was given an extended statutory backing by the Capital 
Issue Decree No. 14 of 1973, which amongst other things, changed the status of the 
committee to a commission – the Capital Issues Commission (Olowe, 1999; Adelegan, 2004).   
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The growing increase in capital market activities and the renewed government commitment 
to improve the market’s efficiency necessitated the establishment of a more robust 
institutional framework to supervise the entire capital market. To that extent, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission was established in 1979 under the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Decree No. 71 of 1979. This major regulatory intervention pivoted the 
accession of Nigerian equity market to the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) in June 1985 (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2014). The SEC 
Decree was amended in 1988 to ensure further protection of investors and to promote capital 
market growth and development in the country (Adelegan, 2004).  
The inherent weaknesses in the regulatory environment of the capital market as espoused by 
the SEC Decree necessitated the promulgation of the Investment and Securities Act No. 45 of 
1999. The new Act was expected to promote a more potent and sustainable capital market, 
which was in consonance with the economic growth and development agenda of the 
government at the time. The Investment and Securities Act has since witnessed a series of 
amendments, but the most current institutional regulatory instrument is the Investment and 
Securities Act (ISA) 29 of 2007. Currently, the ISA accords the Nigerian Securities and 
Exchange Commission the power to regulate and supervise the entire capital market in the 
country.  
It must be pointed out, however, that the strength of the regulatory framework has been 
challenged on various occasions in recent time. For example, there were increasing 
allegations of insider trading in the Nigerian banking industry and low capitalisation that 
eventually prompted the recapitalisation agenda of the government in 2004. Further, there 
was a widespread allegation that the bank failure (that resulted in stock market collapsed by 
about 70 per cent in 2008-2009) (Sanusi, 2010) was orchestrated by opportunistic behaviour 
and fiduciary risks in the banking sector. The ousting of the Central Bank governor by the 
Nigerian President in February 2014 is a clear testimony that the regulatory environment of 
the capital market is precarious and its viability is at best in its infancy.  
2.5.5 Capital market development in South Africa  
The architecture of banking activities in South Africa revolves around various business 
interests, essentially between trading interests of caravan merchants from the East and the 
discovery of mining resources in the country. Bank formation also took a toll along the 
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government colonial arrangements. Commercial banking activities in South Africa dates back 
to 1836 when the Cape of Good Hope bank was founded. Between 1836 and 1861 the total 
number of banks in Cape of Good Hope alone amounted to 30.  
On another front, the Eastern Province bank was formed in Grahamstown in 1837 (Mostert, 
Oosthuizen, Smit & van der Vyver, 2007). The bank was established to intermediate in the 
business interests of Indian merchants that was premised on wool produce (First National 
Bank, 2014). Until about 1870, the economy of South Africa was almost entirely dominated 
by agriculture. Mining assumed prominence in the 19th century when minerals like gold and 
diamonds were discovered (Zeleza, 1993).   
Wool exports faced various challenges during the 1870s in South Africa along with various 
institutional challenges, which culminated in the bank being acquired by an Indian 
commercial bank – the Oriental Bank Corporation (OBC) in 1974. The OBC was an overseas 
bank established in conjunction with the British colonial powers to facilitate currency 
exchanges and transfers between the West (mainly England) and the East (Nishimura, Suzuki 
& Michie, 2012). However, recession precipitated a shortage of good bills exchange being 
drawn between Britain and Asia and the bank’s problems worsened with the drop in prices of 
silver and decline in Chilean government bonds. The increasing operational problems 
eventually forced Oriental Bank Corporation to withdraw from South Africa and thus the 
Bank of Africa was formed in 1879 to take over the OBC's business in South Africa 
(Nishimura, Suzuki & Michie, 2012). 
In 1854, another commercial bank was formed in the Natal Colony - The Natal Bank. The 
bank was formed to intermediate in the sugar industry that was thriving in the colony at the 
time. The bank eventually becomes a major lender to sugar planters at exorbitantly high 
interest rates and investments of English capital boomed to entice other market participants to 
the banking sector (Theal, 2010). Some of the new entrants to the banking industry in the 
Colony were the Commercial and Agricultural Bank of Natal, which was established in 1862. 
In the same year, the Colonial bank of Natal was founded and the Standard Bank of British 
South Africa starts business in Port Elizabeth in 1863 (Standard Chartered, 2014). 
Various other commercial banks, such as the London and South African Bank, Transvaal 
Imperial Bank, Netherlands Bank of South Africa, African Banking Corporation were 
established in the country. During that period, the government of the South African Republic 
founded a commercial bank - the National Bank of the South African Republic Limited to 
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cater for the financial needs of the gold mines and the market agents in that sector. Series of 
bank failures necessitated the dominance of the government bank until when Barclays Bank 
entered the commercial banking industry in South Africa in 1925. The bank later becomes a 
purely local entity in 1987 when it transformed into the First National Bank of Southern 
Africa Limited, now First National Bank (Mostert, Oosthuizen, Smit & van der Vyver, 2007).   
The first government bank in South Africa, the Lombard bank was founded in 1793, but the 
South African Reserve Bank was only established in 1922 (South African Reserve Bank, 
2014).  The Bank was established by Section 9 of the Currency and Banking Act No. 31 of 
1920. The activities of the Bank are underpinned by the South African Reserve Bank Act, 
1989 (Act No 90 of 1989), as amended (South African reserve bank, 2014). According to the 
Bank, the enabling Acts of the Bank has undergone series of amendments, the latest being the 
South African Reserve Bank Regulations 2010. These amendments were undertaken to 
enlarge the brief of the Bank as well as to strengthen the regulatory environment of banking 
in the country. As at 2014, South Africa boasts the most developed and sophisticated banking 
industry in Africa.  
Apart from the well-functioning banking sector, South Africa has a highly developed and the 
most sophisticated equity market in Africa. The World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Survey for 2013-2014 adjudges the JSE as the best regulated securities 
exchanges in the world. Equity trading began in the country in 1887 when the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) was established as a stock exchange (Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 
2014). According to Firer and Mcleod (1999), the impact of the mining sector on the equity 
market was substantial until 1926, and the listing of industrial companies did not add much 
capitalisation until the early 1930s.  
The Import Substitution Industrialisation strategy of the government shortly after the Second 
World War spurs the participation of the manufacturing companies on the equity market. By 
1946, the market capitalisation of financial, industrial and commercial shares has surpassed 
that of mining shares (Firer & Mcleod, 1999). This momentum was enhanced when the JSE-
Actuaries Equity Indices was established in 1960. Further integrative initiatives of the JSE 
include the joining of the World Federation of Exchanges in 1963, and the demutualising of 
the bourse in 2005, and ultimately, the listing of the JSE on its own Main Board in 2006. 
Although, the equity market platform afforded the fledgling mining sector and the market 
agents to raise requisite operational funds at the time, the efficiency of the market was a 
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concern. For instance, there were as many as 754 listed companies on the JSE platform in 
1988 but the number reduced to 472 in 2004 and 425 in 2008 (African Development 
Indicators, 2014). As a result of various instabilities that pervade capital markets, there is 
always a need to regulate and continuously strengthen the regulations that governs the 
operations of every capital market.  
Some notable reforms to the South African regulatory environment include the transferring of 
supervision of banking activities from the Department of Finance (National Treasury) to the 
South African Reserve Bank in 1987 and the establishment of the Financial Services Board in 
1989. Further reforms include the enactment of the Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 
and the establishment of the Policy Board for Financial Services and Regulation by Act of 
Parliament in 1993 (Falkena, Bamber, Llewellyn & Store, 2001).  
2.5.6 Capital market development in Tunisia 
An evaluation of material on capital market development in Tunisia is a bit problematic for a 
student that is only proficient in the use of English Language given that most of the valuable 
resources are only available in French and in some cases, Arabic Language. Because of these 
challenges, effort will be made to review some of the available resources in English 
Language.  
Banking activities in Tunisia dates back to the pre-political emancipation era of the country – 
just like in the other countries sampled in this study. In Tunisia, two types of commercial 
banks exist as informed by their capital structure. In most cases, banks are either state-
controlled or personal/individually-owned. It is considered superfluous to deluge into this 
form of categorisation for the purpose of this study. The first commercial back was 
established in 1880 – the Société Centrale de Banque with its headquarters in Tunis.  
The bank was (as at the time) a local subsidiary of a French commercial bank (Amen Bank, 
2014). The bank changed its name to Crédit Foncier d’Algerie et de Tunisie in 1966. To 
further engender local participation, the Ben Yeder group took over the bank in 1970, and the 
bank later changed its name to Amen Bank in 1995. The bank benefited from its alignment to 
the French system as it becomes the first commercial bank in Tunisia to introduce innovative 
banking systems (such as telephone and Internet banking). The bank is now the second 
largest bank in the country (Amen Bank, 2014).  
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Another commercial bank (Banque de Tunisie) was established shortly after the Société 
Centrale de Banque. Banque de Tunisie is one of the oldest banks in Tunisia. The bank was 
established in 1884 with its headquarters in Tunis (Oxford Business Group, 2009). The bank 
is one of the most liquid banks in the country, and it maintains its strong historical ties with 
France, with CIC Group (one of the largest banking groups in France) having more than 20 
per cent stake in the bank (Oxford Business Group, 2009). The bank differentiates itself from 
the other commercial banks as it focusses more on growing its market base in the corporate 
and institutional clientele rather than individual customers.  
Tunisia gained political independence from France in 1957. The increasing need for the 
government to participate in the distribution of credit as a strategic way of achieving a better 
financial deepening in the new Tunisia necessitated the creation of two commercial banks in 
quick succession – the Société Tunisienne de Banque (1957) and the Banque Nationale 
Agricole (1959). Since their respective inception, these banks have been able to advance the 
intermediation agenda of the government by providing access to low-cost funding to the less-
privileged section of the economy. Undoubtedly, these banks provided the government with 
the capability to advance its developmental and patronage agendas (Henry & Wilson, 2004).  
Another commercial bank in Tunisia is Attijari Bank. This bank is a subsidiary of the 
Moroccan banking group - Attijariwafa Bank. The bank was established in 1968 with its 
headquarters in Tunis. This commercial bank has flourished in the Tunisian banking sector, 
especially given the strong backing it enjoys from the parent body in the form of various 
resources. The increasing capitalisation of the bank and its innovativeness suggest that the 
bank may soon become the second largest bank in Tunisia.   
The merger between la Société Marseillaise de Crédit and the then British bank of the Middle 
East led to the establishment of Banque International Arabe de Tunisie in Tunisia in 1976. 
The bank has increasingly grown in its expanse and capitalisation and it is one of the leading 
commercial banks in North Africa. A joint venture between the Lebanese governments, 
Tunisia’s Social Security Fund and the private sector led to the establishment of the Banque 
de l’Habitat in 1977. The bank is increasingly growing its market share in individual and 
peasant banking sectors. 
The political independence of Tunisia raised the bar for the agitation for financial detachment 
from the colonial rulership. As a result of the agitation, the Central Bank of Tunisia was 
eventually established in 1958, and the Bank assumed immediate responsibility for currency 
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control (Henry & Wilson, 2004). Towards the end of 1958, a new Tunisian currency – the 
Tunisian dinar was created, and the currency was disconnected from the French franc to 
ensure absolute financial autonomy.  
Apart from the commercial banks in Tunisia, there is also a relatively efficient equity 
platform in the country. According to Calamanti (1979), the first trading platform in Tunisia 
(ctiambres de compensation) operated between 1937 and 1945, before it was later replaced 
with Tunisien de Cotation des Valeurs Mobilieres that operated between 1945 and 1970. 
These platforms were established to challenge the deliberate attempt of French colonial 
powers that were meant to prevent domestic trading in Tunisia. More specifically, the first 
platform was orchestrated to engage market participants in the trading of bank loans, while 
the latter was established to unify trading system in the country.  
However, no serious trading occurred until the enactment of Law No. 69-13 of 28 February 
1969. To address the fragmentation that pervades the previous trading arrangements in the 
country, the Bourse des Valeurs Mobilières de Tunis (BVMT) or Bourse de Tunis was 
established in 1969 in Tunis (Calamanti, 1979). The idea of the stock exchange was 
particularly driven by the desire of the government to improve domestic savings in the 
economy. To achieve the savings objectives, the government provided tax breaks to 
organisations that listed on the platform (Ben Ali & Sghaier, 2012).  
Initially, the Bourse was controlled by the Minister of Finance through the Comite de la 
Bourse (the Bourse Committee). The Bourse has low market capitalisation and is dominated 
mainly by the banking sector (Hakimi, Dkhili and Khlaifia, 2012). The low capitalisation of 
the Bourse and its low trading turnover eventually precipitated some reforms, amongst other, 
the formation of the Financial Market Council in 1994. Since its inception, the Council has 
presided over a relatively stable capital market. The most recent initiative of the Council was 
the ascension of the Bourse to the International Organisation of Securities Commission 
(IOSCO) in March, 2014.  
2.6 Capital market development and market imperfection  
Apart from the specific challenges that confront capital market development in the selected 
African countries, various generic opinions have been expressed on the causes of low capital 
market development on the continent. One of the prominent arguments locates in the 
structural impediments that distort the equilibrium position of demand and supply of credit – 
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credit market imperfections (Matsuyama, 2007). Market imperfection refers to the inherent 
inefficiency in the capability of the market to channel credit to the necessary projects based 
on their envisaged returns on investment. It occurs when the forces of market imperfection 
distort the level of equilibrium in the process of capital allocation.  
Some of the notable credit market imperfections are misplaced taxes and high transactions 
costs (agency problems) (DeGennaro, 2005). These factors influence capital market 
development in different ways. Taxes culminate in market imperfection as they influence not 
only the cost of capital but also the decision to trade financial securities (Matsuyama, 2007). 
These costs may not necessarily be monetary; they may take the form of compensation 
packages for corporate executives in order to mitigate agency incentives. In addition, the cost 
of unfair trading and forced regulatory conformity form a part of the tax considerations in 
capital investment (DeGennaro, 2005).   
Transaction costs on the other hand, arise as market participants strive to balance demand 
against supply. In this process, the impact of social capital is vital for effective contracting 
which in turn increases the provision of financial products at minimal costs possible. To 
reduce transaction costs, it is essential to have the necessary level of social capital
5
. This is 
because; the availability or absence of social capital influences the level of costs associated 
with the operations of the capital market (Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, 2004). A well-
functioning financial sector is contingent on both the availability of social capital and strong 
institutional frameworks that foster enforcement of financial contracts – usually expressed via 
a high level of minority investor protection (Coffee, 2000; Holmén & Högfeldt, 2004).  
Institutional frameworks in this regard refer to the appropriate underlying “legal, cultural or 
political system” (Rajan & Zingales, 2003:6). Evidence suggests that there is a strong 
correlation between a country’s maturity of legal institutions and the level of its financial 
market development (Coffee, 2000; Stulz & Williamson, 2003). It is suggested that financial 
investment decisions are influenced not only by the opportunity costs of such an investment, 
but also by institutional protection of investments and assets (Kindleberger, 1993; Davies, 
1994; Smith & Walter, 2003; Levi, 2009). It thus becomes imperative to ensure adequate 
                                                 
5
 Putman (1993:67) defines social capital as “features of social organisation such as networks, norms and social 
trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit”. These social institutions are regarded as 
instrumental within the capitalist framework as they can easily be transformed into a bundle of policy 
framework. The availability of strong social capital in a given society will ultimately lower transaction costs and 
the cost of default on an agreement within the social network, because the defaulter may be blacklisted.    
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protection of financial investments against market failures (which are mainly attributable to 
market imperfection) in order to stimulate investors’ interest in committing to that market.   
Tilly (1992:103) highlights the effect of financial infrastructure on the efficiency of capital 
markets. According to this author, the major explanation for the divergence of corporate 
share issues between Germany and Britain after 1990 was because of the “paucity of 
information and relatively weak financial controls of the operations of company founders and 
insiders” in Britain. Rajan and Zingales (2003:7) also reinforce the institutional hypothesis by 
observing, “the strength of political forces in favour of financial development is a major 
variable factor”. They stress, in agreement with Tilly (1992), that a liberalised capital market 
will mute the rent seeking capability of incumbency, thereby promoting capital inflows and 
growth. Having presented the conceptual overview of capital market in chapter two, it 
becomes important to survey some of the leading previous studies on the concepts of foreign 
direct investment (FDI). The next chapter (chapter three) will contain that discourse.  
2.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter begins with the discourse on the theoretical underpinning of this study. 
Illustration was presented on the relevance of the theory of investment behaviour of firms as 
depicted in some of the leading works of Caves. In the work studied, Caves (2007) 
establishes a connection between the development of a country’s capital market and its 
attraction to inflow of FDI, which is the focus of this study. The chapter also presents 
material on the overview of capital market system, with specific reference to the banking and 
equity markets.  
The specific dynamics of the sampled African capital markets was presented. Efforts were 
made to appraise the trend and prospects of capital market development in Africa, as well as 
some of the challenges that inhibit its viability. According to the literature, considerable 
progress has been made in line with capital market development in Africa, and the role of the 
rising middle class on the continent in increasing the capitalisation of capital markets were 
also highlighted.   
Despite the progress made so far, some hindrances to capital market development still 
persists on the continent, especially challenges that hinge on institutional inefficiency. Some 
of these challenges were presented in this chapter. The chapter concludes by presenting an 
envelope of these identified challenges using market imperfection perspectives, where the 
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theoretical relationship between capital market and price mechanism was briefly discussed. 
This discussion sheds light on the implication of market imperfection as the principal 
determinant of market efficiency (or otherwise), upon which other considerations revolve. 
The next chapter will review some of the leading literature on the concept of FDI as well as 
the relationship between capital market development and inflow of FDI. 
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Chapter three 
The conceptual overview of FDI 
3.1 An introduction  
Tomohara (2004), amongst other researchers (such as Schumpeter, 1934; Allen & 
Ndikumana, 2000; Hill, 2013), establishes a link between investment and economic growth. 
According to these authors, the openness of an economy enhances the internationalisation of 
domestic enterprises, and the resulting inflows of foreign investment improve the production 
capacity of the host nation, thereby leading to economic growth. Research suggests that FDI 
and foreign portfolio investments (FPI)
6
 (both referred to as foreign capital flows) play 
crucial roles in economic growth of the receiving country. This effect manifests mainly in the 
increase of investment participation due to increased production in the receiving country. It is 
argued that the more an economy attracts inflow of foreign capital, the more its productivity 
frontiers expand, and the more the economy grows (Akinkugbe, 2005).  
Further, economic liberalisation is generally seen as a catalyst for industrialisation. For 
example, Frankel and Romer (1999) indicate that investment plays an important role in 
achieving economic growth. They contend that aggregate investment in the real economy has 
a significant effect on GDP per capita. This rise in per capita income is achieved, in their 
opinion, as trade spurs the accumulation of physical and human capital; thereby increasing 
output for given levels of capital.   
Considering its importance concerning financing local industrial projects, the significance of 
foreign capital inflow in enhancing credit growth has also been widely discussed in literature. 
For example, the study by Crowley (2008) finds that foreign capital inflows are significant 
for growth of credit in the Slovak Republic. Several previous studies support this finding (Ito, 
1999; Arvai 2005; Duenwald, Gueorguiev & Schaechter, 2005). More so, studies have 
identified a theoretical basis to support the roles played by foreign capital inflows in 
economic development. Notable among these theories is the theory of direct investment.  
                                                 
6
 Foreign portfolio investment (FPI) is defined as the “purchases of foreign financial assets (stocks, bonds, and 
certificates of deposit) for a purpose other than control” (Griffin & Pustay, 2010:34). The main distinction 
between FPI and FDI is that investors tend to be more involved in the operations and management of their 
foreign investments, where their presence is physical and long lasting (FDI) as compared to a more distant and 
short-lived approach exhibited in FPI.   
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The theory of direct investment states that “a company investing abroad must have an 
advantage over companies in the host country; if such an advantage is missing, the foreign 
company...would be at a sizeable disadvantage against local competitors and would not be 
able to survive” (Kindleberger, 1993:259). As a result, MNEs’ overseas expansion is usually 
strategic as they venture abroad to seek specific location advantages while at the same time 
increasing the industrial capacity of the host country (Dunning, 1993; Graham & Krugman, 
1995; Asheghian, 2004; Griffin & Pustay, 2010).  
For the purpose of this research, multinational corporations (or transnational corporations) are 
defined as “incorporated or unincorporated enterprises comprising parent enterprises and 
foreign affiliates” (UNCTAD, 2008:1). A parent enterprise is an enterprise that controls 
assets used in international production, merchandise trade, or service trade. A foreign affiliate 
is an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in a (host) country in which an enterprise 
resident in another (home) country has a stake that permits a lasting interest in the 
management of that enterprise. 
3.2 FDI defined 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1993:86) defines a direct investment as “the category 
of international investment that reflects the objective of a resident entity in one economy 
obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy.” The Fund regards 
the resident entity as the direct investor, while the enterprise is seen as the direct investment 
enterprise. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD, 1996:7), foreign direct investment (FDI) “reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting 
interest by a resident entity in one economy (“direct investor”)  in an entity resident in an 
economy other than that of the investor (“‘direct investment enterprise”).” The organisation 
reiterates that the lasting interest signifies the existence of a long-term business relationship 
between the investor and the enterprise, especially a controlling stake by the investor in the 
investment.   
Concurring with these definitions, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD, 1999:4) defines FDI as “an investment involving a long-term relationship and 
reflecting a lasting interest and control by a resident entity (the foreign investor or parent 
enterprise) of one country in an enterprise (foreign affiliate) resident in a country other than 
that of the foreign investor”. In addition, the International Monetary Fund - IMF (1993) 
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identifies the capital contents of FDI as the equity capital, reinvested earnings and other 
capital. The focus of this study is the equity capital and other direct investment capital. These 
forms of capital inflows are discussed below: 
1. Equity capital - this is the currency value of a foreign investor’s offshore investment in 
capital shares of an enterprise.  An equity capital stake of 10 per cent or more of the ordinary 
shares or voting power in an incorporated business (or its equivalent in an unincorporated 
business) venture is normally considered a springboard to exercise control over the activities 
of the enterprise. This form includes mergers and acquisitions (M&A), ‘greenfield’ and 
brownfield investments.  
2. Other direct investment capital (or intercompany debt transactions) - this refers to the short 
and long-term borrowing and lending of funds (including debt securities and suppliers’ 
credits) between direct investors and their foreign affiliates, branches, and associates. To 
qualify as a FDI, “a foreign enterprise or an individual investor would have to bring into the 
host country some assets for a long-term business operation, which could be a production 
facility, a trading entity, or a service presence” (Li Hai-Qing, 2001:4). 
3.3 The evolution and determinants of FDI destination 
The major determinants of the host country’s attractiveness to inflow of FDI are fiscal and 
monetary policies, political stability and domestic market size constraints (Dunning, 1993; 
Caves, 1996; De Mello, 1999) - the political economy of the nation
7
.  These factors influence 
the decision of foreign investors (MNEs) on the possible choice of an investment location 
(Akinkugbe, 2005). Categorically, the more favourable a country ranks on the scalar chain of 
political economy, the more attractive the country is to inflow of FDI.  
The concept of foreign direct investment evolves from the theory of the multinational 
enterprise (MNEs)
8
. The theory of MNE itself has evolved from two main economic 
                                                 
7
 The political economy of a country is aggregated at a country level as institutional framework. The variables 
identified here are some of the prominent variables that are widely used to measure the availability of regulatory 
instruments as well as their effectiveness. The overall favourableness of the investment environment of any 
country is informed by the ranking of the country on these measurable indicators. 
8
 This theory was propounded to provide the economic justification for the strategic overseas expansion of 
MNEs. Naturally, firms are established to serve the overseas interest of the corporate body from its home base 
in order to forestall a series of uncertainties and risks that are associated with locating a production facility in a 
foreign country. The twin-aisles of this theory provide the economic springboard upon which the rationale for 
locating production facilities abroad was based.   
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perspectives. First, MNEs are observed to have developed through the location specific 
theory, which espouses the comparative advantage of certain business locations over another 
(Stopford & Wells, 1972; Vernon, 1974). This theory postulates that MNEs will locate an 
offshore production facility in a country that offers some specific location advantages that are 
not (absolutely or comparatively) available in the home market. Second, the industrial 
organisation theory relates to the benefits derivable from competition between domestic 
producers and foreign firms (Caves, 1996; Ghauri & Buckley, 2002; Hill, 2013).  This theory 
advocates that domestic firms will reap advantages such as process reengineering and 
administrative expertise by competing against foreign firms, which by implication, are more 
advanced in these regards.  
The internationalisation process of firms (as the location specific advantage theory is also 
known) as a determinant of the direction of FDI flow, gave credence to the geographical 
economic advantage that is derivable from production portfolio diversification rather than 
concentrating production facilities in the home country. This market-seeking approach was 
very popular amongst the early investors from the United States who ventured abroad to 
exploit this competitive advantage in the developing economies (Hill, 2013).  
Prominent among the motivators for multinationals embarking on overseas expansion are the 
need to diversify production processes geographically and, to locate overseas markets for the 
final products. While some of the production resources (such as natural endowments) may be 
quite expensive to shift from their locale to the home country for manufacturing purposes, 
locating manufacturing facilities close to the source of these inputs appears to be an 
affordable option for MNEs. This may justify the reason why the growth of heavy industry in 
Europe in the 1950s took place around the coalfields (Hicks, 1969). In the latter case, the 
industrial organisation theory emphasises the existence of firm-specific advantages.  
These advantages are important in conferring a superior competitive advantage on a foreign 
firm wishing to produce in competitive markets, both at home and abroad (Rugman, 1981; 
Dunning, 1981; Caves, 1982; Rivera-Batiz & Oliva, 2003). Some of the superior competitive 
capabilities that MNEs enjoy over domestic competitors include advanced technology, 
research and development capabilities, superior managerial and marketing skills, access to 
low-cost funding (either internal to the firm or because of the firm’s better credit rating), and 
favourable interest- and exchange-rate differentials (Anderson, 2005; Steers & Nardon, 2006, 
Levi, 2009).  
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Large firms with opportunities for economies of scale and scope, and more extensive 
marketing and distribution networks, have demonstrated additional firm-specific advantages 
over domestic competitors (Asheghian, 2004; Meyer, 2004). As a result, MNEs venture 
abroad to reap associated benefits of not only profits, but also other competitive competencies 
that arise from synergistic overseas expansion.  
The positive effects of investments by MNEs, especially in developing economies (such as in 
Africa) is contingent on a number of variables such as the amount of initial capital involved, 
foreign market conditions and the political economy of the host country, amongst other 
considerations (Perez, 1983; Abramovitz, 1989; Shafaeddin, 2005). As suggested by studies, 
if integrated into a strategic concept of productive capacity building and upgrading, the direct 
impact of MNEs’ offshore investments on the host-national income and capital formation has 
been substantial (Ngowi, 2001; UNCTAD, 2006).    
Given the advantages of FDI to the host nation, evidence suggests that countries strive to 
attract as much of it as possible (Versi, 2003; Hill, 2013). Despite concerted efforts by 
governments of the developing countries to attract FDI, research indicates that the global 
flow of FDI remains highly skewed against the developing countries, especially African 
countries. Chakrabarti (2003:150) rightly observes that the top five per cent of the world 
economies receive 68 per cent of the global inflow of FDI, while the bottom five receives 
only one per cent.  
The same situation occurs in Africa. For example, during the period 1998-2002, only three 
countries (South Africa, Angola, and Nigeria) accounted for 55 per cent of the total FDI 
inflows to Africa. The top fifth (10 out of 48 countries) account for 80 per cent, and the 
bottom half account for less than five per cent (Adjasi, Abor, Osei, & Nyavor-Foli, 2009:3). 
These authors further observe that the trend has held for at least the last three decades, with 
the top 10 countries accounting for more than 75 per cent of the continent’s total FDI inflows. 
The World Economic Report published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development further buttresses this observation (UNCTAD, 2013: xiv) as presented in Figure 
3.1: 
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Figure 3.1: Top 20 FDI Host Economies – 2012 (UNCTAD, 2013: xiv) 
From Figure 3.1, it is very clear that United States alone still account for roughly 18 per cent 
of the global stock of FDI, closely followed by China that accounts for about 13 per cent. 
Although this situation is gradually changing, especially because of the impact of the 2008 
global financial crisis, which had a more devastating effects on the advanced economies.  The 
same report suggests further that the developing countries attracted more FDI inflow than the 
developed world for the first time ever in 2012. During 2012, FDI inflow to the developing 
countries grows to 57 per cent, although the stock was lower than in 2011. The situation is 
not different in 2013. Global foreign direct investment inflows rose by 11 per cent in 2013, to 
an estimated US$1.46 trillion (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development - 
UNCTAD, 2014:1).  
Out of the global FDI stock of US$ 1.3 trillion in 2013, the developing world attracted an 
estimated stock of US$759 billion, which pushed the share of the developing world to a 
record 52 per cent of global FDI inflows in 2013. Africa’s stock grows from US$ 44 billion 
in 2010 to US$ 50 billion in 2012 and US$ 56 billion in 2013. The report however observes 
that most of the increase in FDI flow to Africa went to resources. The tabular presentation of 
the recent trend in global and Africa regional FDI inflow (up till 2012) is depicted below in 
Table 3.1.  
 
 
54 
 
Table 3.1: Shares of African sub-regions in global FDI inflows, 1970-2012 (per cent) 
Sub-region  1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2005 2010-2012 
Central Africa  0.7 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.2 
East Africa 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.7 
North Africa  0.8 1.0 0.5 0.7 0.6 
Southern Africa 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 
West Africa 2.1 0.8 0.5 0.4 1.1 
Total African share in 
global FDI inflows 
4.6 1.5 1.7 2.2 3.2 
Total FDI inflows to 
Africa (US$ billion) 
11.2 22.1 67.4 110.6 340.9 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) 
 
From Table 3.1, the flow of FDI into Africa has been disappointing. Although, the stock of 
FDI inflow amounted to US$ 50 billion in 2012 alone (UNCTAD, 2013: xiii), it is 
comparatively very low in the global context. Further, inflow of FDI to Africa differs 
significantly across sub-regions especially given their divergent resource-orientations. As 
depicted in Table 3.1, North Africa was the traditional favourite location for inflow of FDI to 
Africa as compared to the rest of the regions. The unequal attractiveness of North Africa was 
demonstrated between 1970 and 2010 in Table 3.1
9
.  
During the period depicted in the Table, North Africa accounted for about one-third of all 
inflow of FDI to the entire African continent (UNCTAD, 2012). As a result of political unrest 
and social uprising that have recently characterised the region, Western Africa has become 
the leading recipient of FDI inflow to the continent since then as the region acclaims about 
1.1 per cent of total inflow of FDI to the continent. East Africa closely follows West Africa 
with 0.7 per cent of global inflow of FDI to Africa.  
Moreover, it is important to notice that West Africa experienced sharp decline in FDI inflow 
from the early 1970s up until sometime in 2005. The decline in the attractiveness of the 
region may not be unconnected to the series of political unrest and macroeconomic instability 
that pervaded the region at the time. The question that now arises from figures 3.1 and 3.2 is 
why this conspicuous disparities in the attractiveness of countries to inflow of FDI. Some of 
the reasons identified in literature will be discussed in the following paragraphs.  
3.4 Decision criteria for locating an offshore subsidiary    
Various authors (Blonigen & Wang, 2004; Kolstad & Villanger, 2008) have proposed and 
adopted different measures to explain the basic criteria adopted by MNCs to choose the 
                                                 
9
 It must be pointed out that Arab Spring began in the region in 2010. 
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location of their offshore subsidiaries. While the divergence in methodologies applied has 
also yielded divergent results, there is a general understanding that the determinants of 
national competitive advantage varies across industries. Despite the incongruence in decision 
making criteria, there is however, a convergence that factors that foster capital productivity 
gains are positively significant in determining a country’s attractiveness for inflow of FDI 
(Kumar, 1984; Asiedu; 2002; Chakrabarti, 2003; Akinkugbe, 2005; Kok & Ersoy, 2009).  
Akinkugbe (2005) observes that since foreign investors are primarily interested in satisfying 
their commercial motives, they will only choose such countries where higher returns on 
investments can be achieved, and where they will not have to commit so much of their capital 
to infrastructural upgrading. Kumar (1984) observes that the viability of local capital market 
is of great importance, as this facilitates easy intermediation and capital efficiency, thereby 
providing foreign investors with the opportunity to diversify portfolio risks.  
Chung (2001) suggests that MNEs act strategically when it comes to overseas expansion. 
Evidence of this strategic approach to FDI is located in a few previous studies (Bruce & 
Chang, 1991; Walter, 1999; Robert & Papanastassiou, 1999) where it was found that 
investment motives are functions of industry conditions. This strategic behaviour by MNEs is 
informed mainly by the level of uncertainty that characterises foreign investment, especially 
the volatility of capital market and industry condition (Allen, 1995; Davis, 2004; Peng, 
2009). This may require investors to seek overseas finance, as a way of diversifying risk 
portfolio (King & Levine; 1993a). 
3.5 Capital market development and FDI inflow: a conceptual 
discourse 
As stated in chapter two, capital market play essential roles in the functioning of national 
economies. Capital market is observed to be capable of “facilitating the flow of long-term 
funds from surplus units to deficit units” (Madura, 2001:3) within the economy. To that 
extent, an efficient capital market is capable of enhancing wealth creation within an economy 
through efficient sourcing and allocation of financial resources.  
In a situation whereby the domestic capital market is unable to fulfil this role, the capital gap 
is expected to be filled by inflow of foreign capital.  Foreign funding in the form of FDI is 
therefore, crucial in this regard, for countries and regions that are not able to mobilise 
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domestic resources. Due to limited savings and inadequate depth of local capital markets in 
the developing world (Ojah & Pillay, 2009), improved capital inflow will be required to cater 
for the surplus domestic demand for capital  (Ito, 1999); especially within an expansionary 
macroeconomic regime.  
Hence, the argument in support of foreign capital flows is premised on the cyclical effect of 
capital formation, in that, the rate of capital formation in a country contributes to determining 
capital market development, thereby furthering the attractiveness of a country to inflow of 
capital, especially FDI (De Long & Summers, 1991; Levine & Renelt, 1992; Graham & 
Krugman, 1995). This process therefore, enhances the efficiency of intermediation; thus, 
capital market development.  
Greenwood and Smith (1997:146) underpin this proposition as they observe, “market 
formation is an endogenous process. Arranging and effecting trades requires resource 
expenditures. Bankers, stockbrokers, insurance agents, realtors, replacement agencies, and 
agents who enforce the terms of contracts make a living doing precisely this”. This implies 
that market participants channel productive investments through economic agents in order to 
create utility, whose rental costs accrues through financial intermediation. One may argue, 
therefore, that the efficiency of capital productivity and the rate of investment gains influence 
the destination of capital flow, especially investments in the form of FDI.  
It must be acknowledged that there are fundamental differences in the characteristics of 
foreign portfolio investments (FPI) and FDI, not only in terms of the motivating factors that 
are discussed in 3.3 and 3.4 above, but also their resilience to market failures as well. This 
divergence makes it extremely challenging to draw a clear interrelationship or linkage 
between them, not to delve on causal effects (Vladimir, Tomislav & Irena, 2013). It must be 
noted, however, that these terminologies are largely used in policy documents as synonyms 
and the practise is also not uncommon in academic discourse.  
Conceptually, there are limited documented evidence on the relationships between capital 
market development and inflow of FDI. However in the face of this challenge, efforts will be 
made to position the theoretical interaction of these variables but the discourse will be 
specifically focused on the banking sector and the equity platform based on their specific 
relevance to this study. According to Claessens, Dooley and Warner (1995), portfolio 
investors are largely not motivated to commit funds to long-term projects. To achieve their 
investment targets, they commit to high-yielding stock markets that offer not only risk 
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diversification opportunities and short-term capital gains, but macroeconomic stability as 
well. Portfolio investors are arms-length investors with limited interest in the fund’s 
administration. As such, the assurance to invest in any stock market is an automatic impulse 
to motivate for inflow of FDI (Hausmman & Fernández-Arias, 2000).   
Further on their characteristics, portfolio investments are characterised by frequent changes 
of ownership and investment platforms. Portfolio investors are quick to respond to headlines 
performance indices and this kind of investment is characterised by high volatility and 
reversibility. The impact of investors’ speculative expectation is strong and foreign investors 
in portfolios are highly susceptible to moral hazard debacles as driven by their appetite for 
immediate gains. Although, the negative effects of ‘market speculation’ increases the 
volatility of the stock market, a liquid stock market with high turnover rate will motivate 
inflow of FDI to the country (Claessens, Dooley & Warner, 1995; Hausmman & Fernández-
Arias, 2000; Agbloyor, Abor, Adjasi & Yawson, 2013).  
Oyama (1997) enumerated the stock market dynamics in Venezuela, Jordan and Pakistan. 
She also observes that capital market liberalisation, especially the liberalisation that targets 
foreign participation in the stock market, reduces investment risk premiums in the country. 
This author opined that inflow of FDI to these countries was particularly higher during the 
periods of investment rapture on the stock market when the headlines stock indices 
appreciated the most. The argument goes further to suggest that the growth in stock values 
serves as assurance on macroeconomic stability of the country, thereby motivating investors 
to commit investments in the form of FDI, which are riskier in nature and not as easily 
reversible.  
In addition, after detailed analyses of the linkages between FDI and FPI between Germany 
and the major economies, De Santis and Ething (2007) conclude that the movements of stock 
prices on the equity trading platform are the major determinants to the attractiveness of a 
country to foreign investment in the form of FDI. These authors suggest that the volatility of 
stock valuation on the equity platform serves as critical indicators to foreign direct investors 
on the attractiveness of the country to inflow of FDI. The argument goes on to suggest that 
the more appreciative the headlines indices, the more attractive the country becomes for FDI.    
In the African context, Adam and Tweneboah (2008) also investigated this linkage in Ghana. 
According to these authors, by liberalising the equity platform, both domestic and foreign 
investors, as well as institutional investors are allowed to be active participants on the stock 
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market platforms. According to these authors, as a result of the increase in stock turnover rate 
and increasing stock market capitalisation, Ghana is observed to be more attractive to inflow 
of FDI.  
While all the studies cited above emphasised unidirectional causal relationship between stock 
market development and inflow of FDI, Soumaré and Tchana Tchana (2011) found 
bidirectional causal relationships. In their study of 29 emerging markets, these authors found 
simultaneous and bidirectional causal relationship between capital market development and 
inflow of FDI. One of the major explanations expressed by these authors is the fact that 
capital market viability play crucial roles in facilitating mergers and acquisitions, which are 
important components of FDI. Agbloyor, Abor, Adjasi and Yawson (2013) also emphasise 
the bidirectional causal effects between capital market efficiency and inflow of FDI.  
Soumaré and Tchana Tchana (2011) further suggest that liquid and well-supervised equity 
market encourage foreign investors to take up equity stake in the host economy, especially 
through the mergers and acquisition arrangements. This result corroborates the findings of 
Chousa, Tamazian and Vadlamannati (2008) where a strong relationship between stock 
market development and inflow of FDI via merger and acquisition nexus were established. 
These authors also corroborate the arguments advanced by Adam and Tweneboah (2008) on 
the spillover hypothesis on the absorptive capacity of local financial market; of which the 
relationship between the development of local financial market and benefits from inflow of 
FDI was evaluated. However, Chousa, Tamazian and Vadlamannati (2008) investigated 
spillover effects from another dimension. They observe that the spillover effects of FDI on 
the domestic economy translate into stock market development through the listing of 
multinational companies on the domestic equity platform. As a result of the listing, the 
capitalisation of the stock increases and the size of the stock market are deemed large enough 
to absorb further foreign capital injection, which was the position advanced by Adam and 
Twaneboah (2008).   
Still on the spillover effects, Choong, Yusop and Soo (2004) study the relationship between 
FDI and economic growth in Malaysia through the capital market nexus. Using domestic 
capital market data that springs across 33 years, these authors contend that the benefits of FDI 
to economic growth become stronger as the domestic capital market develops. That is, inflow 
of FDI translates into higher growth as the domestic capital market develops to absorb the 
benefits of FDI. These authors particularly observe that inflow of FDI will be more 
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meaningful to the host country when domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of 
GDP is developed enough to certain level.  
Soumaré and Tchana Tchana (2011) further observe that the presence of multinational 
companies in the host country motivates the policy makers to liberalise the equity market, 
thereby encouraging wider participation on the equity platforms. Notable among those 
regulations are investor protection, and equity trading regulations that ultimately catalyse the 
development of the stock market.  
Apart from stock market effects on inflow of FDI, we also observe some relationships 
between the development of local banking system and inflow of FDI to the country. Evidence 
suggests that developed banking sectors do not only serve as source of funding to foreign 
direct investors (Caves, 2007), but actually attract investment directly (Goldberg, 2007).  
Hailu (2010) reinforces the hypothesis of viable banking sector as an important determinant 
of inflow of FDI. Just as indicated by Caves (2007), although bank charges are generally very 
high in the developing countries and access to funding could be frustrating, the capacity and 
depth of a host country’s commercial banks is a strong assurance to foreign investors that the 
economy is healthy and the possibility of market failure is low. This proposition is also 
supported by Agbloyor, Abor, Adjasi and Yawson (2013). According to these authors, given 
that the initial capital transfers from the home country is facilitated through the banking 
sector in the host country, the actualisation of financial resource transfer may be challenging 
if the banking sector in the host country is less developed. 
Klein, Peek and Rosengren (2002) support the hypothesis of strong linkage between banking 
sector development and inflow of FDI. These authors argued that the development of banking 
sector enhances the attractiveness of the host country to inflow of FDI. The argument goes 
further to emphasise the importance of social capital between the MNCs and the domestic 
banks. These authors specifically argued that the strength of this social capital determines the 
choice of offshore subsidiary location of the MNC.  
Although, growth in financial sector FDI is a new dynamics in cross border investment, it has 
gained momentum in the past few years (Goldberg, 2007). However, this form of investment 
is only possible if the banking sector is well-developed. This form of FDI occurs when 
conglomerate banks in the developed world acquire equity stake (and sometimes controlling 
stake) in an offshore bank. Good examples of this form of acquisition in the banking sector 
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include Barclays bank, Standard Chartered bank, ICBC bank, and a host others. To achieve 
this form of cross border investment, there is need for capital market liberalisation in the host 
country.  
Unite and Sullivan (2001) investigate the impact of capital market liberalisation on the 
Philippines’ banking sector and observe that this liberalisation promotes foreign ownership in 
local banking system. Such inflow of capital into the banking sector does not only serve the 
interests of foreign investors, but domestic investors as well. Further, the increasing 
capitalisation of the banking sector as a result of the liberalisation also accords the host 
country the necessary capital market stability status that is important to attract FDI inflow. 
Goldberg (2007) also corroborate this argument by observing that the financial crises of the 
mid-to-late 1990s in Latin America provided additional opportunities for the entry of foreign 
banks into the region, as Latin American countries sought to recapitalise their banks and 
improve the efficiency of their financial systems.  
In his study of 37 developing economies, Zakaria (2007) adopted multivariate methods to 
uncover the causal linkage between capital market development and inflow of FDI. In that 
study, the author found no conclusive evidence in support of causal flow from inflow of FDI 
to the banking sector. However, the author was able to establish a causal relationship between 
inflow of FDI and stock market development. It must be pointed out that the causal link 
flowing from capital market development to inflow of FDI was not investigated by the 
author.  
Further, Kholdy and Sohrabian (2008) conducted a study to investigate the linkage between 
inflow of FDI and capital market development. Covering a period between 1976 and 2003 in 
a cross-section analysis of 22 developing countries, these authors dissected the dichotomy 
between political influence on business and capital market development. These authors were 
able to uncover a strong bidirectional causal link between capital market development and 
inflow of FDI in 10 of the 22 countries sampled. They further observe that the impact of FDI 
inflow on capital market development will be stronger in the short run. 
In a similar study conducted by Dutta and Roy (2008), these authors investigate the 
relationship between financial market development, inflow of FDI and political risks.  In a 
panel analysis that covers 97 countries over a period of 20 years, the authors were able to 
establish a short-run relationship between financial market development and inflow of FDI. 
The threshold analysis indicates that the statistical importance of capital market development 
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on inflow of FDI is reasonably strong up to certain threshold, after which the effect becomes 
negative.  
However, the introduction of political satiability indicator to the system reverses the negative 
impact to strong positive relationship. From the analysis, Dutta and Roy (2008) also 
investigate the spillover benefits of FDI to capital market development. Their result suggests 
that political stability, which stimulates capital market development, would ultimately 
enhance the benefits derivable from inflow of FDI by the host country.  
Choong, Baharumshah, Yuzop and Habibullah (2010) investigate the impact of capital 
market variables (especially portfolio flows and debt market equity) on economic growth 
between 1988 and 2002 in a sample of 51 countries. In that study, the authors investigate the 
spillover effects FDI inflow on economic growth through the capital market development 
nexus, especially stock market efficiency.  
These authors found, in the first instance, that portfolio investment and foreign debt are 
negatively related to growth. However, they were able to establish a strong relationship 
between the stock market development and growth when these variables were interacted. 
These authors therefore concluded that a developed stock market up to certain threshold of 
development is capable of transforming the negative effect of debt and portfolio flows into a 
positive, thereby enhancing growth in the process. 
In a study of Malaysia between 1965 and 2004, Ang (2009) examines the relationship 
between financial market development and inflow of FDI, with specific attention on the role 
of financial market development on growth. In that study, various capital market variables 
(especially banking variables) were used. In their result, they were able to establish a strong 
link between capital formation (through capital market development and inflow of FDI) and 
real economic output. These authors further contend that the influence of FDI inflow to the 
economy becomes stronger as the banking sector develops.  
From the literature review presented above, two views on the relationship between capital 
market development and inflow of FDI can be observed. In the first instance, the direction of 
causality flows from inflow of FDI to capital market development. According to this view, 
inflow of FDI helps to develop domestic capital market through the spillover effects. More 
specifically, foreign investors normally use their financial powers and administrative skills to 
impress on the government of the host country to strengthen regulatory framework of the 
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country in order to improve the attractiveness of the country to inflow of investment and also, 
as a panacea for attracting new ones.  
Such regulatory frameworks will normally include investor protection, judicial efficiency, 
infrastructure development, improvement in the polity stance and stable nation building that 
are capable of translating into sustainable economic growth. By the very nature of its 
resilience to market failure, inflow of FDI to countries with weak institutional development 
and poor infrastructures may be higher as compared to inflow of FPI. Good examples are 
Asian and South American countries that are regarded as prime destinations for inflow of 
FDI, but their attractiveness to capital market investments has been very poor.   
As argued earlier in this chapter, inability of many countries in the developing world to raise 
funding for development initiatives through the global capital market have prompted these 
countries to initiate policies that are capable of attracting FDI. In this view, foreign investors 
may be motivated to invest (FDI) in countries with less developed capital market in lieu of 
flowing capital into underdeveloped capital market that are susceptible to market failure.  
In specific, Claessens, Dooley and Warner (1995) suggest that FDI flows more to countries 
that are risky for investment as this form of investment is seen as a launchpad to circumvent 
the inherent challenges of investing in risky capital markets. Jeffus (2004) also supports this 
viewpoint. The findings of  Adam and Tweneboah (2009) that one per cent innovations shock 
on inflow of FDI culminated in about 1.5 per cent increase in the stock market capitalisation 
of Ghana stock exchange further buttresses the spillover effects hypothesis.    
The second view on the relationship between capital market development and inflow of FDI 
suggests that capital market development leads to the attractiveness of a country to inflow of 
FDI. According to Jeffus (2004), a developed capital market will be attractive to FDI as the 
capital market platform provides multinational companies the opportunity of matching their 
foreign currency assets to foreign currency liabilities in order to offset foreign exchange 
exposures that are particularly high in developing countries.  
Further, Agbloyor, Abor, Adjasi and Yawson (2013) suggest that Jeffus (2004) opinion holds 
more prominently in a situation where foreign investors finance part of their investment with 
external capital or sell equity in the domestic capital markets. The cardinal theoretical 
underpinning of this study that rests on Caves (2007) behaviour of multinational corporations 
reinforces this hypothesis. According to Caves (2007), countries with developed capital 
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markets are more attractive to inflow of FDI because they provide foreign investors the 
opportunity to raise capital through the local capital market. Looking at it from a 
complementary angle, the fact that multinational corporations get listed on the domestic 
equity market of the hoist country to raise capital further suggests that only developed capital 
market with good fluidity will be attractive to inflow of FDI. 
In Africa, and specifically in the sampled African countries, it may be suggested that the 
forms of linkage are possible. This proposition ensues from the practical realisation that the 
effect of capital market development on inflow of FDI has been noticeable over time. 
However, it must be pointed out that the strength of this relationship and the direction of 
causality of this relationship will only be examined in the data analysis chapter – chapter five. 
In the meantime, the interaction between capital market development and inflow of FDI to 
the selected African countries is presented in Figure 3.2. While the y axis denotes the 
countries and year, the x axis depicts currency denominated (US$ million) response of the 
variables under study.  
According to this Figure, the performance of these markets on both capital market 
development and inflow of FDI is shown and the extremes of the performances (minimum 
and maximum) are also indicated. The Figure also indicates that although South Africa is a 
clear leader in equity market capitalisation, inflow of FDI to the country has not been 
substantial. However, the same cannot be said of Egypt, Nigeria and Morocco.  This analysis 
feeds into the pooled descriptive statistics that is presented in Table 5.2.   
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Figure 3.2: Capital Market Development and FDI Stock in Selected African Countries 
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3.6 Lessons from the literature 
Most of the studies surveyed in chapters two and three of this study have suggested links 
between capital market development and economic growth while a few others have also 
investigated the relationship between capital market development and FDI inflow. However, 
the focus of this thesis differs from those of the earlier studies. To start with, most of the 
earlier studies focus on the developed economies. For example, Schumpeter, (1934) 
examined the relationship between bank finances and innovation in the advancement of 
economic growth. In that study, Schumpeter (1934) did a classical analysis of capitalist 
society where he was able to establish a link between capital market efficiency and economic 
growth through innovative entrepreneurship financing.  
Further, Desai, Foley and Hines (2006) studied the multinational firms of US origin and their 
efficiency in developed capital markets. Xu (2000) conducted similar study on the US firms. 
In addition, Kok and Ersoy (2009) only included Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco in their list of 
the 24 developing countries considered in their cross-section study on the determinants of 
FDI direction. In that study, the impact of capital market development as FDI determinant 
was not examined. In some of the studies that covered developing economies, Kholdy and 
Sohrabian (2008) only included Egypt and Kenya in their cross section study of 25 countries.  
Asiedu (2002) investigates the determinants of the direction of FDI to the developing 
countries, with specific reference to the sub-Saharan African countries. In her study, she 
observes, “infrastructure development and a higher return on capital promote FDI to non-
SSA countries. This indicates that there is an adverse regional effect for SSA: a country in 
SSA will receive less FDI   by virtue of its geographical location. These results suggest that 
Africa is different” (Asiedu, 2002:116). Asiedu’s study did not investigate capital market 
development as a determinant of FDI inflow to the sub-Saharan African countries. However, 
Asiedu (2002) emphasised that the policy that enhances FDI flow to the other regions may 
not achieve the same result in Africa. This further buttresses the uniqueness of African 
countries and the need to conduct a study that covers the major capital markets across Africa. 
Other studies on the developing countries such as the work of Alfaro, Chandab, Kalemli-
Ozcanc, and Sayek (2004) used time series to estimate the link between FDI and economic 
growth, through the capital market development nexus in 50 economies from 1980 to 1995. 
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In that study, the authors included 15 African countries. However, the study included some 
African countries that do not have stock markets.  
For example, countries such as Gambia, Congo, Niger and Senegal were included in the 
sample (Alfaro et al, 2004: 108-109), while excluding big stock markets like Nigeria stock 
exchange (NSE) and Casablanca stock exchange (CasaSE), amongst others. The exclusion of 
some of the leading capital markets from that study is deemed erroneous, as their inclusion 
would arguably have influenced the result of the study. The same logic holds for the inclusion 
of countries without capital markets in the estimation.   
Quite a few other studies were either regional or country-specific. For example, Allen and 
Ndikumana (2000) look at the relationship between economic growth and the level of 
financial market development, using cross-country time series data between 1970 and 1996. 
In that study, the authors only focussed on bank credit in eight southern African countries to 
estimate the entire financial sector. In addition, Adam and Tweneboah (2009) were country-
specific. In their study, these authors look at the spillover effects of FDI on the economy of 
Ghana, through the absorptive capacity of the stock market. Frimpong and Oteng-Abayie 
(2006) focus their study on the relationship between FDI and economic growth in Ghana 
using bivariate causality analysis, and they did not investigate the role played by capital 
market development in that regard.  
Although a few studies specifically looked at the development of local capital market as a 
pull factor for inflow of FDI, they are either non-African orientated or firm level biased. For 
instance, Jeffus (2004) studied this relationship in four Latin American context, while 
Chousa, Valdlamannati and Tamazian (2008) investigated the relationship at firm level in 
nine emerging economies that included South Africa as the only African country in their 
estimation.  The closest to this study is the work of Hailu (2010) that covers 45 African 
countries between 1980 and 2007. However, that study suffers from endogeneity bias, which 
was not discussed or diagnosed in the estimation. Further, the obvious implication of 
including more countries without stock markets than those with stock markets negates the 
validity of the findings of that study.   
In addition, most of the studies surveyed above suggest that instabilities, wars and political 
turmoil pervade African countries. These aspects are becoming history as instability in 
African countries has reduced substantially over the past decade (Miller and Holmes, 2011). 
The free transfer of political powers through democratic processes has taken place in quite a 
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number of countries that were unstable (such as in Nigeria, Chad, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte 
d'Ivoire and so on), and the demise of apartheid era in South Africa has also yielded 
noticeable socio-political and economic improvement.  
As such, predictability and stability are becoming evident in African countries. To that extent, 
African countries are fast becoming more attractive to foreign capital inflows, especially in 
the form of FDI. It is thus important to study and analyse available (updated) data in order to 
capture the impact of these new events as they influence the attractiveness of Africa to inflow 
of FDI, especially by investigating the role of domestic capital market in that instance.  
Furthermore, this study is different from previous studies as it incorporates institutional 
consideration in the investigation of capital market development in African countries. The 
institutional dynamic has rarely been reported in studies that investigated the role of capital 
market development on inflow of foreign direct investment. More importantly, this study 
estimates the relationship between capital market development and inflow of FDI with 
specific focus on the six largest capital markets on the continent. The study also draws 
inferences on the similarities or otherwise on regional effects.   
More importantly, the study investigates the relationship between the institutional efficiency 
in Africa and the development of capital market on the continent as well as the role of 
institutional framework on the attractiveness of the continent to inflow of FDI. The literature 
review presented in chapters two and three shed lights on the relationship between capital 
market development and the attraction of a country to inflow of foreign direct investment. 
The roles of institutional framework on capital market development as well as inflow of FDI 
as highlighted in those chapters are marginally documented. 
3.6.1 Determinants of capital market development 
Various researchers have adopted different variables to estimate capital market development. 
Notable amongst these studies are the work of Allen and Ndikumama (2000), who used: (1) 
credit provided to the private sector, (2) the volume of credit provided by banks and, (3) 
liquid liabilities of the financial system (represented by M3) in their study of capital market 
development in Southern Africa. According to these authors, the greater the credit provided 
to the private nonfinancial sector as a percentage of the overall credit, the greater the 
possibility of capital efficiency and the greater the potential for economic growth. They 
argued that these proxies of financial development are good measures of the efficiency with 
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which the financial system allocates resources to economic sectors (with more emphasis on 
the private sector), as a way of stimulating growth.  
King and Levine (1993c) constructed four empirical indicators of capital market development 
that are designed to measure the level of services provided by financial intermediaries for 
achieving economic growth. These authors used the following proxies in their estimation:  
 the traditional method of financial depth, which is measured by the ratio of liquid 
liabilities of the financial system to GDP that is labelled LLY. 
 the ratio of domestic assets acquired through bank deposits, as compared to those 
acquired through the central bank – the importance of banks, which is labelled BANK.  
 the percentage of credit allocated to private firms, i.e. the ratio of claims on the 
nonfinancial private sector to the total available domestic credit, which they labelled 
PRIVATE, and 
 the ratio of credits issued to private firms in relation to the GDP, i.e. the ratio of total 
claims on the nonfinancial private sector to GDP, which they labelled PRIVY.  
According to the study, LLY is used to capture the depth of the financial intermediation, 
thereby indicating the ability of financial institutions to provide financial services to deficit 
units. These authors regarded the variable “BANK” as rather controversial, in that although 
banks are better managers of financial risks, they are not the only institutions that provide risk 
management and other related financial services. The limitation of this proxy is further 
highlighted by the fact that BANK does not accurately measure the beneficiary of the credit 
facility provided by surplus units in the economy. However, this variable is included in our 
estimation because it forms a major component of the capital market in Africa.   
Furthermore, PRIVATE is derived as a proxy for the dispersion of financial allocation to 
various sectors of the economy, along the public/private dichotomy. To achieve financial 
efficiency, King & Levine (1993c) argue, funds must not only be directed to 
government/public sectors and state-owned-enterprises, but also to the private sector. This 
fact is reinforced on the premise that private sectors are more averse to inefficiency when it 
comes to financial management, thereby making the private sector a more attractive and 
growth-inclined sector to channel credit facility (Mookerjee & Yu, 1995).  
More specifically, empirical evidence suggests that credits channelled to the public sector are 
less likely to generate growth within the economy mainly due to institutional inefficiencies. 
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Most public sectors are susceptible to waste, corruption and politically-motivated investments 
that may not be able to deliver the financial incentives required to galvanise growth (Levin, 
Loayza & Beck, 2000; Naceur, Ghazouani & Omran, 2007).  
King and Levine (1993c: 721) also justify their inclusion of various capital market indicators 
in their estimation as a gauge for financial efficiency: “we include this broad array of 
financial indicators to maximise the information on financial development in our study”. 
They are of the opinion that the inclusion of PRIVATE, which measures the percentage of 
public/private allocation of credit, as well as PRIVY, which measures the ratio of credit to the 
GDP, will provide opportunity to maximise information on financial development in relation 
to growth. These authors are however mindful of the fact that these variables may not 
measure accurately or more specifically, the depth of financial services that are provided to 
various sectors of the economy.   
A few other studies adopted stock market indicators to assess financial development in 
advanced economies. For instance, Davis (2004) constructed four variables as indicators of 
financial development; namely stock market capitalisation, stock market turnover, listed 
companies and bank credit. This author is of the opinion that financial development is best 
measured through the twin aisles of the financial market components (stock market and credit 
market). More so, Oura (2008) adopted the ratio of external (bank) finance to total firm 
finance as a measure of financial development. This author shares the same line of thoughts 
with previously mentioned researchers that performances of the agents of intermediation 
(banks) are the main determinants of the depth of the capital market (King & Levine 1993c; 
Davis, 2004; Naceur, Ghazouani & Omran, 2007).  
In summary, Table 3.2 recaps the findings of some of the major literature reviewed on the 
determinants of capital market development as presented in chapter two and as summarised 
in this section (3.6.1): 
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Table 3.2: Summary of Key Empirical Literature on the Determinants of Capital Market Development 
Author and year Title of article Data coverage Methodology Key findings 
Bosworth, Collins and 
Reinhart, 1999 
Capital Flows to Developing 
Economies: Implications for 
Saving and Investment. 
Unspecified Exploratory  Positive: the book chapter emphasised 
the positive effect of domestic capital 
market on the attractiveness of a country 
to inflow of foreign investment.  
Levine, Loayza and 
Beck, 2000 
Financial Intermediation and 
Growth: causality and 
causes. 
1960}1995 GMM dynamic 
panel estimators 
and Time series 
regressions 
Positive: the authors find both direct and 
reverse causality between financial 
intermediation and growth.  
Portes and Ray,  2001 Information and Capital 
Flows: The Determinants of 
Transactions in Financial 
Assets 
1988–1998 Time series 
(OLS) 
Positive: the authors found positive 
relationship (both short and long run) 
between information and asset pricing, as 
well as the flow of capital. The role of 
institutional framework was also found to 
be significant.   
Rajan and Zingales, 
2003 
The Great Reversals: the 
Politics of Financial 
Development in the 
Twentieth Century. 
1913–1999 GMM Mixed: the authors found causation from 
growth to capital market development, 
especially in the long run. The impact of 
institutional framework is also found to 
be significant.    
Jeffus, 2004 FDI And Stock Market 
Development In Selected 
Latin American Countries 
1960 to 2002 Time series  Positive: Sock market development was 
found to be an important driver of FDI 
inflow.  
Caves, 2007 Multinational Enterprise and 
Economic Analysis 
unspecified exploratory Positive: the book chapter clearly 
emphasised the role of capital market, 
especially the banking sector, on the 
attractiveness of a country to inflow of 
FDI.  
De Santis and Ething 
(2007) 
Do International Portfolio 
Investors Follow Firm’s 
Foreign Investment 
Decisions? 
1980 to 1998 2SLS and 
GMM 
Mixed: a strong positive relationship was 
only found between investors’ decisions 
and the location of foreign subsidiaries of 
MNCs.  
Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine, 2008 
Finance, Financial Sector 
Policies and Long Run 
Growth. 
1960 to 1995 GMM Positive: the relationship between 
institutional framework and capital 
market development were found to be 
positively strong, and they all culminate 
growth in the long run.   
Chousa, 
Valdlamannati, and 
Tamazian,  2008 
Does Growth and Quality of 
Markets Drive Foreign 
Capital? The Case of Cross-
border Mergers and 
Acquisitions from leading 
Emerging Economies. 
1987 to 2006 Time series Positive: developed capital markets were 
found to be more attractive to inflow of 
FDI. The positive impacts on growth (in 
the long run) were also established.   
Choong, 
Baharumshah, Yuzop 
and Habibullah, 2010 
Private Capital Flows, Stock 
Market and Economic 
Growth in Developed and 
Developing Countries: a 
comparative analysis. 
1988 - 2002 GMM Negative: the impact of foreign capital 
flow on stock market development was 
found to be negative. Foreign capital 
flows were also found to retard growth.    
As indicated in Table 3.2, quite a number of the studies surveyed in chapter two and the 
synopsis presented in this section clearly suggest positive relationship between capital market 
development and the attractiveness of an economy to inflow of FDI. Although, the Table did 
not represent all the citations used on these discourse, it does, however, present and recap the 
findings of some of the major literature reviewed and the methodology used in those studies. 
As the second major focus area of this study, we now proceed to evaluate some of the 
identified measurable indicators of the attractiveness of a country to inflow of FDI.    
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3.6.2 Determinants of FDI destination  
As discussed earlier in one of the preceding sections (specifically, section 3.4), FDI 
determinants vary not only according to the strength of the explanatory variables, but also as 
informed by the availability of suitable data (Froot & Stein, 1991; Asiedu; 2002; Chakrabarti, 
2003). While data availability may not pose any significant challenge when dealing with 
advanced countries like the United States and the Great Britain, data availability is always 
problematic in the developing world, especially African countries. Except for a few countries 
such South Africa and Nigeria that have relatively good databases, data on other African 
countries is problematic, essentially due to poor record keeping. This explains why intuitive 
proxies, which are not adequate representatives of variables, are used to capture the effects of 
certain explanatory variables (Asiedu; 2002; Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan & Sayek, 2004; 
Kok & Ersoy, 2009).  
Apart from the problem posed by availability of data, there is also a challenge on the 
significance of some of the FDI variables that are commonly used by authors, and the overall 
explanatory power of each of the variables that is included in the econometric models. 
Studies suggest that while some of the explanatory variables of FDI behaviour emanate from 
formal hypotheses or theories of FDI, authors, based on personal judgement and scientific 
relevance (Kok & Ersoy, 2009), have included other variables intuitively. For example, 
Durham (2004:286) hypothesised that institutional variables, such as “legal codes and 
corporate governance structures” play a role in explaining capital flows (FDI or FPI) to the 
developing world, while similar variables play an insignificant role when dealing with 
advanced countries.  
Bekaert and Harvey (2000) suggest that institutional-backed economic liberalisation is an 
important determinant of capital flow to developing economies. This highlights the 
significance of institutional adequacy as an explanatory variable of capital flow to a country, 
especially developing countries. One of the intuitive justifications for the high explanatory 
power of this variable may be the ‘fears of unknown’ and risk-aversion tendencies of 
investors.  
While institutional incapacitation may act as a deterrent to capital flow to the developing 
world, portfolio theory, which is generally exemplified by the Capital Asset Price Model 
(CAPM) as proposed by Markowitz (1952), establishes a strong relationship between 
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portfolio risk and investment. Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) reinforce this hypothesis 
as they suggest that investors are only prepared to commit funds to high-risk zones if the 
opportunity cost of the returns on investment is low. In essence, high-risk investments are 
expected to yield above-average returns. 
Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet and Mayer (2007) further this argument. These authors contend that 
institutions play a vital role as a determinant of the destination of FDI. The role of domestic 
capital formation as a determinant of FDI destination is also emphasised by the authors. 
Given that capital formation is a function of capital productivity, returns on capital is reliant 
on yield. This proposition falls in line with Caves (2007) theory of investment behaviour of 
firms, wherein the importance of cost of capital and long-run capital productivity gains are 
identified as important determinants for choosing the location of the foreign subsidiary of an 
MNC.  
As done in the previous section, we conclude section 3.6.2 with a tabular recap of some of the 
major studies used in this chapter, their major findings and the methodology employed to 
arrive at those findings. Those pieces of information are contained in Table 3.3: 
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Table 3.3: Summary of Key Empirical Literature on the Determinants of the direction of FDI flow 
Author and year Title of article Data coverage Methodology Key findings 
Modigliani and Miller, 
1958 
The Cost of Capital, Corporation 
Finance and the Theory of 
Investment. 
1952 to 1953 Descriptive statistics 
and linear regression   
Positive: capital market 
efficiency is found to 
enhance inflow of 
investment and more 
importantly, growth.  
Froot and Stein, 1991 Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct 
Investment: An Imperfect Capital 
Markets Approach. 
1973 to 1988 OLS Mixed: Efficient capital 
market is found to 
positively attract inflow 
of FDI in the long run, as 
opposed to the negative 
relationship that subsists 
in the short run.   
Levine and Zervos, 
1998 
Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic 
Growth 
1976-1993 GMM Positive: Stock markets, 
but more especially 
banks, are found to 
enhance growth and 
inflow of FDI.  
Binswanger, 1999 Stock Markets, Speculative Bubbles 
and Economic Growth. 
Unspecified  Unspecified  Positive: the imp-act of 
efficient capital market 
on investment, and 
ultimately growth, are 
established.  
Allen and Ndikumana, 
2000 
Financial Intermediation and 
Economic Growth in Southern Africa. 
1972 to 1996 GMM Mixed: The role of 
capital market efficiency 
on investment, and 
ultimately growth are 
established. The results 
vary along capital 
market development 
dichotomy.   
Alfaro, Chanda, 
Kalemli-Ozcan, and 
Sayek, 2004 
FDI and Economic Growth: The Role 
of Local Financial Markets. 
1975-1995 OLS Mixed: the role of 
efficient capital market 
on inflow of FDI was 
established, but the 
effect on growth was 
found to be limited. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, & 
Mitton, 2005 
Determinants of Vertical Integration: 
Financial Development and 
Contracting Costs. 
2002 OLS, GMM Mixed: the role of 
institutional adequacy 
and capital market 
development on foreign 
investment were 
established but only in 
the long run.  
Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet 
and Mayer 2007 
Institutional Determinants of Foreign 
Direct Investment. 
1985 to 2000 Gravity Model Mixed: The result 
suggests that FDI will 
flow more to politically-
matured economies than 
to those countries with 
fledgling institutions.   
Chousa, Vadlamannati 
and Tamazian, 2008 
Does Growth and Quality of Markets 
Drive Foreign Capital? The Case of 
Cross-border Mergers and 
Acquisitions from leading Emerging 
Economies. 
1987 to 2006 GMM Positive: The impact of 
efficient capital market 
on the attractiveness of 
countries to inflow of 
FDI was found to be 
positive. The impact of 
growth in this regards is 
also found to be 
significant.   
Baker, Foley and 
Wurgler, 2009 
Multinationals as Arbitrageurs: The 
Effect of Stock Market Valuations on 
Foreign Direct Investment. 
1975 to 2001 GMM Positive: The impact of 
efficient stock market on 
the attractiveness of 
countries to inflow of 
FDI was found to be 
significant.   
Vladimir, Tomislav and 
Irena, 2013 
The Relationship between the Stock 
Market and Foreign Direct Investment 
in Croatia: Evidence from VAR and 
Cointegration Analysis. 
2001:Q1–
2011:Q4 
VAR and 
Cointegration 
Analysis 
Mixed: the relationship 
between efficient stock 
market and inflow of 
FDI was found to be 
weak in the short run, 
but positively strong in 
the long run.    
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The literature survey that was presented in chapter three on inflow of FDI as well as the 
précis of the determinants as contained in Table 3.3 suggest that quite a number of variables 
influence the direction of FDI destination. Although, the significance of these variables in 
determining the attractiveness of a country to inflow of FDI are largely country dependent, 
there is a prima facie asseveration that investor motive is a paramount consideration in that 
regard. As observed from the ongoing, location specific advantage is considered the prime 
determinant of the ability of an offshore location to deliver an envisaged investor motive. Out 
of all the identified location specific advantages, the availability of viable capital market is 
considered very crucial.   
3.7 Chapter summary 
The literature review conducted in this chapter corroborates the thesis of an existing 
relationship between capital market development and the attractiveness of a country to inflow 
of FDI. It was argued that a developed capital market would serve as a pull-factor for inflow 
of FDI. It was observed that certain conditions must be met to achieve capital market 
development. While some studies identified economic fundamentals as prerequisites, a few 
others pointed to institutional adequacy as an important precondition in this regard, especially 
in the developing economies.  
It must be said, however, that none of these studies looked at the relationship between capital 
market development and the attractiveness of African countries to FDI inflows (as clarified in 
chapter one), especially the regional dynamics. Although, the Southern African regional 
component was introduced to the study conducted by Allen and Ndikumana (2000) where the 
relationship between capital market efficiency (financial intermediation) and economic 
growth in Southern Africa are investigated, the study did not investigate the other regions that 
are covered in this study.  
While the study of Agbloyor, Abor, Adjasi and Yawson (2013) investigated the possible 
impact of financial market development and economic growth on the continent, this study 
differs from the previous one largely on methodology and more importantly, regional 
dynamics. Further, the impact of institutional efficiency on capital market development, as 
well as the impact of institution framework on inflow of FDI to Africa was not investigated in 
that study. These focus areas and the difference in methodology applied, are the contribution 
of this research to the current body of knowledge.  
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Having reviewed a series of previous studies on the dynamics of capital market development 
and conceptual discourse of FDI, attention is now turned to the research methodology. The 
next chapter (chapter four) will focus on the methodology used in this study. 
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Chapter four  
Research methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the methodology that is applied to analyse available data in order to 
answer the research questions, as a way of achieving the research objectives. This chapter 
will focus on four important issues. The first area of focus centres on the measurable 
indicators of capital market development. Various estimation opinions on the forces/issues 
that influence capital market development are raised. The same approach is applied to 
evaluate the determinants of the direction of FDI flow. The chapter goes on to reiterate the 
research questions, and it states the research hypotheses. The specification of research models 
also forms part of the issues raised.  
Secondly, the source of data and the kind of data that is used will be discussed. In addition, 
the variables to be used in the estimation are identified and discussed. We also present 
material on the sample size of the research and the justification for the sample selection. 
Furthermore, the econometric techniques used in estimating the models specified in the 
earlier part of the chapter are indicated and justified. Towards the concluding end, issue of 
endogeneity and estimation diagnostics that are applied in this study are discussed. This 
chapter concludes with a chapter summary.  
4.2 Research hypotheses and models  
This section begins by stating the research hypotheses, and proceeds to model specification. 
For the sake of easy analysis, the model specification process is divided into three parts, 
namely Parts A, B and C. Part A (the relationship between capital market development and 
inflow of FDI) contains two econometric equations that was transposed into one, while Part B 
(capital market development and institutional framework) contains five equations. The last 
part (Part C) contains only one equation that measures the relationship between institutional 
framework of a country and the attractiveness of the country to inflow of FDI.  
4.2.1 Research hypotheses 
This study intends to test the following hypotheses, whose formulation is informed by the 
research questions. The research questions were raised in order to achieve the research 
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objectives. Further, these hypotheses were informed by the findings of a series of previous 
studies as suggested by the literature survey conducted in chapters two and three.  
Table 4.1: Proposed Research Hypotheses 
Model Specification  Determinants Hypothesised effects 
PART A:  Capital market development (CMD) Positive 
 
 
Dependent variable 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
(FDINFL) 
Stock market capitalisation to GDP (%) 
(EQCAP) 
Positive 
Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP) 
(TURNOVER) 
Positive 
Domestic credit provided by banking 
sector (% of GDP) (BANK) 
Positive  
Domestic credit to private sector (% of 
GDP) (PRIVY) 
Positive 
The ratio of total claims on the 
nonfinancial private sector (% of GDP) 
(NONFIN) 
Positive 
PART B: Institutional variables   
Dependent variables 
Capital Market 
Development 
(EQCAP; 
TURNOVER; BANK; 
PRIVY; NONFIN) 
Rule of Law (estimate) (LAWRULE) Positive  
Combined polity score (POLITY) Positive 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
(INFLATION) 
Negative 
Regulatory Quality (estimate) 
(QLEGAL) 
Positive  
Corruption Perceptions Index (score) 
(CORRUPTION) 
Negative 
PART C Institutional variables  
Dependent variable 
FDINFL 
Rule of Law (estimate) (LAWRULE) Positive  
Combined polity score (POLITY) Positive 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
(INFLATION) 
Negative 
Regulatory Quality (estimate) 
(QLEGAL) 
Positive  
Corruption Perceptions Index (score) 
(CORRUPTION) 
Negative 
Adapted from similar study conducted by Chousa, Valdlamannati and Tamazian (2008:12) 
 
Following from Table 4.1, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
1 There is a direct positive relationship between inflow of FDI and capital 
market development variables such as: 
1.1 Bank private credit as a percentage of GDP (BANK), 
1.2 Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a 
percentage of GDP (NONFIN), 
1.3 Domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP (PRIVY),  
1.4 Stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP), 
1.5 Total value of all traded shares in a stock market exchange as a 
percentage of GDP (TURNOVER). 
77 
 
2 There is a direct positive relationship between capital market development 
and variables of institutional framework (except for inflation and corruption 
that are expected to bear negative coefficients) such as: 
2.1 Rule of law (estimate) (LAWRULE), 
2.2 Combined polity score (POLITY), 
2.3 Regulatory Quality (estimate) (QLEGAL). 
3 There is a direct positive relationship between inflow of FDI and the 
variables of institutional framework (except for inflation and corruption that 
are expected to bear negative coefficients) such as: 
3.1 Rule of law (estimate) (LAWRULE), 
3.2 Combined polity score (POLITY), 
3.3 Regulatory Quality (estimate) (QLEGAL).  
Multinational organisations, the main agents of FDI inflows, react in various ways to the 
level of capital market development in a potential host nation (Caves, 1974; 82; 2007). The 
fact that financial resources are transferred across geographies through the mechanisms of 
capital market further reinforces the significance of the efficiency of capital market in 
offshore investments.  
Meanwhile, literature suggests that attracting FDI is capable of catalysing the economic 
growth of the host nation as these multinational corporations penetrate host countries with 
advanced technology, managerial knowhow, much improved operational processes and 
investible capital – all of which improves the level of productivity, and precipitates economic 
growth.  
Although the assumption is that a developed capital market will attract inflow of FDI, the 
attractiveness of the countries in our sample is expected to vary due to the variation in the 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Further, the variations in the quality of institutional 
infrastructures that underlie these markets (such as the efficiency of capital market 
supervision, the legal, political and social frameworks) also play a significant role.  This 
justifies the need for the regional effects intervention that is introduced in this study.   
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4.2.2 Models specification 
The research hypotheses and questions, as informed by the purpose statement and objectives 
of this research, necessitate dividing the model specification into different parts (as indicated 
in section 4.3.1). First, the focus of this research is to establish a possible relationship 
between capital market development and inflow of FDI. However, having established earlier 
that institutional framework plays a significant role in the determination of capital market 
development as well as inflow of FDI; it becomes important to look at the roles of 
institutional framework on both capital market development and inflow of FDI to the 
sampled countries.  
The model specification that captures the relationship between capital market development 
and FDI inflow will be specified in Part A. Part B will contain the model specifications that 
examine the relationship between capital market development and institution framework. The 
last part (Part C) will contain the model specification on the effects of institutional adequacy 
on the attractiveness of sampled countries to inflow of FDI.  
4.2.3 Part A: Models specification on the impact of capital market development on 
inflow of FDI  
The choice of appropriate models for this study poses some challenges.  As stated earlier in 
chapters two and three, the amount of existing literature in this study area is limited. As a 
result, we will examine some of the models that have been used previously and then make a 
decision on the most suitable model that could be adapted. To start with, we consider the 
model used in the study of Chousa, Vadlamannati and Tamazian (2008:7). In that study, the 
authors analyse the importance of growth and capital market development on the 
attractiveness of countries to inflow of FDI.  
However, the model used in that study focused more on debt than equity market, which 
makes the application of that model inappropriate in this study. Also, the models used in the 
work of Jeffus (2004) where the relationship between stock market development and inflow 
of FDI were estimated are also considered. In that study, Jeffus (2004) used a linear equation 
to model this form of relationship. However, some of the major weaknesses in those models 
(models 1 and 2; page 41) are the possible endogeneity problems between economic 
liberalisation and FDI, as well as between stock market liquidity and transparency/disclosure 
that are combined together in the same equation.  
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However, there are documented evidence (Khan & Senhadji, 2000; Adjasi & Biekpe, 2006) 
to suggest that Levine and Zervos (1998) finance-growth linkage model has been adjudged as 
one of the most efficient basic models to investigate macroeconomic issues, especially 
macroeconomic issues with capital market component. The model is depicted as follows: 
LogYit = α1 + α2CMTit + α3Xit + eit               (1)  
From the model above: 
Yit is economic growth measured as the log of: (GDPCt/GDPCt−1) in country i and at time t. 
As observed, the proxy for economic growth is averaged for a test of robustness in the growth 
model.   
CMTit is the capital market indicators for country i at time t; 
Xit contains control variables and eit is the error term.       
Given that this study focusses on investigating possible relationships between capital market 
development (CMT) and inflow of FDI (FDINFL), there is the need to reconstruct the model 
of Levine and Zervos (1998). The reconstructed basic model will substitute inflow of FDI for 
growth while retaining the capital market component. The new model is presented in 
equation 2 below: 
FDINFLit = α1 + α2CMTit + α3Xit + eit     (2)  
From the equation above, FDINFLit represents inflow of FDI, while CMTit is the capital 
market indicators. As in equation 1, Xit contains the control variables while eit is the error 
term. This equation (equation 2) satisfies the first research hypothesis and answers the first 
research question.  
The components of the model (equation 2) require some deeper exaptation. From model 2, 
the dependent variable is FDI inflow (FDIFL), which is measured by net FDI inflow as a 
percentage of GDP. The various capital market development variables used as independent 
variables are entered separately into the equation. These variables include the two measures 
of equity market development (market capitalisation of listed companies as a percentage of 
GDP – EQCAP; stocks traded, total value as a percentage of GDP - TURNOVER). The two 
variables that capture the development of stock market are used in this study to capture their 
individual effects on inflow of FDI as contained in the study of Jeffus (2004).   
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This novelty is considered essentially necessary given that stock market capitalisation and 
trading may have different pull effects on inflow of FDI (Adjasi & Biekpe, 2006; Baker, 
Foley & Wurgler, 2009). As demonstrated in chapter two, while a market may be well 
capitalised, the competitiveness of stock-holding laws in the country may significantly 
influence the market’s viability. Other capital market variables used in the estimations are 
available bank credit as a percentage of total credit (BANK), the ratio of credit to the private 
sector credit, i.e. the credit directed to the private sector as a percentage of the total available 
credit (PRIVY), and the ratio of total claims on the nonfinancial private sector, i.e. the 
nonfinancial private sector claims divided by the GDP (NONFIN).  
As shown in equation 2 above, control variables are introduced into the equations. Control 
variables are used to accommodate other variables that are likely to affect the outcome of the 
estimation aside the identified variables.  The control variables used in this equation (as 
informed by theory) are carefully chosen because capital market variables are not the only 
determinants of the attractiveness of an economy to inflow of FDI. In estimating financial 
market development, Alfaro et al (2004) followed the lead of Levine and Zervos (1998).  
In the study conducted by Levine and Zervos (1998) that investigates capital market as 
growth nexus, control variables such as legal origin, black market premium, inflation and 
trade volume were adopted. These control variables have also been used in similar studies 
(Beck & Levine, 2002; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2003). To ensure comparability and 
due to availability of relevant data, trade volume and inflation will be used in this study. 
These variables are chosen based on their scientific appropriateness, in that, they are not 
subject to reverse causality as explained above. 
Inflation is depicted as annual percentage increase in consumer prices. It measures the 
purchasing power of a currency relative to price adjustments of a basket of household items 
over a year (Hill, 2013). The inclusion of this variable in this study helps to accommodate the 
possible negative effects of financial exposures in the reported capital market figures that do 
not necessarily translate into an increase in the real capital base of these firms (Levine, Loaya 
& Beck, 2000; Hailu, 2010). The use of this control variable in capital market estimation is a 
general practice as indicated in the previous paragraphs.  
Further, the introduction of trade volume as a control variable in this regard is also premised 
on the fact that an increase in trade volume would culminate in an increase in inflow of 
revenue from abroad (Jeffus, 2004; Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, and Mayer, 2007). This increase 
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in foreign earnings may change the structure of the capital market, but not necessarily 
increasing the efficiency of any of the capital market components. Using measures of 
countries’ trade volume in capital market estimation helps to reduce autocorrelation bias 
because developing countries generally adopt free-market trade policies to improve domestic 
quality of life by encouraging competition in the domestic market (Sala-i-Martin, 1991; Hill, 
2013).  Further explanation on the remaining variables will be presented in sections 4 and 5. 
For now, we proceed to Part B where models on institutional framework will be presented.      
4.2.4 Part B: Model specification for institutional framework and capital market 
development  
The importance of institutional efficiency on capital market development is well documented 
in literature. Biekpe (2002:178) summarised the determinants of capital market efficiency 
under five headings:  
o Improved environment - trade liberalisation, strengthening the rule of law, 
improved regulatory mechanism, better governance, transparency in government 
affairs, efficient transport and technological development. 
o Economic reform – reduction in inflation, devaluation of overvalued currency, 
reduction of government deficits, raising education standards, upgrading of 
human capital and technological resources. 
o Private sector encouragement – privatisation of state-owned enterprises. 
o Better FDI regulatory framework – encourage profit repatriation, tax incentives, 
establishment of promotion agencies. 
o Venture capital provision – encourage FDI to operate in SMEs, access to credit 
facility, allocate a portion of official development assistance (ODA) to the 
informal sector.  
Biekpe’s view was buttressed by a host of other authors such as Atje & Jovanovic (1993), Ito 
(1999), Levine, Loaya, & Beck (2000), and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 
(2000).  As suggested in the literature, the variables documented above provide the platform 
to measure institutional efficiency. The choice of which variables to be included in the 
estimation will be based on the African specific dynamics, essentially, availability of data and 
historical experience of these countries as indicated by the literature (Allen & Ndikumana, 
2000; Biekpe, 2002). To ensure the robustness of the estimation, a few other variables, such 
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as the strength of legal framework, cost of contract enforcement will also be used as informed 
by the literature (Ojah, Gwatidzo & Kaniki, 2009; Laeven & Majnoni, 2004; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishney, 1998).  
Evidently, data is not available for some of the variables identified above (such as 
strengthening the rule of law, improved regulatory mechanism, and better governance), 
thereby making them difficult to measure accurately. As such, the econometric equation takes 
a lead from Biekpe (2002) and applies the variables that are available on the databases used 
in this study. It must be pointed out that the model specified in equation 2 (Part A) will be 
modified to suit the proposed objectives of this section of the study. Given that this section of 
the study focusses on investigating possible relationships between capital market 
development (CMT) and institutional efficiency (INST), there is the need to remodel the 
equation presented in equation 2 (Part A) above.  
In the remodelled basic equation, we substitute capital market variables for inflow of FDI. 
Further, institutional variables (INST) will be introduced as substitutes for capital market 
variables. In specific, five models will be specified to determine the relationship between 
capital market development and institutional efficiency, and each of the models will be 
capturing the relationship between the identified institutional variables and each of the five 
capital market variables (in this case, as the dependent variables). These model specifications 
are depicted in equations 3 to 7. They satisfy the third research hypothesis and answer the 
third and fourth research questions.  
BANKit = α1 + α2INSTit + α3Xit + eit     (3) 
PRIVYit = α1 + α2INSTit + α3Xit + eit     (4) 
NONFINit = α1 + α2INSTit + α3Xit + eit     (5) 
EQCAPit = α1 + α2INSTit + α3Xit + eit     (6) 
TURNOVERit = α1 + α2INSTit + α3Xit + eit    (7) 
In equations 3 to 7, CMTit captures the capital market indicators for country i at time t. These 
variables are the same set of variables used in equation 2. INST proxies the institutional 
variables, while Xit contains control variables and eit is the error term.       
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From equations 3 to 7, the five dependent variables are represented by the financial resources 
provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP, which is 
depicted as BANK. In addition, PRIVY depicts the domestic credit to private sector as a share 
of GDP. The other three dependent variables in this section include claims on domestic real 
nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) and the market 
capitalisation of listed companies, that is, the total value of all listed shares in a stock market 
as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP). The last dependent variable is the total value of all traded 
shares in a stock market exchange as a percentage of GDP, which is represented as 
TURNOVER.  
The independent variables (INST) include the rule of law (LAWRULE), the combined polity 
score (POLITY), which espouses the dynamics of the political economy. Other variables 
include the annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION), the quality of legal 
system (QLEGAL), and the prevalence and depth of corruption that is measured through 
corruption perception index (CORRUPTION).  
As observed in equations 3 to 7, control variables are introduced into the estimation.  
According to La Porta et al. (2000), per capita income (GNI per capita at constant prices) 
plays a major controlling role in estimating institutional dynamics of capital market. For the 
sake of potential endogeneity, this variable will not be used in this study. Furthermore, the 
control variable adopted by Bosworth, Collins & Reinhart (1999) is considered unsuitable in 
this study, especially because in the regional analysis, North Africa contains more than one 
country, whereas the other regions are represented by only one country each.  
To that effect, the fixed effects technique will be applied in the estimation alongside regional 
effects dummy. Also, control variables such as the cost of enforcing a contract (ENFORCE), 
which is a proxy for the cost of seeking a contractual redress in the cause of a breach will be 
used as done is the study of Rousseau and Wachtel (2000).   
4.2.5 Part C: Model specification for institutional framework and inflow of FDI  
Several studies have investigated the relationship between institutional framework and the 
attractiveness of a country to inflow of FDI. One of the early attempts in that regard was the 
study of Wheeler and Mody (1992). The study examined the role of country risk factors such 
as quality of legal framework, bureaucratic processes, political instability and corruption, 
using a principal component model and found inconclusive evidence.  However, Kaufmann, 
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Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) suggest that the rule of law, political stability, violence, 
corruption, efficiency of government institutions and regulatory burden are significant 
institutional determinants of inflow of FDI into a country. 
From the on-going, it becomes evident that some institutional variables are clearly efficient in 
determining the attractiveness of a country to inflow of FDI more than others do. To that 
extent, the model used in this section takes a lead from the work of Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, 
and Mayer (2007:770). In that study, a gravity model was used to investigate the 
deterministic role of institutions as a pull factor for inflow of FDI. The use of gravity model 
by these authors necessitates modification to suit our study. Having provided the theoretical 
justification for the relevance of the model developed by Levine and Zervos (1998), the 
application of a remodelled equation is considered appropriate in estimating the relationship 
between inflow of FDI and institutional framework. The revised model is stated as follows: 
FDINFLit = α1 + α2INSTit + α3Xit + eit     (8) 
The variables used in this equation are the same as those used in the previous equations (1 to 
7) for the sake of consistency. As done in the previous equations, control variables are also 
introduced here to absorb estimation bias. Following the lead provided by the study of 
Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, and Mayer (2007), the latitude and longitude of the countries in our 
sample are used as the control variables. These variables are favoured more importantly 
because there is no documented evidence that they can serve as direct determinants of inflow 
of FDI. The use of religion and monotheism dummy (Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, and Mayer, 
2007) are considered inappropriate in this study due to unavailability of data and more 
importantly, because of the complexity of religion classification in many countries in Africa.  
However, given that country fixed effects will be applied in the estimations, the introduction 
of these dummies may be obnoxious.  
4.3 Motivation for variables used in Parts A, B and C 
As discussed under each equation, and as influenced by literature survey in chapters two and 
three, the determination of appropriate variables to be used in this research is examined. In 
this section, attempts are made to further justify the appropriateness of the variables used in 
this study. It should be said, however, that some of the variables used in literature are not 
readily measurable through available data, thereby prompting the modifications in the 
equations and the application of relevant proxies.  
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4.3.1 Dependent variables 
Six dependent variables are used in this research, flowing from equations 2 to 8, namely the 
proxy for foreign direct investment (FDIFL), and the capital market variables (EQCAP, 
TURNOVER, BANK, PRIVY and NONFIN). The components of the dependent variables 
adopted in this research have previously been used by authors in various studies, although in 
varying combinations (King & Levine, 1993c; Allen & Ndikumana, 2000; Rousseau & 
Wachtel, 2000; Akhter & Daly, 2009); although, other authors have used fairly different 
measures to estimate capital market development (Alfaro, et al., 2004; Davis, 2004).  
In this research, inflow of FDI is measured through net inflow as a percentage of GDP (net 
inflows - % of GDP). Similar data has been used in the previous studies (Asiedu, 2002; 
Chakrabarti, 2003, Chousa, Vadlamannati and Tamazian, 2008; Hailu, 2010). The capital 
market development is measured through the proxies for capital market efficiency and 
financial deepening as suggested by King and Levine (1993c); Allen and Ndikumana (2000); 
Levine, Loayza & Beck (2000); Beck and Levine (2002); Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(2003).  
As indicated earlier, the choice of these dependent variables is reinforced by literature 
favoured by their relevance to African dynamic, and this study in particular. In addition, it is 
considered easier to generate or access relevant data for the purpose of analysis. The choice 
of panel estimation is informed by the inherent weaknesses in a purely time series analysis. It 
should be emphasised that the main concern in time series analysis is the robustness of the 
tests and the explanatory power of the estimators that may possibly arise from the natural 
temporal ordering of time series data. Some authors have emphasised similar concerns in the 
past (Dufrenot, Mignon & Peguin-Feissolle, 2010). This research intends to conciliate this 
concern by exploring the panel environment.  
4.3.2 Independent variables 
The theoretical and policy expanses of capital market development, institutional framework 
and inflow of FDI suggests that various explanatory variables can be used for their 
measurement, depending on author’s perspective as well as the research objectives. On the 
one hand, the measurement of FDI inflow may inform a series of possible regression models, 
as demonstrated by various authors (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2004; Alfaro, et al., 2004; Akinkugbe, 
2005; Adams, 2009). More so, the variables for measuring capital market development could 
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vary widely as suggested by several authors (King & Levine, 1993c; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Levine, 2003; Alfaro, et al., 2004; Allen & Ndikumana, 2004). However, Biekpe (2002) 
combined both qualitative and quantitative variables to demonstrate possible relationship 
between capital market development and institutional efficiency.  
4.4 Explanation of independent variables 
The explanation of independent variables used in this research will be categorised into three 
Parts, as they appear in each of the estimation groupings. While each of the independent 
variables will be defined, any variable that feature in more than one group will be defined 
only where they first appear to avoid duplication. The definitions contained in this research 
largely take credence from previous studies as contained in chapters two and three. A 
synopsis of the definitions of these variables and the sources of data used are presented in 
Table 4.2: 
Table 4.2: Definition of Variables and their Sources 
Variable Brief Description Source of data 
FDINFL Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) World Development Indicators (WDI) 
BANK The financial resources provided to the private sector 
by domestic money banks as a share of GDP. 
Global Financial Development (GFD) 
PRIVY Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) World Development Indicators (WDI) 
NONFIN Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the 
Central Bank as a share of GDP 
Global Financial Development (GFD) 
EQCAP Total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a 
percentage of GDP 
Global Financial Development (GFD) 
TURNOVER Total value of all traded shares in a stock market 
exchange as a percentage of GDP 
Global Financial Development (GFD) 
LAWRULE Rule of Law (estimate) Africa Development Indicators (ADI) 
POLITY Combined polity score Africa Development Indicators (ADI) 
INFLATION Inflation, consumer prices (annual percentage change) Africa Development Indicators (ADI) 
QLEGAL Regulatory Quality (estimate) World Development Indicators (WDI) 
CORRUPTION Corruption Perceptions Index (score) Africa Development Indicators (ADI) 
ENFORCE Legal enforcement of contracts Global Economic Freedom (GEF) 
TRADE Merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP Africa Development Indicator (ADI) 
4.4.1 Part A: The impact of capital market development on FDI inflow 
Equation 2: capital market development and inflow of FDI  
In equation 2, the relationships between capital market development and inflow of FDI are 
estimated. The capital market components used in estimating the relationship between capital 
market development and inflow of FDI follows the lead provided by various authors, but 
more specifically the work of King & Levine, 1993c, as modified in the study conducted by 
Chousa, Vadlamannati and Tamazian (2008).  
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As suggested by these authors, the main measurable indicators of capital market development 
are the equity market capitalisation, turnover rate, bank credit, credit provided to private 
sector and nonfinancial private sector claim. The capitalisation of equity market is measured 
through the market capitalisation of firms listed on the stock market of the economy 
concerned. The inclusion of the stock turnover rate of listed firms is also not uncommon in 
studies of this relevance (Jefus, 2004; Baker, Foley & Wurgler, 2009; Chousa, Vadlamannati 
& Tamazian, 2008; Hailu, 2010; Vladimir, Tomislav and Irena, 2013).  
Further, bank credit can be measured in two ways: first, through the total bank credit 
available in the economy or second, by adding the credits directed to both private and public 
sectors. However, we are interested in the credit directed to the private sector because this 
fund is considered more efficient than those directed to the public sector are. Credit provided 
to the private sector is easily generated through available databases. The use of credit 
provided to private sector is well supported in literature as the most efficient indication of 
productive fund (King & Levine, 1993c; Beck & Levine, 2002; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Levine, 2003). The nonfinancial private sector claim is used as a measure of funds made 
available by banks to institutions outside the financial sector. All these variables are accessed 
from the databases used in this study.       
4.4.2 Part B: Institutional efficiency and capital market development  
Equations 3 to 7: Institutional efficiency and capital market development 
For equations 3 to 7, six explanatory variables of institutional adequacy are included in the 
regression analyses, apart from the control variables that have been discussed above. These 
variables are chosen from a pool of variables suggested in literature (chapters two and three), 
and they include the following: the rule of law (LAWRULE), polity score (POLITY), real 
inflation (INFLATION), quality of legal framework (QLEGAL), and corruption 
(CORRUPTION). These variables have been used in the past studies (Lamont, 1997; La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishney, 1998; Ito, 1999; Rajan & Zingales, 2003; 
Laeven & Majnoni, 2004; Lee & Chang, 2009; Ojah, Gwatidzo & Kaniki, 2009; Ayaydin & 
Baltaci, 2013), albeit in varying combination.  
The combination of these variables, as used in this study is not only informed by the previous 
studies, but also by theories as well. For instance, some of the variables used in the costly-
state-verification models of Townsend (1979) that tests the correlation between market 
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efficiency and cost of capital were modified to suit the objectives of this study. Availability 
of suitable data also contributes to the choice of the variables used in this study. In addition, 
Laeven and Majnoni (2005) investigated the strength of legal framework concerning the 
protection of investors and the efficiency of the judicial system to investors’ protection across 
106 countries, and they only use four of these variables in their estimation. Ojah et al (2009) 
also used similar variables to investigate the role of legal environment on the use of financial 
resources in East Africa.  
4.4.3 Part C: Institutional efficiency and inflow of FDI 
Equation 8: Institutional adequacy and inflow of FDI 
The variables used in equation 8 have been used in the previous equations. In specific, 
FDINFL is the dependent variable used in the capital market model in equation 2. The same 
data is used for FDINFL in all the estimations where this variable appears. Further, the 
institutional variables used in equation 8 (Part C) is the same as the one used in equations 3 to 
7.  
The only difference between equations 3 to 7 and equation 8 is the transposition of the 
dependent variables, as well as the variation in the dummy variables used. As suggested in 
the preceding paragraphs under each Part of the model specification, the motivation for using 
various control variables in specific models were highlighted, and these postulations were 
supported by literature.  
Having explained the dependent and independent variables used in this study in the previous 
paragraphs, attention will now be directed towards explaining the source of data and the 
sample size   
4.5 Discussion on source of data and sample size 
Sample selection on African studies is a common practice. In a study of market efficiency 
and stock return behaviour in Africa's emerging equity markets, Alagidede (2008) focused on 
six largest African stock markets.  In a similar study, Kodongo (2011) sampled seven capital 
markets. Taking a lead from the previous studies, this study will investigate six countries and 
these countries are subdivided into four regions (North, Southern, West and East). The 
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sampling coverage focuses on the oldest six African stock markets
10
 in order to ensure a 
wider data coverage. Appendix A contains the list of stock markets in Africa, the date of their 
establishment and the sampled countries. The top oldest six stock markets are then 
categorised into four regions in Africa, namely North (Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia), 
Southern (South Africa), West (Nigeria), and East (Kenya).  
Apart from North Africa that has more than one country in the regional analysis, the other 
three regions contain only one country in each. In the case of the three regions that were 
represented by single countries, each of these countries is a clear regional economic leader. 
For instance, South Africa accounts for more than two-third of the GDP of Southern Africa 
region (World Bank, 2013). Nigeria is also the economic super house of West Africa 
accounting for more than 60 per cent of West Africa’s GDP (World Bank, 2013), while 
Kenya also boasts the same prowess in East Africa. It thus makes sense to represent these 
regions with the chosen countries, especially given that they are the only countries that 
qualify for inclusion in our sample based on the ages of their stock markets.  
 Although, data on FDI inflow can be generated for most of the African countries, however 
data on capital market
11
 is sparse, especially given that most of the stock markets (in 
exception of the chosen ones) were established barely two decades ago. Another challenge is 
that data collection and capturing process in most developing countries (including most of the 
countries in Africa) is less efficient and sometimes inadequate. To that effect, the data used in 
this research are obtained from the Africa Development Indicators (ADI), the World 
Development Indicators (WDI), the Global Development Finance (GDF) – all of which are 
World Bank databases and the Economic Freedom Network (EFN).  
Data for the capital market estimations were generated from the GDF and WDI (and in some 
cases, ADI). Some of the data relating to institutional frameworks are generated from the 
EFN; although the other two sources are also used as complementary. For instance, most of 
the institutional variables such as the rule of law, polity score and quality of legal framework 
appear in the two databases (ADI and WFN). However, variables such as the index of legal 
enforcement of contracts are only available on the AFN, where they are gleaned for this 
                                                 
10
 These stock markets have been established by 1960.   
11
 As indicated in chapter two, the study focuses on the two major components of capital market namely bank 
and equity.  
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study. Where the variables are available on more than one database, the most comprehensive 
source is used in order to reduce the number of missing units. Consistency in the data 
arrangement is also considered.   
Data for all the variables used in the models are generated directly from these databases. One 
of the major limitations of this study is that the dataset for capital market variables only 
covered the period between 1980 and 2012, while the dataset for FDI inflow as well as 
measures of institutional framework (relating to both capital market development and inflow 
of FDI) were also restricted to that period.  
It must be stated that it was easy to obtain data for all the variables used in this estimation 
except for instances where we experience missing units for some of the variables in the time 
series. For example, institution variables for most of the sampled countries were only 
available around early 1990s. In specific, data on the rule of law (LAWRULE), corruption 
index (CORRUPTION) and quality of legal framework (QLEGAL) only become available on 
the ADI database in 1996 for Nigeria and Kenya and, in 1998 for South Africa. The dataset 
for North Africa is even more problematic with a lot of missing units in-between the period 
covered.  
More importantly, data for equity market (such as equity capitalisation and turnover rate) 
only become available for most of the countries much later after their establishment. For 
instance, these equity market data are only available for all the sampled countries from 1989 
onward, with missing units in-between the period covered. In addition, none of the sources 
used in this study have a comprehensive capital market data that covers the period under 
investigation. Although, the use of unbalanced panel is a common practice in empirical 
studies (such as in Asiedu, 2002; Alfaro et al, 2004; Adjasi and Biekpe, 2006; Adjasi, Abor, 
Osei & Nyavor-Foli, 2009), imbalance in the years covered for different variables and across 
the sampled countries may trigger some estimation biases.  
Also, estimating an equation with missing units in the dependent variable may trigger 
instability and a series of sensitivity issues in the estimation (Baltagi & Song, 2004). In 
addition, balanced panels have been observed to always have estimation superiority over 
unbalanced panels (Redwood & Tudela, 2004; Wilder, 2009). To avoid these shortcomings, 
data will be generated for the missing units using five-year moving average going backward. 
In addition, data will be generated for those countries that do not have data for 2012 using the 
forecasting tools that is built in E-views 8.  
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Further to the explanation offered in the previous paragraphs, it should be noted that some of 
the previous studies have establish relationships between local capital market and inflow of 
FDI. For example, Alfaro, et al. (2004) studied the extent to which local capital market 
enhances the absorptive capacity of an economy to leverage FDI benefits in Southern Africa. 
Ang (2009) conducted a similar research on Malaysia. To investigate the importance of 
absorptive capacity of stock market on FDI flow, Adam and Tweneboah (2009) conducted a 
research on Ghana, where the importance of domestic stock market was established. Baker, Foley 
and Wurgler (2009) conducted similar study where they investigated the attractiveness of United 
States to inflow of FDI from the OECD countries and they were able to establish that stock 
market valuation helps to attract inflow of FDI to the United States.   
This research takes a step further by looking at different issues/forces that may possibly 
determine the direction of FDI inflow; specifically by examining the effects of capital market 
components in this regard12. This research further emphasises the role of institutional framework 
on capital market development as well as on inflow of FDI. While various studies have examined 
a variety of possible determinants of inflow of FDI, the role of capital market, which facilitates 
capital transfer, allocation, and appropriation, remains marginally researched especially in Africa; 
hence the interest in this study. The regional effects of these dynamics are also yet to be 
documented in academic literature.  
4.6 Estimation techniques 
In this section, the econometric technique used in estimating the model specified in section 
4.4.2 of this chapter is discussed. In this research, given that a series of explanatory variables 
are considered as possible determinants of (1) FDI inflows and (2) capital market 
development, for a period over three decades across six African countries, a panel approach is 
considered appropriate. This approach is popular in capital market studies, especially those 
studies that focus on the developing countries (such as in Allen & Ndikumana, 2000; Asiedu, 
2002; Alfaro, et al., 2004; Adjasi & Biekpe, 2006; Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2008).  
The understanding is that this technique helps to ascertain some degree of precision as it 
augments the number of observations in the estimation (Wooldridge, 2001; Baltagi, 2008). 
By pooling several periods of data for each of the variables, the number of observations is 
increased. In addition, the multiplicity of such variables across countries over a long period of 
                                                 
12
 This study does not only cover the stock market but the banking sector as well. 
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time will ultimately increase the number of observations, thereby enhancing the degree of 
precision that is obtained from the estimation (Bhargava, Franzini & Narendranathan, 1982).  
Further, this method enhances the possibility of consistent estimation of the fixed effects 
model, thereby allowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity that may be correlated with 
regressors (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Hsiao, 2003). Such unobserved heterogeneity normally 
lead to omitted variable bias (this will be discussed in 4.10.1). Further motivations for 
adopting the dynamic panel approach will be presented in sections 4.8.1 and 4.8.2 below, as 
well as in chapter five where the dynamic panel technique is applied.   
4.6.1 The causal relationship between the model variables 
Causality is summarised as “a useful way of describing the relationship between two (or 
more) variables when one is causing the other(s)” (Granger, 1969:428). In essence, causal 
relationship depicts the direction of relationship that exists between variables under 
consideration. In econometric estimation, causality is said to exist if a variable causes a 
change in the behaviour of another variable. In this research, the causal relationship between 
models specified in section 4.3 will be examined.  It is important to point out, however, that 
despite careful selection of variables (as informed by theories), the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables in all the six models may be uni-directional or bi-
directional (as indicated in chapters two and three). To that extent, an explanation of the 
estimation technique that accommodates endogeneity will be presented below.  
Although, Ordinary Least Squares and Weighted Least Squares approaches can easily be 
used to determine the level of relationship between variables, their power is limited as they 
merely suggest relationship and not specific causality. To this extent, the most popular 
causality test (Granger causality test) will be used. According to Granger (1969), causality is 
established between two variables (x and y) if the historical behaviour of a variable (x) can be 
predicted by the present behaviour of the other variable (y); i.e. x (t1) = f [y (t2)].   
4.7 Diagnostic techniques 
For the sake of reliability, a series of error correction/diagnostic techniques will be adopted in 
this study. One of the widely used diagnostic techniques is the Durbin-Watson statistics that 
is contained in the Ordinary Least Squares regression. This application is used to test for first 
order autocorrelation/ serial correlation in variables. In the dynamic panel environment 
93 
 
(Arellano & Bond, 1991) the Arellano and Bond serial correlation test should have been 
appropriate, but the test is not robust against temporal heteroskedasticity.  
Further, the test is only applicable to estimation done in first difference, which is less 
efficient to orthogonal deviation that is applied in this study (Arellano & Bover, 1995; 
Hayakawa, 2009). To that extent, this study relies on fixed effects error correction technique 
to treat higher order serial correlation. The White period standard errors and covariance 
matrix tests were also conducted to test for covariance and standard errors in the estimation. 
This test has been modified in the package used for this analysis (E-views 8) to accommodate 
autocorrelation in series if they exist.  
In ordinary time series data, two diagnostic unit root tests are identified to be very popular, 
namely the Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Square (DF-GLS) and Phillips-Perron tests. The 
DF-GLS test, which is also referred to as a de-trending test, was developed by Elliot, 
Rothenberg and Stock (1996). This test was developed to enhance the power of ADF tests for 
small sample sizes. However, given that, the data used in this research is primarily in the 
panel form, the use of either DF-GLS or ADF tests are not practicable. To that extent, the 
Lindeberg–Levy central limit theorem (LLC) (Levin, Lin & Chu, 2002) is used to test for the 
presence of unit root in the cross-section or time dimensions of variables. This pre-estimation 
diagnostic is conducted on each of the variables used in this study.  
4.7 Sensitivity analysis 
According to Archer, Saltelli and Sobol (1997:100), “sensitivity analysis estimates the 
sensitivity of a function f (X) with respect to different variables or subgroups of variables”. 
These authors further illustrates the praxis of this analysis by depicting it as a functional 
relationship where Y = f (X) is used to represent the (possibly vector valued) output variable, 
while the X are used to represent the input variables. To ensure the robustness of the findings 
in this research, sensitivity analysis is considered important. As indicated in the preceding 
paragraph, there is always a concern about the quality of the data used in the analyses. As 
such, this study adopts techniques that are helpful to determine over what range and under 
what conditions the components of the results obtained would remain unchanged.  
The sensitivity analysis helps to uncover various errors in econometric modelling. For 
example, it might be that the predictors of inflow of FDI (one of the dependent variables used 
in this study) are not well-specified. Although, the primary issue is not to attain the most 
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appropriate combination of predictors, but to investigate what additional explanatory 
variables should be acquired to predict, for instance, the effects of capital market 
development on the attractiveness of the countries in the analysis to inflow of FDI. The same 
could be said of the relationship between institution infrastructure and the development of 
capital market, as well as the impact of institutional framework on inflow of FDI. Sensitivity 
analysis has been proven to be capable of providing an invaluable tool for addressing such 
issues (Archer, Saltelli & Sobol, 1997).  
4.7.1 Omitted variables 
The problem of omitted variables is a serious one in econometrics. To that extent, it is 
considered essential to control for other variables that are also qualified to be used as 
determinants of inflow of FDI, capital market development as well as institutional framework 
but omitted in this study for various reasons as explained earlier.   
Documented evidence in econometric estimation suggests that we use cross-section fixed 
effects if there are omitted variables that vary across entities or variables that cannot be 
estimated due to absence of data (Baltagi, 2008; Keller, 2012). These authors further suggest 
that period fixed effects are used if there are omitted variables that are the same for each 
entity in the sampled countries, but vary over time (such as equity capitalisation or equity 
turnover rates). To identify the most appropriate technique to be used, Hausman test is 
conducted. Prior to estimating the equations, stepwise estimation technique is used to check 
whether the inclusion or exclusion of any variable from the model makes any statistical 
difference to the predictive ability of the models. 
4.7.2 The issue of endogeneity 
In previous studies (such as in King and Levine, 1993a; Filer, Hanousek & Campos, 1999; 
Chousa, Vadlamannati & Tamazian, 2008), the issue of endogeneity was discussed and the 
attempts made to accommodate this unique problem in estimations were suggested. In this 
study, the problem of endogeneity is addressed by using various techniques. As suggested in 
previous studies (King and Levine, 1993a; Temple, 1999; Schich and Pelgrin, 2002; 
Vazakidis and Adamopoulos, 2009; Lee and Chang, 2009), endogeneity bias may arise due to 
the potential correlation of variables used as proxy for inflow of FDI or institution framework 
determinants with omitted variables that are eventually treated as error terms.  
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To address these errors, correlation statistics (not reported) is conducted for the variables 
used in this study. The analyses of the correlation statistics suggest low possibility of 
autocorrelation. In specific, bank credit and inflation are the two variables that show some 
degree of autocorrelation (-0.38) and the Correlogram-Q-statistics (CQS) test for 
autocorrelation up to the lag of 16 that is reported in the descriptive statistics allays the fear 
of autocorrelation among the variables up to the lag of 16.  Further, the instrumental variables 
are restricted to one in analysing the models in Parts A, B and C (as done by Filer, Hanousek 
& Campos, 1999).  
In addition, we apply the orthogonal deviation in the GMM environment as suggested by 
Arellano and Bover (1995). In a recent study, Hayakawa (2009) corroborates the opinion of 
these authors that unobserved individual effects are removed by the forward orthogonal 
deviation in dynamic panel analyses. This author further observes that the GMM estimator of 
the model transformed by the forward orthogonal deviation tends to work better than those 
transformed by the first difference in addressing autocorrelation/endogeneity in estimations. 
As such, the orthogonal deviation technique enhances the validity and suitability of the 
instruments used in the GMM estimation, thereby addressing the problem of endogeneity 
(Adjasi & Biekpe, 2006).  
This study report results that are based on the generalised method of moments (GMM), and 
the results are orthogonalised for fixed and/or random effects. The GMM approach of 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) are used to control for endogeneity 
bias and unobserved country fixed/random effects. The GMM technique has been proven to 
be robust to weak instrument bias. The estimations in this study are instrumented by suitable 
lag levels and lagged first differences of the regressors. To minimise the number of GMM-
style instruments used and due to concern of sample size, we restrict the maximum lags of 
dependent variables in the estimation. In accordance with GMM estimation techniques, 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond test that the average 
autocovariance of residuals of order two is zero are reported and all results are based on 
robust standard errors. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions helps to uncover 
possible autocorrelation between the instruments and the model residuals.  
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4.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter began by stating the research hypotheses. Three research hypotheses were 
stated, in order to achieve the set research objectives. The research hypotheses laid a basis for 
the choice of estimation technique, as reflected in the model specification. In all, eight 
models were specified, of which one estimates the relationship between capital market 
development and inflow of FDI, five looks at the impact of institutional framework on capital 
market development and the remaining one equation estimates institutional framework and 
inflow of FDI.  
To accommodate endogeneity, some control variables are used and the theoretical 
justification for the suitability of these variables is discussed. The chapter goes on to discuss 
the explanatory variables that were used as well as the theoretical underpinning of the 
variables. The sources of data and sample size were also discussed. The econometric 
techniques used in estimating the models were also discussed, as well as the error correction 
mechanisms used to minimise errors or biases.  The next chapter (chapter five) contains the 
data analysis. It presents the estimation of the models specified and brief explanation of the 
contextual application. 
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Chapter five 
Data analysis and interpretation 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter four discussed the research hypotheses and restated the research questions. A tabular 
presentation of the research hypotheses that is contained in chapter four helps to deconstruct 
the kind of potential relationships that are proposed among the research variables. The 
relationship proposed in Table 4.1 suggests a causal relationship between: capital market 
development and inflow of FDI, institutional adequacy and capital market development and 
causality between institutional adequacy and inflow of FDI. 
Having constructed econometric models to test the proclivity of these proposed hypotheses, 
this chapter (chapter five) contains the statistical analyses, ensuing from the econometric 
models presented in chapter four. The analyses of the econometric models are done in the 
order of their appearance in chapter four, as informed by the sequence of the research 
hypotheses. It is noteworthy that the regional effect estimation will be conducted for 
equations 2 to 8, covering the three Parts of the model specification. This is necessary in 
order to not only establish the intended relationships at “pooled” levels but at the regional 
levels as well. In all the estimations, the variables that are statistically significant and of 
relevance to this study will be highlighted in order to clearly distinguish them in the results.  
5.2  Error correction model 
Before commencing the estimation, a series of pre-estimation diagnostic tests were conducted 
as hinted in chapter four. This is essential in order to ensure that none of the estimation 
assumptions
i
 is violated. As suggested in the literature (Jönsson, 2005; Baltagi, 2008; Keller, 
2012), the violation of any of the estimation assumptions could generate a misleading result. 
According to these authors, the error correction model (ECM) is mostly applied in 
econometrics to diagnose possible errors in “pool” panel estimation. The ECM is applied in 
panel estimation to accommodate cross-sectional effects error components that are not 
included in the series (that is, cross-sectional error disturbances). The conventional ECM 
equation is depicted in equation 9: 
 
98 
 
                                        9 
Where y is NT*1, X is NT*K, Z = [iNT, X],    =      and iNT is a vector of one of the 
dimensions of NT. This equation can also be expressed as: 
u=       is                               10 
Where    = (                                
The transformation performed in this equation stacks the observation in such a way that the 
slower index is placed over the countries observed (cross-sectional effects), while the faster 
index is placed over time (time-specific effects). This is done given that country-specific 
dynamics generally leads to slow reaction as compared to time-specific effects, which could 
trigger unannounced turbulence. A good example was the political emancipation of South 
Africa. Although, foreign investors’ response was noticeable, it was rather a gentle response 
rather than a sudden shock.  
However, the news that Nigeria will rebase its economy has triggered spontaneous investor 
reaction. The situation becomes more meaningful when Nigerian economy was declared the 
biggest economy in Africa. The same spontaneous reaction was recorded by Ghana when the 
economy was rebased. As such, the transformation performed above is considered important 
because, if estimation errors follow an error components specification, the use of OLS can 
lead to biased standard errors and inaccurate test statistics (Scott & Holt, 1982; Moulton, 
1986 & 1990). It is therefore important to test for the presence of error components in the 
model as a pre-estimation process before conducting the regression analyses.  
To estimate equation 10 in this study, we estimate each model separately and their regional 
effects are also considered. In all cases, we estimate the vector error correction model 
(VECM) through the final prediction error (FPE) and Akaike's information criterion (AIC) 
under the rank restriction r = 1. We restrict the regression rank because such restrictions 
permit consistent estimation of the cointegration space within the limit of the restriction. 
Further, we include two lags of the differences of the variables being the optimal achievable 
lag length because of the small sample size. This approach has been used in previous study 
by Breitung, Brüggemann and Lütkepohl (2004). The vector error correction estimates will 
be presented for each of the equations as they appear in the study designation Parts, 
beginning with equation 2 in Part A.   
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5.3 Part A: Model of capital market development and inflow of 
FDI  
Equation 2: Estimation of the relationship between capital market development and 
inflow of FDI  
The model specified in this study will be estimated after presenting the general analysis, such 
as descriptive statistics and unit root test will be combined for models that fall in the same 
group or that contain the same set of variables. For instance, the descriptive statistics for Part 
B will be combined with the variable of interest in Part C, thereby making it unnecessary to 
prepare another descriptive statistics in Part C. As indicated in the introduction to this 
chapter, regional analyses will also be done for all the equations. For each of the Parts (A, B 
and C), vector error correction estimations will be presented after each of the descriptive 
statistics. Thereafter, unit root tests will be conducted and this will be followed by dynamic 
panel estimations. After the results of regression analyses, impulse response estimations will 
be presented. The impulse response estimation will be followed by cointegration tests, which 
are preludes to causality estimations. The estimations will be concluded with causality tests.  
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics for equation 2  
In the paragraphs that follow, the analyses begin with a descriptive statistics for equation 2 as 
contained in Table 5.1:     
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for Equation 2 (1980-2012): pooled data 
 FDINFL BANK EQCAP NONFIN PRIVY TURNOVER 
 Mean  1.799651  36.84061  40.32874  10.50296  48.85565  9.750868 
 Median  1.160749  32.60942  13.22464  4.711673  36.31355  1.260129 
 Maximum  9.424577  78.32955  265.6193  50.52455  167.5360  142.6287 
 Minimum -1.150856  8.377203  2.288972  0.128763  8.934061  0.017788 
 Std. Dev.  1.863557  18.77094  57.46845  12.49453  35.24897  22.99928 
 Skewness  1.628432  0.268749  2.066418  1.541461  1.502632  3.630464 
 Kurtosis  6.378861  1.837831  6.703321  4.527061  4.866250  17.12316 
 Jarque-Bera  181.6969  13.52621  254.0581  97.64965  103.2447  2080.524 
 Probability  0.000000  0.001156  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 Sum  356.3310  7294.440  7985.091  2079.586  9673.420  1930.672 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  684.1507  69412.62  650616.6  30754.33  244770.5  104206.5 
CQS  -0.1117** -0.1089** 0.1638** -0.1020** -0.1293** 
 Observations  198  198  198  198  198  198 
*Std. Dev (Standard deviation), CQS*** (Correlogram-Q-statistics) test statistic for autocorrelation up to the lag of 16. Result shows no 
autocorrelation up to the lag of 16. Correlations are asymptotically consistent approximations 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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The descriptive statistics contained in Table 5.1 is interpreted in conjunction with regional-
specific analysis that is contained in Table 5.2. That is, Table 5.1 is a summary of the detailed 
analysis contained in Table 5.2. According to Table 5.1, the highest increase in inflow of FDI 
as a percentage of GDP (FDINFL) was recorded by Tunisia in 2006 (9.4246), while the 
highest divestment as a percentage of GDP was recorded by Nigeria in 1980 (-1.1509). 
Although, the statistics for the skewness and the kurtosis do not support the assumption of 
normal distribution, the fact that our sample size is small (198) coupled with the statistically 
significant p-value (0.0000) favours our non-rejection of the null hypothesis of normal 
distribution at 1 per cent.  
The descriptive statistics for BANK suggests that South Africa generates the highest level of 
bank credit as a percentage of total credit in 2008 (78.3295) than the other countries in our 
sample at any given year between 1980 and 2012. However, Nigeria recorded the lowest 
level (8.377) in this regard in 1991. The same rule of normal distribution hypothesis applies 
to BANK, as well as inflow of FDI as stated in the preceding paragraph. Considering the 
descriptive statistics for claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a 
share of GDP (NONFIN), the highest credit was generated by Egypt in 1991 (50.5246), while 
the lowest credit was generated by Tunisia in 2011 (0.1288). The same rule of normal 
distribution hypothesis also applies in this context, as it does in the previous variables as 
stated in the preceding paragraphs. This same principle applies to the test of normal 
distribution hypothesis of the variables contained in Table 5.2. 
Also, the descriptive statistics for the domestic credit provided to the private sector as a 
percentage of GDP (PRIVY) suggests that South Africa generated the highest credit (167.53) 
in 2007, as compared to the lowest credit generated by Nigeria (8.9341) in 1996. Regarding 
the descriptive statistics for the equity market indicators, South Africa recorded the highest 
level of the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) 
(265.619) in 2007. This level of increase in the capitalisation of the JSE may not be 
unconnected to the sale of Edcon (a clothing retailer) to a private equity consortium. Further, 
the sale of a 20 per cent stake in the Standard Bank group to the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China might have contributed to this level of increase in the JSE capitalisation in that 
year. Morocco recorded the lowest stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP in 
1989 (2.289).  
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In addition, the descriptive statistics for the total value of all traded shares in the sampled 
stock market exchanges as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) between 1980 and 2012 
suggest that South Africa recorded the highest value in 2008 as compared to Nigeria that 
recorded the lowest volume in 1989 (0.0178). Discussion of the descriptive statistics for the 
dummy variables (inflation (INFLATION and trade volume (TRADE)) are considered 
unnecessary because they are not part of the variables of interest in the estimations. In all, 
equity capitalisation exhibits the highest level of volatility as compared to FDI that appears to 
be more resilient in the analysis.  
The observation from the analysis contained in Table 5.1 is in line with previous findings 
(Beamish & Banks, 1987; Jeffus, 2004; Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer, 2007; Hailu, 
2010). In addition, the correlogram-Q-statistics test is conducted to test for autocorrelation in 
the series. The test reveals that there is no autocorrelation in the series up to the lag of 16. As 
indicated in chapter four, this study intends to investigate the possible regional effects on the 
main variables of interest in this study. To that extent, we will proceed to analyse the regional 
effects through the descriptive statistics. The output of the regional effects is depicted in 
Table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for Equation 2 (1980-2012) – Regional Dynamics 
North Africa – Pooled Descriptive statistics 
 FDINFL BANK EQCAP NONFIN PRIVY TURNOVER 
 Mean  2.096743  41.48241  20.21174  13.90870  44.91465  5.246296 
 Median  1.589571  47.63822  10.56272  7.251865  47.69861  1.221997 
 Maximum  9.424577  74.52475  88.73975  50.52455  75.46774  39.98322 
 Minimum -0.210299  14.03905  2.288972  0.128763  13.18058  0.106007 
 Std. Dev.  1.890663  15.78512  21.81706  15.72227  16.69079  9.398273 
 Skewness  1.768546 -0.135291  1.665245  0.932259 -0.153291  2.332043 
 Kurtosis  7.110936  1.891789  4.937608  2.459205  1.703534  7.454047 
 Jarque-Bera  121.3196  5.368054  61.24174  15.54666  7.321124  171.5679 
 Probability  0.000000  0.068288  0.000000  0.000421  0.025718  0.000000 
 Sum  207.5775  4106.759  2000.962  1376.962  4446.551  519.3833 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  350.3114  24418.66  46646.44  24224.60  27301.10  8656.099 
 Observations  99  99  99  99  99  99 
CQS  0.2688*** 0.3958*** 0.1049*** 0.2487*** 0.4904*** 
North Africa (Egypt) 
 FDINFL BANK EQCAP NONFIN PRIVY TURNOVER 
 Mean  2.542159  33.77368  23.86250  33.28157  36.22076  8.707949 
 Median  1.741456  30.37049  16.43421  36.25473  33.07230  2.299441 
 Maximum  9.343527  53.36719  88.73975  50.52455  54.93114  39.98322 
 Minimum -0.210299  15.87697  3.743926  14.75867  13.18058  0.179666 
 Std. Dev.  2.237186  11.61321  24.28193  11.00682  11.67126  12.77675 
 Skewness  1.620556  0.357956  1.343997 -0.268307  0.253497  1.470619 
 Kurtosis  5.375916  1.714996  3.914548  1.688093  1.928720  3.668868 
 Jarque-Bera  22.20595  2.975179  11.08484  2.762448  1.931441  12.51012 
 Probability  0.000015  0.225917  0.003917  0.251271  0.380709  0.001921 
 Sum  83.89125  1114.531  787.4626  1098.292  1195.285  287.3623 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  160.1601  4315.732  18867.58  3876.805  4358.988  5223.848 
 Observations  33  33  33  33  33  33 
North Africa (Morocco) 
 FDINFL BANK EQCAP NONFIN PRIVY TURNOVER 
 Mean  1.210953  37.22940  26.58131  7.963731  37.76342  5.424254 
 Median  0.596262  27.51473  20.02899  7.251865  32.27027  2.133197 
 Maximum  4.641830  74.52475  85.19169  17.17659  71.21470  28.18958 
 Minimum  0.003232  14.03905  2.288972  0.940118  16.80232  0.106007 
 Std. Dev.  1.261888  19.54805  26.03460  5.138500  17.00292  8.471783 
 Skewness  1.121935  0.520977  0.911501  0.290437  0.477045  1.875829 
 Kurtosis  3.275667  1.911040  2.585732  1.789076  1.964035  5.167086 
 Jarque-Bera  7.027553  3.123316  4.805559  2.480160  2.727329  25.81040 
 Probability  0.029784  0.209788  0.090466  0.289361  0.255722  0.000002 
 Sum  39.96144  1228.570  877.1831  262.8031  1246.193  179.0004 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  50.95555  12228.04  21689.62  844.9338  9251.174  2296.675 
 Observations  33  33  33  33  33  33 
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Table 5.2 continues 
North Africa (Tunisia) 
 FDINFL BANK EQCAP NONFIN PRIVY TURNOVER 
 Mean  2.537116  53.44415  10.19142  0.480813  60.75978  1.606685 
 Median  2.205335  52.00040  8.718248  0.536142  60.05065  1.009865 
 Maximum  9.424577  67.72235  22.20978  0.812962  75.46774  17.78000 
 Minimum  0.600417  47.58281  4.680400  0.128763  46.44948  0.184159 
 Std. Dev.  1.770915  4.312865  5.582136  0.194974  6.184150  3.071782 
 Skewness  1.877582  1.368388  0.888650 -0.371541  0.049814  4.601992 
 Kurtosis  8.067114  4.915538  2.575664  1.977684  3.066619  24.79212 
 Jarque-Bera  54.69323  15.34394  4.590925  2.196289  0.019751  769.4636 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000466  0.100715  0.333489  0.990173  0.000000 
 Sum  83.72484  1763.657  336.3168  15.86683  2005.073  53.02062 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  100.3565  595.2257  997.1279  1.216479  1223.799  301.9471 
 Observations  33  33  33  33  33  33 
West Africa (Nigeria) 
 FDINFL BANK EQCAP NONFIN PRIVY TURNOVER 
 Mean  3.080351  15.08456  10.54057  12.54557  17.06116  1.298276 
 Median  2.889681  12.57826  7.853700  13.81913  13.23590  0.120569 
 Maximum  8.279540  35.39296  35.99110  29.05323  63.11585  9.259680 
 Minimum -1.150856  8.377203  3.745239  1.971889  8.934061  0.017788 
 Std. Dev.  1.951197  6.687729  8.557656  7.586334  10.67929  2.372455 
 Skewness  0.708319  1.570344  1.674051  0.187904  2.857302  2.185845 
 Kurtosis  4.121780  4.782273  5.276576  2.163717  11.96714  6.628339 
 Jarque-Bera  4.489725  17.93058  22.53981  1.155827  155.4660  44.38020 
 Probability  0.105942  0.000128  0.000013  0.561068  0.000000  0.000000 
 Sum  101.6516  497.7905  347.8387  414.0037  563.0184  42.84312 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  121.8294  1431.223  2343.471  1841.679  3649.511  180.1133 
 Observations  33  33  33  33  33  33 
CQS  -0.1161*** 0.2296*** 0.1676*** 0.1255*** 0.2048*** 
Southern Africa (South Africa) 
 FDINFL BANK EQCAP NONFIN PRIVY TURNOVER 
 Mean  0.867182  58.39585  153.3293  1.822736  111.5909  40.21759 
 Median  0.409797  57.00336  136.6658  1.822456  116.2357  14.32826 
 Maximum  6.136400  78.32955  265.6193  4.244845  167.5360  142.6287 
 Minimum -0.674920  37.96843  99.00165  0.408235  55.60003  4.621268 
 Std. Dev.  1.347555  10.77237  52.36949  1.079900  33.85756  42.53460 
 Skewness  2.157639  0.152182  0.755784  0.648451 -0.143402  1.005191 
 Kurtosis  8.366813  2.066522  2.221569  2.508091  1.736706  2.829811 
 Jarque-Bera  65.20842  1.325527  3.974841  2.645405  2.307482  5.597080 
 Probability  0.000000  0.515425  0.137048  0.266414  0.315455  0.060899 
 Sum  28.61700  1927.063  5059.866  60.15030  3682.501  1327.180 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  58.10897  3713.405  87762.02  37.31787  36682.70  57894.14 
 Observations  33  33  33  33  33  33 
CQS  0.6196*** 0.3973*** -0.2896*** 0.5435*** 0.5161*** 
East Africa (Kenya) 
 FDINFL BANK EQCAP NONFIN PRIVY TURNOVER  
 Mean  0.560148  23.11599  17.46739  6.923350  29.73786  1.250458  
 Median  0.402865  23.43907  11.89643  7.005947  29.40222  0.468384  
 Maximum  2.676694  33.58402  46.97015  16.47278  38.14996  6.820000  
 Minimum  0.004721  17.30457  5.143699  2.296972  24.60027  0.119363  
 Std. Dev.  0.603192  4.137148  13.56683  3.772697  3.063780  1.712121  
 Skewness  2.394649  0.401307  0.780813  0.543985  0.592204  1.783593  
 Kurtosis  8.714689  2.657654  2.110777  2.477474  3.233902  5.287434  
 Jarque-Bera  76.44319  1.046910  4.440414  2.002981  2.004107  24.69110  
 Probability  0.000000  0.592470  0.108587  0.367331  0.367125  0.000004  
 Sum  18.48487  762.8277  576.4239  228.4705  981.3494  41.26511  
 Sum Sq. Dev.  11.64289  547.7119  5889.882  455.4637  300.3760  93.80343  
 Observations  33  33  33  33  33  33  
CQS  0.1315*** 0.2500*** -0.1477*** 0.2386*** 0.2858***  
*Std. Dev (Standard deviation) 
CQS*** (Correlogram-Q-statistics) test statistic for autocorrelation up to the lag of 16. Result shows no autocorrelation up to the lag of 16. 
Correlations are asymptotically consistent approximations 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
According to Table 5.2, although Egypt appears to be the regional economic powerhouse, 
there seems to be some equitable viability of the capital market components in the North 
African region. For example, inflow of FDI to Egypt appears to be more volatile than the 
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other two countries. In 2006, Egypt experienced more inflow of FDI (9.42458) than the other 
two countries, while the same country also witnessed unprecedented level of divestment       
(-0.210299) in 2011. The divestment may not be unconnected to the series of political 
uprising (especially the aftermath of the Arab Spring) that have been confronting many 
countries in North Africa and the Middle East since 2008. However, Morocco’s domestic 
banks (BANK) provided more financial resources to the private sector as a share of the GDP 
than the other two sampled countries (74.52475 in 2009). In addition, Egypt’s stock market 
capitalisation reaches a regional maximum level in 2007 as compared to the lowest regional 
capitalisation recorded by   Morocco in 1989.  
Further, Egypt directed more financial resources to nonfinancial private sector in 1991, while 
Tunisia recorded the least market efficiency in this regard in 2011. Again, this low level of 
financial support to nonfinancial private sector in Tunisia in 2011 may be difficult to 
disconnect from the debacles of Arab Springs at the time.  It is surprising to note that Tunisia 
provided more domestic credit to the private sector (PRIVY) in 2011, while Egypt performed 
the least in this regard in 1980. Expectedly, Egypt recorded higher stock turnover rate 
(TURNOVER) in 2008 while Morocco had the least stock turnover rate in 1989. The buy-and-
hold policy in Morocco at the time might have culminated in low trading and as such, the 
comparatively low stock turnover rate. The CQS also suggests that there is no autocorrelation 
among the variables in the series.  
Given that North Africa is the only region with more than one country in the sample, we 
present the results of the other regions based on general behaviour of the main variables of 
interest in comparison to each regional sample. These Tables are presented in Appendix A2-1 
to A2-4. According to Table 5.2, on the average, West Africa attracts more inflow of FDI 
(FDINFL - 3.1) than the other regions, closely followed by North Africa (2.1) while East 
Africa performed the least. However, inflow of FDI to East Africa (on the average) exhibits 
higher degree of stability (0.6) as compared to West Africa that exhibits higher volatility (2.0) 
as indicated by their standard deviation.  
Considering the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks 
as a share of GDP (BANK), Southern Africa performs better on the average compared to the 
other regions, closely followed by North Africa while West Africa recorded the least 
performance in this regard. Despite recording the second best performance on the average, 
North Africa region (15.8) shows higher volatility in terms of bank credit (BANK) as 
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compared to the other regions whereas East Africa again appears to be resilient to volatility in 
this regard (4.1).  
Considering the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP 
(EQCAP) on regional basis, Southern Africa emerged the average best performer (153.3) 
compared to the runner-up (North Africa – 20.2) and the least performer (West Africa – 
10.5). Although, Southern Africa performs a lot better than the other regions on the average, 
the region also shows the highest level of volatility while West Africa indicates the highest 
degree of stability in this instance. 
On the average, the claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a 
share of GDP (NONFIN) shows a tight performance between the best performer (North 
Africa – 13.9) and the runner-up (West Africa – 12.5) as compared to the least performing 
regions (East Africa – 6.9 and Southern Africa – 1.8). Conversely, the best performing region 
also shows the highest level of volatility (15.7), while Southern Africa record the highest 
level of stability in this regard (1.1).  
Considering the domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP (PRIVY), Southern 
Africa recorded the best average performance (111.6). Although, North Africa is the second 
best performer (44.9), the gap between southern Africa and North Africa is very wide. The 
least performing region on the average (West Africa) recorded a comparatively low average 
score (17.1). On the contrary, Southern Africa also exhibited the highest level of volatility 
while East Africa shows the highest level of stability.   
Looking at the descriptive statistics for the total value of all traded shares in a stock market 
exchange (TURNOVER), Southern Africa emerged again as the leading region on the average 
(40.2). Although, North Africa is in the second position (5.2), the gap between the two 
regions is comparatively very large. Again, the best performer region in stock turnover rate 
(Southern Africa) also shows the highest level of volatility (42.5) as compared to East Africa 
that shows the best level of stability in this context (1.7). In all the regional analyses, the test 
of normal distribution follows the same assumption for the pooled data and they all favour 
our non-rejection of the null hypothesis of normal distribution at one per cent error level.  
106 
 
5.3.2 Vector error correction estimation for equation 2  
In the analyses presented in the paragraphs that follow, equation 10 will be estimated for each 
of the three Parts of the research (Parts A, B and C). This is considered important as the 
analysis generated through this process will hint on the specific deterministic relationships 
between the dependent and the explanatory variables. This form of analysis also hints on the 
possible relationship that is obtainable if the dependent variable is alternated.  
In simple terms, the error correction terms describe how the time-series adjust to 
disequilibrium. According to Breitung, Brüggemann and Lütkepohl (2004), the simple 
interpretation of error correction estimation suggests that the error terms that bear negative 
coefficients would achieve future equilibrium through positive response patterns, while error 
terms with positive coefficients would be mean-reverting through negative future trends.  
In both cases, the error terms have to be statistically significant to be of relevance 
(Alogoskoufis & Smith, 1991; Baltagi, 2008; Keller, 2012). In essence, the error term in the 
dynamic estimation is deemed ‘reasonable’ if it revert towards its equilibrium within a short 
period, preferably within the first period (depending on the series – daily, weekly, monthly, 
quarterly or annual data). The results of the VECM for Part A are presented in Tables 5.3 and 
5.4 below:   
Pooled Estimate  
Table 5.3: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 2 (1980-2012): 
Pooled data (Dependent variable – inflow of FDI) 
 Error correction estimation results 
 FDINFL BANK NONFIN PRIVY EQCAP TURNOVER 
Lag 1 1.00000 -0.005121 
(0.04787) 
[-0.10698] 
-0.038252 
(0.02820) 
[-1.35669] 
-0.046686 
(0.04461) 
[-1.04660] 
0.049632 
(0.02093) 
[ 2.37135]** 
-0.132252 
(0.03677) 
[-3.59647]*** 
Differenced -0.118678 
(0.04791) 
[-2.47703]** 
-0.014512 
(0.09234) 
[-0.15716] 
-0.090312 
(0.07081) 
[-1.27537] 
0.012229 
(0.21239) 
[ 0.05758] 
-0.895302 
(0.29684) 
[-3.01607]*** 
0.391491 
(0.15250) 
[ 2.56713]** 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
-0.383916 
(0.08336) 
[-4.60544]*** 
-0.023846 
(0.05799) 
[-0.41121] 
0.027279 
(0.05305) 
[ 0.51417] 
-8.95E-05 
(0.02726) 
[-0.00328] 
0.018113 
(0.01328) 
[ 1.36388] 
-0.069659 
(0.03503) 
[- 1.98827]* 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.036352 
(0.07937) 
[-0.45802] 
-0.032173 
(0.05378) 
[-0.59818] 
0.058018 
(0.05268) 
[ 1.10134] 
0.001122 
(0.02631) 
[ 0.04265] 
0.017858 
(0.01412) 
[ 1.26471] 
-0.087406 
(0.03580) 
[-2.44146] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 {Emphasis are placed on *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05} 
From equation 2, there is a total of 1080 system (balanced) observations with an included 
observation of 180 for each of the possible VECM models (derived by alternating the 
dependent variables). The stability of the model is determined by the Durbin Watson statistics 
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that ranges between 1.89 and 2.05 in the probability statistics determinant estimation (OLS) 
that is presented in raw E-views output table that appears in Appendix C1. Appendix C1 also 
contains the detailed information about the possible combinations that are obtainable from 
equation 2.  
This appendix (C1) is presented here as a sample of how the p-values of the VECM 
estimations were generated in order to ascertain the statistical significance of some variables 
that may be difficult to estimate (e.g. statistical value such as -1.98827) through the use of 
convention t-statistics technique. The presentation of this system estimation will not be 
repeated for the rest VECM estimations, but the results generated through this process will be 
reported. From Appendix C1, only 28 statistically significant relationships are identified out 
of a possible 78 relationships.  
According to Table 5.3, the differenced FDINFL as well as differenced in lag 1 are 
statistically significant. In both instances, the error correction mechanisms are negative and 
significant, suggesting that more than 12 per cent and 39 per cent of the deviations from 
equilibrium are corrected within the first year through structural reform. Also, the 
relationship between lagged FDINFL and lagged EQCAP is statistically significant; so also is 
the differenced EQCAP in lag 1. Further, TURNOVER in lag 1, differenced as well as 
differenced in lag 2 are statistically significant, suggesting that more than 13 per cent, 39 per 
cent and nine per cent of the disequilibrium expressed in the variables are corrected within 
the first and second year respectively, with an undertone of structural reform.  
The total value of all traded shares in a stock market exchange as a percentage of GDP 
(TURNOVER) is also seen as an important determinant of FDINFL in this analysis. However, 
the other combinations in Table 5.3 appear not to have significant short term effects. The 
combinations of the other variables that appear in Appendix B1 will not be discussed as they 
are of no interest in this study. An important observation from the pooled estimation is that 
only the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) 
and the total value of all traded shares in a stock market exchange as a percentage of GDP 
(TURNOVER) are statistically significant as determinant of FDINFL and their speeds of 
adjustment to equilibrium is weak.  
The regional VECM estimations for equation 2 are also conducted and the results are 
presented in Table 5.4. However, it is considered unnecessary to present the p-value 
determinants in this instance, but the statistical significance of the variables will be discussed. 
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In addition, the variables of interest are presented in the VECM Tables while the other 
combinations that are of no interest in this study are presented in the appendix (B1 to B35). 
According to p-value determinant estimation, the stability of the estimation is ensured with 
the Durbin-Watson statistics that ranges between 1.8 and 2.1 for all the regions. The p-value 
determinant estimation also suggests that 14 out of a possible 84 combinations are 
statistically significant at five per cent error level.  
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Regional Estimates 
Table 5.4: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 2 (1980-2012): 
Regional analysis (Dependent variable – lagged FDINFL) 
Variables  Error correction estimation results 
North Africa FDINFL BANK PRIVY NONFIN EQCAP TURNOVER 
Lag 1 1.000000 -0.109120 
(0.06276) 
[-1.73874]* 
0.029503 
(0.05240) 
[ 0.56301] 
-0.045536 
(0.01612) 
[-2.82410]** 
-0.021347 
(0.04070) 
[-0.52454] 
0.072569 
(0.09528) 
[ 0.76160] 
Differenced -0.632057 
(0.11865) 
[-5.32729]*** 
0.288934 
(0.28479) 
[ 1.01456] 
0.525604 
(0.42062) 
[ 1.24958] 
0.121746 
(0.20312) 
[ 0.59937] 
-0.446743 
(0.48171) 
[-0.92741] 
0.051738 
(0.30275) 
[ 0.17090] 
Differenced in lag 1 -0.146996 
(0.10743) 
[-1.36831] 
-0.188983 
(0.06834) 
[-2.76521]** 
0.035387 
(0.04102) 
[ 0.86262] 
-0.077718 
(0.06846) 
[-1.13519] 
-0.025139 
(0.03483) 
[-0.72184] 
0.203055 
(0.08001) 
[ 2.53800]** 
Differenced in lag 2 0.122855 
(0.10486) 
[ 1.17163] 
-0.095321 
(0.07044) 
[-1.35323] 
-0.015273 
(0.04167) 
[-0.36651] 
-0.002235 
(0.07075) 
[-0.03160] 
0.048202 
(0.03820) 
[ 1.26169] 
-0.154479 
(0.07544) 
[-2.04779]** 
Southern 
Africa 
 BANK PRIVY NONFIN EQCAP TURNOVER 
Lag 1 1.000000 -0.507385 
(1.35379) 
[-0.37479] 
1.167091 
(0.35285) 
[ 3.30764]*** 
-40.37407 
(3.64814) 
[-11.0670]*** 
-1.794196 
(0.18714) 
[-9.58754]*** 
1.022530 
(0.16945) 
[ 6.03446]*** 
Differenced -0.025577 
(0.01620) 
[-1.57880] 
-0.034261 
(0.03141) 
[-1.09078] 
0.062751 
(0.14847) 
[ 0.42265] 
0.018886 
(0.00495) 
[ 3.81855]*** 
0.420743 
(0.20488) 
[ 2.05361]** 
0.068778 
(0.11531) 
[ 0.59646] 
Differenced in lag 1 -0.913725 
(0.25619) 
[-3.56658]*** 
-0.392223 
(0.27818) 
[-1.40996] 
0.142387 
(0.07840) 
[ 1.81624]* 
0.296951 
(0.59429) 
[ 0.49967] 
-0.088986 
(0.04817) 
[-1.84729]* 
-0.025091 
(0.04657) 
[-0.53879] 
Differenced in lag 2 -0.392122 
(0.25074) 
[-1.56385] 
-0.442812 
(0.21846) 
[-2.02694]** 
0.186793 
(0.07078) 
[ 2.63908]** 
-1.250032 
(0.81039) 
[-1.54250] 
0.003738 
(0.02423) 
[ 0.15426] 
0.174741 
(0.08312) 
[ 2.10228] 
West Africa FDINFL BANK PRIVY NONFIN EQCAP TURNOVER 
Lag 1 1.000000 1.363983 
(0.20942) 
[ 6.51304]*** 
-0.971534 
(0.20575) 
[-4.72198]*** 
-0.256107 
(0.02913) 
[-8.79103]*** 
-0.046705 
(0.10962) 
[-0.42606] 
-1.359188 
(0.44563) 
[-3.05006]*** 
Differenced -1.442001 
(0.28580) 
[-5.04554]*** 
-0.751062 
(0.62773) 
[-1.19648] 
0.950671 
(1.10765) 
[ 0.85828] 
-1.500545 
(0.86187) 
[-1.74103]* 
0.024466 
(1.11883) 
[ 0.02187] 
-0.015272 
(0.25417) 
[-0.06009] 
Differenced in lag 1 0.375608 
(0.26892) 
[ 1.39675] 
1.793540 
(0.35027) 
[ 5.12051]*** 
-1.429234 
(0.24539) 
[-5.82436]*** 
-0.266282 
(0.13391) 
[-1.98855]** 
0.010770 
(0.16516) 
[ 0.06521] 
-1.948591 
(1.05472) 
[-1.84750]* 
Differenced in lag 2 0.351631 
(0.18195) 
[ 1.93260]* 
0.474752 
(0.24422) 
[ 1.94394]* 
-0.805598 
(0.22527) 
[-3.57615]*** 
-0.034416 
(0.13222) 
[-0.26029] 
0.556872 
(0.21205) 
[ 2.62610] 
-3.210988 
(0.77822) 
[-4.12604] 
East Africa FDINFL BANK PRIVY NONFIN EQCAP TURNOVER 
Lag 1 1.000000 -0.159288 
(0.22132) 
[-0.71971] 
-2.449650 
(0.28929) 
[-8.46785]*** 
2.123940 
(0.31304) 
[ 6.78480]*** 
-0.946304 
(0.15438) 
[-6.12965]*** 
1.53159 
(1.67669) 
[ 6.87759]*** 
Differenced -0.005592 
(0.03384) 
[-0.16526] 
0.018321 
(0.11184) 
[ 0.16382] 
0.291317 
(0.12570) 
[ 2.31753]*** 
-0.104551 
(0.07828) 
[-1.33559] 
-0.486373 
(0.30724) 
[-1.58303]* 
-0.132885 
(0.03829) 
[-3.47027]*** 
Differenced in lag 1 -0.995856 
(0.15774) 
[-6.31327]*** 
0.036421 
(0.10073) 
[ 0.36158] 
0.031511 
(0.07411) 
[ 0.42520] 
-0.154991 
(0.08704) 
[-1.78059]* 
0.058545 
(0.03699) 
[ 1.58274]* 
0.813849 
(0.35203) 
[ 2.31189]** 
Differenced in lag 2 -0.722909 
(0.15477) 
[-4.67083]*** 
-0.036466 
(0.10158) 
[-0.35899] 
0.140081 
(0.07248) 
[ 1.93267]** 
0.120609 
(0.08080) 
[ 1.49269] 
-0.062591 
(0.05105) 
[-1.22610] 
-0.062699 
(0.66560) 
[-0.09420] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 {Emphasis are placed on *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05} 
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North Africa  
According to Table 5.4 and appendix B2 in the instance of North Africa, 14 out of possible 
84 relationships are statistically significant. Specific to Table 5.4, six out of 24 relationships 
are statistically significant.  In specific, lagged FDINFL in its differenced form is statistically 
significant. Further, the error correction mechanisms are negative and significant, suggesting 
that more than 63 per cent of the deviations from equilibrium are corrected within the first 
year. Further, the relationship between FDINFL and differenced BANK in lag 1 is statistically 
significant and negative. This indicates that BANK is an important determinant of inflow of 
FDI, and more than 19 per cent of the disequilibrium experienced in the variation is corrected 
within the first year.  
In addition, the lagged form of NONFIN and differenced form of TURNOVER in lag 2 have 
statistically significant and negative relationships with FDINFL. These relationships suggest 
that more than five per cent and 15 per cent of the disequilibrium are corrected within the 
first year. However, the same cannot be said for the relationship between FDINFL and 
differenced TURNOVER in lag one. This relationship bears a positive coefficient, suggesting 
that the variation would have to be shocked in order to correct about 23 per cent of the 
disequilibrium within the first year.  In the North Africa analysis, three of the capital market 
variables are statistically significant determinants of FDINFL.  
Southern Africa  
For Southern Africa, there are a total of 180 system (balanced) observations, and included 
observation is 30. The p-value determinant estimation is considered stable given its Durbin-
Watson statistics that ranges between 2.18 and 2.25. In addition, 17 out of possible 84 
variable combinations are statistically significant. According to Table 5.4, 10 out of a 
possible 24 combinations are statistically significant of which four bear negative coefficients 
(below the point of equilibrium) and the remaining six bear positive coefficients (above the 
point of equilibrium).    
In a more specific term, differenced FDINFL in lag 1 is statistically significant. There is an 
indication that more than 91 per cent of the variations expressed in the variable could be 
corrected within the first year by introducing nominal shock on the variables, which is 
capable of shooting the series towards the equilibrium point. Still on Southern Africa 
analysis, differenced BANK in lag 2 share a negative and statistically significant coefficient 
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with FDINFL. This suggests that BANK in this form is an important determinant of FDINFL, 
and more than 44 per cent of the disequilibrium in the variable could be corrected within the 
first year.  
PRIVY in the Southern Africa analysis in its lag 1 shares a positive relationship with 
FDINFL, so also is TURNOVER. This relationship suggests that both variables are significant 
determinants of FDINFL and the disequilibrium expressed in these series are explosive as 
they are above 100 per cent. In the case of the other statistically significant variables, 
differenced PRIVY in its lag 2 is positive, so also is TURNOVER. The interpretation of this 
form of relationship is similar except for time lag, which varies from one to two years and 
their speeds of adjustment are also 19 per cent and 17 per cent respectively.  
In addition, the NONFIN in lag 1 and EQCAP in lag 1 both share positive relationships with 
FDINFL. These relationships hint that these positive variables are above the equilibrium 
points and have to be shocked to reverse their series towards equilibrium. The analysis 
further indicates that these relationships are explosive as they tail above 100 per cent.  In 
conclusion, the differenced NONFIN and differenced EQCAP bear positive relationships 
with FDINFL, and their speeds of adjustment are two per cent and 42 per cent respectively.  
West Africa 
For West Africa, the numbers of total system observation as well as included observations are 
similar to that of Southern Africa. For West Africa, the stability of the p-value determinant 
estimation is buttressed by the Durbin-Watson statistics that ranges between 1.6 and 2.0. 
Looking at the individual error terms in the VECM estimation as contained in Table 5.4, 10 
out of a possible 84 combinations are statistically significant of which seven bear negative 
coefficients and the remaining three bear positive coefficients.   
Looking at individual variables, FDINFL in first difference as well as differenced in lag 1 are 
statistically significant with explosive negative coefficient. This may imply that if there is a 
meaningful linear combination of exogenous shock in the variable over the previous year, it 
would affect its behaviour in the current year (Alogoskoufis & Smith, 1991). Further, BANK 
in lag 1, and differenced in lag 1 are statistically significant when it interacts with FDINFL. It 
is noteworthy that both relationships are positively related and their effects are also explosive. 
However, FDINFL and PRIVY share statistically significant relationships that are negative. 
PRIVY in its first lag, differenced in first lag and differenced in lag 2 indicate that more than 
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97 per cent, explosive (143 per cent) and 81 per cent of the disequilibrium is corrected within 
the first year respectively.   
The analysis for NONFIN indicates that this variable share a statistically significant 
relationship with FDINFL only in its first lag, and the coefficient suggests that more than 26 
per cent of the disequilibrium is corrected within the first year. The relationship between 
FDINFL and differenced EQCAP in lag 2 is statistically significant and its coefficient 
suggests that more than 56 per cent of the disequilibrium will be corrected within the first 
year. TURNOVER shares two inverse relationships with FDINFL, first in its lagged form and 
second, when differenced in lag 2. In both instances, the coefficients are explosive (136 per 
cent and 321 per cent respectively).  
East Africa 
For East Africa analysis, the same number of system observation and included observation 
were obtained as in the other regions. However, the Durbin-Watson statistics of the p-value 
determinant estimation ranges between 1.7 and 2.4, which is acceptable as indication of the 
model’s stability. Further, 12 out of a possible 84 interaction combinations are statistically 
significant. Out of the 12, 10 are of interest in this study. Differenced FDINFL in lag 1 is 
statistically significant with 99 per cent coefficient. So also is the differenced form of this 
variable in lag 2 with a negative coefficient of 73 per cent. In both instances, there are 
indications that 99 per cent and 73 per cent of the disequilibrium expressed in these 
interactions can be corrected within the first and second year respectively.  
Still on East Africa analysis in Table 5.4, none of the BANK variables is statistically 
significant. However, FDINFL and PRIVY share three statistically significant relationships. 
The lag form of PRIVY bears a negative coefficient that is explosive, followed by the 
differenced form of PRIVY that is positive with a coefficient of 29 – suggesting that 29 per 
cent of the disequilibrium in the series is corrected within the first year. The variable in lag 2 
is also statistically significant and the coefficient suggests that more than 14 per cent of the 
disequilibrium is corrected within two years. NONFIN, however, in its first lag, shares a 
single positive relationship with FDINFL and the coefficient of the relationship is explosive. 
EQCAP in its first lag has a single statistically significant relationship with FDINFL, and the 
coefficient of the relationship suggests that more than 95 per cent of the disequilibrium is 
corrected within the first year.   
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The relationship between FDINFL and TURNOVER yield three forms of statistically 
significant results. In the first instance, TURNOVER in lag 1 shares a negative statistical 
significance with FDINFL with an explosive coefficient. However, the relationship in its 
differenced form is positive and it indicates a 13 per cent error correction within the first 
year. When this variable is differenced and in lag 1, the coefficient suggests that more than 81 
per cent of the disequilibrium in the series is corrected within the first year.  
In the regional analysis, except for North Africa region, capital market variables are found to 
share statistically significant relationships with FDINFL and the speed of adjustment to 
equilibrium ranges from low (2 per cent) through to being explosive.  Having conducted the 
error correction estimations, we now proceed to the test of unit root in the series.  
5.3.3 Panel unit root test for equation 2  
Prior to the dynamic panel estimation, test of stationarity is conducted. Evidence suggests 
that if the time series of the variable under study are not integrated in the same order, the 
variable cannot be in a long-run equilibrium relationship (Engle and Granger 1987; Johansen 
and Juselius, 1990; Jönsson, 2005). Thus, it is important to conduct the stationarity tests in 
order to determine the order of integration of the variables for the purpose of regression 
analyses and cointegration tests. The Levin, Lin and Chu unit root test is used as the 
dominant method.    
The Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) unit root test (LLC) is very popular in literature (Jönsson, 
2005; Pesaran, 2007; Baltagi, 2008). This method is regarded as the most reliable test in 
panel data because the technique “allows for fixed effects, individual deterministic trends and 
heterogeneous serially correlated errors” (Baltagi, 2008:275). This is essentially so because, 
according to Baltagi, the length of the time series, which is held as infinity, is crucial for 
determining asymptotic properties of estimators.  
In addition, the approach provides a good approximation for the empirical distribution of the 
test statistic even in relatively small samples (for example where N ranges between 10 and 
250, and T between 25 and 250) (Pesaran, 2007; Baltagi, 2008) as in the case of this study. 
The fixed effects consideration is important given that we are focussing on specific countries 
in Africa, and the estimation inference is restricted to the behaviour of these countries across 
series. Also, given that all the countries are pooled together in the estimation, the fixed effects 
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diagnostic wipes out the individual effects of countries in the series. The result of the 
stationarity test is presented in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Unit Root Tests for Equation 2 in Part A (1980 – 2012) 
Newey-West Automatic Bandwidth Selection and Bartlett Kernel  
 I II III 
Variables Levin, Lin & Chu (Individual 
Intercept and Trends) 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
(individual effects) 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
(none) 
At level In first diff. At level In first diff. At level  In first diff. 
FDINFL -7.89033*** - -7.38178** - -2.0741** - 
Observation 191 - 191 - 183 - 
Order of 
integration 
 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
 
(I(0) 
BANK -2.20896** - 0.95657 -4.4496*** 3.08456 -8.9578*** 
Observation 187 - 186 186 186 186 
Order of 
integration 
 
I(0) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
EQCAP -0.13933 -2.05990** 2.83900 -5.0543*** 1.52127 -9.08623*** 
Observation 181 165 179 173   
Order of 
integration 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
NONFIN -3.09768*** - -0.46065 -8.84961*** -3.11405*** - 
Observation 186 - 186 183 185 - 
Order of 
integration 
 
I(0) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(0) 
PRIVY -0.12360 -3.87139*** 0.60489 -4.92863*** 1.29929 -10.2445*** 
Observation 184 179 185 177 189 177 
Order of 
integration 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
TURNOVER 10.5263 9.97232 6.97660 12.7308 2.35283 -1.60853** 
Observation 172 171 172 168 172 168 
Order of 
integration  
 
- 
 
- 
 
I(1) 
Using the Levin, Lin & Chu (2002) test, probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality  
***; **; * This indicates that we reject the null hypothesis of unit root at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
Automatic selection of maximum lags; Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 5 
All variables except for EQCAP, PRIVY and TURNOVER are stationary at level and significant at minimum of 5%.  
Table 5.5 contains three types of unit root tests, using the same method.  From that table, the 
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) unit root test is adopted, using the Newey-West Automatic 
Bandwidth Selection and Bartlett Kernel selection criteria. Column I of the table tests for unit 
root in individual intercept and trend (both at level and in first difference), while columns II 
and III tests for unit roots in individual effect and no effects respectively.  
As suggested in Table 5.5, analyses presented in column I suggest that three variables 
(FDINFL, NONFIN and BANK) become stationary at level and statistically significant at one 
per cent and five per cent error levels respectively, while the other two variables (EQCAP 
and PRIVY) only become stationary in first difference but statistically significant at one per 
cent error levels. The unit root tests for TURNOVER in column 1 (at level and in first 
difference) indicate the presence of unit root in columns 1 and II. The result contained in 
column II suggests that all the variables tested become stationary in the first difference and 
statistically significant at one per cent error level, except for FDINFL that is stationary at 
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level and statistically significant at one per cent error level.  The results contained in column 
III suggest that all the variables (including TURNOVER) pass the tests of unit root. While 
FDINFL and NONFIN are stationary at levels and statistically significant at five per cent 
error levels, the remaining four variables only become stationary in first difference but 
statistically significant at one per cent error levels
13
. 
The overall stationary test for the variables used in equation 2 indicates that the variables are 
not integrated in the same order, regardless of the type of analysis. Although, all the variables 
become stationary at a point, but their order of integration varies widely. To that extent, it 
becomes important to introduce each of the variables in their first difference, essentially so to 
satisfy cointegration criteria. In the regression analyses, we will adopt orthogonal deviation 
technique rather than differencing and the justification for that choice will be presented later.  
Although, other tests of stationarity techniques, such as Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat test, 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square and ADF - Choi Z-stat were also used (not reported) benefitting 
from balanced panel arrangement, their results were not significantly different from the one 
presented in Table 5.5.   
5.3.4 Dynamic panel estimation for equation 2 
Having conducted the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study, coupled with 
the error correction estimation, and having tested the variables for stationarity, attention is 
now shifted to the estimation of the models. Various estimation techniques have been used in 
studies of this nature (Levine & Zervos, 1998; Asiedu, 2002; Alfaro et al, 2004; Chousa, 
Valdlamannati & Tamazian, 2008). The main consideration in choosing an estimation 
method is the likely problems of estimation bias and inconsistent conditions of a dynamic 
estimation (Adjasi and Biekpe, 2006; Revia, 2013). The primary intention is to estimate the 
models in a way that is dynamic enough to achieve the study objectives while eliminating 
possible errors that may result from country specific or time-related effects that may be 
correlated with the explanatory variables.    
To address these errors and biases, this study adopts the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic instrumental variable modelling approach. 
In this estimation approach, the lagged values of the dependent variable (inflow of FDI - 
                                                 
13
 TURNOVER is statistically significant at 5% error level.  
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FDINFL) and the differences of the independent variables (in orthogonal deviation 
environment) are used as valid instruments to control for this bias and errors. The use of 
suitable instruments is important in dynamic panel estimation because the lagged dependent 
variable [yit – yit -1] will be correlated with the lagged error terms [eit – eit - 1] by construct and 
this process would precipitate endogeneity problem in the estimation.  
Based on the assumptions that there is no serial correlation in the error terms and the 
possibility of weak exogeneity of explanatory variables, the following moments condition 
applies to the instrumentation procedure: 
E[CMTit - jΔeit] = 0 for j = 2, 3, . . . , (T - 1) ; i = 1 ... 6    (11) 
E[zit - Δeit] = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , (T- 1); i = 1…..6     (12) 
Where zit is a set of explanatory variables. 
The Arellano and Bond (1991) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation is based 
on the moment conditions specified in equations 11 and 12 above and the estimates is only 
consistent if the lagged values of explanatory variables that are used in the estimation are 
valid instruments. The validity of the of instruments used is checked using a Sargan test of 
over-identifying restrictions which tests for correlation between the instruments used in the 
estimation and the model residuals. The result of the dynamic panel (using Generalised 
Method of Moments - GMM) is presented in Table 5.6.  
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Table 5.6: The GMM Panel Regression for Equation 2 (1980-2012): pooled data 
Capital Market Development on Inflow of FDI (Dependent Variable – FDINFL) 
  I    II III IV V 
EQCAP 0.017020 
(0.004180)*** 
    
INFLATION 0.021737 
(0.013215) 
    
TRADE 0.047866 
(0.012770)*** 
    
TURNOVER  0.020931 
(0.005505)*** 
   
INFLATION  0.017804 
(0.013257) 
   
TRADE  0.052265 
(0.012468)*** 
   
BANK   0.033227 
(0.010379)*** 
  
INFLATION   0.022785 
(0.013772)* 
  
TRADE   0.055044 
(0.012947)*** 
  
PRIVY    0.019902 
(0.005883)*** 
 
INFLATION     0.021649 
(0.013733) 
 
TRADE    0.057802 
(0.012469)*** 
 
NONFIN     0.005179 
(0.023507) 
INFLATION     0.026338 
(0.026338)** 
TRADE     0.034139 
(0.013656)** 
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 
Number of countries 6 6 6 6 6 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.304 0.288 0.596 0.232 0.891 
Orthogonal Deviations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cross-section weights instrument weighting matrix and 
convergence was achieved after 1 weight iterations. Cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f correction). 
   Maximum lags of dependent and predetermined variables for use as instruments are limited to 1.  
     Period fixed (dummy variables) applied in the estimation 
In Table 5.6, both time-specific effects and cross-sectional analysis were conducted. The two-
way error correction methods are used in order to accommodate the likelihood of either or 
both of these errors in the estimation. The Hausman test suggests that the introduction of 
period fixed effect is strong as the null hypothesis falls in the region of rejection, hence the 
justification for introducing period fixed dummy into the regression.  
The test further suggests that cross-sectional effects are statistically significant, as the 
hypothesis falls within the region of rejection, hence the motivation for introducing cross 
section fixed effect dummy (orthogonal deviation) (Arellano & Bover, 1995). Further, we 
adopted the weighting matrix in the criterion function in order to establish the robustness of 
the GMM to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form in the estimation 
(Baltagi, 2008). We thereby tackle multicollinearity and endogeneity bias by implementing a 
robust estimation procedure through the instrumentation and orthogonalisation. 
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By so doing, the reliability and sensitivity of the analysis are ensured. In addition, the 
estimation is done on two-stage least squares (2SLS – not reported) instrument weighting 
matrix in robust coefficient covariances, which is contingent on the transformation of the 
residuals in the orthogonal deviations environment. This weighting technique exhibits robust 
property in that it is the optimal weighting matrix for the transformed model specification 
(Arellano & Bover, 1995). The 2SLS is conducted for robustness check and the output is not 
statistically significantly different from the results generated from the GMM estimation. 
Hence, the assumption of the validity of the estimation presumably holds for all the GMM 
estimations in this study.  
In the pre-estimation process, the stepwise regression analysis (not reported) conducted 
indicates that the introduction of legal origin weakens the explanatory powers of the model, 
thereby prompting its removal in order to avoid misspecification. In all cases in the analyses 
contained in this study, the null hypotheses of non-significance of our set of instruments are 
rejected through the Sargan tests. Using the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as 
a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) as the explanatory variable in column I, the robust standard 
errors suggests statistical significance of the model, coupled with the p-value that is 
statistically significant at 1 per cent.  
The statistical insignificance of Sargan tests (0.304) lend credence to the statistical validity of 
the estimation propositions (Gujarati & Porter, 2009; Keller, 2012).The estimation coefficient 
indicates a positive relationship with the dependent variable, suggesting that a country with 
high level of equity capitalisation has the tendency to attract more inflow of FDI than a 
country with less capitalised equity market. The coefficient of equity turnover rate 
(TURNOVER) is also positive and statistically significant (Column II). The explanatory 
power of the coefficient suggests that equity turnover rate is more motivating to attract inflow 
of FDI than the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP 
(EQCAP). This finding is in line with the outcome of the studies conducted by Jeffus (2004), 
as well as Baker, Foley and Wurgler (2008).  
Caves (1974, 82, 96, and 2007) hypothesis is reinforced when we consider the statistical 
importance of the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks 
as a share of GDP (BANK). As indicated in column III, BANK is not only statistically 
significant with positive coefficient, but the variable also exhibits the highest level of 
explanatory power (0.03). Considering the explanatory power of the coefficient of effect of 
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domestic credit provided by banking sector as a percentage of GDP on inflow of FDI, it could 
be argued that BANK positively influences inflow of FDI (FDINFL). In specific, an increase 
in domestic bank credit has a statistically significant probability of positively influencing the 
attractiveness of the sampled African countries to inflow of FDI.  
The domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP (PRIVY) is also statistically 
significant with positive coefficient. Although, the explanatory power of the variable is 
weaker relative to equity turnover rate (TURNOVER) and domestics bank credit (BANK), it is 
stronger than that of equity market capitalisation (EQCAP). In essence, although equity 
market capitalisation is a statistically significant positive motivator for inflow of FDI, its 
influence in this regard is weaker compared to PRIVY, EQCAP and, more importantly, 
BANK.  
The fifth capital market variable used in this analysis (NONFIN) indicates a positive 
coefficient but it is statistically insignificant. It could thus be observed that claims on 
domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a percentage of GDP does not serve 
as an important pull factor for inflow of FDI into the sampled African countries. Although, 
the period effect indicates that this variable has become increasingly important in determining 
the attractiveness of the sampled African countries since 2005 up until 2012, just like the rest 
of capital market development variables used in this analysis.  
The outputs for the regional effects show fairly different stories. In North Africa estimation, 
the same process is followed as done for the pooled estimation, given that the number of 
observation for the three-country regional analysis is comparatively higher than in the other 
regions (96 compared to 33). Although GMM is applied in the Southern, West and East 
African estimations, orthogonal deviation cannot be used being single-country analyses. To 
that effect, we applied the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) 
estimation, using the Bartlett Kernel, Integer Newey-West fixed bandwidth selection 
procedure.  
Study (Baltagi, 2008) suggests that the GMM-time series (HAC) option enhances the 
robustness of estimations to contemporaneous autocorrelation of residuals in estimation. We 
report results based on standard errors and covariance weighting matrix estimation. Also, 
because of the small observation size (33), we restrict the number of dummy variables to one 
(INFLATION) in order to uncover the explanatory power of the capital market variables that 
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are used in the estimation. Inflation is preferable to trade volume (TRADE) because it is a by-
product of a country’s macroeconomic policy and its influence is more immediate as 
compared to that of TRADE. Further, annual percentage change in consumer prices 
(INFLATION) is more of a concern in Africa than TRADE and its introduction into the 
system may change the dynamics of the estimation. This fear is compounded given its 
possible negative multiplier effects on the quality of life and cost of living on entire domestic 
economy. The results of the estimation are presented in Table 5.7: 
Table 5.7: The Regional-Effect GMM panel Regression for equation 2 (1980-2012) 
Capital Market Development on Inflow of FDI (Dependent Variable – FDINFL) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cross-section weights instrument weighting matrix 
and Convergence was achieved after 1 weight iterations. Cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f. 
correction). Maximum lags of dependent and predetermined variables for use as instruments are limited to 1. 
Before conducting the regression analysis, stepwise regression is conducted in order to 
determine the explanatory power of the variables used in the estimation. The result of the 
stepwise regression suggests that trade volume (TRADE) weakens the explanatory powers of 
the model. This finding further reinforces the justification to remove the variable from the 
estimation. In the North Africa regional analysis, the robust standard errors suggest statistical 
significance of the model.  
In addition, the goodness of fit of the model is ascertained through the Sargan tests that are 
statistically insignificant in the estimation. We use the total value of all listed shares in a 
 North Africa Southern Africa West Africa East Africa 
EQCAP 0.037882 
(0.007917)*** 
0.008716 
(0.000985)*** 
0.138573 
(0.023977)*** 
0.015785 
(0.005162)*** 
INFLATION 0.019910 
(0.033456) 
-0.054775 
(0.009734)*** 
0.061494 
(0.010776)*** 
0.029470 
(0.009206)*** 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.320 0.325 0.904 0.283 
TURNOVER 0.091711 
(0.015830)*** 
0.016613 
(0.002375)*** 
0.511797 
(0.051686)*** 
0.140917 
(0.037673)*** 
INFLATION 0.0941) 
(0.030233) 
-0.003779 
(0.004693) 
0.085063 
(0.010970)*** 
0.038576 
(0.006492)*** 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.546 0.523 0.407 0.238 
BANK 0.020190 
(0.013098) 
0.030876 
(0.005396)*** 
0.105441 
(0.017018)*** 
0.017268 
(0.004345)*** 
INFLATION -0.005716 
(0.042182) 
-0.095392 
(0.024328)*** 
0.085320 
(0.010261)*** 
0.016261 
(0.007666)** 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.740 0.956 0.194 0.345 
PRIVY 0.017184 
(0.014558) 
0.013781 
(0.002270)*** 
0.085320 
(0.019926)*** 
0.012412 
(0.005008)** 
INFLATION -0.009564 
(0.043102) 
-0.064848 
(0.017148)*** 
0.058766 
(0.011677)*** 
0.017360 
(0.011921) 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.306 0.621 0.119 0.556 
NONFIN -0.041205 
(0.028354) 
0.277537 
(0.144716)* 
0.134559 
(0.051699)** 
-0.006743 
(0.017839) 
INFLATION -0.011960 
(0.039792) 
-0.022801 
0.032873 
0.031371 
(0.023974)*** 
0.045752 
(0.016325)*** 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.379 0.198 0.135 0.423 
Observation 96 33 33 33 
Number of countries 3 1 1 1 
Orthogonal Deviation Yes No No No 
Newey-West (HAC) No Yes Yes Yes 
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stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) as the independent variable in Table 5.6 
while inflow of FDI (FDINFL) remains the dependent variable. According to that Table, the 
total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) has 
positive relationship with inflow of FDI (FDINFL) in all the four regions in our sample. The 
coefficient of this variable is stronger is West Africa than in the other three regions. This 
suggests that although, equity capitalisation is a statistically significant determinant of inflow 
of FDI to the regions in our sample, its effect is greater in West Africa (0.14) and lesser in 
Southern Africa (0.00) than in the other regions.  
Table 5.6 further suggests that the total value of all traded shares in a stock market exchange 
(TURNOVER) bears positive coefficients with the dependent variable in all the regions. 
According to the Table, the relationship between the dependent variable (FDINFL) and stock 
turnover rate (TURNOVER) is statistically significant for all the four regions. However, stock 
turnover rate tends to explain inflow of FDI to West Africa more than the other three regions, 
while its explanatory power is comparatively weakest in explaining inflow of FDI to 
Southern Africa region. Apart from the statistical importance of the equity market as a 
determinant of inflow of FDI to the four Africa regions in this estimation, BANK also play a 
significant role in attracting inflow of FDI to the four regions.  
As contained in Table 5.7, BANK has positive coefficient with the dependent variable and it 
is statistically significant for the four regions. According to this analysis, the more financial 
resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a share of GDP, the 
more FDI flows to the four Africa regions sampled in this study. In specific, the result 
indicates that BANK plays a stronger deterministic role in inflow of FDI to West Africa than 
in the other three regions, with North Africa showing the least importance of this variable in 
attracting FDI.  
Regarding domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP (PRIVY), this variable 
bears a positive coefficient in all the regions, but it is only statistically significant in three of 
the four regions namely Southern, West and East Africa regions. However, its statistical 
significance is stronger in Southern and West Africa compared to East Africa region. In 
addition, its explanatory power is stronger in explaining inflow of FDI to West Africa (0.085) 
and weakest in East Africa (0.012) in this regard. 
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It must be recalled that claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a 
share of GDP (NONFIN) is statistically insignificant as a determinant of inflow of FDI to 
Africa in the pooled estimation. In the regional analysis, however, the result is not very 
different. In specific, NONFIN bears negative coefficient with the dependent variable in 
North and East Africa, but the variable is statistically insignificant in both instances.  
In Southern and West Africa regions, the variable bears a positive coefficient and it is 
statistically significant. The statistical significance is stronger in West Africa (five per cent 
level) than in Southern Africa (10 per cent). In specific, the explanatory power of NONFIN as 
a pool factor for inflow of FDI to regions in Africa is stronger in Southern Africa than in 
West Africa. However, the fact that the variable is only significant at 10 per cent error level 
as compared to five per cent error level in the case of West Africa indicates that we tame the 
comparative strength of the statistical importance of this variable in Southern Africa with 
caution.  
5.3.5 Impulse response analysis for equation 2 
Although, the regression analysis is able to establish some form of relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables, it is important to establish the speed of adjustment of 
the dependent variables to the shocks of independent variables. In econometrics, an impulse 
response function depicts the effect of a one-time shock (more importantly of the dependent 
variable) to one of the innovations on current and future values of the potential endogenous 
variables (Pesaran & Yongcheol, 1998; Koop, 2008).  
To control for individual effects in all the impulse response estimations in this study, the 
residuals are orthogonalised while the instrumental variables are restricted using the AIC 
criteria. This restriction is essential because, in its absence, the long-run reactions of the 
variables to the impulses hitting the system will not be very clear (Lewis & Reinsel, 1985; 
Breitung, Br¨uggemann & L¨utkepohl, 2004).  
Further, these diagnostic procedures ensure that the instrumental variables are 
contemporaneously uncorrelated and endogeneity bias is eliminated (Pesaran & Yongcheol, 
1998; Breitung, Brüggemann and Lütkepohl, 2004). For equation 2, the impulse response 
estimation is generated using the nonfactorised one unit innovations. This technique is 
informed by the nature of FDI data and capital market dataset that are presented in natural 
numerical or currency units. Further, the point of equilibrium in the speed of adjustment for 
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all the impulse response estimations is set to zero (0), given that (0) is the balancing point 
between negative and positive impulse responses. The result of the impulse response for 
equation 2 is presented in Table 5.8. In Table 5.8, all the variables in the estimations are 
entered at the same time, especially given that the introduction of the variables separately into 
the estimation yields the same result. 
Pooled Estimation  
Table 5.8: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 2 (1980-2012): 
Pooled data (Response of FDINFL to Capital Market) 
 Period BANK NONFIN PRIVY EQCAP TURNOVER 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2 -0.023238  0.031819  0.005451  0.012223  0.085354 
 3 -0.061279  0.099444  0.027208  0.028655  0.054149 
 4 -0.076296  0.113791  0.041010 -0.000673  0.076214 
 5 -0.055945  0.114639  0.023717 -0.008374  0.061940 
 6 -0.060183  0.107780  0.042321 -0.012313  0.063750 
 7 -0.070794  0.102943  0.045335 -0.009711  0.081459 
 8 -0.065645  0.096792  0.046376 -0.008193  0.102405 
 9 -0.068091  0.097605  0.053718 -0.009917  0.120982 
 10 -0.074827  0.101259  0.060055 -0.010815  0.134971 
Nonfactorized one unit innovation.  
 
Conventionally, impulse response estimation also helps to ascertain stationarity in the 
estimated variables. In practice, if the estimated model is not stationary, the asymptotic 
values will not be displayed since they do not exist. More importantly, if the estimated model 
is stationary, the impulse responses will asymptote to zero (Pesaran & Yongcheol, 1998; 
Baltagi, 2008). In Table 5.8, both these cases hold, especially given that the impulse 
responses asymptotes to zero for all the explanatory variables. It must be pointed out that one 
standard deviation shock is selected to control for innovation uncertainty when estimating the 
standard errors of the responses in all the impulse response estimations in this study.   
The coefficients of the representation presented in the analysis contained in Table 5.8 may be 
interpreted as reflecting the responses of FDI inflow to impulses (innovation shocks) of 
capital market development indicators hitting the system. Looking at individual variables in 
Table 5.8, the reaction of inflow of FDI to one unit shock in financial resources provided to 
the private sector by domestic money banks as a share of GDP (BANK) begins in the second 
period and it continues negatively for the duration of the estimation period (nine years).  
By implication, the speed of adjustment of the FDI inflow to one unit innovation on BANK is 
very significant and this relationship suggests that inflow of FDI is negatively influenced by 
BANK and the effect is even greater in the fourth
 
and 10
th
 periods (eighth and seventh per 
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cent). However, the reaction of inflow of FDI to one unit innovation shock on NONFIN is 
positive, and the effect is greater in the fourth and the fifth periods (11 per cent). Further, the 
reaction of inflow of FDI to PRIVY is positive and the impulse response is highest in the 10
th
 
period (six per cent).  
The responses of FDI inflow to the two equity market variables were both negative and 
positive. For EQCAP, the first two periods are positive and the effect is greater (three per 
cent) in the third year, but the negative effects are very mild and the worst responses are 
recorded by the sixth and 10
th
 periods (one per cent). For a unit shock on TURNOVER, the 
response of FDI inflow is positive and the highest response is recorded in period ten (13 per 
cent).  
Considering the reaction of FDI inflow to these capital market variables, it is evident that 
these variables play strong deterministic role on the attractiveness of the sampled African 
countries to inflow of FDI. More specifically, the reaction of FDI inflow to a unit shock in 
financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a share of 
GDP (BANK) as well as a unit shock on the total value of all traded shares in a stock market 
exchange (TURNOVER) may negatively affect inflow of FDI to the sampled African 
countries. A cautious approach to any possible innovative shock on these explanatory 
variables will thus be expedient.  
Having looked at the impulse response analysis for the pooled equation, we now look at the 
regional impulse response analyses, beginning with North African analysis that is presented 
in Table 5.9.  
 North Africa 
Table 5.9: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 2 (1980-2012): 
North Africa Regional data (Response of FDINFL to Capital Market) 
 Period BANK PRIVY NONFIN EQCAP TURNOVER 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2 -0.120013  0.016740 -0.048937 -0.011646  0.157187 
 3 -0.037586 -0.066663 -0.004317  0.067129 -0.105906 
 4 -0.073039 -0.008365  0.051053  0.070743 -0.135963 
 5  0.030442 -0.001669  0.109168 -0.048501  -0.031302 
 6  0.154136 -0.010457  0.113738 -0.081509 -0.014702 
 7  0.159154 -0.011184  0.064636  0.042008 -0.245407 
 8  0.142285  -0.004897  0.032068  0.052318 -0.108125 
 9  0.204046 -0.001206  0.052226 -0.054589 -0.125943 
 10  0.206750 -0.016160  0.044402  0.014113 -0.098763 
Nonfactorized one unit innovation 
125 
 
According to Table 5.9, inflow of FDI reacts negatively to one unit innovation shock in 
financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a share of 
GDP (BANK) from the second period through to the fourth period, before the reaction 
changes to a positive one for the rest of the period under consideration. The worst negative 
effect is recorded in the second period whereas the best positive reaction comes in the tenth 
period (21 per cent). This implies that although inflow of FDI may react negatively to new 
banking regulations, the negative effect will be temporary and the positive effects on inflow 
of FDI will be greater at a later stage.   
Looking at the reaction of inflow of FDI to one unit innovation shock on domestic credit to 
the private sector as a percentage of GDP (PRIVY), inflow of FDI reacts positively at two per 
cent to the new development, but the reaction becomes negative from the third period and it 
does not recover for the entire period considered in this study. The highest negative reaction 
is recorded in the third period (seven per cent), and the reaction becomes insignificant at 
barely one per cent for the remaining period considered.    
Further, the reaction of FDI inflow to one unit shock on the claims on domestic real 
nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) is significantly high in 
the second period (about 5 per cent), but it becomes positive in the fourth period and that 
positive reaction continues throughout the periods covered, the highest being in the fifth and 
sixth periods (11 per cent). As for one unit innovation shock on the two equity market 
indicators, the reaction of FDI inflow is mixed.  
The period immediately after the innovation shock on the total value of all listed shares in a 
stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) experienced a negative reaction of about one 
per cent on inflow of FDI. FDI inflow later recovered to gain about seven per cent 
improvement in the third and fourth periods, before reacting negatively again at about eight 
per cent in the sixth period. The negative trend continues for the rest of the period considered, 
albeit at a reducing response rate. 
Looking at the reaction of FDI inflow to one unit innovation shock on the total value of all 
traded shares in a stock market exchange (TURNOVER), it is observed that inflow of FDI 
reacts spontaneously and positively too by about 16 per cent immediately after the innovation 
shock, but the reaction becomes negative immediately after the second period (11 per cent), 
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and the negative trend continues for the rest of the period covered. The negative effect 
reaches its peak in the seventh period (25 per cent).  
The general observation from this analysis is that all these explanatory variables play 
statistically significant deterministic roles on inflow of FDI to North Africa. While the best 
possible effect is recorded through innovation shock on BANK, the reaction of inflow of FDI 
to innovation shock on TURNOVER is negative and the speed of adjustment to the shock is 
very rapid.    
Southern Africa 
Table 5.10: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 2 (1980-2012): 
Southern Africa Regional data (Response of FDINFL to Capital Market) 
 Period BANK PRIVY NONFIN EQCAP TURNOVER 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2 -0.379246  0.112536  1.329608 -0.043095 -0.051244 
 3 -0.264069  0.088883 -0.095560  0.024306  0.044498 
 4  0.034823 -0.008505 -1.636286  0.026825  0.099046 
 5 -0.355251  0.084069  0.359086 -0.012698  0.076905 
 6 -0.461435  0.107518  0.151818 -0.000619  0.102086 
 7 -0.171374  0.069778 -1.181646  0.028718  0.158104 
 8 -0.235495  0.072567 -0.874583 -0.002308  0.183896 
 9 -0.486622  0.128862 -0.088230 -0.004832  0.185199 
 10 -0.374700  0.121273 -1.180467  0.015006  0.236112 
Nonfactorized one unit innovation 
The results of the impulse response presented in Table 5.10 for Southern Africa indicates that 
the reactions of FDI inflow to the capital market variables are mixed. To begin with, inflow 
of FDI reacts spontaneously in a negative way to one unit innovation shock on financial 
resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a share of GDP (BANK) 
by about 38 per cent in the second period. The negative trend continues throughout the period 
under consideration and it reaches its peak in the ninth period (49 per cent). This result hints 
that Southern Africa region would not be attractive to inflow of FDI if the banking sector 
experiences instability.  
In addition, inflow of FDI reacts more positively than negatively to one unit innovation shock 
on domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP (PRIVY). In specific, except 
for the fourth period that experiences less than one per cent negative reaction, inflow of FDI 
reacts positively to one unit innovation shock on PRIVY throughout the period covered in the 
study. For instance, inflow of FDI reacts positively to one unit innovation shock on PRIVY in 
the second period by more than 11 per cent, and the positive trend reaches a peak of 13 per 
cent in the ninth period before reducing to 12 per cent in the 10
th
 period. One may argue from 
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the analysis that the advantage of innovation shock on PRIVY would be meaningfully 
important to make Southern Africa more attractive to inflow of FDI.   
Looking at the reaction of inflow of FDI to one unit innovation shock on the claims on 
domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN), it is 
interesting to note that inflow of FDI reacts positively and spontaneously too (second period), 
to the innovation shock by more than 100 per cent. However, the positive reaction does not 
last for long. The reaction becomes negative in the third period, and the negative reaction is 
explosive in the fourth period, before receding to moderate positive reactions in the fifth and 
sixth periods. The negative reactions are explosive again in the seventh and 10
th
 periods. 
Even the negative reaction during the eighth period is more than 87 per cent. One can thus 
argue that inflow of FDI will generally react negatively to innovation shock on the claims on 
domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN), even 
though the innovation shock may look expedient at the beginning.  
Looking at the reaction of FDI inflow to one unit innovation shock on the two equity capital 
market variables, it is observed that FDI inflow reacts negatively by about four per cent to 
one unit innovation shock on the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a 
percentage of GDP (EQCAP). The reaction turns positive in the third (2 per cent) and fourth 
(3 per cent) periods before changing to negative by about one per cent in the fifth period. The 
seventh and 10
th
 periods also experience positive reactions of about three and two per cent 
respectively. One may thus observe that although the speed of adjustment of FDI inflow to 
one unit innovation shock on EQCAP is high, there is a high tendency that Southern Africa 
region will be more attractive to FDI inflow through this form of innovation shock.   
The reaction of inflow of FDI to one unit innovation shock on the last capital market variable 
(and the second equity capital market variable – TURNOVER) hints that this form of 
innovation shock is very desirable in order for Southern Africa to be more attractive to inflow 
of FDI. For instance, inflow of FDI reacts immediately but negatively by about five per cent 
to this innovation in the second period, but the reaction becomes positive thereafter, reaching 
a peak of 24 per cent in the 10
th
 period. It can therefore be proposed that inflow of FDI to 
Southern Africa region will react more positively to one unit innovation shock on the equity 
market (EQCAP and TURNOVER) than to debt market, especially BANK and NONFIN, 
whose effects are conspicuously negative.     
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West Africa 
Table 5.11: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 2 (1980-2012): 
West Africa Regional data (Response of FDINFL to Capital Market) 
 Period BANK PRIVY NONFIN EQCAP TURNOVER 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2 -0.173325 -0.028280  0.103024  0.078119  0.011360 
 3 -1.639017  0.642010  0.412394  0.703195 -1.963460 
 4 -1.332007  0.720480  0.567654 -0.387053  0.629666 
 5 0.164986 -0.364442  0.139206 -1.098547  5.110116 
 6  0.198699 -0.161041 -0.020251  0.447027 -2.504201 
 7 -1.106491  0.684175  0.195488  0.674209 -6.389053 
 8 -0.776256  0.467498  0.340755 -1.143278  4.604588 
 9 -0.478799  0.329061  0.395747 -1.296325  10.17264 
 10  0.468987 -0.096942  0.074218  0.098317 -0.732861 
Nonfactorized one unit innovation 
According to Table 5.11, inflow of FDI responds to one unit innovation shock on the 
financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a share of 
GDP (BANK) negatively in most of the periods and explosive in three of the instances. In 
specific, the reaction of inflow of FDI in the first period is about 17 per cent, before the 
negative reaction becomes explosive in third and fourth periods. The positive recovery in the 
fifth and sixth periods is barely 16 and 20 per cent respectively before the negative reaction 
sets in again. After the explosive negative reaction in the seventh period, the speed of 
adjustment back to the point of equilibrium becomes steady and a positive 47 per cent 
response is recorded in the tenth period.  
Looking at the reaction of FDI inflow to one unit innovation shock on the domestic credit to 
the private sector as a percentage of GDP (PRIVY), it is observed that inflow of FDI reacts 
immediately in the second period by about three per cent and it quickly recover back to 
positive territory by the third and fourth periods (64 and 72 per cent respectively). The 
reaction becomes negative again in the fifth and sixth periods (36 and 16 per cent 
respectively) before turning positive in the seventh, eighth and ninth periods (68, 47 and 32 
per cent respectively). However, about 10 per cent negative reaction is recorded in the 10
th
 
period. The observation from these results is that inflow of FDI to West Africa will generally 
react more positively than negatively to innovation shock on PRIVY, and the speed of 
adjustment back to equilibrium is rapid.  
Looking at the reaction of FDI inflow to one unit innovation shock on the claims on domestic 
real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN), we observe that 
the reaction is generally positive, except for the negative reaction of about two per cent 
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recorded in the sixth period. In specific, the positive reaction of inflow of FDI to one unit 
innovation shock on NONFIN in the second, third and fourth periods are 10, 41 and 57 per 
cent respectively. The positive trend continues and reaches 40 per cent in the ninth period, 
before regressing to seven per cent in the 10
th
 period. Here again, it can be proposed that the 
claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP 
(NONFIN) is an important determinant of inflow of FDI to West Africa and the speed of 
adjustment of FDI inflow to innovative shock on this variable is high.  
Regarding the reaction of inflow of FDI to one unit innovation shock on the total value of all 
listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP), it is observed that inflow of 
FDI reacts positively in more instances to the innovative shock. However, in three of the four 
instances where inflow of FDI reacts negatively, the reactions are explosive. While inflow of 
FDI begins its positive reaction in the second period at about eight per cent, the reaction gains 
momentum to more than 70 per cent in the third period before a negative swing of about 39 
per cent in the fourth period and an explosive negative reaction in the fifth period.  
Although the positive recovery of about 45 and 67 per cent improvement in the sixth and 
seventh periods are noticeable, the reaction becomes negatively explosive in the eighth and 
ninth periods and the effects of these negative reactions overshadows the mere 10 per cent 
positive recovery in the 10
th
 period. It could thus be suggested that although inflow of FDI 
will generally react positively to innovation shocks on the total value of all listed shares in a 
stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) in West Africa, the impact of the negative 
reactions will ultimately outweigh the positive reactions.    
The reaction of FDI inflow to one unit innovation shock on the total value of all traded shares 
in a stock market exchange (TURNOVER) is mixed, with a chaotic speed of adjustment. 
While the reaction is barely one per cent at a positive territory in the second period, it 
becomes negatively explosive in the third period before turning positive (63 per cent) in the 
fourth period. The positive reaction becomes explosive in the fifth period, but the negative 
reaction that follows in the sixth and seventh periods are high.  
Although, the reaction of FDI inflow to TURNOVER recovered positively well in the eighth 
and more importantly in the ninth periods, but the negative reaction in period 10 is also 
noticeable (73 per cent).  In the case of West Africa, the general argument can be advanced 
that inflow of FDI responds to innovation shocks on all the capital market variables in the 
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estimation - more negatively to BANK and more positively to TURNOVER, suggesting that 
although these variables are important determinants of the attractiveness of West Africa to 
inflow of FDI, the effects of BANK and TURNOVER are higher.  
East Africa   
Table 5.12: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 2 (1980-2012): 
East Africa Regional data (Response of FDINFL to Capital Market) 
 Period BANK PRIVY NONFIN EQCAP TURNOVER 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.037311  0.045209 -0.166868  0.063837  0.749364 
 3 -0.088554  0.219120 -0.049888  0.023907  0.002911 
 4  0.029449  0.189683 -0.021435  0.020144  0.077213 
 5  0.103669  0.168789 -0.156871  0.118279 -0.791201 
 6  0.176833 -0.091925 -0.000366  0.061693 -0.548381 
 7  0.150307 -0.188475 0.169472 -0.082269  0.463221 
 8 -0.065563 -0.039933 0.115954 -0.128937  1.914360 
 9 -0.255529  0.381128 -0.121139 -0.023583  1.936927 
 10 -0.214098  0.726336 -0.360977 0.175277  0.006842 
Nonfactorized one unit innovation 
 
From Table 5.12, inflow of FDI responds to one unit innovation shock on capital market 
variables hitting the system both negatively and positively. In specific, the reaction of inflow 
of FDINFL to the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks 
as a share of GDP (BANK) is positive but weak in the second period (about four per cent). 
The reaction becomes negative in the third period by nine per cent before maintaining a 
steady positive reaction of three, 10, 18 and 15 per cent during fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh 
periods respectively.  However, the reaction enters a negative territory in the eighth period 
and it never recovered till the last period in the study. A general observation from these 
results is that inflow of FDI will react more negatively (26 per cent) than positively (18 per 
cent to innovative shocks on BANK.  
Further, inflow of FDI reacts positively by four per cent during the second period to one unit 
innovation shock on the domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP 
(PRIVY). During the third, fourth and fifth periods, this positive reaction stands at 22, 19 and 
17 per cent respectively. Thereafter, although the variable reacts negatively by nine, 19 and 
four per cent during the sixth, seventh and eight periods, the positive reactions that follows 
between the ninth (38 per cent) and 10
th
 (73 per cent) periods are more significant. This lends 
credence to the statistical significance of PRIVY as an important capital market determinant 
of the attractiveness of East Africa to inflow of FDI.   
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Looking at the reaction of FDI inflow to one unit innovation shock on the claims on domestic 
real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN), we observe that 
the reaction is generally negative, except for the positive reactions of 17 and 12 per cent 
recorded in the seventh and eighth periods. In the second period, inflow of FDI reacts 
negatively by 17 per cent to one unit innovation shock on NONFIN. The negative reaction 
continues in the third (four per cent), fourth (two per cent) and fifth (16 per cent) periods. By 
the ninth and 10
th
 periods, the negative reactions are 12 and 36 per cent respectively. It can 
thus be implied that the negative effects of innovation shocks on NONFIN will negatively 
affect the attractiveness of East Africa to inflow of FDI.   
Regarding the reaction of inflow of FDI to one unit innovation shock on the total value of all 
listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP), it is observed that inflow of 
FDI reacts positively in more instances to the innovations shock than negatively. In specific, 
the positive reaction starts in the second period (six per cent), increases to 12 per cent in the 
fifth period before changing to negative again in the seventh (eight per cent), eighth (13 per 
cent) and ninth periods (two per cent). The reaction of FDI inflow to one unit innovation 
shock on EQCAP ends in the 10
th
 period in a positive territory (18 per cent). These results 
indicate that inflow of FDI will react more positively than negatively to innovation shock on 
EQCAP, and that EQCAP is an important determinant of the attractiveness of East Africa to 
inflow of FDI.     
The reaction of FDI inflow to one unit innovation shock on the total value of all traded shares 
in a stock market exchange (TURNOVER) is largely very positive, except for the two 
negative reactions recorded in fifth (79 per cent) and sixth (55 per cent) periods. In the 
second period, the reaction is strong at 75 per cent, before becoming mild in the fourth period 
(eight per cent). The seventh period experiences a moderate reaction of 46 per cent, but the 
positive reaction becomes explosive in the eighth and ninth periods. Although, the 10
th
 period 
is positive, its effect is very mild (barely one per cent). In all instances, it can be argued that 
innovation shocks on the capital market variables will improve the attractiveness of East 
Africa to inflow of FDI. It is also observed that all the capital market variables are 
statistically significant as determinants of inflow of FDI to the East African region; while 
innovation shocks on BANK will generally result in more negative effects on the 
attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI, such a shock would yield more positive effects 
in the case of TURNOVER.     
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5.3.6 Cointegration test for equation 2 
After the impulse response analysis, attention will now be directed to the causality test. 
However, causality test cannot be performed until we are able to establish long-run 
cointegration of the variables under consideration. As such, cointegration regressions are 
conducted. In the cointegration estimation, we specify the deterministic trend components 
through the trend specification. We estimate the differenced regressors equations (given the 
I(1) order of integration as informed by the unit root test presented earlier). With the basic 
assumption of nonstationarity (Pedroni, 2000; Kao & Chiang, 2000), we apply the pooled 
(weighted) cointegration regression estimation. This is done in order to account for 
heterogeneity by using cross-section specific estimates of the long-run covariances in 
reweighting the data prior to computing the pooled fully-modified ordinary least squares 
(FMOLS).  
According to Pedroni (2000), as well as Kao and Chiang (2000), first-stage estimates of the 
long-run and regressors equations are used to obtain the residuals, and estimate the individual 
long-run variances thereby enhancing the stability of the result. These authors further observe 
that the FMOLS is particularly useful in situations where the long-run variances differ across 
cross-sections in heterogeneous cointegrated panels. Further, we estimate the individual and 
long-run average covariance matrices using a (non-prewhitened) kernel approach with a 
Bartlett Kernel function and Newey-West fixed bandwidth.   
For robustness check, we applied the grouped-mean estimator technique to accommodate 
potential presence of heterogeneity in the cointegrating relationships. According to Pedroni 
(2001; 2004), this technique offers the desirable property of providing consistent estimates of 
the sample mean of the cointegrating vectors, in contrast to the pooled and weighted 
estimators. However, the results are not statistically different from the one generated through 
the base estimation technique (FMOLS). We therefore report the results based on the FMOLS 
given its specific relevance to this study (cross-section and period effects). To limit the lag 
length because of the small sample size, the Schwarz criterion is applied to select the number 
of lags required in each case. The result of the cointegration test is presented in Table 5.13. 
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Table 5.13: Cointegration Regression for equation 2 (1980-2012) 
Capital Market Development on Inflow of FDI (Dependent Variable – FDINFL) 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Method: Panel Fully Modified Ordinary  Least Squares 
(FMOLS). First-stage residuals use heterogeneous long-run coefficients. Long-run covariance estimates (Prewhitening with 
lags = 1, Bartlett Kernel, Integer Newey-West fixed bandwidth). 
 
In Table 5.13, column I represents the pooled estimate for the six African countries in our 
sample. Columns II, III, IV and V represent the North, Southern, West and East African 
regions as sampled. We report results based on robust standard errors. The results of the 
cointegration tests for the pooled sampled regions suggest that we reject the Null of no 
cointegration.  
Although, this decision criteria is weaker for domestic credit to private sector as a percentage 
of GDP (PRIVY) and claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a 
share of GDP (NONFIN), but the two variables are still statistically significant at 5 per cent 
error levels. In the regional analysis, cointegration between the dependent and independent 
variables are though statistically significant, but only at 10 per cent for four of the five capital 
market variables under consideration.   
In the pooled cointegration test, EQCAP, TURNOVER and BANK share statistically 
significant relationships with the dependent variable at 99 per cent confidence levels, while 
the cointegration between the dependent variable and the other two capital market variables 
(PRIVY and NONFIN) are statistically significant at 5 per cent error levels. This suggests that 
all the variables used in the pooled equation share long run relationships with the dependent 
variable.  
For North Africa, the two equity market variables along with BANK are statistically 
significant at 99 per cent confidence levels, while the PRIVY and NONFIN are statistically 
significant at 10 per cent error levels respectively.  The situation for Southern Africa is a bit 
different, in that four of the five capital market variables are in long run equilibrium with the 
 I II III IV V 
EQCAP 0.019565 
( 0.00542)*** 
0.042582 
(0.010447)*** 
0.012613 
(0.003985)*** 
0.213119 
(0.052026)*** 
0.012021 
(0.004821)*** 
TURNOVER 0.026920 
( 0.00721)*** 
0.093478 
(0.02315)*** 
0.016497 
(0.004205)*** 
0.783384 
(0.068903)* 
0.100553 
(0.039901)*** 
BANK 0.044055 
( 3.12088)*** 
0.044179 
(0.019098)*** 
0.072785 
(0.014252)*** 
-0.008565 
(0.08999)* 
0.012583 
(0.019205)* 
PRIVY 0.024567 
(0.009499)** 
0.035536 
(0.022182)* 
0.020635 
(0.004458)*** 
-0.008367 
(0.041728)* 
0.016333 
(0.027391)* 
NONFIN -0.015936 
(0.02443)** 
-0.031397 
(0.034619)* 
-0.356084 
(0.068199)* 
0.030650 
(0.052832)* 
-0.058497 
(0.018455)*** 
Observation 192 96 32 32 32 
Number of countries 6 3 1 1 1 
Pooled Estimation Yes No No No No 
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dependent variable, while the fifth variable (NONFIN) is only statistically significant at 10 
per cent error level.  
In West Africa, only equity capitalisation (EQCAP) is statistically significant at 99 per cent 
confidence level, and the remaining four capital market variables only show cointegration 
with the dependent variable at 10 per cent error levels. In the case of East Africa, three of the 
five capital market variables (EQCAP, TURNOVER, and NONFIN) are statistically 
significant at 99 per cent confidence levels, while the remaining two variables (BANK and 
PRIVY) are only statistically significant at 10 per cent error levels. In line with the regional 
cointegration analysis, argument can be advanced that there are long run equilibrium 
relationships among the variables used in equation 2.  Further observation suggests that the 
result contained in Table 5.13 is in line with the GMM result presented in Table 5.7.     
5.3.7 Granger causality test for equation 2 
After the cointegration test, attention will now be directed to the causality test, to establish 
the direction of causality in the relationship established in the regression analysis. In this 
study, Granger causality test will be used. The Granger Causality tests are generally used to 
examine whether there exists causal relationship between the macroeconomic variables under 
study. To test for causality, the null hypothesis of no causality has to be rejected, as 
determined by the p-value of the series. More specifically, we reject the Null in the rows for 
p-values <= 0.05. This Granger test is implemented by running the following regression: 
       ∑   
 
         ∑   
 
                                                       (13) 
The statistical significance of the null hypothesis (H0: γ1 = γ2 = ...γp  = 0)   is tested against the 
alternative hypothesis: 
       ∑        
 
    ∑        
 
                                      (14) 
Alternative hypothesis decision: (H0: γ1 >γ2 ...γp  > 0); 
Where  is the difference operator,   and    are the variables being tested for causal 
relationship,     and     are constant term,     and    are the estimate coefficients, and    is 
the lag length of the model.   
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Statistically, Granger causality from one variable (y) to the coincident variable (x) is 
established if the null hypothesis of the asymptotic chi-square (χ²) test is rejected. A 
significant test statistic indicates that the x variable has predictive value for forecasting the 
corresponding movements in y in the series. Although, one of the major shortcomings of the 
Granger causality test is that it is based on the asymptotic theory, which prescribes the 
stationarity of variables (Granger, 1988), this assumption is satisfied in this study as indicated 
in Table 5.5 (unit root test). Further, in all the causality tests, the main results are highlighted 
to show clearly the variables that are statistically significant.  
The causal relationships among the variables tested are indicated in red in Table 5.14, which 
contains only the variables of interest (capital market development and inflow of FDI 
variables):  
Table 5.14: Granger Causality Test for Equation 2 (1980-2012):  
Pooled Data (lag of 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F-statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
From Table 5.14, in three of the possible ten instances, we do not reject the null that capital 
market variables do not homogeneously cause inflow of FDI. From Table 5.14, there are only 
three causal relationships in the analysis, and they are unidirectional. In specific, causality 
runs from equity capitalisation to inflow of FDI. Causality also runs from equity turnover rate 
to inflow of FDI and the last causality runs from the financial resources provided to the 
private sector by domestic money banks as a share of GDP to inflow of FDI.  
In all the three instances, the causal relationship is weak (10 per cent error level). Despite the 
weak statistical significance of these causal relationships, argument can still be advanced that 
three of the five capital market variables used in this analysis motivates inflow of FDI to the 
Direction of causality  Statistical 
significance  
 
FDINFL EQCAP (0.38128) 
EQCAP FDINFL (3.37066)* 
FDINFL TURNOVER (0.3195) 
TURNOVER FDINFL (0.1413)* 
FDINFL BANK (1.10540) 
BANK FDINFL (0.44435)* 
FDINFL PRIVY (1.02365) 
PRIVY FDINFL (0.05814) 
FDINFL NONFIN (1.05504)  
NONFIN FDINFL (1.26532) 
Observation 186 
Number of countries 6 
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sampled African countries. As done in the previous analysis, we also investigate the regional 
effects on causality. The results of the causality test are presented in Table 5.15: 
Table 5.15: Granger Causality Test for Equation 2 (1980-2012)  
Regional analysis (lag of 2) 
F-statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
North Africa: 
From Table 5.15, the causal relationship between the dependent variable (inflow of FDI – 
FDINFL) and the five capital market variables is fairly different from the relationships 
obtained for the pooled African estimation. In the North Africa regional analysis, there is 
bidirectional causality between inflow of FDI and equity capitalisation in the North Africa 
region. However, the causality is stronger from equity capitalisation to FDI than the other 
way round. This may be interpreted that equity capitalisation leads to inflow of FDI and 
increases in inflow of FDI may at a later stage influence equity capitalisation. Although, 
bidirectional causality may signal some degree of endogeneity, it must be recalled that we 
controlled for endogeneity in the regression analysis, thereby allaying this fear.  
Further analysis of Table 5.15 indicates that there is a direct causal relationship from stock 
turnover rate to inflow of FDI, suggesting that stock turnover rate does positively influence 
inflow of FDI to the sampled North Africa region. The same level of causal relationship also 
exists between the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money 
banks as a share of GDP (BANK) and inflow of FDI. This finding buttresses the hypothesis 
raised by Caves (2007).   
 
Direction of causality  North Africa Southern 
Africa 
West 
Africa 
East Africa 
 Statistical significance 
FDINFL EQCAP (2.60744)* (2.01603) (0.20825) (1.81227) 
EQCAP FDINFL (2.84562)** (4.56259)** (0.13950) (4.08595)** 
FDINFL TURNOVER (0.02438) (0.32466) (0.06498) (1.20780) 
TURNOVER FDINFL (2.42803)** (4.18826)** (0.38657) (4.16741)** 
FDINFL BANK (0.14113) (2.52314)* (0.12558) (1.44696) 
BANK FDINFL (4.34323)** (5.47091)** (0.30500) (1.05555) 
FDINFL PRIVY (0.10304) (2.16034) (0.09455) (1.55387)  
PRIVY FDINFL (1.34425) (7.21368)*** (0.05211) (1.24453) 
FDINFL NONFIN (1.04957) (0.97369) (1.63221) (1.71617) 
NONFIN FDINFL (0.25359) (0.70366) (0.55204) (0.30812) 
Observation 93 31 31 31 
Number of countries 3 1 1 1 
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Southern Africa: 
In the Southern Africa causality results, there is a bidirectional causal relationship between 
the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a share of 
GDP (BANK) and the dependent variable (inflow of FDI). By implication, causality flows 
stronger from BANK to FDINFL than the other way round which may suggest that an 
increase in BANK will culminate in an increase in FDINFL.  
In the long-run, increases in inflow of FDI may precipitate an increase in available credit to 
domestic private banks, which may be channelled to the private sector to rekindle the cyclical 
effect of capital regeneration. However, the remaining capital market variables (except for 
claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP - 
NONFIN) indicate unidirectional causal relationship with the dependent variable. The 
causality flows from these capital market variables to inflow of FDI at 5 per cent levels for 
equity capitalisation and stock turnover rate, and one per cent for domestic credit to private 
sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY).  
As informed by the results in Table 5.15, all the capital market variables (except for 
NIONFIN) contributes to the attractiveness of Southern Africa to inflow of FDI. This result 
corroborates the findings in Table 5.7 where NONFIN is found to be less significant as a 
determinant of inflow of FDI to Southern Africa. It could thus be suggested that further 
development of the southern Africa capital market will enhance the attractiveness of the 
region to inflow of FDI.  
West Africa: 
The West Africa Granger causality analysis indicates that none of the capital market variables 
used in this analysis have any causal effect on the dependent variable and vice versa. 
However, this may not be interpreted as suggesting that capital market does not influence 
inflow of FDI to West Africa region, especially given the dominant GMM result in Table 5.7.   
East Africa: 
The result of Granger causality test for East Africa is unique. In the East Africa analysis, only 
the stock market variables (equity capitalisation – EQCAP and stock turnover rate – 
TURNOVER) indicate unidirectional causal relationship with the dependent variable 
(FDINFL). In specific, causality between equity capitalisation and inflow of FDI flows 
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strongly from equity capitalisation to inflow of FDI. This suggests that equity capitalisation 
does serve as a pull factor for inflow of FDI to the East Africa region. The same relationship 
exists between the equity turnover and inflow of FDI. By implication, this form of 
relationship suggests that stock turnover rates do attract inflow of FDI to East Africa region.  
In all the regional analyses, claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank 
as a share of GDP (NONFIN) does not Granger cause inflow of FDI. This finding is not very 
different from the findings contained in the regression analysis (Table 5.7) where NONFIN is 
only statistically significant in Southern Africa (10 per cent) and in West Africa (5 per cent).  
Having completed a series of analyses that are deemed necessary to test the possible impact 
of capital market development on inflow of FDI within the limit of this study, we now 
proceed to Part B of the analysis. The next set of equations (equations 3 to 7) estimates the 
possible relationship between institutional framework and capital market development.  
Given that the role of institutional adequacy on capital market development (especially in 
Africa) is scarce in literature, this forms a part of the contribution of this study to the body of 
existing knowledge.  
5.4 Part B: Model specification for institutional framework and 
capital market development  
As done in Part A, the analyses of equations in this Part will begin with descriptive statistics. 
However, a single descriptive statistical table will be presented for the variables used in the 
Part. Table 5.16 contains the descriptive statistics for the pooled data, while Tables A2-1 to 
A2-4 contains the descriptive statistics for the four regions considered in this study. The 
argument below lays credence to the variables contained in Table 5.16.  
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics for equations 3 to 7 
To begin with, we conduct the descriptive statistics to establish the kind of relationship that 
exists between the variables used in estimating the models specified in this Part of the study. 
However, given that the explanatory variables used in Parts B and C are the same, we include 
the dependent variable for Part C in order to avoid duplicating the descriptive statistic in Part 
C. The result of the descriptive analysis is presented in Table 5.16. 
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Table 5.16: Descriptive Statistics for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012): pooled data 
 LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 Mean -0.374104 -1.969697  10.39535 -0.206048  3.399497 
 Median -0.120418 -5.000000  8.042283 -0.201023  3.300000 
 Maximum  0.240164  9.000000  83.62289  0.778381  5.300000 
 Minimum -1.521641 -9.000000 -5.550901 -1.322868  1.000000 
 Std. Dev.  0.559494  5.921576  10.68197  0.426414  1.245107 
 Skewness -0.692909  0.798545  3.098005 -0.037600 -0.022748 
 Kurtosis  1.753156  2.043955  16.95526  3.059373  1.705352 
 Jarque-Bera  28.66966  28.58391  1923.403  0.075736  13.84501 
 Probability  0.000001  0.000001  0.000000  0.962840  0.000985 
 Observations  198  198  198  198  198 
CQS (BANK) 0.6317*** 0.2384*** -0.3831*** 0.6927*** 0.7831*** 
CQS (PRIVY) 0.5255*** 0.4843*** -0.2377*** 0.7774*** 0.7070*** 
CQS (NONFIN) 0.1470*** -0.372*** 0.2306*** -0.3366*** -0.3553*** 
CQS (EQCAP) 0.3575*** 0.6517*** -0.1848† 0.6903*** 0.4498*** 
CQS (TURNOVER) 0.2692*** 0.4936*** -0.1068† 0.4913*** 0.2931*** 
CQS (FDINFL) -0.1059*** -0.1842†† 0.1678*** -0.2779*** -0.1115*** 
*Std. Dev (Standard deviation; CQS*** (Correlogram-Q-statistics) test statistic for autocorrelation up to the lag of 16. 
Result shows no autocorrelation with the dependent variable up to the lag of 16.Correlations are asymptotically consistent 
approximations. 
***Denotes statistical significance at 1% level 
† No autocorrelation up to lag of 10 
††  No autocorrelation up to lag of 8 
The descriptive statistics contained in Table 5.16 suggests that Nigeria has the worst rule of 
law (LAWRULE) rating out of the sampled countries and it was recorded in 2003 (-1.5216), 
while Morocco’s rule of law is rated the best in our sample and it occurred in 1998 (0.2402). 
The descriptive statistics for combined polity (POLITY) indicates that Tunisia in 1980 was 
considered the worst country on polity ratings while South Africa was rated the best 
throughout the period under consideration. Further, Nigeria experienced the highest-sample 
level of deflation in 1998 (-5.5509), as opposed to the highest sample-inflation level 
experienced by the same country in 1992 (83.6229).  
Still on the descriptive statistics contained in Table 5.16, Nigeria recorded the sample-worst 
quality of legal framework (QLEGAL) in 2004 (-1.32287) as opposed to South Africa’s 
sample-best rating in 2003 (0.7784). Corruption is largely seen as the major deterrent to 
capital market development in Africa (Hailu, 2010) and the result of the descriptive statistics 
is in the affirmation of this postulation. For example, the best corruption ranking in our 
sample was recorded by Tunisia in 2001 (5.3).  
This suggests that Tunisia in 2001 has a score of 53 out of 100 on a scale from 0 (highly 
corrupt) to 100 (very clean) (Transparency International, 2013). Although two-thirds of the 
177 countries surveyed in 2013 scored below 50 (Transparency International, 2013), the fact 
that the best-ranked African country (and one of the six-largest economies in Africa) was 
ranked this low indicates a serious, corruption problem on the continent. To further buttress 
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the severity of corruption as indicated by the descriptive statistics, Nigeria was ranked the 
lowest on corruption index in 2001 (1, i.e. 10 out of 100).   
The statistics for the skewness and the kurtosis do fairly well support the assumption of 
normal distribution. In addition, the fact that our sample size is small (198) couple with the 
statistically significant p-value (0.000, except for QLEGAL) favours our non-rejection of the 
null hypothesis of normal distribution at one per cent.  
As done in Part A, we also conduct the regional descriptive statistics in this Part. The results 
of the regional descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix A2-1 to A2-4. According to 
the regional descriptive statistics, North Africa region is ranked comparative the best in the 
rule of law (LAWRULE) (0.24) and West Africa is ranked the worst (-1.1). Considering the 
combined polity score (POLITY), Southern Africa is ranked the best (9) while North Africa 
records the least rank.  
Further, inflation is a general problem in the sampled region. However, the problem is seen to 
be a major concern in West Africa than in the other regions. Still on the descriptive statistics, 
Southern Africa is considered to be the best out of the four regions in terms of quality of legal 
framework, and West Africa is again, the least performer in this regard. In conclusion, 
corruption is highest in North Africa than the other three regions in our sample while East 
and West Africa are considered better-ranked in this regard.  
5.4.2 Vector error correction estimates for equations 3 to 7 
Having ensured that the variables are normally distributed, it is considered important to 
determine the error terms for equations 3 to 7. The vector error correction technique is also 
adopted for these set of equations as done for equation 2. The results of the vector error 
correction tests are presented in the tables that follow: 
The “pooled” VECM estimations for equations 3 to 7 is presented in Tables 5.17 and 5.18 
below. The same set of diagnostics and restrictions applied to the estimation presented in 
Table 5.3 and 5.4 are also applied in Tables 5.17 to 5.21.  In Table 5.17, sections A, B, C, D 
and E represents equations 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 respectively. 
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Table 5.17: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012):  
Pooled data  
 Error correction estimation results 
SECTION A BANK LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.0000000 -1.408036 
(24.0637) 
[-0.05851] 
-2.502282 
 (1.41874) 
[-1.76374]* 
3.864851 
(0.81604) 
[ 4.73610]*** 
37.96712 
(29.6011) 
[ 1.28263] 
-8.512879 
(9.89673) 
[-6.86017]*** 
Differenced -0.008178 
(0.00785) 
[-1.04171] 
-0.000100 
(0.00020) 
[-0.50881] 
0.004098 
(0.00544) 
[ 0.75389] 
-0.096986 
(0.02327) 
[-4.16721]*** 
-0.000285 
(0.00025) 
[-1.14515] 
0.0006605 
(0.00054) 
[ 0.08570] 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
0.286817 
(0.09110) 
[ 3.14824]*** 
2.349478 
(3.24567) 
[ 0.72388] 
0.117943 
(0.11011) 
[ 1.07114] 
0.033196 
(0.03058) 
[ 1.08548] 
-1.474962 
(2.53481) 
[-0.58188] 
0.723358 
(1.17171) 
[ 0.61735] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.097194 
(0.09872) 
[-0.98457] 
2.184468 
(3.40320) 
[ 0.64189] 
-0.055913 
(0.10911) 
[-0.51243] 
0.024604 
(0.02601) 
[ 0.94592] 
-1.855886 
(2.50937) 
[-0.73958] 
0.917290 
(1.20206) 
[ 0.76310] 
SECTION B PRIVY LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 -49.69867 
(28.3618) 
[-1.75231] 
-7.867040 
(1.67444) 
[-4.69832]*** 
-0.671377 
(0.95516) 
[-0.70290] 
77.09678 
(35.1307) 
[ 2.19457] 
-10.92443 
(11.6937) 
[-0.93422] 
Differenced -0.015907 
(0.01488) 
[-1.06901] 
6.26E-05 
(0.00017) 
[ 0.36134] 
0.015123 
(0.00462) 
[ 3.27345] 
0.007818 
(0.02168) 
[ 0.36062] 
-0.000322 
(0.00022) 
[-1.48122] 
-0.000985 
(0.00047) 
[-2.08418] 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
-0.079673 
(0.09202) 
[-0.86583] 
10.28797 
(6.98412) 
[ 1.47305] 
-0.004823 
(0.23874) 
[-0.02020] 
-0.065895 
(0.05076) 
[-1.29814] 
-5.366757 
(5.48649) 
[-0.97818] 
-0.980780 
(2.52680) 
[-0.38815] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.124044 
(0.09498) 
[-1.30603] 
-1.541174 
(7.41362) 
[-0.20788] 
-0.158036 
(0.23871) 
[-0.66206] 
0.017526 
(0.05079) 
[ 0.34508] 
2.301456 
(5.43068) 
[ 0.42379] 
0.223716 
(2.55649) 
[ 0.08751] 
SECTION C NONFIN LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 -40.83922 
(8.16022) 
[-5.00467]*** 
-0.130357 
(0.47893) 
[-0.27218] 
-1.671101 
(0.27684) 
[-6.03635]*** 
7.656146 
(10.0227) 
[ 0.76388] 
12.14712 
(3.36606) 
[ 3.60871]*** 
Differenced -0.004523 
(0.01443) 
[-0.31348] 
0.000706 
(0.00052) 
[ 1.36373] 
0.003771 
(0.01446) 
[ 0.26083] 
0.284395 
(0.05802) 
[ 4.90144]*** 
0.000802 
(0.00066) 
[ 1.22148] 
-0.002176 
(0.00143) 
[-1.51849]* 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
0.483091 
(0.07860) 
[ 6.14602]*** 
2.525994 
(2.31450) 
[ 1.09138] 
0.036390 
(0.07466) 
[ 0.48741] 
0.050903 
(0.02299) 
[ 2.21376]** 
-3.290938 
(1.79998) 
[-1.82832]* 
0.208661 
(0.78948) 
[ 0.26430] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.223845 
(0.07817) 
[-2.86352]*** 
0.903895 
(2.40796) 
[ 0.37538] 
-0.107255 
(0.07517) 
[-1.42684] 
0.029313 
(0.01848) 
[ 1.58651]* 
-2.590148 
(1.77509) 
[-1.45917]* 
0.481244 
(0.80298) 
[ 0.59933] 
SECTION D EQCAP LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.0000000 -0.002399 
(0.00591) 
[-0.40573] 
-9.961800 
 (2.42097) 
[-4.1148]*** 
-6.135781 
(1.37478) 
[-4.46311]*** 
-11.11145 
(50.4648) 
[-0.22018] 
9.268320 
(16.9015) 
[ 0.54837] 
Differenced 0.002806 
0.00234) 
[ 1.20114] 
-2.19E-05 
(1.9E-05) 
[-1.17897] 
0.006916 
(0.00318) 
[ 2.17336]** 
0.051614 
(0.01399) 
[ 3.69035]*** 
0.00005 
(0.00015) 
[ 0.28342] 
-0.000473 
(0.00032) 
[-1.49529]* 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
0.245145 
(0.07844) 
[ 3.12529]*** 
9.004136 
(10.3469) 
[ 0.87022] 
0.335541 
(0.35667) 
[ 0.94076] 
-0.012042 
(0.09369) 
[-0.12853] 
1.001732 
(8.02603) 
[ 0.12481] 
-3.947290 
(3.59281) 
[-1.09866] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.280138 
(0.07564) 
[-3.70344]*** 
1.104842 
(10.2373) 
[ 0.10792] 
-0.503063 
 (0.35921) 
[-1.40048] 
0.022794 
(0.08090) 
[ 0.28175] 
-5.142249 
(7.92809) 
[-0.64861] 
-2.608261 
(3.64687) 
[-0.71521] 
SECTION E TURNOVER LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 -25.72531 
(16.8185) 
[-1.52958]* 
-3.365817 
(0.99969) 
[-3.36685]*** 
1.051581 
(0.56586) 
[ 1.85839]* 
20.82384 
(20.7832) 
[ 1.00195] 
6.855955 
(6.92906) 
[ 0.98945] 
Differenced -0.064197 
(0.01860) 
[-3.45179]*** 
0.000122 
(0.00028) 
[ 0.43053] 
0.013209 
(0.00790) 
[ 1.67271]* 
-0.066837 
(0.03538) 
[-1.88927]* 
-0.000453 
(0.00036) 
[-1.26076] 
-0.000920 
(0.00076) 
[-1.20309] 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
0.921068 
(0.10597) 
[ 8.69162]*** 
-6.716674 
(5.36544) 
[-1.25184] 
-0.149298 
(0.17855) 
[-0.83618] 
0.054552 
(0.03965) 
[ 1.37573] 
-2.741899 
(4.17744) 
[-0.65636] 
0.613258 
(1.89742) 
[ 0.32321] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.214701 
(0.11726) 
[-1.83097]* 
-1.774773 
(5.64038) 
[-0.31465] 
-0.100366 
(0.18085) 
[-0.55498] 
0.041233 
(0.03905) 
[ 1.05578] 
-2.335352 
(4.13080) 
[-0.56535] 
0.743558 
(1.92151) 
[ 0.38696] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 {Emphasis are placed on *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05} 
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According to section A in Table 5.17, 13 out of the possible 84 combinations are statistically 
significant but only four of these statistically significant variables are of interest. One of those 
statistically significant error terms is the differenced BANK in lag 1, with a positive 
coefficient that hints that more than 28 per cent of the disequilibrium in the series is corrected 
within the first period.  
In addition, INFLATION in its first lag is statistically significant with an explosive positive 
coefficient, while the differenced form of INFLATION is statistically significant with a 
negative coefficient that suggests that about 10 of the disequilibrium in the series is corrected 
within the first period. More importantly, the statistical significance of differenced 
INFLATION suggests that a change in real inflation dynamics would significantly influence 
the BANK in Africa. To conclude section A, the effects of INFLATION on BANK is negative 
and this relationship bears a negative coefficient that is explosive in nature.  
According to section B of Table 5.17, 14 out of the possible 84 combinations are statistically 
significant, but only four of those combinations are of interest in this study. The stability of 
the p-value determinant estimations that range between 1.95 and 2.05 allude to the stability of 
the model. According to Section B, the dependent variable (PRIVY) shares a negative 
statistically significant relationship with lagged POLITY, and the coefficient is explosive in 
nature.  
In addition, the differenced form of POLITY shares a positive relationship with the dependent 
variable but the coefficient is low (about 2 per cent). For the remaining two variables, 
QLEGAL and CORRUPTION are statistically significant and they bear positive and negative 
coefficients respectively. While the coefficient of the former is explosive, the coefficient of 
the latter is very low (less than one per cent). Based on the analysis presented in this section, 
argument can therefore be advanced that POLITY, QLEGAL and CORRUPTION do influence 
the development of PRIVY in the sampled African countries.  
In section C, out of a possible 84 possible relationships, only 12 are statistically significant, 
and eight of those statistically significant relationships are of interest to this study. Also, the 
stability of the model is ensured through the Durbin-Watson statistic that ranges between 1.95 
and 2.05. looking at individual relationships, the differenced NONFIN in lag 1 bears a 
positive coefficient, which suggests that more than 48 per cent of the disequilibrium in the 
series is corrected within the first period by possibly ‘pulling’ the innovation shock towards 
the point of equilibrium. However, the differenced form of the same variable in lag 2 bears a 
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negative coefficient, which suggests that more than 22 per cent of the effects of the shocks on 
the system can be corrected within the first period.  
In addition, LAWRULE in lag 1 bears an explosive negative coefficient, while the same 
variable in its differenced form bears an infinitesimal positive coefficient. POLITY does not 
have any form of statistically significant relationship with NONFIN, but INFLATION shares 
three different forms of relationship with the dependent variables. In the first instance, 
INFLATION in lag 1 bears an explosive negative coefficient with the dependent variable. But 
the differenced form of the variable shares a positive relationship with the dependent variable 
with a coefficient that suggests more than 28 per cent system error correction within the first 
period. Further, the differenced form of the variable in lag 1 also bears a positive coefficient 
that suggests more than five per cent system error correction within the first period. 
The last variable of interest in section C is CORRUPTION.  The lag 1 form of this variable 
shares a single statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. It is 
noteworthy that the coefficient of the variable is very explosive. Having analysed the 
relationship between NONFIN and the institutional variables, we now proceed to section D in 
Table 5.17. According to section D, the Durbin-Watson statistic of the p-value determinant 
estimation ranges between 1.95 and 2.06, suggesting a strong stability. In addition, out of a 
possible 84 combination of variables, only 13 are statistically significant and six of those 
variables appear in Table 5.17.  
The differenced form of EQCAP in lag 1 as well as the differenced form of the variable in lag 
2 are statistically significant and bear moderate positive (0.25) and negative (-0.28) 
coefficients respectively. This form of result indicates that lags (periods) play an important 
role in the adjustment of this variable to equilibrium and that the variable is more likely to 
respond rapidly to the effects of innovations shock on the system. The other variable of 
interest here is POLITY. This variable in lag 1 and its differenced form bears explosive 
negative (-9.96) and infinitesimal positive (0.006) coefficients respectively with the 
dependent variable. This relationship suggests that although lag (period) plays an important 
role on the influence of the variable on EQCAP, a change in the policy framework will be of 
stronger (positive) importance. 
The last variable of interest in this section is INFLATION. Just as in the case of POLITY, 
INFLATION also shares an explosive negative (-6.14) and low positive (0.05) coefficients 
with the dependent variable. This form of relationships hints that while lag is of essence in 
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the adjustment of the variable to equilibrium, a change in functionality of the policy 
framework will mollify the effects of the shocks on the system more effectively. The last 
section (section E) of Table 5.17 contains the results for the last dependent variable (equation 
7). According to the analysis of the 84 possible relationships that are obtainable in this 
section, it is observed that only 13 are statistically significant, of which four are of interest in 
this study. In addition, the Durbin-Watson statistics that ranges between 1.5 and 2.13 hints 
that the p-value determinant estimation is stable.  
Looking at individual variables, it is observed that TURNOVER (the dependent variable) 
bears a negative (-0.06) and positive (0.92) coefficients in its differenced form as well as its 
differenced form in lag 1 respectively. This relationship hints that lag (period) is of statistical 
importance to the adjustment of this variable to equilibrium. That is, the variable will adjust 
very quickly to the effects of any possible innovations shock on the system very quickly (by 
more than 92 per cent in one instance).  
Still on this section of the Table, POLITY bears an explosive negative (-3.37) relationship 
with the dependent variable while INFLATION bears a subtle negative coefficient.  While the 
former suggests a rapid speed of adjustment to lag, the latter hints on a possible change to 
innovative shock on the variable. In the pooled analyses, the results largely indicate that all 
the institutional variables used in this study are good determinants of the dependent variables. 
Although, variables such as the rule of law (LAWRULE) and quality of legal framework 
(QLEGAL) play less statistically significant role in explaining the variations expressed in the 
dependent variables (capital market development variables).   
North Africa 
Having discussed the results of the pooled estimation, we now proceed to investigate the 
regional effects of the vector error correction model. The results of the analysis are contained 
in Table 5.18 for North Africa. After discussing the results for North Africa, we will proceed 
to the discourse of the other regions of interest in this study. 
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Table 5.18: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012):  
North Africa Regional effects  
 Error correction terms  
SECTION A BANK LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 151.5541 
(188.119) 
[ 0.80563] 
-12.46509 
(13.8756) 
[-0.89834] 
-14.10335 
(4.91635) 
[-2.86866]*** 
-687.1519 
(205.513) 
[-3.34360]*** 
21.41086 
(34.6898) 
[ 0.61721] 
Differenced -0.004901 
(0.00384) 
[-1.27675] 
-4.34E-05 
(9.9E-05) 
[-0.43827] 
0.002562 
(0.00087) 
[ 2.94237]** 
0.011921 
(0.00467) 
[ 2.55463] 
0.000155 
(0.00012) 
[ 1.30036] 
-0.000239 
(0.00028) 
[-0.84011] 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
0.336071 
(0.14341) 
[ 2.34339]** 
-4.737759 
(4.75514) 
[-0.99635]] 
- 1.396057 
(0.53112) 
[ 2.62850]** 
-0.026283 
(0.09125) 
[-0.28803] 
-4.380500 
(4.18376) 
[-1.04703] 
-1.275820 
(1.62632) 
[-0.78448] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
0.189203 
(0.14724) 
[ 1.28498] 
0 -1.656322 
(5.31532) 
[-0.31161] 
0.172994 
(0.70047) 
[ 0.24697] 
-0.013332 
(0.08046) 
[-0.16569] 
-6.454020 
(3.63331) 
[-1.77635]* 
-0.898925 
(1.66132) 
[-0.54109] 
SECTION B PRIVY LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 139.7177 
(35.5856) 
[ 3.92624]*** 
- 3.165524 
(2.67027) 
[ 1.18547] 
0.125475 
(0.87505) 
[ 0.14339] 
22.79300 
(39.1765) 
[ 0.58180] 
-12.45405 
(6.47975) 
[-1.92200]** 
Differenced -0.008446 
(0.03132) 
[-0.26971] 
-0.001661 
(0.00052) 
[-3.21364]*** 
-0.010002 
(0.00505) 
[-1.97881]* 
0.035239 
(0.02671) 
[ 1.31915] 
-0.000644 
(0.00065) 
[-0.99058] 
-0.002509 
(0.00156) 
[-1.61219]* 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
0.263998 
(0.14613) 
[ 1.80665]* 
6.190737 
(7.43162) 
[ 0.83303] 
1.622419 
(0.82338) 
[ 1.97044]* 
-0.058394 
(0.12801) 
[-0.45618] 
-2.699910 
(5.36557) 
[-0.50319] 
-4.742487 
(2.44299) 
[-1.94127]* 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.115225 
(0.14370) 
[-0.80185] 
-2.020960 
(7.82500) 
[-0.25827] 
0.576533 
(1.08198) 
[ 0.53285] 
0.004691 
(0.11863) 
[ 0.03955] 
-3.555599 
(5.10467) 
[-0.69654] 
0.313446 
(2.42711) 
[ 0.12914] 
SECTION C NONFIN LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 -23.23713 
 (10.8224) 
[-2.14713]** 
-1.441228 
 (0.76347) 
[-1.88774]* 
-2.043194 
 (0.26000) 
[-7.85840]*** 
44.11218 
 (12.3828) 
[ 3.56239]*** 
7.557043 
(2.06171) 
[ 3.66543]*** 
Differenced -0.058818 
(0.03633) 
[-1.61896]* 
0.002510 
(0.00136) 
[ 1.84500]* 
0.001810 
(0.01302) 
[ 0.13900] 
0.270898 
(0.05929) 
[ 4.56891]*** 
0.000300 
(0.00171) 
[ 0.17572] 
-0.004826 
(0.00407) 
[-1.18690] 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
0.640800 
(0.11212) 
[ 5.71531]*** 
0.898494 
(3.14338) 
[ 0.28584] 
-0.256751 
(0.34120) 
[-0.75250] 
-0.028970 
(0.07322) 
[-0.39566] 
-4.574640 
(2.75927) 
[-1.65792]* 
0.064623 
(1.04358) 
[ 0.06192] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.169621 
(0.10901) 
[-1.55598]* 
3.406783 
(3.54082) 
[ 0.96215] 
0.226533 
(0.46454) 
[ 0.48766] 
-0.148000 
(0.05871) 
[-2.52102]** 
-3.132657 
(2.47628) 
[-1.26507] 
0.311781 
(1.03602) 
[ 0.30094] 
SECTION D EQCAP LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 45.73170 
(21.9356) 
[ 2.08482]** 
-2.397042 
(1.46685) 
[-1.63415]* 
2.915693 
(0.50409) 
[ 5.78409]*** 
30.41331 
(24.1435) 
[ 1.25969] 
16.31204 
(3.87290) 
[ 4.21184]*** 
Differenced -0.147929 
(0.04421) 
[-3.34619]*** 
-0.001442 
(0.00061) 
[-2.36931]** 
0.002982 
(0.00624) 
[ 0.47786] 
-0.080992 
(0.03182) 
[-2.54537]** 
0.000237 
(0.00081) 
[ 0.29058] 
-0.001685 
(0.00199) 
[-0.84501] 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
0.701426 
(0.10481) 
[ 6.69253]*** 
3.320346 
(8.10649) 
[ 0.40959] 
0.194984 
(0.83698) 
[ 0.23296] 
0.317603 
(0.16014) 
[ 1.98325]* 
-0.593802 
(6.65281) 
[-0.08926] 
-1.661393 
(2.64415) 
[-0.62833] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.124113 
(0.11719) 
[-1.05905] 
3.166256 
(9.13311) 
[ 0.34668] 
0.674718 
(1.15650) 
[ 0.58341] 
0.198962 
(0.13909) 
[ 1.43046] 
-10.08447 
(6.30158) 
[-1.60031]* 
-0.305192 
(2.61944) 
[-0.11651] 
SECTION E TURNOVER LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 -75.27159 
(34.3629) 
[-2.19049]** 
-7.873593 
(2.17946) 
[-3.61263]*** 
1.891940 
(0.73112) 
[ 2.58773]** 
71.21924 
(37.2330) 
[ 1.91280]* 
0.256609 
(6.15425) 
[ 0.04170] 
Differenced -0.046239 
(0.02216) 
[-2.08625]** 
0.000485 
(0.00060) 
[ 0.81085] 
0.006738 
(0.00566) 
[ 1.18985] 
-0.087852 
(0.02807) 
[-3.12969]*** 
-0.000303 
(0.00072) 
[-0.42132] 
0.002944 
(0.00173) 
[ 1.69981]* 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
0.692116 
(0.12799) 
[ 5.40773]*** 
-32.27558 
(4.78457) 
[-6.74577]*** 
0.216696 
(0.47915) 
[ 0.45225] 
0.092738 
(0.08292) 
[ 1.11842] 
1.771896 
(3.81356) 
[ 0.46463] 
-1.954877 
(1.45052) 
[-1.34771] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.688729 
(0.13985) 
[-4.92487]*** 
-26.85167 
(5.19079) 
[-5.17294]*** 
-1.170527 
(0.65768) 
[-1.77979]* 
0.161492 
(0.07486) 
[ 2.15715]** 
-1.485253 
(3.56477) 
[-0.41665] 
1.260379 
(1.46057) 
[ 0.86294] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 {Emphasis are placed on *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05} 
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According to the p-value determinant estimation, 12 out of the possible 84 variable 
combinations are statistically significant and six of those variables appear in Table 5.18 
section A, being variables of interest. Further, the Durbin-Watson statistics ranges between 
1.84 and 2.11 to suggest that the estimation is stable. Looking at the individual variables, the 
differenced BANK in lag 1 is statistically significant with a positive coefficient that suggests 
an approximation of 34 per cent of error correction within the first year. The other variables 
of interest include POLITY that has subtle positive (0.002) and explosive negative   (-1.4) 
coefficients with the dependent variable. These kinds of relationships with the dependent 
variable (BANK) suggest that the effects of the innovative shocks of POLITY on the system 
are not only statistically significant, but could be explosive as well when period is factored in.  
INFLATION is another variable of interest in this section. In lag 1, the variable shares an 
explosive negative coefficient with the dependent variable but a barely one per cent positive 
coefficient in its differenced form. The differenced form of this variable bears a positive 
coefficient (16 per cent). The result for INFLATION suggests that period effect is of essence 
in the reversal of the variable back to the point of equilibrium. This result is similar to the one 
obtained for POLITY. The last variable of interest in this section is QLEGAL. The variable in 
lag 1 bears an explosive negative coefficient that lends credence to the postulation that period 
effect is of essence. In all, these three variables are statistically significant determinants of 
BANK and their speed of adjustment appears to be high.    
In section B of Table 5.18, 18 out of the possible 84 combinations are statistically significant. 
However, only two of these combinations are relevant in our context. Also, the Durbin-
Watson statistics of the p-value determinant estimation that ranges between 1.86 and 2.12 
alludes to the stability of the model. As indicated in Table 5.18, only one variable 
(LAWRULE) is of statistical significance to this study. Looking at the statistically significant 
variable (LAWRULE), in lag 1, the variable has an explosive positive coefficient, but the 
differenced form of the variable has a negative coefficient that is less than one per cent. This 
result suggests that the effects of innovations shock on LAWRULE do influence the reaction 
of PRIVY and that the reversal of the effects of innovations shock on the system are more 
periods -dependent.  
In section C, the Durbin-Watson statistics of the p-value determinant estimation that ranges 
between 1.87 and 2.07 indicates that the estimation is stable. Further, eight out of a possible 
84 combinations are statistically significant at five per cent error level, of which seven are of 
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statistical relevance to this study as indicated in Table 5.18. Looking at individual variables, 
differenced NONFIN in lag 1 is statistically significant with a positive coefficient, suggesting 
that more than 64 per cent of the deviations from equilibrium are corrected within the first 
year. In the case of lagged LAWRULE, the coefficient is negative and explosive and POLITY 
is found to be statistically insignificant.  
Still on section C, INFLATION in lag 1 is statistically significant with an explosive negative 
coefficient, but its differenced form bears a positive coefficient that suggests about 27 per 
cent adjustment to the equilibrium point within the first period. The differenced form of the 
variable in lag 2 also bears a negative coefficient that suggests about 15 per cent adjustment 
to equilibrium within two periods. The remaining two statistically significant variables in the 
section are QLEGAL and CORRUPTION. Both variables are statistically significant in lag 1, 
with positive coefficients that are explosive. These kinds of relationships suggest that the 
dependent variable (NONFIN) react rapidly and in explosive manner too, to innovations 
shock on these variables.  
The results contained in section D in Table 5.18 is regarded as being reliable because the 
Durbin-Watson statistics that ranges between 1.93 and 2.14 indicate that the estimation is 
stable. Further, 15 out of possible 84 combinations are statistically significant at five per cent 
error level, and six of those variables feature in section D in Table 5.18. Looking at 
individual variables, differenced EQCAP and its lag 1 form bear negative and positive 
coefficients respectively. In the former, the coefficient of the variable suggests that about 15 
per cent of the deviation from equilibrium is corrected through the innovative shock hitting 
the system, while the coefficient of the latter suggests that more than 70 per cent of the 
deviations from the equilibrium point are corrected within the first period.    
The other variable of interest in the section is LAWRULE. The variable in its differenced form 
is statistically significant and it bears an infinitesimal negative coefficient. In the case of 
INFLATION, the variable bears an explosive positive relationship in lag 1 and a low negative 
coefficient (0.08) if differenced. Considering the variation between the two forms of the 
variable, it is apparent that the lag (period) plays an important role in the behaviour of the 
variable. As such, the relationship between the variable and the dependent variable (EQCAP) 
suggests that the dependent variable would react significantly to innovative shock from 
INFLATION as it hits the system and this reaction is presumably rapid. Still on this section, 
148 
 
CORRUPTION in lag 1 is statistically significant with explosive positive coefficient. This 
result tallies with that of INFLATION and the interpretation is the same.  
The stability of the analysis of the variables presented in the concluding section of Table 5.18 
(section E) suggests stability, considering the Durbin-Watson statistics that ranges from 1.86 
to 2.15. Out of the possible 84 combinations, 14 of those combinations are statistically 
significant and six of those variables feature in Table 5.18 as the variables of interest.  
The consideration of individual variables suggests that differenced TURNOVER and 
differenced TURNOVER in lag 1 bears negative and positive coefficients respectively. In the 
former relationship, there is an indication that about 5 per cent of the deviation from the 
equilibrium point will be corrected within the first period, whereas the results in the latter 
indicates that more than 69 per cent of the deviation from equilibrium as a result of the 
innovative shock hitting the system will be corrected within the first year. The differenced 
TURNOVER in lag 2 also bears a negative coefficient that suggests that about 69 per cent of 
the disequilibrium that occurs through the innovations shock is corrected within two periods. 
The result of differenced LAWRULE in lag 1 is similar to the result of differenced 
TURNOVER in lag 1, except that the coefficient is negative and explosive in this instance. 
Differenced LAWRULE in lag 2 also bears a negative coefficient and this coefficient is 
explosive in nature.  
In the instance of POLITY in lag 1, the variable bears a negative but explosive coefficient. 
INFLATION in lag 1 also bears an explosive coefficient but positive. Still on INFLATION, 
the variable in first difference bears a negative coefficient that suggests that about 9 per cent 
of the deviation from equilibrium is corrected within the first year.  The general conclusion 
that could be reaches from Table 5.18 is that two institutional variables (LAWRULE and 
INFLATION) are statistically significant determinants of capital market efficiency in North 
Africa.  
Southern Africa 
Having concluded the interpretation of error correction results for North Africa, we now look 
at the results for Southern Africa. The result of the error correction analysis for the region is 
presented in table 5.19.  
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Table 5.19: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012): 
Southern Africa Regional effects  
 Error correction terms  
SECTION A BANK LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 -654.9841 
(62.5610) 
[-10.4695]*** 
-3.558712 
(0.44760) 
[-7.95065]*** 
-2.562924 
(0.48261) 
[-5.31059]*** 
63.26229 
(17.7853) 
[ 3.55700]*** 
57.15002 
(11.9932) 
[ 4.76521]*** 
Differenced -0.139804 
(0.04679) 
[-2.98758]*** 
0.001382 
(0.00085) 
[ 1.63197]* 
0.060120 
(0.06314) 
[ 0.95219] 
-0.053481 
(0.03128) 
[-1.70965]* 
0.001231 
(0.00112) 
[ 1.09937] 
-0.004462 
(0.00229) 
[-1.94696]* 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
0.223019 
(0.27031) 
[ 0.82504] 
-55.47553 
(24.9180) 
[-2.22633]** 
-0.271796 
(0.16821) 
[-1.61584]* 
-0.781197 
(0.37359) 
[-2.09105] 
-0.609106 
(7.31006) 
[-0.08332] 
8.911345 
(6.48712) 
[ 1.37370] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.354715 
(0.26419) 
[-1.34263] 
-38.98274 
(19.7438) 
[-1.97443]* 
-0.223582 
(0.15488) 
[-1.44356] 
-0.239846 
(0.19447) 
[-1.23331] 
6.722561 
(9.92040) 
[ 0.67765] 
7.541730 
(6.30401) 
[ 1.19634] 
SECTION B PRIVY LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 66070.10 
(4300.49) 
[ 15.3634]*** 
-179.0804 
(29.1629) 
[-6.14069]*** 
28.57885 
(30.1050) 
[ 0.94931] 
2009.517 
(1339.50) 
[ 1.50020]* 
-675.3233 
(814.787) 
[-0.82883] 
Differenced -0.001151 
(0.00214) 
[-0.53847] 
-3.90E-05 
(4.3E-06) 
[-9.06355]*** 
0.001261 
(0.00071) 
[ 1.77585]* 
3.88E-05 
(0.00042) 
[ 0.09179] 
-2.49E-05 
(1.3E-05) 
[-1.86300]* 
3.26E-05 
(3.2E-05) 
[ 1.00560] 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
-0.089452 
(0.24558) 
[-0.36425] 
158.3581 
(113.325) 
[ 1.39738] 
-0.126422 
(0.57920) 
[-0.21827] 
-1.174226 
(1.14117) 
[-1.02897] 
-3.278392 
(31.1132) 
[-0.10537] 
-24.21749 
(19.5814) 
[-1.23676] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
0.059426 
(0.27973) 
[ 0.21244] 
69.92352 
(76.3870) 
[ 0.91538] 
-0.362374 
(0.59356) 
[-0.61051] 
-0.360636 
(0.69923) 
[-0.51576] 
67.83834 
(37.7095) 
[ 1.79897]* 
46.67980 
(23.6542) 
[ 1.97343]* 
SECTION C NONFIN LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 -573.9748 
(54.3007) 
[-10.5703]*** 
-0.379404 
(0.39184) 
[-0.96827] 
-1.546788 
(0.41618) 
[-3.71666]*** 
-63.00187 
(16.7698) 
[-3.75686]*** 
-17.09200 
(10.1098) 
[-1.69063] 
Differenced -0.010522 
(0.01365) 
[-0.77103] 
0.003754 
(0.00075) 
[ 5.01081]*** 
0.048160 
(0.09594) 
[ 0.50197] 
-0.083652 
(0.03847) 
[-2.17439]** 
0.002116 
(0.00155) 
[ 1.36435] 
-0.003767 
(0.00385) 
[-0.97781] 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
0.799887 
(0.24713) 
[ 3.23669]*** 
-6.204344 
(5.91632) 
[-1.04868] 
-0.042444 
(0.03554) 
[-1.19411] 
-0.040271 
(0.08154) 
[-0.49386] 
-1.452048 
(2.21857) 
[-0.65450] 
0.418731 
(1.14460) 
[ 0.36583] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.630414 
(0.26582) 
[-2.37161]** 
-3.501348 
(3.94068) 
[-0.88851] 
-0.009791 
(0.03093) 
[-0.31659] 
-0.051634 
(0.05094) 
[-1.01370] 
-3.347068 
(2.36637) 
[-1.41443] 
-2.283668 
(1.42531) 
[-1.60223]* 
SECTION D EQCAP LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 -186.2381 
(91.9783) 
[-20.2481]*** 
142.3826 
(0.61416) 
[ 2.31833]** 
6.394227 
(0.63274) 
[ 10.1055]*** 
-37.21537 
(25.4153) 
[-1.46429] 
201.9238 
(18.0120) 
[ 11.2105]*** 
Differenced -0.419375 
(0.15710) 
[-2.66950]** 
0.000758 
(0.00041) 
[ 1.84995]* 
-0.014429 
(0.03887) 
[-0.37118] 
-0.018922 
(0.01851) 
[-1.02237] 
0.000595 
(0.00051) 
[ 1.16233] 
0.001190 
(0.00097) 
[ 1.22773] 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
-0.016255 
(0.20791) 
[-0.07818] 
-478.0695 
(247.163) 
[-1.93423]* 
0.948234 
(0.97202) 
[ 0.97553] 
-1.617379 
(1.82539) 
[-0.88605] 
-164.2617 
(80.0839) 
[-2.05112]* 
57.71794 
(40.4011) 
[ 1.42862] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.845779 
(0.30909) 
[-2.73639]*** 
-351.6731 
(188.585) 
[-1.86480]* 
1.677274 
(1.31580) 
[ 1.27472] 
-0.568373 
(1.13724) 
[-0.49978] 
-175.7222 
(89.5696) 
[-1.96185]* 
-37.39652 
(37.9314) 
[-0.98590] 
SECTION E TURNOVER LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 -740.2521 
(134.020) 
[-5.52344]*** 
0.207629 
(0.81032) 
[ 0.25623] 
-6.932836 
(1.27763) 
[-5.42631]*** 
181.9154 
(59.1993) 
[ 3.07293]*** 
195.0991 
(41.9338) 
[ 4.65255]*** 
Differenced 0.067329 
(0.08851) 
[ 0.76070] 
0.000810 
(0.00042) 
[ 1.92359]* 
0.020173 
(0.03858) 
[ 0.52286] 
-0.003786 
(0.01834) 
[-0.20641] 
-3.34E-06 
(0.00065) 
[-0.00514] 
-0.002745 
(0.00050) 
[-5.53466]*** 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
0.300872 
(0.40898) 
[ 0.73567] 
99.32541 
(68.2832) 
[ 1.45461] 
-0.410973 
(0.51088) 
[-0.80444] 
-0.915585 
(1.03204) 
[-0.88716] 
61.95432 
(32.2932) 
[ 1.91849]** 
52.89281 
(24.7641) 
[ 2.13587]*** 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.315437 
(0.55053) 
[-0.57297] 
40.40794 
(50.4522) 
[ 0.80091] 
0.043028 
(0.49747) 
[ 0.08649] 
-0.146253 
(0.65464) 
[-0.22341] 
53.62781 
(40.0925) 
[ 1.33760] 
36.32949 
(31.8650) 
[ 1.14010] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 {Emphasis are placed on *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05} 
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The p-value determinant estimation for section A in Table 5.19 suggests that the estimation is 
stable, given that the Durbin-Watson statistics of the estimation ranges from 1.5 to 2.0. Out of 
a possible 84 combinations in the estimation, only 13 are statistically significant and eight of 
those statistically significant combinations appear in Table 5.19. According to section A, the 
differenced BANK bears a negative coefficient, which suggests that about 14 per cent of the 
error generated in the system as a result of the innovations shock on BANK is corrected 
within the first period.  
In the case of LAWRULE, the variable bears explosive negative coefficients in lag 1 and also 
when differenced in lag 1. These results hint that although a change in the structural 
formation of rule of law may be important determinant of BANK efficiency, the period effect 
is of more statistical significance. A similar result is obtained for INFLATION in lag 1, but 
the coefficient of the differenced form of the variable in lag 1 is not explosive (78 per cent), 
suggesting that about 78 per cent of error generated through the innovations shock on 
INFLATION hitting the system is corrected within the first period. The result for POLITY in 
lag 1 is also explosive, suggesting exigency of time in the adjustment of the variable back to 
the equilibrium point. The results for QLEGAL and CORRUPTION both in lag 1 and bearing 
explosive positive coefficients indicate that these variables would adjust to equilibrium very 
rapidly within the first period and their deterministic effects on the dependent variable 
(BANK) is also noticeable.   
In section B, the stability of the estimation is established with the Durbin-Watson statistics of 
between 1.6 and 2.3. Out of a possible 84 combinations, only 18 are statistically significant at 
five per cent error level, and three of those combinations appear in section B of Table 5.19. 
The first of the three variables is LAWRULE. This variable in lag 1bears an explosive positive 
coefficient, but the coefficient becomes negative (still explosive) when the variable is 
differenced. This finding suggests that both structural changes and period have effects on the 
reaction of the dependent variable (PRIVY) to the rule of law. The result also hints that the 
dependent variable will react quickly to innovations shock on these explanatory variables as 
regards both structural changes and time lags. POLITY in lag 1 also bears a negative 
coefficient that is explosive, suggesting a similar fit with LAWRULE in lag 1.  
Considering section C in Table 5.19, the p-value determinant estimation has a Durbin-Watson 
statistics of between 1.5 and 2.9 that validates the stability of the estimation. Out of the 
possible 84 combinations, only 16 are statistically significant and seven of those 
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combinations appear in section C of Table 5.19. According to that section, NONFIN bears 
both negative and positive coefficients when differenced in lag 1 and differenced in lag 2 
respectively. In both instances, the coefficients hint that about 80 per cent and 63 per cent of 
the disequilibrium on the series are corrected within the first and second periods respectively, 
thereby buttressing the exigency of time and structural changes.  
The next variable of interest is LAWRULE. This variable bears an explosive negative 
coefficient in lag 1 but infinitesimal positive coefficient in first difference. This result 
suggests that this variable negatively influences the dependent variable through period 
dynamics. INFLATION has a very similar trait with LAWRULE except that the variable bears 
negative coefficient in both instances and the coefficient of the differenced form is a bit 
higher (eight per cent). QLEGAL also bears an explosive negative coefficient in lag 1. None 
of the combinations that include POLITY and CORRUPTION are found to be statistically 
significant. These results suggest that period is of significance in the adjustment of these 
variables to equilibrium and their deterministic effects on the dependent variable (NONFIN) 
vary significantly across time.   
Looking at section D, the p-value determinant estimation has a Durbin-Watson statistics that 
ranges between 1.6 and 2.2, suggesting that the estimation is stable. Further, out of a possible 
84 combinations obtainable from the estimation, only 18 are statistically significant and 
seven of those statistically significant combinations appear in section D of the Table. 
According to that section, EQCAP bears negative coefficients in first difference (42 per cent) 
and also in lag 2 when differenced (85 per cent). In both instances, 42 per cent and 85 per 
cent of the deviations from equilibrium point are corrected through structural changes and 
during the second period. By implication, both structural changes and period play important 
role in the variation expressed by this variable. 
Still on that section, LAWRULE bear explosive negative coefficient in lag 1, suggesting that 
the relationship between the variable and the dependent variable is period-dependent. In 
addition, POLITY, INFLATION and CORRUPTION all bear explosive positive relationship 
with the dependent variable in lag 1. These forms of relationships suggest that the 
deterministic impact of these variables on the dependent variable (EQCAP) is period-
dependent. The last variable of interest in this section is differenced QLEGAL, which has an 
explosive negative coefficient in lag 1. This implies that the deviation of this variable from 
equilibrium could be corrected through structural changes and period.  In all, an argument can 
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be advanced that all these institutional variables play important roles in explaining the 
dependent variable and the variation expressed in the system can be corrected through 
structural change to the innovations shock and through period as well.   
The p-value determinant estimation for section E of the Table establishes the stability of the 
estimation through the Durbin-Watson statistics that ranges between 1.5 and 2.0.  Further, out 
of possible 84 combinations, 16 are statistically significant at five per cent error level of 
which six appear in Table 5.19.  Looking at each combination, the interaction of TURNOVER 
and LAWRULE generate an explosive negative coefficient on LAWRULE in lag 1, so also is 
INFLATION. QLEGAL and CORRUPTION also generate explosive positive coefficients. In 
all these instances, the deviation of these variables from equilibrium through innovations 
shock would be corrected over time, but more specifically, in the first period.  
Further, CORRUPTION bears an infinitesimal negative coefficient in lag 1, but an explosive 
positive coefficient when the variable is differenced in lag 1. These results indicate that the 
deviation from equilibrium as a result of innovations shock will not be corrected effectively 
through structural change but rather through period dynamics. The overarching conclusion 
that can be drawn from the error correction estimation conducted for Southern Africa in 
equations 3 to 7 is that LAWRULE, POLITY, INFLATION and CORRUPTION play 
statistically significant deterministic role on the capital market variables. Further, the impacts 
of period dynamics rather than structural change to the innovative shocks are conspicuous in 
the results. 
West Africa  
Sequel to the completion of the error correction estimations for Southern Africa, we now 
proceed to the West Africa analysis. The results of the analyses are presented in Table 5.20. 
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Table 5.20: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012):  
West Africa Regional effects  
 Error correction terms  
SECTION A BANK LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 3281.171 
(1180.25) 
[ 2.78007]** 
35.92234 
(6.10700) 
[ 5.88216]*** 
2.778349 
(1.85551) 
[ 1.49735] 
958.4879 
(708.840) 
[ 1.35219] 
-958.4717 
(119.970) 
[-7.98927]*** 
Differenced 0.004875 
(0.00307) 
[ 1.58744]* 
-0.000163 
(6.7E-05) 
[-2.43750]*** 
-0.004804 
(0.00351) 
[-1.37059] 
-0.010454 
(0.02485) 
[-0.42071] 
-0.000498 
(9.9E-05) 
[-5.01151]*** 
-0.000321 
(0.00019) 
[-1.65370]* 
Differenced in 
lag 1 
0.112171 
(0.25832) 
[ 0.43423] 
14.90228 
(11.6502) 
[ 1.27914] 
0.041341 
(0.20989) 
[ 0.19696] 
0.012518 
(0.02928) 
[ 0.42749] 
-9.742662 
(6.11430) 
[-1.59342]* 
9.515768 
(4.08167) 
[ 2.33134]*** 
Differenced in 
lag 2 
-0.281168 
(0.28326) 
[-0.99262] 
10.93860 
(11.5779) 
[ 0.94478] 
-0.158349 
(0.20724) 
[-0.76408] 
0.016418 
(0.03069) 
[ 0.53498] 
-8.234930 
(6.57622) 
[-1.25223] 
5.673090 
(3.92754) 
[ 1.44444] 
SECTION B PRIVY LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 478.8336 
(185.333) 
[ 2.58363]*** 
2.940727 
(0.70490) 
[ 4.17182]*** 
0.197404 
(0.23104) 
[ 0.85441] 
69.76799 
(105.290) 
[ 0.66263] 
-185.1731 
(17.0163) 
[-10.8821]*** 
Differenced -0.068821 
(0.05384) 
[-1.27830] 
-0.000573 
(0.00050) 
[-1.14500] 
-0.022244 
(0.02371) 
[-0.93830] 
-0.056253 
(0.15745) 
[-0.35728] 
-0.002864 
(0.00074) 
[-3.85687]*** 
-0.002153 
(0.00124) 
[-1.74163]* 
Differenced in 
lag 1 
0.349733 
(0.59095) 
[ 0.59182] 
31.51992 
(29.4969) 
[ 1.06858] 
0.254903 
(0.54901) 
[ 0.46429] 
0.046138 
(0.08269) 
[ 0.55794] 
-2.820836 
(16.8637) 
[-0.16727] 
1.879123 
(12.2614) 
[ 0.15326] 
Differenced in 
lag 2 
-1.145252 
(0.44424) 
[-2.57800]** 
10.18651 
(29.4504) 
[ 0.34589] 
-0.009645 
(0.54366) 
[-0.01774] 
0.055548 
(0.07988) 
[ 0.69536] 
6.017218 
(18.7810) 
[ 0.32039] 
-11.36600 
(11.4782) 
[-0.99023] 
SECTION C NONFIN LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 3.984537 
(17.3304) 
[ 0.22992] 
-0.038616 
(0.15097) 
[-0.25578] 
-0.091832 
(0.04876) 
[-1.88349]* 
-93.12481 
(13.0177) 
[-7.15372]*** 
35.92499 
(2.77523) 
[ 12.9449]*** 
Differenced -0.199774 
(0.10358) 
[-1.92876]** 
0.003386 
(0.00335) 
[ 1.01088] 
0.014153 
(0.11955) 
[ 0.11839] 
0.525998 
(0.73745) 
[ 0.71327] 
0.017252 
(0.00346) 
[ 4.98055]*** 
0.002782 
(0.00649) 
[ 0.42859] 
Differenced in 
lag 1 
0.472877 
(0.21198) 
[ 2.23075]** 
11.09230 
(8.12272) 
[ 1.36559] 
0.238112 
(0.20953) 
[ 1.13639] 
0.038923 
(0.03188) 
[ 1.22087] 
-10.57003 
(7.86160) 
[-1.34451] 
5.266368 
(4.19954) 
[ 1.25404] 
Differenced in 
lag 2 
-0.141526 
(0.22336) 
[-0.63361] 
-6.627216 
(7.99689) 
[-0.82872] 
-0.412223 
(0.20997) 
[-1.96326]* 
0.042792 
(0.02891) 
[ 1.47999] 
-3.206253 
(6.19173) 
[-0.51783] 
4.917381 
(3.95711) 
[ 1.24267] 
SECTION D EQCAP LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 -286.1114 
(38.2642) 
[-7.47725]*** 
0.664128 
(0.23676) 
[ 2.80509]** 
-0.122110 
(0.07856) 
[-1.55444]* 
279.8394 
(24.3628) 
[ 11.4863]*** 
-0.003166 
(0.00339) 
[-0.93503] 
Differenced 0.135909 
(0.05255) 
[ 2.58651]** 
0.000793 
(0.00155) 
[ 0.50987] 
-0.036787 
(0.06661) 
[-0.55224] 
0.157317 
(0.45525) 
[ 0.34557] 
-0.006347 
(0.00240) 
[-2.64314]** 
-0.003166 
(0.00339) 
[-0.93503] 
Differenced in 
lag 1 
0.022444 
(0.26156) 
[ 0.08581] 
53.01898 
(16.7256) 
[ 3.16993]*** 
-0.005698 
(0.19713) 
[-0.02891] 
0.010056 
(0.02658) 
[ 0.37828] 
-34.73431 
(12.4105) 
[-2.79878]** 
13.50017 
(4.46264) 
[ 3.02515]*** 
Differenced in 
lag 2 
-0.462859 
(0.17540) 
[-2.63885]** 
10.88749 
(15.9619) 
[ 0.68209] 
0.022932 
(0.19225) 
[ 0.11928] 
0.043940 
(0.02757) 
[ 1.59352]* 
-1.318491 
(9.96408) 
[-0.13232] 
10.49612 
(3.35054) 
[ 3.13266]*** 
SECTION E TURNOVER LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 -25.70503 
(0.92071) 
[-27.9188]** 
0.001823 
(0.00237) 
[ 0.76845] 
0.002240 
(0.00073) 
[ 3.08322]*** 
19.16748 
(0.54085) 
[ 35.4394]*** 
-4.447389 
(0.07610) 
[-58.4423]*** 
Differenced 1.122837 
(0.38990) 
[ 2.87983]** 
-0.092806 
(0.05070) 
[-1.83043]* 
0.655568 
(2.55205) 
[ 0.25688] 
-17.57149 
(17.2078) 
[-1.02114] 
-0.289554 
(0.08202) 
[-3.53015]*** 
0.352449 
(0.10860) 
[ 3.24542]*** 
Differenced in 
lag 1 
0.157918 
(0.21894) 
[ 0.72128] 
27.82650 
(8.39255) 
[ 3.31562]*** 
0.009055 
(0.03794) 
[ 0.23869] 
-0.000558 
(0.00504) 
[-0.11067] 
-17.74090 
(5.68008) 
[-3.12335]*** 
5.150623 
(1.38505) 
[ 3.71873]*** 
Differenced in 
lag 2 
-1.384929 
(0.11896) 
[-11.6421]*** 
9.757063 
(3.99070) 
[ 2.44495]** 
0.020553 
(0.03756) 
[ 0.54726] 
0.001524 
(0.00555) 
[ 0.27450] 
-4.068289 
(2.71730) 
[-1.49718] 
3.964233 
(0.85349) 
[ 4.64473]*** 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 {Emphasis are placed on *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05} 
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In section A of Table 5.20, the Durbin-Watson statistics of the p-value determinant 
estimation ranges from 1.7 to 2.2, thereby suggesting that the estimation is stable. Further, 
nine out of possible 84 combinations are statistically significant and five of those variables 
appear in the Table as variables of interest to this study. Looking at each section of the Table, 
the result contained in section A indicates that five combinations are statistically significant 
at five per cent error level. LAWRULE in its differenced form is statistically significant, but 
the coefficient is negative and infinitesimally low (less than one per cent). Similar result 
holds for QLEGAL in its first difference. POLITY in lag 1 bears an explosive positive 
coefficient, suggesting that time is of essence in the adjustment of the variable back to the 
point of equilibrium.  
CORRUPTION in lag 1 bears an explosive negative coefficient, while the variable in its first 
difference (and in lag 1) bears a positive but explosive coefficient. The behaviour of this 
variable suggests that although the variable is an important determinant of variation 
expressed by BANK (the dependent variable), the adjustment of the variable to time lag 
suggests that period will play an important role in the adjustment of the variable back to 
equilibrium from innovations shock. In section A, all the explanatory variables play 
important deterministic roles with the dependent variable (BANK) in exception of 
INFLATION.  
Section B in the Table presents the result of interaction between PRIVY and the institutional 
variables. The analysis of the p-value determinant suggests that the estimation is stable, 
owing to the Durbin-Watson statistics that ranges between 1.7 and 2.0. According to the 
results, all the institutional variables play important deterministic role on the behaviour of the 
dependent variable, again, except for INFLATION.  
In specific, PRIVY in first difference with lag 1 bears an explosive negative coefficient. So 
also is LAWRULE in lag 1 and POLITY in lag 1, except that the coefficients are positive in 
the case of these two variables. The coefficient of CORRUPTION in lag 1 is also explosive 
but negative, while QLEGAL bears an infinitesimal negative coefficient in first difference. In 
this section, the overall conclusion that could be drawn is that time lag is important to the 
adjustment of these explanatory variables back to equilibrium as a result of innovations shock 
hitting the system.  
In section C, NONFIN in first difference and lag 1 bears a positive (40 per cent) coefficient. 
Here, there is an indication that about 40 per cent of the effects of the shock on the system are 
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corrected within the first period. It can thus be suggested that the variable responds to 
structural changes in the system over time, thereby reinforcing time exigency in the 
behaviour of the variable.  
Further, QLEGAL bears explosive negative coefficient (-93.12) and low positive coefficient 
(0.017) in lag 1 and in first difference respectively. CURRUPTION also bears an explosive 
positive coefficient in lag 1. These results indicate that time lag plays an important role in the 
adjustment of the variables back to the point of equilibrium. It must be pointed out, however, 
that only QLEGAL and CORRUPTION play statistically significant deterministic role on 
NONFIN.  
According to the p-value determinant estimation for section D, the Durbin-Watson statistics 
for the estimation ranges between 1.6 and 2.0. This result hints on the stability of the model. 
Further, results contained in section D suggest that 10 out of possible 84 combinations are 
statistically significant. All the 10 statistically significant variables appear in Table 5.20 
section D. According to that section, EQCAP bears positive coefficient in first difference (14 
per cent) and a negative coefficient (-.046) in lag 1 of first difference. This suggests that the 
deviation from equilibrium experienced by the variable as a result of innovative shock hitting 
the system can be corrected within two periods through structural reforms.  
In lag 1, LAWRULE bears an explosive negative coefficient while the same variable bears 
explosive positive coefficient when lagged in first difference. Further, POLITY bears a 
positive coefficient in lag 1. The coefficient suggests that more than 66 per cent of the 
deviation from equilibrium is corrected within the first period. As for QLEGAL, the variable 
bears an explosive positive coefficient in lag 1, infinitesimal negative coefficient in first 
difference and an explosive negative coefficient in first difference in lag 1.  
In addition, the coefficients of CORRUPTION are explosive and positive in first difference in 
lag 1, as well as first difference in lag 2. INFLATION does not play any statistical significant 
deterministic role with the dependent variable (EQCAP). There is a clear indication from the 
results contained in this section that the four explanatory variables have strong deterministic 
impacts on the dependent variable. However, the recovery of the variables from 
disequilibrium that results from innovations shock hitting the system is more period-
dependent than structural inclination.  
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According to section E of the Table, the Durbin-Watson statistics of the p-value determinants 
estimation ranges from 1.6 to 2.4. This hints that the estimation is stable. Further, 29 out of 
the possible 84 combinations are statistically significant. Of the 29 variables, 13 appear in 
section E of Table 5.20. Looking at the combinations, TURNOVER bears explosive positive 
and negative coefficients in first difference and differenced in lag 2. This lends credence to 
the importance of structural changes rather than period effects.  
The other variable of interest in the section is LAWRULE. This variable bears an explosive 
negative coefficient in lag 1. The variable also bears explosive positive coefficients when 
differenced in lag 1 as well as differenced in lag 2. These kinds of results indicate that period 
effect is of noticeable significance in the adjustment of the variable back to the point of 
equilibrium. Further, INFLATION in lag 1 bears an infinitesimal positive coefficient with the 
dependent variable, while QLEGAL in lag 1 bears an explosive positive coefficient. The 
variable in differenced form bears a negative coefficient that hints on the possibility of about 
29 per cent of the variation from equilibrium being corrected within the first period. Further, 
the variable in first difference in lag 1 also bears an explosive negative coefficient.  
The last variable of interest in the section is CORRUPTION. The p-value determinant 
estimator for the section indicates that the estimation is stable, judging from the Durbin-
Watson statistics that range from 1.6 to 2.4. Further, 29 out of a possible 84 combinations are 
statistically significant. Looking at individual combination, TURNOVER bears an explosive 
positive coefficient as well as an explosive negative coefficient in first difference and also in 
first difference in lag 1 respectively. The results for LAWRULE also generate explosive 
coefficients – negative in lag 1, positive in differenced form in lag 1, as well as in differenced 
form in lag 2 respectively.  
In addition, INFLATION bears a positive infinitesimal coefficient in lag 1. QLEGAL bears an 
explosive positive coefficient in lag 1 and an explosive negative coefficient in differenced lag 
1. The variable however, bears a negative coefficient that suggests about 29 per cent of the 
deviation from the point of equilibrium being corrected through structural adjustment, 
although period effect is also of significant essence.  
As for CORRUPTION, the variable is statistically significant throughout the four scenarios 
presented in Table 5.20 – lag 1, first difference, differenced in lag 1 and differenced in lag 2. 
The overarching conclusion that can be drawn from the results contained in Table 5.20 is that 
period effects and structural reforms play prominent role in the adjustment of the variables 
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back to the point of equilibrium from innovative shocks that hit the system.  More 
importantly, all the institutional variables play strong deterministic roles on the dependent 
variables (capital market variables).  
East Africa 
The error correction estimation for equations 3 to 7 will now be concluded by presenting the 
results of the analysis conducted for East Africa. The result is contained in Table 5.21.  
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Table 5.21: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012):  
East Africa Regional effects  
 Error correction terms  
SECTION A BANK LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 139.5808 
(22.6367) 
[ 6.16613]*** 
-3.689936 
(0.39828) 
[-9.26474]*** 
0.506466 
(0.19473) 
[ 2.60086]** 
315.6668 
(42.5568) 
[ 7.41754]*** 
-11.39217 
(30.7954) 
[-0.36993] 
Differenced \-0.069339 
(0.05833) 
[-1.18877] 
-0.002734 
(0.00171) 
[-1.59708]]* 
0.191248 
(0.04570) 
[ 4.18446]*** 
0.164553 
(0.24576) 
[ 0.66957] 
-0.001225 
(0.00119) 
[-1.02712] 
0.004391 
(0.00377) 
[ 1.16465] 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
-0.095497 
(0.29209) 
[-0.32695] 
2.862091 
(9.53964) 
[ 0.30002] 
0.021140 
(0.25359) 
[ 0.08336] 
-0.033940 
(0.07358) 
[-0.46127] 
6.025549 
(21.4967) 
[ 0.28030] 
-3.076456 
(4.39737) 
[-0.69961] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
0.427112 
(0.37910) 
[ 1.12664] 
-4.629178 
(7.76836) 
[-0.59590] 
-0.108317 
(0.24890) 
[-0.43518] 
0.054119 
(0.06315) 
[ 0.85700] 
11.83264 
(13.8061) 
[ 0.85706] 
1.450011 
(4.61087) 
[ 0.31448] 
SECTION B PRIVY LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 -1560.743 
(249.399) 
[-6.25802]*** 
51.42073 
(4.43543) 
[ 11.5932]*** 
-6.292747 
(2.10850) 
[-2.98447]** 
-5095.125 
(464.444) 
[-10.9704]*** 
840.6126 
(280.197) 
[ 3.00008]*** 
Differenced 0.001284 
(0.00578) 
[ 0.22228] 
8.84E-05 
(0.00013) 
[ 0.65524] 
-0.014913 
(0.00193) 
[-7.72057]*** 
-0.010532 
(0.01576) 
[-0.66830] 
2.74E-05 
(6.7E-05) 
[ 0.40932] 
-0.000201 
(0.00024) 
[-0.83709] 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
-0.354963 
(0.25514) 
[-1.39123] 
-10.11673 
(11.7141) 
[-0.86364] 
-0.483707 
(0.39651) 
[-1.21991] 
0.064635 
(0.14628) 
[ 0.44187] 
14.36702 
(32.8123) 
[ 0.43785] 
-0.563460 
(7.21520) 
[-0.07809] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.590722 
(0.42523) 
[-1.38919] 
-6.497362 
(11.3681) 
[-0.57155] 
0.020494 
(0.35854) 
[ 0.05716] 
0.076557 
(0.09802) 
[ 0.78101] 
34.96614 
(21.7076) 
[ 1.61078]* 
7.961528 
(6.78045) 
[ 1.17419] 
SECTION C NONFIN LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 -31.74651 
(5.20315) 
[-6.10140]*** 
1.479943 
(0.09967) 
[ 14.8491]*** 
-0.423627 
(0.04572) 
[-9.26606]*** 
-87.67153 
(9.70324) 
[-9.03528]*** 
38.46113 
(6.15917) 
[ 6.24453]*** 
Differenced -0.158144 
(0.11681) 
[-1.35388] 
3.00E-05 
(0.00618) 
[ 0.00485] 
-0.713313 
(0.09531) 
[-7.48393]*** 
0.222931 
(0.71017) 
[ 0.31391] 
-0.002360 
(0.00351) 
[-0.67167] 
0.002284 
(0.01355) 
[ 0.16861] 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
0.661994 
(0.14981) 
[ 4.41892]*** 
-2.721036 
(5.08405) 
[-0.53521] 
-0.109830 
(0.15926) 
[-0.68965] 
0.058761 
(0.06190) 
[ 0.94928] 
-4.063380 
(13.8455) 
[-0.29348] 
5.102833 
(4.36374) 
[ 1.16937] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.669156 
(0.16740) 
[-3.99723]*** 
-2.056188 
(5.22738) 
[-0.39335] 
-0.022747 
(0.17469) 
[-0.13021] 
0.074412 
(0.04702) 
[ 1.58244]* 
8.499817 
(8.31746) 
[ 1.02192] 
3.587107 
(3.46901) 
[ 1.03404] 
SECTION D EQCAP LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 223.4887 
(31.6134) 
[ 7.06944]*** 
-7.187259 
(0.54121) 
[-13.2799]*** 
0.418338 
(0.24453) 
[ 1.71080]* 
532.7789 
(53.1856) 
[ 10.0174]*** 
-132.1059 
(32.1513) 
[-4.10888]*** 
Differenced -0.160367 
(0.06180) 
[-2.59475]** 
-0.001303 
(0.00101) 
[-1.29575] 
0.104059 
(0.02325) 
[ 4.47568]*** 
0.009947 
(0.11338) 
[ 0.08774] 
-0.000117 
(0.00062) 
[-0.18920] 
0.002720 
(0.00229) 
[ 1.18657] 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
0.363128 
(0.16307) 
[ 2.22687]** 
31.60340 
(15.8335) 
[ 1.99599]* 
0.704609 
(0.48622) 
[ 1.44917] 
0.666812 
(0.13019) 
[ 5.12198]*** 
143.4029 
(46.8234) 
[ 3.06264]*** 
7.525382 
(10.9437) 
[ 0.68765] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
0.016521 
(0.18903) 
[ 0.08740] 
41.90696 
(14.6919) 
[ 2.85238]** 
1.147666 
(0.53499) 
[ 2.14520]** 
0.516425 
(0.13886) 
[ 3.71907]*** 
75.76485 
(29.9059) 
[ 2.53344]** 
20.34283 
(10.0365) 
[ 2.02688]** 
SECTION E TURNOVER LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 -4.993027 
(1.47333) 
[-3.38895]*** 
0.120394 
(0.02847) 
[ 4.22839]*** 
-0.035515 
(0.01158) 
[-3.06809]*** 
-34.08429 
(3.02628) 
[-11.2628]*** 
-2.276231 
(1.38646) 
[-1.64176]* 
Differenced -0.589661 
(0.28369) 
[-2.07857]** 
0.001006 
(0.02706) 
[ 0.03718] 
-2.229815 
(0.71719) 
[-3.10909]*** 
-2.644299 
(3.76118) 
[-0.70305] 
0.001278 
(0.01323) 
[ 0.09657] 
0.013146 
(0.05693) 
[ 0.23092] 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
0.745488 
(0.30397) 
[ 2.45248]** 
0.314401 
(3.09764) 
[ 0.10150] 
0.007245 
(0.09679) 
[ 0.07486] 
0.020971 
(0.02193) 
[ 0.95629] 
-11.65187 
(7.16644) 
[-1.62589]* 
2.484488 
(1.56238) 
[ 1.59020]* 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
0.282290 
(0.58046) 
[ 0.48632] 
0.022611 
(2.92815) 
[ 0.00772] 
-0.026485 
(0.08981) 
[-0.29489] 
0.032871 
(0.02180) 
[ 1.50803] 
3.813378 
(4.80367) 
[ 0.79385] 
3.248667 
(1.74373) 
[ 1.86305]* 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 {Emphasis are placed on *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05} 
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From section A in Table 5.21, the p-value determinant estimation lends credence to the 
stability of the model with the Durbin-Watson statistics that ranges between 1.5 and 2.6. 
Further, 11 out of possible 84 combinations are statistically significant and four out of those 
variables appear in section A of the Table. In specific, LAWRULE and QLEGAL bear 
explosive positive coefficients in lag 1. Whereas, POLITY bears both explosive negative and 
low positive coefficients in lag 1 and in first difference respectively.   
As for section B, the Durbin-Watson statistics of the p-value determinant estimation ranges 
from 1.5 to 2.4, thereby alluding to the stability of the estimation.  In addition, 14 out of the 
possible 84 combinations are statistically significant and five of those variables appear in 
section B of the Table. In specific, all the explanatory variables are statistically significant in 
lag 1, and in addendum, POLITY is statistically significant in first difference. It is however 
noteworthy that the coefficients of all the variables are explosive in nature.  
Further, LAWRULE, INFLATION, QLEGAL in lag 1 bear negative coefficients, while 
POLITY and CORRUPTION in lag 1 bear positive coefficients. Further, POLITY in first 
difference also bears a negative coefficient. The coefficient of POLITY in first difference 
indicates that more than 71 per cent of the error generated through innovations shock is 
corrected through structural reform. The results contained in this section also indicate that 
period effect is of invaluable importance in this combination. Further, all the explanatory 
variables play important roles in explaining the variations in the behaviour of the dependent 
variable (PRIVY).  
The Durbin-Watson statistics for the p-value determinant estimation for section C ranges 
from 1.5 to 2.4. This statistical value suggests that the estimation is stable. Looking at the 
results of error correction estimations for section C, 14 out of a possible 84 combinations are 
statistically significant. Out of the 14 statistically significant combinations, eight appears in 
section C of Table 5.21. Looking at the individual combination in section C, the results of the 
explanatory variables is similar to the one obtained for section B and the coefficients 
generated through the interactions are also similar in both instances.  
In specific, differenced NONFIN in lag 1 bears a positive coefficient that suggests a possible 
correction of more than 66 per cent of the deviation from equilibrium within the first period. 
However, the differenced form of the variable in lag 2 bears a negative coefficient that 
suggests a possible correction of the deviation of the variable from the point of equilibrium 
by about 67 per cent during the second period.  In both instances, the importance of structural 
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change and time lag as determinants of speed of adjustment back to equilibrium are 
emphasised.   
 As indicated earlier, the behaviour of the explanatory variables in section C is similar to 
what we obtained for section B. for instance, all the explanatory variables are statistically 
significant in lag 1 and POLITY is in addition, statistically significant in first difference. 
Further, the sign on the coefficients of these variables are similar, suggesting some similarity 
in their response pattern in both instances.  
However, the coefficient of INFLATION is not explosive in section C and the coefficient of 
POLITY in first difference is also not too weak. In case of the former, the coefficient suggests 
that about 42 per cent of the error generated through the innovations shock hitting the system 
will be corrected within the first period. In case of the latter, the coefficient suggests that 
more than 71 per cent of the deviation from equilibrium will be corrected through structural 
reforms to the innovations shock. In this section, the importance of time lag and structural 
change are emphasised. Further, there are indications that the explanatory variables are all 
good predictors of the variation expressed by the dependent variables (NONFIN).   
The Durbin-Watson statistics for p-value determinant estimation for section D ranges from 
1.5 to 2.1, thereby buttressing the stability of the estimation. Further, 22 out of a possible 84 
combinations are statistically significant and 14 of those variables appear in Table 5.21 as 
variables of interest. To start with, EQCAP bears a negative coefficient in first difference. 
The coefficient of the variable suggests that barely 16 per cent of the deviation of the variable 
from equilibrium point as a result of innovative shock is corrected through structural change. 
However, the coefficient of the variable when differenced and lagged once, becomes positive 
and suggests that about 36 per cent of the error generated as the innovative shock hits the 
system is corrected in the first year and through structural reforms as well.  
Further, LAWRULE bears an explosive positive coefficient in lag 1, and also an explosive 
positive coefficient in second difference of lag 2. Again, the importance of time lag is 
emphasised here. POLITY bears an explosive positive coefficient in lag 1 and a low 
coefficient (about 10 per cent) in first difference. The variable also bears an explosive 
positive coefficient in lag 2 of first difference.  
This instance also emphasise the importance of time lag. Looking at INFLATION, the 
variable bears a positive coefficient when differenced and in lag 1. The coefficient suggest 
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that about 67 per cent of the error generated through innovations shock hitting the system is 
corrected during the first year and with the aid of structural change. In addition, the variable 
bears a positive coefficient in first difference of lag 2. The coefficient indicates that about 52 
per cent of the error generated through the innovation shock hitting the system is corrected 
within two periods, aided by structural reforms.   
QLEGAL bear explosive positive coefficients in lag 1, differenced in lag 1, as well as 
differenced in lag 2. This result hints on the importance of time lag and structural change. 
Further, CORRUPTION bears both explosive negative coefficient and explosive positive 
coefficient in lag 1 and differenced in lag 2 respectively. The result generated in this section 
suggests that both time lag and structural change play important roles in the adjustment of the 
variables back to the point of equilibrium. Further, all the explanatory variables contribute 
significantly towards explaining the variation expressed by the dependent variable.  
The p-value determinant estimation for section E has a Durbin-Watson statistics that ranges 
from 1.6 to 2.3, thereby buttressing the stability of the estimation. In addition, eight out of a 
possible 84 combinations are statistically significant and seven of those variables appear in 
section E of Table 5.21. To start with, TURNOVER bears a negative coefficient in first 
difference. The coefficient suggests that about 60 per cent of the error generated through the 
innovation shock hitting the system is corrected through structural reform. The variable also 
bears a positive coefficient when differenced in lag 1.  
Further, all the explanatory variables (except for CORRUPTION) are statistically significant 
in lag 1. In addition, POLITY is also significant with an explosive negative coefficient in first 
difference. Further, LAWRULE and QLEGAL bear explosive negative coefficients, POLITY 
has a low positive coefficient (12 per cent) and INFLATION has an infinitesimal negative 
coefficient. In this section, it is evident that these variables are important determinants of the 
variations expressed by the dependent variable. More so, the importance of time lag is 
espoused stronger than structural change in the error correction process.  
The general conclusion from the East Africa error correction estimations is that both time and 
structural changes play significant role in the adjustment of the variables back to the point of 
equilibrium from the innovations shock that hit the system. More importantly, all the 
explanatory variables are observed to have contributed significantly towards explaining the 
variation that is expressed by the dependent variable.     
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5.4.3 Panel unit root test for equations 3 to 7 
Having looked at the error terms in equations 3 to 7 for both ‘pooled’ data and the regions, 
tests for stationarity of the variables used in equations 3 to 7 is conducted. Evidence suggests 
that if the time series of the variable under study are not integrated in the same order, the 
variable cannot be in a long-run equilibrium relationship (Engle and Granger 1987; Johansen 
and Juselius, 1990). Thus, it is important to conduct the stationarity tests in order to ensure 
that the variables are not integrated in different order. The Levin, Lin and Chu unit root test 
was used as the dominant method as done in Table 5.5. The results of the unit root test for the 
variables used in estimating equations 3 to 7 are presented in Table 5.22: 
Table 5.22: Unit Root Tests for equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012) 
Newey-West Automatic Bandwidth Selection and Bartlett Kernel  
 I II III 
Variables Levin, Lin & Chu 
(Individual Intercept and 
Trends) 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
(individual effects) 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
(none) 
At level In first diff. At level In first diff. At level  In first diff. 
LAWRULE -3.70030*** - -2.7292*** - -0.96888 -20.3827*** 
Observation 185 - 186 - 190 184 
Order of 
integration 
 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
 
I(1) 
POLITY -2.52309*** - 0.16979 -13.0398*** -2.63971*** - 
Observation 190 - 190 154 188 - 
Order of 
integration 
 
I(0) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(0) 
QLEGAL -7.06277*** - -5.3568*** - -1.56520** - 
Observation 189 - 188 - 187 - 
Order of 
integration 
 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
 
I(0) 
CORRUPTION -1.06974 -9.7920*** 0.21799 -11.8017*** -1.52291* - 
Observation 182 180 182 178 179 - 
Order of 
integration 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(0) 
ENFORCE -1.59244** - 1.93982 -2.37030** -5.37030 -7.29761*** 
Observation 96 - 64 42 64 55 
Order of 
integration  
 
I(0) 
 
I(1) 
 
I(1) 
Using the Levin, Lin & Chu (2002) test, probabilities are computed assuming asympotic normality  
***; **; * This indicates that we reject the null hypothesis of unit root at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
Automatic selection of maximum lags; Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 5 
All variables except for EQCAP, PRIVY and TURNOVER are stationary at level and significant at 5%.  
 
Before analysing the unit root test, it is important to note that the variables used in this table 
are not ‘normal’ time series dataset compared to the customary capital market time series 
dataset such as equity market capitalisation, bank deposit etc. that are readily available in 
various national accounts. The fact that these variables are largely ‘perception’-based indices 
indicates that we may not be suitable enough to exploit the usual mean-reverting behaviour 
that characterises conventional unit root tests. However, it is considered important to perform 
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the test in order to conform to the econometric criteria, especially the cointegration regression 
that is underpinned by order of integration of series.   
As indicated in Table 5.22, the order of integration for most of the variables used are I(0), 
except for corruption index (CORRUPTION) and the dummy variable, legal enforcement 
(ENFORCE) that only become stationary in first difference. This suggests that the variables 
are mostly stationary at level (1%) using Levin, Lin and Chu test. However, as demonstrated 
in the literature review chapters, the availability/presence of these institutional frameworks in 
the sampled countries is not sufficient to ensure market efficiency. It was observed that more 
needs to be done to strengthen the existing regulations and to probably promulgate new ones 
in order to achieve institutional adequacy. To that effect, these institutional variables are used 
in their first difference in the estimations.  
Although, differencing variables that are already stationary at level may seem over-
differenced, but this practice is not uncommon in econometrics as demonstrated by Zivot and 
Wang (2006). According to these authors, differencing a variable that is stationary at level 
will yield a scenario similar to the one presented in Figure 5.1: 
0  
Figure 5.1: Simulated trend stationary (I(0)) and difference stationary (I(1)) processes. 
Adapted from Zivot and Wang, 2006:113 
From Figure 5.1, it is evident that first differencing a variable when it is trend stationary 
would produce a new form of the original variable with a unit moving average root. That is, 
the variable in its new form would generate a series that conforms to the original intended 
stationarity tests that is based on testing for a unit moving average root. By implication, the 
expected order of integration in the series is not compromised (Zivot and Wang, 2006).  
 
 
…… I(0) 
____ I(1) 
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5.4.4 Dynamic panel estimation for equations 3 to 7 
Having tested for stationarity (which is a prelude for the test of cointegration), we now 
proceed to test for cointegration among the variables used in this estimation. However, it is 
considered important to first test for the goodness of fit of the model specified, and to 
establish the degree of relationship between the variables used in the estimation.  
To capture the effects of institutional framework on capital market development, the 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) is 
favoured. The GMM technique is considered appropriate because, the use of appropriate 
estimation instruments coupled with application of fixed and cross-section effects in the 
analysis helps to wipe endogeniety if these biases are present in the estimation. However, the 
GMM approach is only desirable if the number of the observations in the series is greater 
than the number of regressors. 
In each of these models, we have seven regressors and thirty-two periods (the annual data 
used in estimating these models run from 1980 to 2012), which suggests that the GMM 
method can be applied. The result of the GMM estimation is presented in Table 5.12. Before 
adopting the GMM technique, stepwise regression was conducted to ascertain the explanatory 
power or redundancy of the variables contained in the model. The result of the stepwise 
estimation (not reported) indicates that the chosen control variable (ENFORCE) do contribute 
to the explanatory power of the model. As such, this control variable was retained in the final 
estimation. It must be noted that regional dummies cannot be used in this estimation because 
of the fixed effect dummies that are entered into the estimation. Further, INFLATION that 
was used as a control variable in Part A is now used as an institutional variable in this Part.  
Also, it should be pointed out that E-Views does automatically create instruments to be used 
in estimation from lags of the dependent and regressor variables in the original specification 
(here, the White period instrument weighting matrix is used). By so doing, the software 
transforms the linear model and estimates the nonlinear differenced specification (Orthogonal 
deviation is used in this analysis). By default, E-Views also automatically add lagged values 
of the dependent and independent regressors to the corresponding lists of instrumental 
variables to account for the modified specification.  
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This transformation ensures that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals, and that 
the appropriate lag is adopted in the estimation, thereby allaying the fears of endogeneity. 
Also, as done in Part A, each of the explanatory variables is entered separately into the 
estimation in order to uncover their statistical significance in explaining capital market 
development, and to further control for endogeneity bias. We introduce regulatory 
enforcement as the control variable in Parts B and C. The results of the GMM estimations are 
presented in Table 5.23. 
Table 5.23: The GMM Panel Regression for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012): Pooled Data 
Institution Framework on Capital Market Development  
(Dependent Variable – Capital Market Development Variables) 
  BANK PRIVY NONFIN EQCAP TURNOVER 
LAWRULE 0.006307 
(0.000958)*** 
0.001331 
(0.000447)*** 
0.008159 
(0.001420)*** 
0.001719 
(0.000386)*** 
0.000885 
(0.000348)** 
ENFORCE 0.045701 
(0.018159)** 
0.036475 
(0.017104)** 
0.063024 
(0.017288)** 
0.018255 
(0.017149) 
0.028095 
(0.017212) 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.459 0.104 0.219 0.309 0.363 
POLITY -0.102994 
(0.024614)*** 
-0.024676 
(0.017189) 
-0.108794 
(0.044284)** 
-0.001173 
(0.016985) 
-0.011715 
(0.015137) 
ENFORCE -0.198946 
(0.719960) 
-0.343592 
(0.724908) 
-0.784895 
(0.709417) 
-0.404912 
(0. 0.64329) 
-0.469056 
(0.727310) 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.360 0.499 0.883 0.199 0.344 
INFLATION -0.083096 
(0.077127) 
-0.095074 
(0.036417)*** 
0.308442 
(0.125943)** 
-0.028781 
(0.023819) 
-0.008746 
(0.025681) 
ENFORCE -3.568659 
(2.505311) 
-3.530756 
(0.455140) 
-2.619068 
(0.467467) 
-3.985547 
(0.432877)* 
-3.782081 
(2.450160) 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 965 0.710 0.220 0.641 0.175 
QLEGAL -0.004109 
(0.000877)*** 
-0.001141 
(0.000628)* 
0.003846 
(0.001655)** 
0.001299 
(0.000485)*** 
0.00283 
(0.000576) 
ENFORCE 0.045575 
(0.020682)* 
0.040127 
(0.019366)** 
0.051587 
(0.019072)** 
0.026080 
(0.018893) 
0.037798 
(0.018860)* 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.410 0.615 0.612 0.818 0.141 
CORRUPTION 0.001683 
(0.002383) 
-0.000554 
(0.001145) 
-0.004134 
(0.003610) 
-0.000975 
(0.000906) 
-0.001705 
(0.000961)* 
ENFORCE 0.394273 
(0.044849)* 
0.398607 
(0.044600)* 
0.382627 
(0.046910)* 
0.388682 
(0.046159)* 
0.386594 
(0.045106)* 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.237 0.145 0.891 0.711 0.777 
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 
Number of countries 6 6 6 6 6 
Orthogonal Deviations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cross-section weights instrument weighting matrix and 
Convergence was achieved after 1 weight iterations. Cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f.  correction). 
   Maximum lags of dependent and predetermined variables for use as instruments are limited to 1.  
     Period fixed (dummy variables) applied in the estimation 
The estimation technique that was adopted in Part A is also adopted here and will be adopted 
in Part C as well. As indicated in Table 5.23, we adopt cross-section orthogonal deviation and 
period fixed effects in the dynamic panel estimation. To establish the appropriateness of 
introducing cross-sectional and period fixed effects, we conducted Hausman test. The 
Hausman test suggests that the introduction of period fixed effect is strong as the null 
hypothesis falls in the region of rejection, hence the justification for introducing period fixed 
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dummy into the regression. The test further suggests that cross-sectional effects are 
statistically significant, as the hypothesis falls within the region of rejection, hence the 
motivation for introducing cross section fixed effect dummy; in this instance, orthogonal 
deviation. The goodness of fit of the model is ensured through the same set of diagnostics 
that are performed for equation 2.   
From Table 5.23, it is evident that the institutional variables used in this study play some 
roles in the development of capital markets in the selected countries in Africa.  In specific, 
the impact of rule of law (LAWRULE) on equity capitalisation (EQCAP) is evidently strong. 
Bearing a positive coefficient, the statistical significance of this variable on equity capital 
suggests that an improvement in the process of upholding rule of law will improve equity 
capitalisation. This is in line with previous studies (Ito, 1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer & Vishny, 2000) where it was argued that respect for rule of law does translates into 
investor protection, which is important to attract investments into the equity market.  
The analysis further suggests that rule of law does significantly influence stock turnover rates 
(TURNOVER) and the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money 
banks as a share of GDP (BANK) as well. In addition, the institutional variable also 
influences domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY), as well as claims 
on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN). In 
specific, these institutional variable share positive coefficients with all the capital market 
variables and they all have strong predictive ability as indicated by their level of statistical 
significance (1%).    
Furthermore, the combined polity score (POLITY) bears negative coefficient with all the 
capital market variables, although the impact is only statistically significant on the financial 
resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a share of GDP (BANK) 
and claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP 
(NONFIN). By implication, the negative coefficient signals to the possibility that an 
improvement in the shrewd or crafty management of public affairs may be counterproductive 
for capital market development in the selected African markets. To this extent, an argument 
could be raised that Africa’s capital market are already well-regulated and an attempt to 
further regulate the market may render it uncompetitive. This assumption may hold, given 
that the largest stock market on the continent, the Johannesburg stock exchange has 
continuously won the best-regulated stock market award for many years.  Various capital 
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market reforms have also taken place in Nigeria, Egypt, Tunisia and the other leading capital 
markets in Africa.  
The impact of inflation (INFLATION) on the development of capital market is mixed. 
Although, the variable expectedly bears negative coefficient with four of the five capital 
market variables (except NONFIN), it is only statistically significant on domestic credit to 
private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) and claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by 
the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN). This form of characteristic may suggest that 
although inflation negatively affects capital market development, its effect is mainly felt on 
the level of domestic credit that is made available to the private sector. In addition, it should 
not be too surprising to note that inflation has a positive impact on NONFIN. Simply, the 
higher the level of inflation, the more claims the Central Banks have on the domestic real 
nonfinancial sector of the economy (the volume of the cash injection that is denominated in 
local currency).   
Further, the quality of legal framework (QLEGAL) also positively influences three of the five 
capital market development variables, while the effect is negative in two instances. In 
specific, this institutional variable bears negative coefficient with the financial resources 
provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a share of GDP (BANK), and 
domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY). More importantly, the 
institutional variable is statistically significant on both variables (BANK – 1%; and PRIVY - 
10%). This may suggest that these financial units are already overregulated and further 
regulating them may conscript their development.  
Converse to the explanation offered above, the quality of legal framework (QLEGAL) have 
positive impact on three capital market development variables, which are equity capitalisation 
(EQCAP), stock turnover rate (TURNOVER) and claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector 
by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN). However, its impact is only statistically 
significant on EQCAP and NONFIN. The positive coefficient of this institutional variable on 
these capital market development variables, coupled with its strong statistical significance is 
an indication that an improvement in the quality of legal framework will improve the 
attraction of the equity market to investors. This finding is also supported by previous studies 
(King & Levine, 1993c; Laeven & Majnoni, 2004). The same argument can be advanced for 
NONFIN.  
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To conclude the discourse on the regression analysis for this equation, corruption 
(CORRUPTION) has a negative coefficient with four of the five capital market variables 
(except for BANK), but it is only statistically significant on stock turnover rate, albeit very 
weakly (10%). As such, it could be proposed that although, corruption generally have 
negative effects on capital market development, the statistical validity of this proposition is 
weak, even in the case of stock turnover rate.  
The period analysis of these variables (that is included in the estimation, but not reported) 
reveals that these variables are becoming increasingly important determinants of the capital 
market development in Africa, especially consistently since 2005. This assertion is supported 
by the fact that these variables play less significant role in the early 1980s, as opposed to the 
period from 2005 onward. In addition, the fact that these variables are statistically significant 
over 26-year period (out of the 32 years covered in the study) is an indication of the 
prominent deterministic role they play in the development of capital markets in Africa. The 
fact that period analysis bears mixed coefficients (both negative and positive) may suggest 
that some intervention policies were applied across the continent over the period, of which 
some bore positive results while others were counterproductive.  
North Africa 
The regional analysis of equations 3 to 7 is also conducted and the results are presented in 
Tables 5.24 to 5.27. In this analysis, the validity of the instruments used is checked using a 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests for correlation between the 
instruments used in the estimation and the model residuals. The tests yield statistically 
insignificant results, suggesting that there is no correlation between the instruments and the 
model residuals. 
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Table 5.24: The GMM Panel Regression for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012):  
Regional Analysis (North Africa) 
Institution Framework on Capital Market Development  
(Dependent Variable – Capital Market Development Variables) 
  BANK PRIVY NONFIN EQCAP TURNOVER 
LAWRULE -41.62804 
(9.303436)*** 
-37.53532 
(8.873959)*** 
22.37404 
(5.111045)*** 
-82. 14.13821 
(14.13821)*** 
-36.64019 
(6.342152)*** 
ENFORCE 15.30053 
(6.078259)** 
12.52208 
(5.797666)** 
-4.430686 
3.339224 
10.93361 
(9.236984) 
0.143507 
(4.143549) 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.6952 0.4890 0.1380 0.2190 0.3233 
POLITY 2.456236 
(0.800166)*** 
2.313192 
(0.756317)*** 
-1.610800 
(0.428260)*** 
6.325139 
(1.184631)*** 
2.699288 
(0.536843)*** 
ENFORCE 21.78241 
(6.016891)*** 
18.18047 
(5.687166)*** 
-7.364741 
(3.220323)* 
21.06667 
(8.907900)** 
4.832206 
(4.036819) 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.6380 0.1713 0.1011 0.8720 0.2540 
INFLATION -1.137046 
(0.245453)*** 
-1.190404 
(0.225819)*** 
0.449445 
(0.141483)*** 
-1.093588 
(0.423565)** 
-0.260341 
(0.194156) 
ENFORCE 22.18755 
(5.587012)*** 
18.11596 
(5.140092)*** 
-8.735423 
(3.220429)*** 
28.95284 
(9.641197)** 
8.967412 
(4.419386)* 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.2080 0.1681 0.7742 0.2253 0.4002 
QLEGAL -35.36494 
(10.80726)*** 
-35.21991 
(10.14695)*** 
3.160560 
6.234129 
-19.92059 
(18.26372) 
5.877047 
(8.196024) 
ENFORCE 29.38722 
(5.857702)*** 
25.50254 
(5.499800)*** 
-10.67632 
(3.378993)*** 
34.69849 
(9.899214)** 
9.446919 
(4.442370)* 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.1991 0.8081 0.1233 0.8323 0.8933 
CORRUPTION -4.959835 
4.349023 
-2.119098 
4.131892 
3.659480 
2.366729 
-14.37451 
(6.898396)** 
-7.754426 
(3.052104)** 
ENFORCE 25.57898 
(6.112065)*** 
22.19325 
(5.806912)*** 
-9.784815 
(3.326173)*** 
30.56877 
(9.694925)** 
8.609655 
(4.289391)** 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.3040 0.3671 0.4123 0.1633 0.1203 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 
Number of countries 3 3 3 3 3 
Orthogonal Deviations Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cross-section weights instrument weighting matrix and 
Convergence was achieved after 1 weight iterations. Cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f.  correction). 
   Maximum lags of dependent and predetermined variables for use as instruments are limited to 1.  
     Period fixed (dummy variables) applied in the estimation 
According to Table 5.24, most of the explanatory variables used in the analyses yield 
statistically significant results, thereby indicating strong explanatory relationship with the 
dependent variables. For instance, all the explanatory variables (except for corruption) share 
statistically significant relationship with BANK when we control for legal enforcement of 
contracts. It must also be pointed out that the coefficients are explosive in all the cases.  
In specific, the relationship between BANK, and LAWRULE, INFLATION and QLEGAL are 
negative, while POLITY bears a positive coefficient. All these variables are statistically 
significant at one per cent error level, thereby signally a very strong deterministic relationship 
between the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a 
percentage of GDP (BANK) and the institutional variables. This implies that the efficiency of 
BANK is highly influenced by the institutional variables.   
170 
 
Similar relationships exist between the institutional variables and PRIVY. Controlling for 
legal enforcement of contracts (ENFORCE), all the institutional variables have statistically 
significant relationships with the domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP, 
and the sign of their coefficients are similar to the one obtained for BANK. In the case of 
claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP 
(NONFIN), this variable shares strong explanatory relationship with three of the institutional 
variables, controlling for legal enforcement of contracts (ENFORCE). Corruption perception 
and quality of regulation (QLEGAL) are found to be statistically insignificant predictors of 
NONFIN.   
The remaining two capital market variables (equity capital variables – EQCAP and 
TURNOVER) bear statistically significant relationships with all the institutional variables 
(except for QLEGAL) at one per cent error level, and their coefficients are explosive as well. 
In specific, these dependent variables share explosive negative coefficients with rule of law 
(LAWRULE), consumer price increase (INFLATION), and corruption perception 
(CORRUPTION) and explosive positive coefficients with polity score (POLITY). An overall 
conclusion can be drawn that the institutional variables are strong determinants of capital 
market development in North Africa. The explosive coefficients of these variables further 
buttress the statistical significance of this strong relationship.  
Southern Africa 
The Southern Africa analysis is similar to that of North Africa and the rest of dynamic 
estimations in this study. The Sargan tests are statistically insignificant and the coefficients of 
the p-values indicate that the models are stable and there is no problem of endogeneity in the 
estimations. It must be recalled that the explanatory variables are entered into the system 
separately.  
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Table 5.25: The GMM Panel Regression for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012):  
Regional Analysis (Southern Africa) 
Institution Framework on Capital Market Development  
(Dependent Variable – Capital Market Development Variables) 
  BANK PRIVY NONFIN EQCAP TURNOVER 
LAWRULE 29.27746 
(28.71925)* 
157.2380 
(90.51603)* 
-4.905601 
(3.464541) 
184.3624 
(174.5915) 
84.98545 
(141.6722) 
ENFORCE 14.34204 
(1.314143)*** 
25.22286 
(3.820573)*** 
0.573138 
(0.130952)*** 
35.34017 
(5.774329)*** 
8.479834 
(5.692134) 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.4905 0.7016 0.3643 0.4205 0.1161 
POLITY 1.299860 
(0.780353)* 
4.091776 
(2.613371) 
-0.051114 
(0.045773) 
7.260795 
(3.017716)** 
5.188650 
(2.573669)** 
ENFORCE 12.90281 
(1.446760)*** 
45.39166 
(22.09547)*** 
0.548786 
(0.102642)*** 
27.74983 
(5.005491)*** 
2.047453 
(3.755145) 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.3504 0.7000 0.4731 0.8764 0.4387 
INFLATION -1.793965 
(0.276384)*** 
-5.925675 
(0.887641)*** 
0.050621 
(0.051670) 
-7.998117 
(2.143277)*** 
-5.865410 
(1.676748)*** 
ENFORCE 20.05292 
(1.171774)*** 
45.39166 
(3.187216)*** 
0.324035 
(0.158761)** 
61.96194 
(8.027199)*** 
26.92016 
(6.664048)*** 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.1011 0.8765 0.4825 0.7963 0.1935 
QLEGAL 15.63659 
(12.40161) 
66.39788 
(45.93493) 
1.442785 
(1.652856) 
64.41569 
(90.90513) 
108.2337 
(55.98826)* 
ENFORCE 12.97757 
(2.200238)*** 
20.13857 
(7.273156)** 
0.283223 
(0.236844) 
31.09370 
(13.19944)** 
-3.501880 
(9.364903) 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.7854 0.1353 0.3948 0.3364 0.2204 
CORRUPTION -21.18264 
(5.468796)*** 
-69.94598 
(17.76098)*** 
0.900010 
(0.951243) 
-311.9470 
(113.5057)*** 
-84.81954 
(19.81100)*** 
ENFORCE 41.45169 
(6.369008)*** 
116.0458 
(20.45582)*** 
-0.657649 
(1.191511) 
429.2503 
(144.6306)*** 
116.3370 
(23.96048)*** 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.2752 0.5643 0.4638 0.8973 0.2473 
Observations 33 33 33 33 33 
Number of countries 1 1 1 1 1 
Orthogonal Deviations No No  No  No  No  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cross-section weights instrument weighting matrix and 
Convergence was achieved after 1 weight iterations. Cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f.  correction). 
   Maximum lags of dependent and predetermined variables for use as instruments are limited to 1.  
     Period fixed (dummy variables) applied in the estimation 
Looking at individual variables, the deterministic relationships between BANK, and 
LAWRULE and POLITY, is only statistically significant at 10 per cent error level, and both 
bear explosive positive coefficient when we control for legal enforcement of contracts 
(ENFORCE). However, the deterministic relationships are stronger in the case of 
INFLATION and CORRUPTION, both with explosive negative coefficients. It could thus be 
suggested that these institutional variables are strong determinants of the variations expressed 
by BANK.   
In the case of domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP (PRIVY), the 
relationship between the variable and LAWRULE is only statistically significant at 10 per cent 
error level and the coefficient is positive but explosive. However, the relationship between 
the dependent variable and INFLATION is statistically significant at one per cent error level 
with explosive negative coefficient. The same relationship holds for the relationship between 
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the dependent variable and CORRUPTION. In the case of NONFIN, none of the explanatory 
variables is found to be of statistical significance as determinants of the variation expressed 
by the dependent variable. 
Further, POLITY is found to have an explosive positive relationship with the total value of all 
listed shares in the Southern Africa stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) and the 
variable is found to be statistically significant at five per cent error level. However, the 
relationships between EQCAP and INFLATION, and with CORRUPTION are statistically 
significant at one per cent error level and bear explosive negative coefficients. Similar result 
is obtained for the total value of all traded shares in the Southern Africa stock market as a 
percentage of GDP (TURNOVER).  In addition, TURNOVER has a statistically significant 
relationship with QLEGAL at 10 per cent error level and the coefficient is positively 
explosive. In the Southern Africa analysis, evidence suggests that institutional variables play 
strong roles on the development of capital market in that region.    
West Africa 
The regional analysis for West Africa is presented in Table 5.26 and the discussion of the 
result follows thereafter.  
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Table 5.26: The GMM Panel Regression for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012):  
Regional Analysis (West Africa) 
Institution Framework on Capital Market Development  
(Dependent Variable – Capital Market Development Variables) 
  BANK PRIVY NONFIN EQCAP TURNOVER 
LAWRULE 2.170789 
(2.533083) 
8.244544 
(4.993044)* 
-25.73783 
(3.139129)*** 
13.37019 
(2.998485)*** 
4.622339 
(1.065980) 
ENFORCE 4.976224 
(1.073823)*** 
7.702618 
(2.078286)*** 
-5.377310 
(0.781048)*** 
7.778612 
(1.018213)*** 
2.018590 
(0.416972) 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.828046 0.848942 0.315094 0.484637 0.878102 
POLITY 0.082956 
(0.117282) 
0.175842 
(0.133108) 
-0.731119 
(0.216337)*** 
0.347100 
(0.222365) 
0.034993 
(0.029691) 
ENFORCE 4.073090 
(0.265242)*** 
4.436138 
(0.270137)*** 
4.698173 
(0.349869)*** 
2.620037 
(0.408581)*** 
0.177267 
(0.073958) 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.720186 0.288948 0.774380 0.105783 0.483099 
INFLATION -0.075433 
(0.029772)** 
-0.110775 
(0.042182)** 
0.169669 
(0.059515)*** 
-0.069939 
(0.035561)** 
-0.018935 
(0.012424) 
ENFORCE 4.644547 
(0.461630)*** 
5.162232 
(0.469790)*** 
3.275059 
(0.816415)*** 
3.140586 
(0.634374)*** 
0.385416 
(0.189897)* 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.733966 0.383752 0.189887 0.69435 0.035526 
QLEGAL 4.066175 
(3.780701) 
6.771694 
(3.848533)* 
-23.59543 
(8.424940)*** 
13.24165 
(5.579720)** 
3.768445 
(1.740505)** 
ENFORCE 5.187856 
(1.265778)*** 
6.725239 
(1.511766)*** 
-1.743666 
(2.138174) 
6.075205 
(1.432647)*** 
1.230927 
(0.477590)** 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.776045 0.320228 0.695080 0.232691 0.417524 
CORRUPTION 9.888189 
(5.608327)* 
7.087669 
(6.721359) 
24.46266 
(10.87551)** 
-1.804809 
(4.498408)* 
3.476786 
(1.902850)* 
ENFORCE -0.680119 
(2.680886) 
1.082648 
(3.129844) 
-7.418395 
(5.257667) 
3.747566 
(2.014455)* 
-0.922839 
(0.783464) 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.460200 0.111582 0.341127 0.148711 0.559373 
Observations 33 33 33 33 33 
Number of countries 1 1 1 1 1 
Orthogonal Deviations No  No  No  No  No  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cross-section weights instrument weighting matrix and 
Convergence was achieved after 1 weight iterations. Cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f.  correction). 
   Maximum lags of dependent and predetermined variables for use as instruments are limited to 1.  
     Period fixed (dummy variables) applied in the estimation 
In the West Africa analysis, only INFLATION (five per cent error level) and CORRUPTION 
(10 per cent error level) are found to have statistically significant relationship with financial 
resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP 
(BANK). While INFLATION expectantly bears a negative coefficient (eight per cent), 
CORRUPTION surprisingly bears an explosive positive coefficient. This finding indicates 
that inflation would slightly affect BANK development in the region, but CORRUPTION 
would most possibly improve it. This kind of result may suggest that corrupt public officials 
are closely linked to ownership structures of major banks in the region.  
 Looking at the relationship between domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP 
(PRIVY) and the institutional variables, it is apparent that LAWRULE and QLEGAL are 
statistically significant at 10 per cent error levels and both variables bear explosive positive 
coefficients. INFLATION, however, expectantly bears a negative coefficient (-0.11) and the 
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variable is statistically significant at five per cent error level. This result suggests that the 
annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION) does have more significant 
negative effect on PRIVY, but an improvement in LAWRULE and QLEGAL will probably 
improve the development of domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP 
(PRIVY).  
Controlling for legal enforcement of contracts, all the institutional variables play 
deterministic roles on claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a 
share of GDP (NONFIN) at one per cent error level (except for CORRUPTION that is 
statistically significant at five per cent error level).  While LAWRULE and QLEGAL bear 
explosive negative coefficients, the negative coefficient borne by POLITY suggests that the 
development of NONFIN will be affected by about 73 per cent of structural change in 
POLITY. Surprising here again as in the case of BANK, INFLATION and CORRUPTION bear 
positive coefficients, suggesting that the higher the consumer price index and the higher the 
corruption level, the more claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as 
a share of GDP (NONFIN) would increase in the region.  
The relationship between the total value of all listed shares in the Southern Africa stock 
market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) and all the institutional variables is strong and 
statistically significant (except for POLITY). However, in this instance, unlike in the previous 
results, the coefficients of these variables are explosive and they are all positive (except for 
INFLATION that bears a negative coefficient). By implication, corruption is observed to be 
capable of reducing the values of the equity capital, while all other institutional variables are 
observed to be capable of positively enhancing the development of the total value of all listed 
shares in the Southern Africa stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP).  
In the case of the total value of all traded shares in the Southern Africa stock market as a 
percentage of GDP (TURNOVER), only regulatory quality (QLEGAL) and corruption 
perception (CORRUPTION) emerged as the two institutional variables that impact 
TURNOVER. While QLEGAL is statistically significant at five per cent error level, 
CORRUPTION is statistically significant at one per cent error level. It can thus be suggested 
that institutional variables do slightly influence the total value of all traded shares in the 
Southern Africa stock market as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER).  
175 
 
The regional GMM analysis will be concluded with the results for East Africa, which will be 
presented in Table 5.27. The presentation of the results will be closely followed by the 
discussion of the result.  
Table 5.27: The GMM Panel Regression for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012):  
Regional Analysis (East Africa) 
Institution Framework on Capital Market Development  
(Dependent Variable – Capital Market Development Variables) 
  BANK PRIVY NONFIN EQCAP TURNOVER 
LAWRULE 15.83799 
(6.502879) 
38.06961 
(5.708911)*** 
-13.16901 
(7.708220)* 
43.05834 
(28.27531) 
-9.724198 
(4.077621)** 
ENFORCE 7.708899 
(1.281673)*** 
-1.518421 
(1.124432) 
-1.076670 
(1.637769) 
11.36162 
(6.030807)* 
-1.781856 
(0.863166)** 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.552997 0.023047 0.565640 0.866080 0.101752 
POLITY 0.548823 
(0.162716)*** 
-0.168667 
(0.145782) 
-0.420098 
(0.054181)*** 
1.347200 
(0.490528)*** 
0.253673 
(0.042838)*** 
ENFORCE 4.834124 
(0.181425)*** 
6.008252 
(0.197133)*** 
1.371648 
(0.101064)*** 
3.517194 
(0.626410)*** 
0.364758 
(0.050279)*** 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.486011 0.502038 0.501845 0.344563 0.153771 
INFLATION -0.271551 
(0.109308)*** 
0.092851 
(0.107763) 
0.214772 
(0.064179)*** 
-0.226985 
(0.254823) 
-0.021660 
(0.023671) 
ENFORCE 5.579730 
(0.595127)*** 
5.735227 
(0.292670)*** 
1.162781 
(0.278015)*** 
4.176792 
(1.355198)*** 
0.255646 
(0.116055** 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.706385 0.830653 0.382924 0.046697 0.648359 
QLEGAL -1.513656 
(41.42003) 
74.40214 
(20.11335)*** 
-45.62946 
(7.796073)*** 
177.7830 
(51.58284)*** 
23.50720 
(5.758629)*** 
ENFORCE 4.445190 
(2.408563)** 
11.33262 
(1.331066)*** 
-1.158746 
(0.401324)*** 
13.55528 
(3.215443)*** 
1.585147 
(0.376948)*** 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.137707 0.017492 0.315103 0.092001 0.136721 
CORRUPTION 9.555779 
(6.850786) 
16.20960 
(2.749537)*** 
-1.285436 
(4.549249) 
24.28895 
(9.964765)*** 
6.480838 
(0.796544)*** 
ENFORCE 0.119969 
(3.174251) 
-0.956394 
(1.264798) 
2.260665 
(2.124713) 
-8.143544 
(4.780324)* 
-2.723264 
(0.398424)*** 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.158351 0.016325 0.101478 0.139918 0.103346 
Observations 33 33 33 33 33 
Number of countries 1 1 1 1 1 
Orthogonal Deviations No  No  No  No  No  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cross-section weights instrument weighting matrix and 
Convergence was achieved after 1 weight iterations. Cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f.  correction). 
   Maximum lags of dependent and predetermined variables for use as instruments are limited to 1.  
     Period fixed (dummy variables) applied in the estimation 
According to the results presented in Table 5.27, two institutional variables (POLITY and 
INFLATION) are found to have statistically significant relationships with the dependent 
variable (BANK) at one per cent error level. The coefficient of POLITY is positive, suggesting 
an improvement in polity score would improve financial resources provided to the private 
sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) by about 55 per cent. 
Whereas, increase in consumer prices is capable of decreasing the financial resources 
provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) by 
about 27 per cent. 
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Looking at the domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP (PRIVY), there are 
indications from the results contained in Table 5.27 that LAWRULE, QLEGAL and 
CORRUPTION are statistically significant determinants of the behaviour of the dependent 
variable (PRIVY). More importantly, the coefficients of the institutional variables are positive 
and explosive, and they are all statistically significant at one per cent error level. A general 
conclusion can thus be drawn that these variables have strong influence on the development 
of domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP in East Africa.  
Controlling for legal enforcement of contracts, all the institutional variables (except for 
CORRUPTION) are found to play statistically significant deterministic roles on claims on 
domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN). Further, 
except for INFLATION that surprisingly bear positive coefficient (0.21), the other variables 
bear negative coefficients. In specific, the coefficient of LAWRULE is negative and 
explosive, so also is the coefficient of QLEGAL. 
However, the coefficient of POLITY suggests that claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector 
by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) would reduce by about 42 per cent through 
structural changes in POLITY. However, a structural change in consumer price would 
improve the claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of 
GDP (NONFIN).  
Considering the equity market variables (EQCAP and TURNOVER), it is observed that 
POLITY, QLEGAL and CORRUPTION are statistically significant at one per cent error level. 
In additional, LAWRULE is found to be statistically significant at five per cent error level in 
the case of TURNOVER and the coefficient is explosive and negative. In all the instances 
(except for TURNOVER regressed on POLITY), the coefficients of the variables are positive 
and explosive. The two variables that bear positive coefficient (POLITY & EQCAP) suggest 
that the total value of all traded shares in the East African stock market as a percentage of 
GDP (TURNOVER) would improve by about 25 per cent and 235 per cent through structural 
improvement in the combined polity score as well as improvement on regulatory quality.  
The results for regional analyses suggest that all the institutional variables play strong 
deterministic roles on the development of capital market in all the regions, albeit, in varying 
degrees. Although, the GMM estimation suggests strong deterministic relationship between 
the dependent and explanatory variables, there is a need to establish the speed of adjustment 
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of the variables to structural innovation shock hitting the system. This novelty precipitates 
our presentation of impulse response analysis.    
5.4.5 Impulse response analyses for equations 3 to 7 
Having conducted the dynamic panel regression for equations, we now shift our focus to the 
speed of adjustment of the dependent variable to the innovations shock of the explanatory 
variables on the dependent variables. However, instead of using the one unit innovation 
method that was adopted in Part A, we will make use of one standard deviation innovation 
method
14
. The change in approach here is necessary because all the institutional variables are 
presented in indexes. Their units of measurement are different from the conventional unit 
standards that are used in capital market dataset
15
. The results of the impulse response 
analysis are presented in Tables 5.28 to 5.52, beginning with the pooled estimation, through 
to the regional effects. 
Pooled Estimation 
Table 5.28: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 3 (1980-2012): 
Pooled data (Response of BANK to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.184271  0.298551  0.014686 -0.176354  0.171156 
 3  0.346161  0.300001 -0.103188 -0.316201  0.393752 
 4  0.397615  0.217431 -0.338125 -0.300470  0.402472 
 5  0.442183  0.227983 -0.420852 -0.331300  0.415099 
 6  0.420903  0.262133 -0.506875 -0.328718  0.418742 
 7  0.439681  0.279862 -0.588001 -0.353020  0.430044 
 8  0.437887  0.281555 -0.631293 -0.359769  0.438160 
 9  0.444212  0.285534 -0.663831 -0.370304  0.440775 
 10  0.445954  0.292296 -0.694208 -0.374698  0.444848 
One standard deviation innovations 
From Table 5.28, the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money 
banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) is found to respond negatively and significantly too, to 
one standard deviation innovation shocks on two institutional variables (INFLATION and 
QLEGAL), but positively and significantly to the other institutional variables.  
                                                 
14 Institutional variables such as LAWRULE, POLITY, and QLEGAL are based on scores and they range between +10 (best score) and -10 
(worst score). CORRUPTION indexes are perception-based and they are based on scores that range between +1 (corruption free) to -1 (most 
corrupt).  
15 Capital market variables used in this study are measured in either currency units (BANK, NONFIN and PRIVY) or natural numerical 
number (EQCAP and TURNOVER).  
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The reaction of the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money 
banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) to one standard deviation innovation shocks on rule of 
law (LAWRULE) begins on a positive note in the second period, and it continued in that 
positive territory throughout the period covered in the study. More importantly, the reaction 
is barely two per cent in the second period, but it gained momentum thereafter and ended up 
at about 45 per cent in the 10
th
 period. This form of incremental positive response is an 
important indication that the rule of law (LAWRULE) plays an important deterministic role on 
the efficiency and development of the financial resources provided to the private sector by 
domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) as an important component of the 
capital market in Africa.  
The reaction of the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money 
banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) to one standard deviation innovation shock on 
POLITY is not only positive, but also with incremental effects as well. More specifically, 
BANK begins reacting to the innovation shock in the second period and the impact of the 
response is about 30 per cent. The effect remains at 30 per cent in the third period, reduces to 
22 per cent in the fourth period and grows incrementally thereafter till the last period under 
consideration. These results suggest that innovation shocks on POLITY will be necessary to 
improve the performance of the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic 
money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK), as a strategic intervention towards developing 
capital market on the continent.  
The dependent variable (the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic 
money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) starts by responding positively to one standard 
deviation innovations shock in the second period by one per cent. Thereafter, the reaction 
changes to negative in the third period by10 per cent, and grows incrementally in the negative 
territory to 70 per cent in the 10
th
 period. It can therefore be reasonably concluded that 
innovation shocks on consumer prices (INFLATION) may trigger negative response from the 
financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of 
GDP (BANK), and the speed of adjustment to equilibrium will be slow.   
As for the reaction of BANK to a standard deviation innovation shock on regulatory quality 
(QLEGAL), BANK starts by responding negatively to the innovation shock and it never 
reverts back to positive territory throughout the period under consideration. A similar pattern 
of irreversible negative reaction that is recoded for BANK is also recorded here, suggesting 
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that the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a 
percentage of GDP (BANK) will most probably suffer extensively from innovation shock on 
regulatory quality.  To that extent, a compromise on regulatory quality and consumer price 
may trigger persistent serious instability on BANK.  
The reaction of the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money 
banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) to one standard deviation innovation shocks on the 
last institutional variable considered in this study (CORRUPTION) is positive and noticeable. 
In specific, BANK starts reacting positively to the innovative shocks on corruption 
perceptions in the second period at about 17 per cent and the reaction continues for the 
duration of the period under study.  
However, the most important observation in the results is that there is a consistent increase in 
the enormity of the response and the peak of the responses is reaches in the eighth period 
through to the 10
th
 period (44 per cent). It can then be reasonably argued that care should be 
taken to ensure soundness in institutional framework, especially those frameworks relating to 
consumer price and regulatory quality. The result presented in Table 5.28 indicates that it 
may take a very long period for financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic 
money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) to recover from a possible regulatory shock on 
these two institutional variables, but the reactions of BANK to the other institutional variables 
(LAWRULE, POLITY and CORRUPTION) are positive.  
In the preceding paragraphs, we looked at the effects of one standard deviation innovation 
shocks on institutional variables as they affect the financial resources provided to the private 
sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) across the sampled 
countries in a pooled data. In the paragraphs that follow, we will look at this relationship at 
regional level, starting with North Africa as usual.    
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North Africa  
 
Table 5.29: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 3 (1980-2012): 
North Africa Regional data (Response of BANK to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2 -0.450888  1.054794  0.166135 -0.100590 -0.326056 
 3 -0.536569  1.176816  0.169929 -0.425889 -0.336714 
 4 -0.719050  1.282905  0.214792 -0.144391 -0.213293 
 5 -0.765858  1.306719  0.305135 -0.196103 -0.351663 
 6 -0.817538  1.397764  0.378459 -0.031307 -0.309084 
 7 -0.895114  1.412042  0.392884  0.003783 -0.352857 
 8 -0.887816  1.431919  0.435107  0.073555 -0.356528 
 9 -0.938041  1.437698  0.455776  0.114918 -0.352344 
 10 -0.930306  1.439879  0.461751  0.145271 -0.368809 
One standard deviation innovations  
 
From Table 5.29 on North Africa regional analysis, the financial resources provided to the 
private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) starts by responding 
negatively in the second period to one unit standard deviation innovation shocks on 
LAWRULE, QLEGAL and CORRUPTION, and the negative response continues until the last 
period covered in the case of LAWRULE and CORRUPTION, and the sixth period in case of 
QLEGAL. However, the responses to the other institutional variables by BANK are positive 
and explosive for the entire period under study in the case of POLITY.  
Looking at individual variables, the financial resources provided to the private sector by 
domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) begins its reaction to one standard 
deviation innovation shocks on LAWRULE in the second period at 45 per cent. It is 
interesting to note that the negative trend continues for the entire periods covered in this 
study, but more importantly, with incremental trend. With as little as 45 per cent in the 
second period, the response grows to 94 per cent in the ninth period, and it regresses a little to 
93 per cent in period 10. One may thus opine that unguided flouting of rule of law may cost 
North Africa the needed development of BANK, and ultimately, the attractiveness of the 
region to inflow of FDI.   
Response of the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks 
as a percentage of GDP (BANK) to one standard deviation innovation shocks on POLITY is 
not only positive, but explosive as well from the second period and the trend continues 
throughout the period covered in the study. BANK responds in similar positive and 
incremental way to one unit standard deviation innovation shocks on INFLATION from 17 
per cent in the second period to 46 per cent in the ninth and 10
th
 periods. It can thus be opined 
that keeping inflation in check will help to improve the development of the financial 
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resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP 
(BANK).  
The response of the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money 
banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) to one standard deviation innovation shocks on 
regulatory quality (QLEGAL) is both negative and positive, but the negative effects are 
stronger than the positive ones. For example, BANK responds negatively to the innovation 
shocks in the second period by 10 per cent, and the negative increment grows to 43 per cent 
by the third period. However, the positive effects only record the highest response of 15 per 
cent, and that is in period 10. One may therefore advance an argument that enervating 
regulatory quality may trigger inefficiency in the financial resources provided to the private 
sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) as an important component 
of the capital market, and ultimately, dampen the attractiveness of North Africa to inflow of 
FDI.  
The response of financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks 
as a percentage of GDP (BANK) to one standard deviation innovation shocks on corruption 
perception is negative and the trend is incremental in nature. Starting with about 33 per cent 
response rate in the second period, the negative effect proceeds to 37 per cent in period 10. 
This suggests that BANK will react immediately, negatively and strongly too, to policy 
intervention on corruption in North Africa.  
This form of reaction may curtail the development of the financial resources provided to the 
private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK), which is an 
important component of the capital market. Reducing the performance of this important 
capital market component may ultimately reduce the attractiveness of North Africa to inflow 
of FDI. Again, this analysis suggests that financial resources provided to the private sector by 
domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) in North Africa would react 
negatively, almost immediately too, to changes in institutional regulatory dynamics, 
especially as regards LAWRULE, QLEGAL and CORRUPTION. However, while the response 
of BANK to INFLATION is positive and significant, the reaction of BANK to POLITY is 
instantaneous, positive and explosive.  
 
 
182 
 
Southern Africa    
Table 5.30: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 3 (1980-2012): 
Southern Africa Regional data (Response of BANK to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  1.852962  0.864201 -0.802172 -0.641824  0.128077 
 3  3.536355  1.266669 -0.200018 -0.599696  0.798806 
 4  4.239026  1.099280  0.342451 -1.093909  0.156402 
 5  3.317805  0.412979  0.120878 -1.274361  0.194901 
 6  1.807056  0.123564 -0.274091 -1.491125  0.508553 
 7  2.110971  0.634233 -0.281245 -1.220997  1.194619 
 8  3.279216  1.360377 -0.059885 -1.346515  0.679757 
 9  3.879550  1.225241  0.198089 -1.442722  0.644966 
 10  3.101996  0.580940  0.099814 -1.568778  0.584621 
One standard deviation innovations 
 
Considering the results of impulse response presented in Table 5.30, it is observed that 
financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of 
GDP (BANK) in Southern Africa reacts positively to one standard deviation innovation 
shocks on all the institutional variables, except for explosive negative response from 
QLEGAL and a more moderate intermittent negative responses to INFLATION. 
Beginning with the responses of the financial resources provided to the private sector by 
domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) to rule of law (LAWRULE), it is 
observed that the reaction of BANK to LAWRULE is positive and explosive from the second 
period and the trend continues throughout the entire period covered in this study. As for the 
reaction of BANK to one standard deviation innovation shocks on POLITY, it is observed that 
the response is not stable. It begins with a high 86 per cent in the second period, followed by 
an explosive percentage increases in third and fourth periods, before regressing to 41 and 12 
per cent during the fifth and sixth periods.  
The response ends in the last period at 58 per cent after the explosive percentage responses in 
the eighth and ninth periods. This form of spasmodic responses suggests serious instability 
that would make adequate policy intervention difficult. However, it must be pointed out that 
the innovation shock on POLITY is capable of enhancing the performance and development 
of BANK as an important component of capital market in Southern Africa.   
The responses of financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks 
as a percentage of GDP (BANK) to one standard deviation innovations shock on INFLATION 
are both negative and positive. BANK starts by responding negatively to the innovation 
shocks on consumer prices (INFLATION) in the second period by 80 per cent, and the effects 
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of the response reduced to 20 per cent in the third period. By the fourth period, the response 
turns positive (34 per cent) and a 12 per cent positive response is also recorded in the fifth 
period. However, the response becomes negative again in the sixth (27 per cent), seventh (28 
per cent) and eighth (six per cent) periods, before turning positive again in the ninth (20 per 
cent) and 10
th
 (10 per cent) periods. This finding suggests that the response of BANK to 
innovation shocks on INFLATION would be turbulent and chaotic. However, the negative 
effects of the innovation shocks (80 per cent) would outweigh its benefit (34 per cent).   
The response of financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks 
as a percentage of GDP (BANK) to one standard deviation innovations shock on regulatory 
quality (QLEGAL) is negative throughout the periods covered in this study. Beginning in the 
second period, BANK’s reaction is spontaneous and negative (64 per cent). The response 
reduces to 60 per cent in the third period, before becoming explosive for the rest of the period 
under investigation. It is noteworthy, that the negative responses are incremental in nature. 
Looking at the trend, it appears that the negative effect will continue for a long period. This 
result indicates that the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money 
banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) may react uninterruptedly to innovation shocks on 
regulatory quality (QLEGAL).  
Further, one standard deviation innovation shocks on corruption perception (CORRUPTION) 
have positive effects on BANK. The financial resources provided to the private sector by 
domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) starts by reacting to one standard 
deviation innovations shock on CORRUPTION positively in the second period (13 per cent) 
and the response increases to 80 per cent in the third period, becomes explosive in the 
seventh period, before regressing gently to 58 per cent in the 10
th
 period.  This result 
indicates that an improvement in corruption perception will not only serve as an important 
determinant of BANK development in Southern Africa, but the effects of the improvement 
will also be extremely significant.     
The findings from the analysis point to the fact that BANK is positively sensitive to 
innovation shocks on LAWRULE, POLITY and CORRUPTION in Southern Africa, and any 
policy intervention to improve these institutional variables will yield positive results on 
BANK. Further, the effects of policy intervention on regulatory quality (QLEGAL) will 
possibly result in monolithic response from BANK. As such, any policy intervention in that 
regard should be tamed with caution in other not to enervate the financial resources provided 
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to the private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) - an 
important component of the capital market, and an important pull factor for inflow of FDI to 
the region. 
West Africa 
Table 5.31: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 3 (1980-2012): 
West Africa Regional data (Response of BANK to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  2.074233  0.761333  0.649874 -0.505978  0.943115 
 3  2.402129  0.200872  0.675243 -0.419490  1.869177 
 4  2.153379 -0.138904 -0.055994 -0.036843  2.216707 
 5  1.121833 -0.872391 -0.374578 -0.498149  2.214096 
 6  0.849995 -1.063679 -0.098072 -0.902587  2.390279 
 7  0.770340 -1.267292  0.311257 -0.977027  2.640390 
 8  1.330051 -1.228444  0.427037 -0.821188  2.346259 
 9  1.402693 -1.097640  0.373803 -0.409406  1.772431 
 10  1.346092 -0.818752  0.233790 -0.277639  1.739871 
One standard deviation innovations 
The impulse response analysis for West Africa on equation 3 appears in Table 5.31. From the 
results generated through that analysis, it is observed that the financial resources provided to 
the private sector by domestic money bank as a percentage of GDP (BANK) responds both 
positively and negatively to one standard deviation innovation shocks on the institutional 
variables. In the case of rule of law (LAWRULE), BANK begins its response to one standard 
deviation innovation shock on rule of law in the second period and the response is explosive. 
This explosive positive response continues throughout the period covered in the study. 
However, there are two exceptions to the explosive reaction. The first one is in the sixth 
period when a reaction of 85 per cent is recorded and the second reaction occurs in the 
seventh period when 77 per cent reaction is recorded. An opinion can thus be proposed that 
the rule of law is an important determinant of possible development in the financial resources 
provided to the private sector by domestic money bank as a percentage of GDP (BANK).  
In addition, the reaction of BANK to one standard deviation innovation shocks on POLITY is 
mixed. The response begins strongly in the positive territory at 76 per cent in the second 
period, and reverts to 20 per cent positive reaction in the third period. Thereafter, the 
response enters a negative territory in an incremental form and the negative response 
continues till the 10
th
 period. It is thus observed that even though the initial reaction of BANK 
to POLITY is positive, the positive responses are more regressive. More importantly, the 
negative responses of the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic 
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money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) to the innovation shock on POLITY becomes 
incrementally explosive and the resulting negative effects far outweigh the short-run positive 
effects. Any policy intervention in this regard should thus be tamed with caution.     
Looking at the response of the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic 
money bank as a percentage of GDP (BANK) to one standard deviation innovations shock on 
annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION), it is observed that changes in 
consumer prices do influence the development of BANK more positively. Although, there are 
some isolated cases of negative response but the effect of the negative responses that occurs 
between the fourth and sixth periods are not strong. .  
In specific, the reaction of BANK to one standard deviation innovation shock on consumer 
price index (INFLATION) starts in the second period at 65 per cent, and it progresses gently 
to 68 per cent in the third period. Thereafter, the response enters a negative territory, and 
there are six, 38 and 10 per cent negative changes in the response for the fourth, fifth and 
sixth periods respectively. After the brief negative responses, the responses enter positive 
territory and the percentage change in the reaction ranges between 43 per cent in period eight 
and 23 per cent in period 10. It can thus be observed that policy intervention to better manage 
increases in consumer price index may enhance the development of BANK in West Africa. 
The impact of one standard deviation innovation shocks on regulatory quality (QLEGAL) 
results in immediate negative reaction from the financial resources provided to the private 
sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK), which continues for the 
entire period under study. The response begins in the second period with 51 per cent 
reduction in BANK, which later regresses to 42 and four per cent respectively in the third and 
fourth periods. The negative reaction reaches its peak in the seventh period (97 per cent), and 
the effects begins to wane towards the tail end of the period under study with the last period 
experiencing a mere 28 per cent response effect.  
Just as in the case of the other two African regions investigated earlier, regulatory quality is 
of importance in the development of BANK in West Africa. Having observed earlier through 
the regression analyses the importance of this variable on inflow of FDI to the region, it 
becomes expedient to tame any regulatory framework that is capable of affecting the 
functionality of this variable with caution. Otherwise, the attractiveness of the region to 
inflow of FDI may be compromised. 
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The last variable of interest in equation 3 is corruption perception (CORRUPTION). 
According to the analysis contained in Table 5.31, the financial resources provided to the 
private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) starts reacting 
positively to one standard deviation innovation shocks on CORRUPTION during the second 
period with 94 per cent reduction in BANK allocation., and the positive reaction continues for 
the entire periods under consideration in this study, at an explosive rate. Although, the 
explosive effect begins to ebb from period seven (the peak of the reaction), the speed of 
adjustment is rather slow. Just like in the case of Southern Africa as discussed earlier, the 
impact of policy intervention to curb corruption perception in West Africa will be positive on 
BANK – an important component of the capital market and one of the determinants of the 
attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI.    
East Africa 
Table 5.32: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 3 (1980-2012): 
East Africa Regional data (Response of BANK to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2 -0.390787  0.423990 -0.568393 -0.633496 -0.288741 
 3 -0.725088  0.419059 -0.104107 -0.340887  0.289244 
 4 -0.851769  0.201757 -0.019000 -0.668938  0.025731 
 5 -0.783767  0.347071  0.383479 -0.479584  0.028089 
 6 -0.953049  0.056581  0.468658  0.096206  0.101237 
 7 -0.936903  0.110875  0.200525 -0.299466 -0.005917 
 8 -0.884263  0.248323  0.331513 -0.426749 -0.015291 
 9 -1.001856  0.217938  0.278450 -0.359728  0.051356 
 10 -0.904357  0.213641  0.217306 -0.375072  0.083485 
One standard deviation innovations 
The results of the impulse response analysis conducted for equation 3 in East Africa appears 
in Table 5.32. According to that Table, the financial resources provided to the private sector 
by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) starts by responding to one 
standard deviation innovation shocks on rule of law (LAWRULE) negatively, and the effect 
reduces the BANK allocation by 40 per cent in the second period.  
The negative reaction continues thereafter at an incremental pace, reaches its peak in the 
ninth period (100 per cent), and regress a little in period 10 (90 per cent). The trend of this 
reaction suggests that it will take some time for the variable to revert back to the point of 
equilibrium, and the effects of the innovation shocks are significantly negative throughout the 
period covered in the study. This finding hints that unsettling rule of law may precipitate 
instability in the development of BANK in East Africa.  
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The reaction of BANK to one standard deviation innovation shocks on POLITY is 
continuously positive and the highest of such a reaction is 42 per cent (recoded in second and 
third periods). Thereafter, the reaction of financial resources provided to the private sector by 
domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) to one standard deviation innovation 
shocks on POLITY becomes unstable.  
For instance, the response grows from 20 per cent in the fourth period to 35 per cent in the 
fifth period, before regressing to six per cent in the sixth period. The response rate grows 
from 11 per cent in period seven to 25 per cent in period eight, before regressing to 22 per 
cent and 21 per cent in periods nine and ten respectively. This kind of trend suggests that the 
speed of adjustment back to equilibrium is slow and the variable is an important determinant 
of BANK allocation, and by extension, an important pull factor for the attractiveness of the 
East African region to inflow of FDI.      
The response of BANK to one standard deviation innovation shocks on INFLATION is mixed. 
The reaction begins on significantly high negative 57 per cent in the second period, regresses 
to 10 per cent in the third period, and records barely two per cent response rate in the fourth 
period. Thereafter, the response becomes positive in the fifth period and the positive trend 
continues for the rest of the period under investigation. Judging from trend of the response, it 
is apparent that the speed of adjustment back to equilibrium point is slow. Further, while 
innovation shocks on INFLATION would have negative effects on BANK, the possibility that 
the positive effects will continue over a long run lends credence to the appropriateness of 
policy intervention in East Africa to ameliorate the effects on INFLATION in the economy.  
Another variable of interest in equation 3 is regulatory quality (QLEGAL). According to the 
results of analysis presented in Table 5.32, the financial resources provided to the private 
sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) reacts negatively to one 
standard deviation innovation shocks on QLEGAL from the second period throughout the 
periods under consideration.  
In specific, the reaction begins in the second period with a 63 per cent negative response, 
closely followed by 34 per cent response rate in the third period, 67 per cent in the fourth and 
48 per cent in the fifth period. The response regresses further in the sixth period to 10 per 
cent before moving further in negative territory to 30 per cent in the seventh period and it 
ended up at 38 per cent in period 10. The bumpy trend suggests that the speed of adjustment 
back to the point of equilibrium may be slow. One important observation is that QLEGAL has 
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important deterministic effects on BANK. As such, any policy intervention in this regard 
should be cautiously weighted.   
The last variable in this equation is CORRUPTION. The response of financial resources 
provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) to 
one standard deviation innovation shocks on CORRUPTION in East Africa is similar to the 
results obtained for Southern and West Africa regions. In East Africa, the reaction of BANK 
to innovation shocks on CORRUPTION is largely positive, except for three instances where 
the responses are negative (the second, seventh and eighth periods). 
More specifically, BANK begins by responding to innovation shocks on CORRUPTION in 
the second period with a negative of 29 per cent, and the figure changed to 29 per cent in the 
positive territory in the third period, before regressing to three per cent in the fourth and fifth 
periods and 10 per cent in the sixth period. The negative reaction recorded in the seventh 
period is less than one per cent and similar record for the eighth period is about three per 
cent. The last two periods record positive reactions of five and eight per cent respectively.  
Judging from this result, it can be argued that the reaction of financial resources provided to 
the private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) to innovation 
shocks on corruption perception is significant, thereby justifying policy interventions.  
The general observation from the East African analysis is that the institutional variables 
under consideration have significant deterministic effects on the development of BANK in the 
region. Further, because of the negative reactions of BANK to LAWRULE and QLEGAL, any 
policy intervention on these two variables should be tame with utmost caution in order not to 
unnerve one of the critical components of capital market in the region.   
The discussion presented in the preceding paragraphs centre on the pooled and regional 
impulse analyses for equation 3. The same set of analyses will be presented in the paragraphs 
that follow on equations 4, 5, 6 and 7. The presentation will follow the same pattern adopted 
above (beginning with the pooled estimation, followed by the regional analyses), with the 
same set of estimation techniques.  
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Pooled Estimation 
Table 5.33: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 4 (1980-2012): 
Pooled data (Response of PRIVY to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.863535  0.250214 -0.538797 -0.644828 -0.171623 
 3  0.470502  0.042471  0.069108 -0.091464  0.178623 
 4  0.466934  0.245522  0.056866 -0.343857  0.027480 
 5  0.613917  0.478617 -0.143394 -0.330647  0.087079 
 6  0.599358  0.596580 -0.004973 -0.414619  0.149227 
 7  0.620666  0.634488  0.020614 -0.403645  0.162002 
 8  0.644184  0.735784  0.002823 -0.448216  0.178530 
 9  0.666758  0.819488  0.021843 -0.465453  0.203896 
 10  0.677307  0.877598  0.040442 -0.487551  0.219098 
One standard deviation innovations 
The impulse response analysis contained in Table 5.33 largely shows possible response from 
domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) to one standard deviation 
innovation shocks on each of the institutional variables. To start with, the responses of PRIVY 
to one standard deviation innovation shocks on rule of law (LAWRULE) are positive and 
progressive in nature, but with some intermittent variation. From as high as 86 per cent 
increase in the value of domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) in the 
second period, the percentage change drops to 47 in the third and fourth periods before 
increasing to 61 per cent in fifth period. Picking at 60 per cent in the sixth period, the 
upswing trend continues and reaches a peak of 68 per cent in the 10
th
 period.  
While the trend is chaotic at the beginning, it normalises in the second half of the periods 
covered in the study. These results indicate that the effects of rule of law on domestic credit 
to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) is significant and the speed of adjustment back to 
the point of equilibrium may be slow.  Further, any policy intervention to improve the respect 
for rule of law in the sampled African countries may enhance the total value and the 
development of domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY). Buttressing the 
result of GMM contained in Table 5.23, this variable is an important determinant of inflow of 
FDI to the continent, and as such, policy intervention to improve rule of law on the continent 
will contribute positively to enhance efficiency and development of domestic credit to private 
sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY). 
In the same vein, the responses of domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP 
(PRIVY) to one standard deviation innovation shocks on POLITY is positive and progressive 
throughout the period covered in the study. From 25 per cent in the second period, the 
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response dropped to four per cent in the third period and picked up again in the fourth period 
at 25, and the trend continues thereafter incrementally. The incremental positive response 
reaches its peak in the 10
th
 period at 88 per cent.  
The findings from this analysis indicate that POLITY is an important determinant of the 
behaviour of PRIVY, and the speed of adjustment back to the point of equilibrium is slow. It 
can then be proposed that policy intervention to improve the polity score on the continent will 
enhance the development of domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY), 
which is an important component of capital market in Africa.  
Further, the reaction of domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) to one 
standard deviation innovation shocks on annual percentage change in consumer prices 
(INFLATION) is generally positive, except for three instances (second, fifth and sixth 
periods) where the responses are negative. In the first period, the negative response affects 
the value of domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) by 54 per cent, 
becomes positive in the third (seven per cent) and fourth (six per cent) periods, before 
entering negative territory again in the fifth period (14 per cent). The negative reaction in the 
sixth period is barely up to one per cent, and the positive reactions thereafter are also 
insignificant. Looking at the responses in general, it appears that the negative responses are of 
more statistical significance than the positive reactions.   
Just as in the previous impulse response estimations in this Part, capital market variables 
largely respond negatively to innovation shocks on regulatory quality. The same kind of 
negative reaction is experienced here. The response of domestic credit to private sector as a 
share of GDP (PRIVY) to one standard deviation innovation shock on regulatory quality 
(QLEGAL) is negative from the second period, and it ends up in the negative territory in the 
10
th
 period. From a reaction of 64 per cent in the second period, it reduces to nine in the third 
period before picking up at 33 per cent in the fifth period. The peak of the negative reaction 
occurs in period ten (49 per cent).    
In general, the trend of this reaction suggests that although the impulse response of domestic 
credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) to regulatory quality may be greater at one 
point than the other, the effects are statistically significant and as such, policy interventions in 
this regard should be tamed with caution.  
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The last institutional variable in the pooled analysis is corruption perception index 
(CORRUPTION). According to the analysis presented in Table 5.33, it is evident that the 
reaction of domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) to one standard 
deviation innovations shock begins in the second period on the negative note at 17 per cent. 
However, the response turns positive from the third period (18 per cent), and the positive 
response continues to gain momentum till the last period under investigation (22 per cent).  
An overall observation made from the analyses presented for the pooled impulse response 
estimation suggests that domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) reacts 
significantly to these institutional variables, and the trend in the reactions are indications of 
slow speed of adjustment back to the point of equilibrium. This finding thus suggests that 
policy initiatives towards improving the institutional variables should be guided, in order not 
to defeat the intended purpose. Having concluded the pooled analysis for equation 4, we now 
proceed to the regional analysis. The results of the regional analyses appear in the paragraphs 
that follow.  
 North Africa 
Table 5.34: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 4 (1980-2012): 
North Africa Regional data (Response of PRIVY to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.386290  1.203012 -0.236903 -0.280551 -1.076554 
 3  0.286696  1.677108 -0.005162 -0.626699 -0.684959 
 4 -0.071247  1.337359 -0.263713 -0.487239 -0.561353 
 5 -0.098912  1.097292 -0.198869 -0.538187 -0.451358 
 6 -0.393675  1.094297 -0.187702 -0.493274 -0.339835 
 7 -0.411665  1.086155 -0.280367 -0.520096 -0.377935 
 8 -0.530112  1.149752 -0.240485 -0.522156 -0.316379 
 9 -0.595313  1.127493 -0.277684 -0.535866 -0.306799 
 10 -0.652403  1.137481 -0.282618 -0.534861 -0.279066 
One standard deviation innovations 
 
The impulse response analysis presented in table 5.34 indicates that the domestic credit to 
private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) responds positively to one standard innovations 
shock only on POLITY as an institutional variable. Apart from POLITY, PRIVY’s reactions to 
the other institutional variables are negative, but not explosive.  
For instance, the reaction of domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) to 
one standard deviation innovation shocks on the rule of law (LAWRULE) is positive for the 
second and third periods, and it becomes negative throughout the remaining periods under 
consideration, and the trend of the negative responses is incremental as well. From positive 
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responses of 39 per cent and 29 per cent in the second and third periods respectively, the 
impulse response changes to negative in the fourth period. The negative reaction begins with 
barely seven per cent and it grows systematically to 65 per cent in the 10
th
 period. The trend 
of these results suggests that the speed of adjustment back to the point of equilibrium will be 
slow.   
With slow speed of adjustment back to the point of equilibrium, one can easily opine that 
policy intervention to improve rule of law in North Africa should be carefully considered. 
This careful consideration is very essential because, any policy misjudgement may unnerve 
PRIVY that is an important component of capital market in the region, and an important 
determinant of the region to inflow of FDI as suggest in Table 5.7. 
The reaction of domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) to one standard 
deviation innovation shocks on POLITY is positive and explosive from the second period and 
the trend continues throughout the period under study. With the continuum trend in the 
explosive nature of the institutional variable (POLITY), it is interesting to note that the speed 
of adjustment to the point of equilibrium is slow, thereby suggesting cautious policy 
intervention in that regards.  
The domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) starts to react negatively to 
one standard deviation innovation shocks on annual percentage changes in consumer prices 
(INFLATION) from the second period and the negative reaction continues until the last period 
under consideration. Beginning with 25 per cent reduction in the domestic credit to private 
sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) in the second period, the negative effect regresses 
significantly to barely one per cent in the third period, before picking up to 26 per cent in the 
fourth period.  
The period between fifth and 10
th
 period records a systematic increase from 20 per cent in the 
fifth period to 28 per cent in the 10
th
 period.  The continuity of the reaction in negative 
territory at incremental trend suggests that the speed of adjustment back to equilibrium point 
will be slow. As such, any policy intervention targeted at reducing annual percentage change 
in consumer prices should be guided, in order not to further unnerve the skittish institutional 
framework. It is further important to note that PRIVY is one of the important components of 
capital market in North Africa, and it also doubles as an important determinant of the 
attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI. As such, it is considered inexpedient to 
introduce policy measures that are capable of upsetting this framework.  
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 Just as in the case of INFLATION, the domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP 
(PRIVY) begins to respond to one standard deviation innovation shocks on regulatory quality 
(QLEGAL) from the second period, and the negative reaction continues until period 10. The 
negative reaction begins in the second period with 28 per cent in the domestic credit to 
private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY). This reduction grows to 63 per cent in the second 
period before regressing slowly to 49 per cent in the fourth period. From the sixth period, the 
percentage change grows from 49 per cent to 53 per cent in the last period. As in the case of 
INFLATION, the continuum nature of the increment suggests that the speed of adjustment 
back to the point of equilibrium will be slow, thereby suggesting pragmatic policy 
interventions that are capable of addressing the vices inherent in the application of rule of law 
in North Africa.  
CORRUPTION is the last institutional variable in the analysis for this section. According to 
Table 5.34, the reaction of PRIVY to one standard deviation innovation shocks on corruption 
perception is negative from the second period, and the reaction continues in the negative 
territory throughout the period under consideration. Beginning with an explosive reaction in 
the second period, the reaction regresses to 68 per cent in the third period and barely 28 per 
cent in the last period. Here, the speed of adjustment is rapid and it will not take long for the 
trend to revert back to the point of equilibrium. Riding on the laurel of rapid speed of 
adjustment, it is possible for the government to try-out various options as the snag of policy 
misjudgement will be mean reverting in a short period of time.   
From the analysis contained in Table 5.34, there are clear indications that domestic credit to 
private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) will respond rapidly (negatively or positively) to 
innovation shocks of the institutional variables, and the reaction could be explosive in the 
negative but more in the positive territory. The regional analysis for Southern Africa follows 
in the next paragraphs.   
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Southern Africa 
Table 5.35: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 4 (1980-2012): 
Southern Africa Regional data (Response of PRIVY to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  1.839800  0.294122 -2.649349 -0.388470 -3.946115 
 3 -1.601993  1.593656 -1.531814  3.613076 3.313399 
 4 -1.841280 -0.879517 -2.618409  3.031053  4.668108 
 5 -0.820910  0.852139 -2.343262  4.671232  2.192247 
 6 -0.847165  2.235638 -1.499895  4.059266  1.164886 
 7 -0.111493 -0.240216 -2.100556  4.762943  3.202523 
 8 -1.409248  0.541172 -2.069161  3.964609  0.672917 
 9 -2.065887  0.428796 -1.666180  4.786405  4.166576 
 10 -0.941939  1.069384 -2.631465  4.506085  2.047744 
One standard deviation innovations 
 
The result of impulse response presented in Table 5.35 suggests that PRIVY responds 
negatively but more positively to institutional variables. Considering the reaction of domestic 
credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) to one standard deviation innovation 
shocks on rule of law (LAWRULE), it is observed that the first reaction of the capital market 
variable to the innovations shock is positive and explosive. However, the response changes to 
negative in the third period, but it continues to be explosive in most of the instances. Out of 
the four instances where the reactions are not explosive, they are more than 80 per cent in 
three of the instances. 
The simple implication of these kinds of reactions is that although PRIVY will respond 
positively to innovation shocks on LAWRULE at the beginning, the resulting negative effects 
thereafter will be unnerving. As such, policy intervention in Southern Africa to improve the 
development of domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) through the 
LAWRULE nexus cannot be adopted without passable considerations given to its implication. 
Further, given that the speed of adjustment of this variable back to the point of equilibrium is 
slow, the recovery process of PRIVY from such innovation shock may be enduring.  
Looking at the reaction of PRIVY to one standard deviation innovation shocks on POLITY, it 
is observed that the capital market variable reacts positively to the innovation shocks on the 
institutional variable by 30 per cent in the second period. The reaction becomes positively 
explosive in the third period, before turning negative by 88 per cent in the fourth period. 
Immediately thereafter, a positive percentage change of 85 per cent is obtained in the fifth 
period and the positive response becomes explosive again in the sixth period. Except for the 
20 per cent negative reaction in the seventh period, the intensity of the positive response are 
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very strong. This may be interpreted as implying strong deterministic relationships between 
POLITY and PRIVY.    
Looking at the impulse response of domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP 
(PRIVY) to one standard deviation innovation shocks on changes in consumer price 
(INFLATION), it is observed that the domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP 
(PRIVY) responds negatively to innovation shocks on this institutional variable from the 
second period throughout the entire periods covered in this study. More importantly, the 
negative response is explosive and chaotic in most cases. In a simple term, any intended 
macroeconomic policy intervention towards improving the state of inflation in Southern 
Africa should be applied with caution, and realisation that misguided implementation of 
inflation-related policy may unsettle the domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP 
(PRIVY) should be borne in mind. 
Apart from annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION), the impulse 
response of domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) to regulatory quality 
(QLEGAL) in Southern Africa forms an important consideration in this study. According to 
Table 5.35, the domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) reacts negatively 
to one standard deviation innovation shocks on QLEGAL in the second period by 39 per cent. 
Thereafter, the reaction turns positive and it remains in the positive territory for the entire 
duration under study.  
It is important to point out that the reaction is very explosive and the trend is unstable. The 
chaotic trend that is inherent in this response pattern suggests that the speed of adjustment 
back to the point of equilibrium will be slow. Further, one may suggests that policy 
intervention towards improving the quality of regulatory environment in Southern Africa may 
aid the development of domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY), which is 
an important component of capital market in the region, and one of the capital market 
determinants of the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI.  
The last institutional variable of interest here is corruption perception (CORRUPTION). From 
Table 5.35, evidence suggests that domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP 
(PRIVY) reacts positively (except for the second period) and in most cases, explosively too, to 
one standard deviation innovation shocks on CORRUPTION. From the third period, the 
reaction of PRIVY to innovation shocks on CORRUPTION is positive and explosive. 
Although, PRIVY responds to the innovation shocks by 67 per cent increase in period eight, 
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the reaction for the rest of the periods are chaotic and explosive. This finding suggests that 
the domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) would improve if regulatory 
intervention is employed to curb corruption in Southern Africa. Being an important capital 
market determinant for the attractiveness of FDI inflow to the region, regulatory interventions 
are required to improve on this institutional framework.  
West Africa    
Table 5.36: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 4 (1980-2012): 
West Africa Regional data (Response of PRIVY to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2 -0.110002  0.190700  0.785007 -0.866847  2.768985 
 3 -2.304440 -0.978941  1.323415 -0.971898  3.639255 
 4 -3.118537 -2.434080  0.081129 -1.334123  1.758608 
 5 -3.150376 -2.409085 -0.726932 -1.057729  0.751764 
 6 -1.887622 -1.245294  0.675365 -1.491078  3.225849 
 7 -2.390965 -1.416657  2.607338 -1.768104  4.559901 
 8 -4.024406 -2.786577  1.791298 -1.191978  2.503574 
 9 -5.145250 -3.374006 -0.972962 -0.590036 -0.214394 
 10 -2.865383 -1.817249 -1.239666 -1.460663  1.126786 
One standard deviation innovations 
The result of impulse response analysis presented in table 5.36 indicates that the domestic 
credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) reacts negatively to all the institution 
variables at a point in time. For instance, the response of PRIVY to one standard deviation 
innovation shocks on rule of law (LAWRULE) begins in the second period in a negative 
territory. The reaction begins with 11 per cent reduction in PRIVY, and it becomes explosive 
for the rest of the period covered.  Although, the trend of the response is chaotic and unstable, 
thereby making the postulation on the speed of adjustment very difficult. However, there is a 
prima facie proposition that the speed of adjustment back to the equilibrium point is low.  
For POLITY, the domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) reacts to one 
standard deviation innovation shocks positively in the second period by 19 per cent. 
However, the reaction turns negative in the third period by 98 per cent and it becomes 
explosive from the fourth period. The explosive negative reaction continues till the last period 
under consideration, and the trend is unstable. One can thus suggest that the early positive 
response is not enough to offset the explosive negative responses that follow. Further, the 
slow speed of adjustment to the point of equilibrium suggests that policy intervention 
intended to improve POLITY may backfire on PRIVY if it is not guardedly orchestrated.   
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The reaction of domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) to one standard 
deviation innovation shocks on annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION) 
is more positive than being negative. For instance, the initial positive reaction occurs between 
the second and the fourth periods, ranging from 79, 32 and eight per cent in the second, third 
and fourth periods respectively.  The negative reaction experienced in the fifth period reduced 
the domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) by 73 per cent and the 
variable quickly recovers back to positive territory in the sixth period at 68 per cent. Periods 
seven and eight recorded explosive positive responses before the reaction enters a negative 
territory in periods nine and 10.    
Although, the reaction of PRIVY to one standard deviation innovations shock on INFLATION 
are negative in three instances, the intensity of the positive reaction offsets the negative 
impacts. This may imply that an improvement in the macroeconomic policy focused on 
improving annual increase in consumer prices may enhance the value and development of 
domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) in West Africa region.  
Further, the domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) reacts negatively and 
explosively too (in most cases), to one standard deviation innovation shocks on regulatory 
quality (QLEGAL). The negative reaction begins at 87 per cent in the second period and 
progresses to 97 per cent in the third period, before the reaction becomes explosive. The trend 
of the responses depicts an uneven pattern that possibly advice on a slow speed of adjustment 
back to the point of equilibrium.  
The reaction of domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) to one standard 
deviation innovation shocks on corruption perception is extensively positive, except for a 21 
per cent negative response generated in period nine. From the second period, the responses 
are positive and explosive with minimum reaction being the 75 per cent recorded in period 
five. In all other instances, the trends of the responses are unevenly bumpy. This kind of a 
trend indicates a possibly slow speed of adjustment back to the point of equilibrium and anti-
corruption policy intervention should be tamed with caution.  
The impulse response analysis contained in table 5.36 suggests that the domestic credit to 
private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) in West Africa will react negatively to policy 
interventions that are aimed at improving the functionality of some institutional frameworks, 
such as the rule of law (LAWRULE), polity score (POLITY), and regulatory quality 
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(QLEGAL) and the speed of adjustment is slow. However, the capital market variable will 
respond positively to anti-corruption policy interventions (CORRUPTION) and 
macroeconomic reforms that are aimed at reducing annual percentage change in consumer 
prices (INFLATION).      
East Africa 
Table 5.37: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 4 (1980-2012): 
East Africa Regional data (Response of PRIVY to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2 -0.805449 -0.397203  0.438769  0.257613  0.061088 
 3 -0.812584 -0.025164  1.209322  0.738818  1.273150 
 4 -0.583797  0.015508  0.819577 -0.048436  0.751627 
 5 -0.523632 -0.061322  1.545609 -0.195937  0.714629 
 6 -0.664573 -0.272773  1.460078  0.915628  0.735367 
 7 -0.688219 -0.194734  1.433664  1.201322  1.247648 
 8 -0.444187 -0.078579  0.957435  0.226215  0.546737 
 9 -0.620918 -0.203864  1.495795  0.163863  0.429072 
 10 -0.857838 -0.209850  1.263396  0.963080  0.967650 
One standard deviation innovations 
The East African analysis presented in Table 5.37 will conclude the regional impulse 
response analysis for equation 4. According to the results contained in Table 5.37, it is 
evident that the domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) reacts both 
negatively and positively to the institutional variables. In specific, PRIVY responds negatively 
to one standard deviation innovation shocks on rule of law (LAWRULE) throughout the 
period under investigation.  
The trend of the responses contained in Table 5.37 starts with 81 per cent decrease in PRIVY 
in the first period, reaches its minimum level of 52 per cent in the fifth period, then increased 
to 86 per cent in the 10
th
 period. With this kind of responses, it is evident that the speed of 
adjustment of the variable is slow. As such, any policy intervention aimed at improving the 
regulatory quality in East African region should be moderated in order not to unsettle PRIVY.  
Just like LAWRULE, PRIVY responds negatively to one standard deviation innovation shocks 
on POLITY from the second period throughout the period under consideration. The negative 
reaction begins in the second period with a 40 per cent decrease in the domestic credit to 
private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) as a result of the innovation shocks on POLITY. 
The response reduces to barely three per cent in the third period, before the only positive 
response of two per cent is recorded in the fourth period. Thereafter, the negative response 
grows from six per cent in the fifth period to 21 per cent in period 10.  
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Unlike in the case of LAWRULE, the response pattern of PRIVY to innovation shocks on 
POLITY suggests that the speed of adjustment is high. Although, policy intervention to 
improve the polity score of East Africa may trigger negative reactions from the domestic 
credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY), the effects of the reaction may not be 
devastating, and the speed of adjustment back to the pre-intervention period (point of 
equilibrium) will be high.   
The reaction of domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) to one standard 
deviation innovation shocks on annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION) 
is positive from the first period, and throughout the entire period under consideration. From 
as little as 42 per cent in the second period, the response grows to 155 per cent in the fifth 
period, before ending at 126 per cent increase in period 10.  With this kind of explosive 
responses, the speed of adjustment is observed to be slow; suggesting that policy intervention 
in this regard should be carefully considered in order not to unnerve PRIVY an important 
capital market component and one of the major capital market determinants of the 
attractiveness of East Africa to inflow of FDI.   
The domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY) reacts positively in general 
to one standard deviation innovations shock on regulatory quality (QLEGAL), except in 
periods four and five when negative responses of five and 20 per cent are recorded. The 
impulse response begins gently in the second period with a 26 per cent reaction that grows to 
74 per cent in the third period and reaches a maximum of 120 per cent in period seven and 
ends up at 96 per cent in period 10. 
The analysis contained in Table 5.37 buttresses the importance of institutional framework on 
the development of domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP (PRIVY), which forms 
an important component of the capital market in East Africa. Judging from the speed of 
adjustment of the institutional variables to equilibrium, it is evident that policy makers should 
be cautious on introducing too many reforms within a short space of time because such an 
intervention may trigger instability on PRIVY, which may take a long time to redress.   
Having investigated the responses of BANK and PRIVY as capital market variables to the 
institutional variables under consideration in this study, we now proceed to investigate the 
responses of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of 
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GDP (NONFIN). The results of the analyses will be presented in the usual manner – starting 
with the pooled analysis and followed by the regional analyses.  
Pooled Estimation  
Table 5.38: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 5 (1980-2012): 
Pooled data (Response of NONFIN to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.210879  0.080354  0.509829 -0.328235  0.033103 
 3  0.243108 -0.094704  0.708713 -0.504938  0.121599 
 4  0.271497 -0.171474  0.516717 -0.499584  0.154041 
 5  0.276248 -0.141651  0.439388 -0.494834  0.186372 
 6  0.257988 -0.135188  0.398130 -0.474156  0.191625 
 7  0.258477 -0.141477  0.363520 -0.475376  0.195152 
 8  0.255134 -0.146501  0.355420 -0.477503  0.201669 
 9  0.254561 -0.148808  0.349569 -0.480164  0.204168 
 10  0.254335 -0.149241  0.341367 -0.480796  0.206581 
One standard deviation innovations 
The analysis contained in Table 5.38 suggests that the response of claims on domestic real 
nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) to one standard 
innovations shock on the institutional variables will yield mixed reactions – negative and 
positive.  To start with, we investigate the impulse response of NONFIN to one standard 
deviation innovations shock on rule of law (LAWRULE) and observe that claims on domestic 
real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) reacts positively to 
innovation shock on rule of law from the second period through to the end.  
In specific, the positive reaction starts at 21 per cent in the second period, reaches a 
maximum of 28 per cent in the fifth period and begins to regress till the 10
th
 period where a 
25 per cent response from NONFIN is realised. The trend of the responses suggests that the 
speed of adjustment to equilibrium is high and any upset caused by policy intervention in this 
regard will only have short-run effects.   
Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP 
(NONFIN) reacts positively in the second period to one standard innovations shock on 
POLITY with eight per cent. In the third period, the response changes to negative with nine 
per cent reduction in NONFIN. The periods from the fourth experienced incremental negative 
responses that gets to the climax (15 per cent) in period 10. The trend of these results indicate 
that the speed of adjustment of the responses is high and the negative effects of any policy 
intervention intended to improving the polity scores of the sampled African countries will be 
limited to short run.  
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The reaction of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of 
GDP (NONFIN) to one standard deviation innovations shock on annual percentage change in 
consumer prices (INLFATION) is positive from the second period and the responses remain 
in the positive territory for the duration of the period under investigation. In the second 
period, change of 51 per cent is recorded, and it grows to 71 per cent in the third period. The 
response begins to regress from the fourth period and the reversion continues till the end of 
the period under study. Judging from the trend of the responses, it appears that the speed of 
adjustment to the point of equilibrium is high and the effects of policy intervention to 
ameliorate increases in consumer prices will yield positive results. However, the positive 
results may not last for too long. 
The next important institutional variable under consideration here is regulatory quality 
(QLEGAL). From the results presented in Table 5.38, evidence suggests that claims on 
domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) reacts 
negatively to one standard innovations shock on regulatory quality from the second period, 
and the effect continues till the end of the period under study.  
In specific, the negative reaction starts in the second period with 33 per cent reduction in 
PRIVY, and the reactions stabilises at 50 per cent in the third and fourth periods. Thereafter, 
the responses retrograded from 49 per cent in period five to 48 per cent in period 10. 
Although, the speed of adjustment to the point of equilibrium is slow, the trend of the 
response is stable.  
The last institutional variable of interest in this analysis is corruption perception 
(CORRUPTION). According to the analysis contained in Table 5.38, the impulse responses 
of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP 
(NONFIN) to one standard deviation innovations shock on corruption perception 
(CORRUPTION) is progressively positive. From three per cent increase in NONFIN in the 
second period, the reaction grows to 21 per cent in the 10
th
 period.  
One important observation from the impulse response results presented in Table 5.39 is that 
none of the responses is explosive and the trend of the responses are stable and their speeds 
of adjustment are high in almost all the cases. As such, the realisation that claims on domestic 
real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) forms an 
important component of capital market in Africa, and that this variable is an important 
determinant of FDI inflow to Africa, hints on the need for innovations to improve the 
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functionality of the institutional framework.  In the paragraphs that follow, we will present 
material on the regional analysis.  
 North Africa 
Table 5.39: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 5 (1980-2012): 
North Africa Regional data (Response of NONFIN to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.181571 -0.131922  0.318590 -0.721929 -0.090993 
 3  0.619056 -0.047002  0.120452 -1.220911  0.050041 
 4  0.947110 -0.086615  0.424282 -1.442884  0.041765 
 5  1.055692 -0.202895  0.719200 -1.474707  0.045813 
 6  1.011986 -0.187837  0.779905 -1.402389 -0.058429 
 7  1.002356 -0.153797  0.763718 -1.365630 -0.085817 
 8  0.930085 -0.125624  0.740640 -1.304620 -0.080609 
 9  0.912642 -0.126293  0.722120 -1.276168 -0.089961 
 10  0.884171 -0.118097  0.705407 -1.262237 -0.080093 
One standard deviation innovations 
From the impulse response analysis contained in Table 5.39, it is imperative that claims on 
domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) reacts 
both positively and negatively to innovations shock on the institutional variables. Looking at 
individual variables, the claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a 
share of GDP (NONFIN) reacts positively to one standard deviation innovations shock on the 
rule of law (LAWRULE). The reaction starts on the second period at 18 per cent and it 
continued throughout the periods covered in this study. The impulse response grows from 62 
per cent in the third period to 95 per cent in the fourth period, and reaches an explosive 
climax in fifth period. The responses starts declining thereafter and it reaches a minimum of 
88 per cent in period 10.  
From Table 5.39, the shape of the response trend is “bell-shaped” and therefore, the speed of 
adjustment appears to be high. It could thus be suggested that policy intervention in North 
Africa towards improving the functionality of rule of law may positively influence the 
expediency and development of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central 
Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN). Given that the speed of adjustment is high, any policy 
misjudgement would not last for a long period of time.  
The reaction of PRIVY to POLITY in North Africa regional analysis indicates that PRIVY 
responds negatively to one standard deviation innovations shock on POLITY from the second 
period and the negative reaction continues throughout the periods under investigation. From 
13 per cent decrease in the value of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the 
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Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) in the second period, the response grows to 20 
per cent in the fifth period, before reducing to 12 per cent in the 10
th
 period. With this smooth 
and gentle slope, the speed of adjustment is not high, but it is steady. Given that PRIVY 
responds negatively to POLITY with slow speed of adjustment, policy intervention to 
improve polity score in North Africa should be adopted guardedly.  
The reaction of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of 
GDP (NONFIN) to annual percentage increase in consumer prices (INFLATION) is positive 
and incrementally stable. From 32 per cent increase in claims on domestic real nonfinancial 
sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) in the second period, the response 
regresses to 12 per cent in the third period, and progresses to 42 per cent in the fourth period. 
Thereafter, the response becomes stable and incremental, and reaches its peak in the sixth 
period with 78 per cent response rate. After the peak in the sixth period, the response starts 
decreasing and the decrease lasts until the 10
th
 period where it becomes 71 per cent.  
Judging from the trend of the response, it is evident that the speed of adjustment to 
equilibrium is low and policy interventions in North Africa that are aimed at better managing 
annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION) should exploit the opportunity of 
the positive reactions as well as slow speed of adjustment to equilibrium.  
Converse to the reverting negative responses generated in the case of POLITY, the responses 
of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP 
(NONFIN) to regulatory quality (QLEGAL) is negative from the second period and it 
continued in the negative territory unabated till the end of the period under consideration. It is 
noteworthy that from 72 per cent reduction in PRIVY in the second period, the negative 
response grows to 148 per cent in the fifth period and it reduces gradually to 126 per cent in 
period 10.  
With this kind of smooth trend and systematic increase in the value of the responses, it 
becomes apparent to note that the speed of adjustment to equilibrium is slow and the recovery 
of the responses from negative to positive will take some time. To that extent, any policy 
intervention to improve regulatory quality should be treated with sensitivity and care, 
especially considering its potential effects on one of the major components of the capital 
market, and an important determinant of the attractiveness of North Africa to inflow of FDI. 
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The claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP 
(NONFIN) begins its response to one standard deviation innovations shock on corruption 
perception (CORRUPTION) negatively in the second period at nine per cent decrease in 
NONFIN. Thereafter, the response becomes positive between the third and the fifth periods at 
an average of five per cent. However, the negative response kicks-in again in the sixth period 
at six per cent, and it reaches eight per cent in the 10
th
 period.  
Form the results of analysis contained in Table 5.39, the negative trend is stable and the speed 
of adjustment is slow. This kind of response pattern suggests the possibility of trial and error 
in the approach of government towards regulatory innovations, especially as regards 
CORRUPTION in North Africa.  
Southern Africa   
Table 5.40: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 5 (1980-2012): 
Southern Africa Regional data (Response of NONFIN to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2 -0.005637 -0.168333 -0.042122 -0.055833  0.105234 
 3  0.143463 -0.324458 -0.106256 -0.259048 -0.116638 
 4  0.234794 -0.240952 -0.015981 -0.382794 -0.275627 
 5  0.240696 -0.125265  0.001269 -0.406034 -0.230712 
 6  0.224854 -0.109886 -0.038455 -0.368806 -0.127416 
 7  0.194709 -0.138060 -0.028674 -0.327675 -0.068814 
 8  0.178103 -0.161290 -0.031187 -0.307275 -0.044940 
 9  0.190711 -0.161568 -0.042596 -0.319997 -0.072242 
 10  0.204332 -0.160889 -0.033785 -0.327546 -0.092606 
One standard deviation innovations 
 
According to the results of the analysis presented in Table 5.40, claims on domestic real 
nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) reacts negatively to 
innovations shock on all the institutional variables under study. Even rule of law (LAWRULE) 
that reacts largely in a positive manner begins its reaction in the second period in a negative 
territory. However, the impact of the reaction is less than one percentage point. From the 
third period through to the 10
th
 period, NONFIN reacts positively to one standard deviation 
innovations shock on LWARULE positively. From 14 per cent in the third period, the 
response reaches its peak in fifth period at 24 per cent. The response decreased thereafter 
until its upsurge again in the 10
th
 period. 
The trend of the response indicates that the speed of adjustment of this response is slow, 
thereby offering the political class an opportunity to exploit various options in policy 
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innovations that are aimed at improving the respect for, and upholding of rule of law in 
Southern Africa. 
The claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP 
(NONFIN) reacts negatively to one standard deviation innovations shock on POLITY 
throughout the period under study. From 17 per cent decrease in the claims on domestic real 
nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) in the second period, 
the effect grows to 32 per cent in the third period, before reducing to 24 per cent in the fourth 
period. Thereafter, the response reduces to 11 per cent in the sixth period, recorded an 
upsurge in the seventh period (14 per cent) and it increased thereafter until the last period 
under study.  
The trend in the response pattern of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the 
Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) to POLITY suggests a slow speed of adjustment 
to equilibrium. This is a serious warning for policy intervention in that the effects of POLITY-
related policy misjudgement on NONFIN will take a long time to be corrected.  
The reaction of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of 
GDP (NONFIN) to one standard deviation innovations shock on annual percentage change in 
consumer prices (INFLATION) is generally negative, except for the less than one per cent 
positive response that is recorded in the fifth period. From the second period, NONFIN begins 
its negative response to INFLATION with four per cent response, and the response intensifies 
to 11 per cent in the third period. Thereafter, the negative response begins to wane and it ends 
at three per cent in period 10.  
The trend of the results presented in Table 5.40 indicates that the speed of adjustment to the 
point of equilibrium is slow. In that situation, policy interventions in line with addressing 
upsurge in annual percentage increase in consumer prices should be guardedly orchestrated. 
More importantly, the fact that NONFIN is an important component of capital market in 
Southern Africa and an important determinant of the attractiveness of Southern Africa to 
inflow of FDI (according to Table 5.7), any miscalculation in INFLATION-related policy 
intervention may unnerve edgy capital market, thereby negatively affecting the attractiveness 
of the region to inflow of FDI.     
The impulse response of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a 
share of GDP (NONFIN) to regulatory quality (QLEGAL) is negative from the second period 
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to the end of the period under investigation. The negative response begins in the second 
period with six per cent decrease in the value of NONFIN. The negative response further 
increases to 26, 38 and 41 per cent in the third, fourth and fifth periods respectively before it 
start declining.  From 37 per cent in period seven, it reduces to 33 per cent in period 10.  
As suggested in the explanation offered above, it is evident that the speed of adjustment back 
to the point of equilibrium is slow. It thus becomes important to apply caution when 
formulating or implementing policies that relates to regulatory quality. The fact that we 
record an inverse relationship between regulatory quality and claims on domestic real 
nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) is a clear indication 
that the availability of encyclopaedic regulations is not enough without adequate 
implementation.  
The last variable of interest in this analysis is corruption perception (CORRUPTION). 
According to Table 5.40, apart from the 11 per cent positive response of NONFIN to one 
standard deviation innovations shock on corruption perception in the second period, the 
responses thereafter were negative. The response grows from 12 per cent in the third period 
to 28 per cent in the fourth period, but regresses to 23 per cent in the fifth period. The 
negative response ends at nine per cent in period 10.  
Looking at the trend in the response pattern of NONFIN to CORRUPTION, it can be argued 
that the speed of adjustment is slow but steady. As such, anti-corruption policy interventions 
should be orchestrated carefully in order not to upset this important component of the capital 
market. Further, the negative relationship between corruption and NONFIN is an indication 
that any robust changes in anti-corruption regulations will further improve the performance of 
claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP 
(NONFIN) and ultimately, the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI.  
The Southern Africa regional analysis indicates that only rule of law has positive impulse 
relationship with claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share 
of GDP (NONFIN). To that extent, the more the principles of rule of law is reinforced in the 
region, the more NONFIN will develop in the region, and ultimately, the more the region will 
be attractive to inflow of FDI. As for the remaining institutional variables, more needs to be 
done to improve these institutional framework and, to ameliorate their negative impacts on 
the development of capital market in the region. Although, the region boasts the best capital 
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market on the African continent, its capitalisation is still very small on the global average and 
this needs to be improved through institutional intervention.    
West Africa 
Table 5.41: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 5 (1980-2012): 
West Africa Regional data (Response of NONFIN to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  1.002730  0.854391  1.227845  0.809043 -0.360513 
 3 -0.041843 -0.034693  2.025540  1.790880 -0.617575 
 4  0.083905  0.088274  1.443804  1.682989 -0.834599 
 5  0.335723  0.194655  1.332603  1.259762 -0.835666 
 6  0.035845  0.092882  1.776077  1.465403 -0.537614 
 7 -0.069526 -0.022141  1.840223  1.537685 -0.582341 
 8  0.253332 -0.046741  1.752192  1.571490 -0.888887 
 9  0.031829 -0.065580  1.776956  1.708693 -0.888449 
 10 -0.061208  0.058705  1.705620  1.613713 -0.750245 
One standard deviation innovations 
The impulse response result for equation 5 that is generated for West Africa as contained in 
Table 5.41 indicates that claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a 
share of GDP (NONFIN) responds outright positively to one standard deviation innovations 
shock on INFLATION as well as QLEGAL, and outright negatively to CORRUPTION. 
However, the responses generated for LAWRULE and POLITY are combinations of both 
positive and negative reactions.  
The claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP 
(NONFIN) begins its response to rule of law (LAWRULE) positively in the second period by 
an explosive response of 100 per cent. The reaction becomes negative in the third period with 
a four per cent reduction in the value of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the 
Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN). By the fourth period, the response changes to 
positive and eight per cent increase is recorded. The positive reaction continues for the rest of 
the period studied except for the negative responses that occurs in the seventh (seven per 
cent) and period 10 (six per cent).  
One important observation is that the responses generated in the analyses result in an uneven 
trend, and the speed of adjustment back to the point of equilibrium is slow. Further, the 
results indicate that although there are some negative responses, the statistical importance of 
the positive responses is noticeable. As such, it is expedient to suggest that policy 
intervention that is aimed at improving the appreciation of rule of law in West Africa should 
be encouraged. 
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In the case of POLITY, NONFIN responds to one standard deviation innovations shock more 
positively than negatively and the effects of the positive responses are stronger than those of 
the negative responses. In specific, the reaction of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector 
by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) to one standard deviation innovations 
shock on POLITY begins positively on the second period at 85 per cent but the reaction 
turned negative immediately thereafter at three per cent. The response increases to nine per 
cent in the fourth period and further to 19 per cent in the fifth period. The response reduces to 
nine per cent in the sixth period before turning negative in the seventh, eighth and ninth 
periods.  Although, the negative responses for the three consecutive periods have statistical 
implication, the impact is barely at four per cent on the average, and the response ends at six 
per cent on a positive note in period 10.   
One important observation from this analysis is that the bumpy trend in the responses as well 
as the low speed of adjustment should be taken into consideration when formulating policies 
that are aimed at improving the policy score of West Africa region. This is especially 
important because miscalculations in the choice of policy may be costly to the development 
of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP 
(NONFIN). It must be recalled from the analysis contained in table 5.7 that NONFIN is an 
important component of capital market in the region, and one of the determinants of the 
attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI.  
However, claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP 
(NONFIN) reacts positively to one standard deviation innovations shock on annual 
percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION) from the second period to the last 
period. For instance, the reaction begins in the second period with an explosive 123 per cent 
and it grows to 203 per cent in the third period before regressing to 144 and 133 per cent in 
the fourth and fifth periods, and it increases steadily thereafter for the remaining duration of 
the impulse response analysis.   
One important observation from the trend of these results is that policy interventions that are 
aimed at ameliorating annual percentage change in consumer prices may enhance financial 
deepening through the claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a 
share of GDP (NONFIN) nexus. However, given that the speed of adjustment is slow, 
cognisance should be given to the sensitivity of the variable to innovation shocks and the 
possible long-run impacts that such an innovation shock will have on NONFIN.  
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The response of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of 
GDP (NONFIN) to one standard deviation innovations shock on regulatory quality 
(QLEGAL) is positive throughout the period under study and it becomes explosive from the 
third period. This explosive trend continues with systematic increase in the value of the 
responses from the third period through to the end of the analysis, although with exceptions 
in the third, fourth and 10
th
 periods where the pattern of systematic increase is altered.  
The fact that NONFIN responds positively to innovations shock on this institutional variable 
lends credence to the strategic importance of appropriate policy intervention that are capable 
of enhancing the efficiency of regulatory quality in West Africa. Further, the systematic 
increment in the value of the response suggests that the speed of adjustment to equilibrium is 
slow, and it will take a protracted period for the impact of any bad regulatory-related policy 
initiative to ease-off on NONFIN.    
The last variable of interest in West Africa analysis in this section is corruption perception 
(CORRUPTION). According to the analysis contained in Table 5.41, the response of claims 
on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) to one 
standard deviation innovations shock is negative from the second period through to the end of 
the period covered in the study. More importantly, the responses are systematically 
incremental, except for two instances (sixth and 10
th
 periods) where the trend of systematic 
increment is broken. However, there is a strong indication that the speed of adjustment of the 
variable to the point of equilibrium is slow.  
In addition, corruption appears to play an important role on the functionality/development of 
claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP 
(NONFIN) in West Africa. To the effect that this variable is an important component of 
capital market formation in the region and it doubles as an important determinant of FDI 
inflow to the region as contained in Table 5.7, it becomes expedient to initiate appropriate 
anti-corruption policy initiatives that are capable of ameliorating the effects of corruption on 
this component of capital market, as a strategic way of improving the attractiveness of the 
region to inflow of FDI through the capital market nexus. 
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East Africa  
Table 5.42: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 5 (1980-2012): 
East Africa Regional data (Response of NONFIN to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.161663 -0.372698  1.015540  0.391623 -0.150884 
 3  0.033808 -0.507554  1.797452  1.119238 -0.389336 
 4 -0.302336 -0.350133  1.196822  1.162602 -0.741855 
 5 -0.332517 -0.297605  0.523974  0.665032 -0.569356 
 6 -0.062394 -0.292864  0.611754  0.378815 -0.175802 
 7 -0.033946 -0.203786  0.973393  0.451582 -0.008692 
 8 -0.149688 -0.199702  0.885948  0.557324 -0.081109 
 9 -0.123124 -0.283884  0.882292  0.600656 -0.206116 
 10 -0.075389 -0.326532  1.047631  0.678992 -0.351943 
One standard deviation innovations 
The impulse response of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a 
share of GDP (NONFIN) to one standard deviation innovations shock on rule of law 
(LAWRULE) are both positive and negative. In the second period, the response begins on a 
positive note at 16 per cent. The statistical impact of the response reduced to three per cent in 
the third period, and it enters into negative territory thereafter. From the fourth period, the 
negative reaction reaches its peak in the fifth period and the bumpy trend ends at eight per 
cent in period 10.  
Judging from the statistical importance of the negative responses, it is evident that 
innovations shock on rule of law will have devastating effects on the claims on domestic real 
nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) and the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium is slow. In short, the realisation that this capital market variable is 
sensitive to rule of law related policy interventions suggests a guided approach in initiating 
and applying such institutional interventions.  
Looking at the reaction of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as 
a share of GDP (NONFIN) to one standard deviation innovations shock on polity score 
(POLITY), it is apparent that the response enters the negative territory from the second period 
and it never reverts back to positive territory throughout the period under study. Although, 
the value of the responses begins to regress from the third period, but the trend is broken in 
the last period when the trend surged.  
In addition, it becomes important to note that the speed of adjustment of the variable to the 
point of equilibrium is slow, thereby suggesting cautious policy intervention. More so, the 
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negative response of NONFIN to innovations shock on POLITY indicates that the efficiency 
and development of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a 
share of GDP (NONFIN) depends on the improvement in the policy score of the East African 
region.  
The response of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of 
GDP (NONFIN) to annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION) is positive 
from the second period in the analysis to the end. From an explosive 102 per cent increase in 
the value of NONFIN in the second period, the value increases to 180 per cent in the third 
period, and it begins to decline thereafter. However, an explosive (105 per cent increase) is 
realised in the 10
th
 period.  
The trend of the result indicates that the responses are chaotic in nature and unstable in 
pattern. With the observed slow speed of adjustment to equilibrium, appropriately guided 
policy intervention towards improving the effects of inflation on claims on domestic real 
nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) is required. 
The response of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of 
GDP (NONFIN) to one standard deviation innovations shock on quality of legal (QLEGAL) 
framework is positive from the second year in the analysis to the last period covered in the 
study. From 39 per cent increase in the value of NONFIN in the third period, the response 
becomes explosive as it increases to 116 in the fourth period, before regressing to 67 per cent 
increase in the fifth period. Thereafter, the response increases steadily for the rest of the 
period under study and the pattern of the increase is stable.  
It can thus be opined that that the trend of the response indicates slow speed of adjustment, 
which informs guided approach to policy intervention as regards regulatory quality. 
Although, the analysis suggests that positive improvement in the regulatory quality will 
enhance the development of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank 
as a share of GDP (NONFIN), the sensitivity of this capital market variable to regulatory 
quality indicates that any QLEGAL-related policy misjudgement can disintegrate the 
development of NONFIN, and ultimately negatively affect the attractiveness of East African 
region to inflow of FDI.   
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The last variable of interest in the impulse response analysis for equation 5 for East African is 
corruption perception. From the results presented in Table 5.42, it is evident that claims on 
domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) reacts 
negatively to one standard deviation innovations shock on corruption perception 
(CORRUPTION). In the second period, the reaction begins with a 15 per cent decrease in the 
value of NONFIN, followed by a father decrease of 39 per cent. After reaching its peak of 74 
per cent decrease in the value of NONFIN, the effects of the negative responses regress till 
period eight but starts picking again in the ninth and 10
th
 periods.  
One important observation is that corruption is a major problem to the development of claims 
on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) in 
East Africa. Also, considering the slow speed of adjustment, it is apparent that anti-corruption 
policy intervention should be guided in order to forestall the possible impacts of inapt policy 
intervention.   
From the East African regional analysis, it is evident that claims on domestic real 
nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN) will react positively to 
innovations on annual percentage increase in consumer prices and regulatory quality. This 
implies that improving these institutional policy mechanisms may enhance the development 
of NONFIN in the region. Further, the negative impact of rule of law, polity score and 
corruption hints that these institutional frameworks need “to change”, thereby motivating for 
appropriate innovations shock.  
Pooled Estimation  
Table 5.43: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 6 (1980-2012): 
Pooled data (Response of EQCAP to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.759689  0.878543  0.312208  0.107361 -0.857393 
 3  0.779007  0.104361  0.717957 -0.327813 -1.225653 
 4  0.570949 -0.344457  0.557683 -0.163624 -0.960106 
 5  0.511176  0.051489  0.587758 -0.164885 -0.872622 
 6  0.577565  0.277545  0.640619 -0.127244 -0.885400 
 7  0.586468  0.226452  0.665449 -0.140303 -0.924312 
 8  0.594189  0.154886  0.677470 -0.144241 -0.922840 
 9  0.579949  0.173487  0.694200 -0.137700 -0.913850 
 10  0.586053  0.209627  0.699262 -0.134549 -0.911059 
One standard deviation innovations 
The impulse response analysis contained in Table 5.43 suggests that the total value of all 
listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) responds positively to three 
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institutional variables (LAWRULE, POLITY and INFLATION) and negatively to the rest two.  
From the Table, the response of EQCAP to one standard deviation innovations shock on 
LAWRULE begins positively at 78 per cent in the second period and it increases to 78 per 
cent in period three, before regressing to 57 per cent in the fourth period. The response grows 
from 51 per cent in the fifth period to 59 per cent in the eighth period, before regressing again 
to 58 per cent in the ninth period. The response increases slightly in the 10
th
 period as it 
grows to 59 per cent. 
From the results presented in that Table, it becomes evident that innovations shock on the 
rule of law (LAWRULE) does have positive impacts on the total value of all listed shares in a 
stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP). Further, with the slow speed of adjustment, 
there is a possibility for adequate policy manoeuvre in order to improve the regulatory 
environment of rule of law in the sampled African countries.  
Looking at the reaction of total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of 
GDP (EQCAP) to one standard deviation innovations shock on polity score (POLITY), the 
response begins on a positive note in the second period at 88 per cent but reduces to 10 per 
cent in the third period. The response recorded its only negative response in the fourth period 
(34 per cent). Thereafter, the response jumps from five per cent in the fifth period to 28 per 
cent in the sixth period, and it reduces further to 23 per cent in the seventh period. Towards 
the concluding stage, the response increases from 15 per cent in the eighth period to 21 per 
cent in the 10
th
 period. 
One important lesson from the result is that although, negative reaction may creep-in at a 
point in time, the response of EQCAP to innovations shock on POLITY is generally positive. 
Further, the trend of the response suggests an uneven pattern that does not negate the 
possibility of slow speed of adjustment. In addition, policy initiatives aimed at improving the 
polity status of the sampled African countries may improve the motivation for investors to 
take available listing opportunities on the platforms of domestic stock market.  
Further, the response of total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of 
GDP (EQCAP) to one standard deviation innovations shock on annual percentage change in 
consumer prices (INFLATION) yields outright positive response from the second period to 
the last period covered in this study. In the second period, the response begins as this 
innovations shock improves the appetite to list by 31 per cent and the response grows to 72 
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per cent in the third period. Although, the response regresses to 56 per cent in the fourth 
period, it grows thereafter to 70 per cent in period 10.  
Judging from the trend of the response, it is evident that the speed of adjustment is slow. This 
pattern affords the policy makers the opportunity to try a few policy initiatives before they 
arrive at an optimal one. The fact that the response generated here is purely positive, policy 
initiatives that are able to ameliorate increases in consumer prices will further encourage 
listing on the African domestic stock markets. 
In addition, the response of total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of 
GDP (EQCAP) to one standard deviation innovations shock on regulatory quality (QLEGAL) 
starts on a positive note in the second period, but it becomes negative thereafter. In specific, 
the response starts in the second period with an increase of 11 per cent improvement in 
EQCAP, but the tide turns in the third period to negative reaction at 33 per cent. Between the 
fourth and the 10
th
 period, the response reduces from 16 per cent to 13; although, the pattern 
is bumpy with uneven trend.  
The negative reaction of EQCAP to regulatory quality suggests that innovative intervention is 
required to improve the impetus to list on the domestic African stock markets. Further, the 
trend indicates a rapid speed of adjustment between the second and the third periods, 
suggesting that policy intervention should be carefully orchestrated in order not to unsettle 
the stock market that appears to be flappable. 
The last institutional variable of interest here is corruption perception. According to the result 
contained in Table 5.43, the response of total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a 
percentage of GDP (EQCAP) to one standard deviation innovations shock on corruption 
perception (CORRUPTION) is negative from the second period and it continues through to 
the end of the period under investigation. Apart from the first three periods (periods two, 
three and four) that exhibit uneven trend, the trend from the fifth period is stable and the 
pattern remains smooth and incremental till the end of the period under investigation.  
With absolute negative reaction, the need to improve corruption perception on the continent 
towards enhancing the impulse to enlist on the platforms of African domestic stock markets is 
imperative. Given that corruption ratings are ‘perception’ based, regulatory intervention is 
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required to improve transparency within the government structures, reinforce accountability 
and promote administrative etiquette.  
Having looked at the response of total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a 
percentage of GDP (EQCAP) to the institutional variables used in this study, it is considered 
important to also investigate the regional dynamics in this regard as done for the other 
responses. The results of the regional analyses are presented in the paragraphs that follow.  
North Africa  
Table 5.44: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 6 (1980-2012): 
North Africa Regional data (Response of EQCAP to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2 -0.253631  0.414893 -0.437755 -0.501724 -0.982964 
 3 -0.238072  1.217256 -1.274567 -2.167960 -1.602015 
 4 -0.595977  1.602929 -2.839100 -2.693790 -1.688366 
 5 -0.699150  1.560430 -3.864052 -3.217139 -1.732594 
 6 -0.883790  1.356917 -4.382495 -3.247320 -1.386422 
 7 -0.923979  1.031196 -4.517667 -2.970576 -1.127393 
 8 -0.892719  0.769880 -4.209232 -2.641778 -0.890171 
 9 -0.850168  0.618775 -3.802048 -2.349952 -0.775774 
 10 -0.770876  0.581686 -3.437862 -2.164381 -0.778260 
One standard deviation innovations 
 
  
According to the results presented in Table 5.44, total value of all listed shares in a stock 
market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) responds to one standard deviation innovation 
shocks on only polity score positively. The responses to the other intuitional variables are 
negative. Beginning with the rule of law (LAWRULE), the response of EQCAP to one 
standard deviation innovations shock is negative from the second period through to the end of 
the periods under investigation. The negative response begins in the second period with a 25 
per cent decrease in EQCAP. The decrease continues systematically until the seventh period, 
and it begins to regress thereafter. 
With the significance of the negative reaction and its implication on the viability of the stock 
market, there is the need to initiate policy measures that are capable of improving the 
application of rule of law in North Africa, as a way of improving the equity market platforms 
in order to encourage listing. Using Table 5.7 as a term of reference, it must be recalled that 
EQCAP is an important determinant of the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI. As 
such, policy initiatives towards improving the efficiency of the equity platform may further 
the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI. 
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Conversely, the reaction of EQCAP to one standard deviation innovations shock on polity 
score (POLITY)  is positive, and the effect begins in the second period when total value of all 
listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) grows by 41 per cent. The 
trend becomes explosive from the third period through to the seventh period, before it 
regresses slowly to 58 per cent in the 10
th
 period.  
A good lesson from this result is that the positive response of EQCAP to POLITY is a good 
indication that by improving the polity score of the region, there is a high possibility that 
investor confidence in the equity market will grow. Due to an improvement in investor 
confidence, listing on the equity platforms will be improved and inflow of FDI will be 
enhanced concomitantly. More so, fear should not be entertained on possible negative 
reaction to policy intervention because the speed of adjustment is slow.  
The next institutional variable considered here is annual percentage increase in consumer 
prices (INFLATION). According to the results presented in Table 5.44, evidence suggests that 
the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) reacts 
negatively from the second period and that reaction to one standard deviation innovations 
shock on INFLATION continues throughout the period under consideration,.  
The negative reaction begins in the second period as EQCAP drops by 44 per cent as a result 
of the innovations shock on INFLATION. The trend continues in the third period with an 
explosive reaction. However, the tide changes in period four in an incremental pattern that 
endured up until period eight. Period nine and 10 are more regressive in nature.  With this 
kind of response, it is deduced that policy intervention is required to ameliorate the impact of 
purportedly unchequered INFLATION on the equity market, with specific attention being 
directed to EQCAP.  
Still on the North Africa impulse response analysis, the response of EQCAP to regulatory 
quality (QLEGAL) is not different from the result obtained for INFLATION, albeit with a 
moderately divergent trend. The response of EQCAP to one standard deviation innovations 
shock on regulatory quality (QLEGAL) begins in the second period with 50 per cent reduction 
in EQCAP. By the third period, the response becomes explosive with systematic increment 
and that trend lasted until the sixth period. By the seventh period, the response starts to 
regress and that decline continues until period 10.  
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From the results presented above, it is evident that the regulatory quality has to be improved 
in order to spur investor confidence in the equity market, especially in relation to listing on 
the trading platforms. With slow speed of adjustment recorded in the response pattern, there 
is an ample opportunity to try a few options in the regulation formation process, before 
choosing the optimal intervention.  
The last institutional variable of interest in the North Africa impulse response analysis for 
equation 6 is corruption perception. From Table 5.44, it is observed that the total value of all 
listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) begins to respond in the 
second period to one standard deviation innovations shock on corruption perception in a 
negative way. In specific, the impact of the innovations shock on EQCAP is as much as 98 
per cent in the second period. The trend increases continuously in the negative territory till 
period five. From period six onward, the trend starts declining and the decline did not recover 
for the duration of the period under study.  
One important finding here is that weak regulatory quality does affect investor confidence 
and ultimately, heightens investor inertia to commit to the equity market, especially listing on 
the trading platforms. It is thus suggested that policy intervention is required to strengthen 
regulatory quality in the region. The impulse response results presented here is in line with 
the reality that Table 5.7 espouses, thereby reinforcing the rationalisation to improve 
institutional framework in the North African region.   
Sequel to the impulse response analysis for North African region, we now look at the 
outcome of similar analysis for the other regions under study, beginning with Southern 
Africa. The results of those analyses are presented in the subsequent paragraphs.   
Southern Africa  
Table 5.45: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 6 (1980-2012): 
Southern Africa Regional data (Response of EQCAP to Institutional Variables)  
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  14.45165  1.588334 -9.259126 -8.855540 -3.042026 
 3  16.30129  1.070840 -6.054284 -11.70457 -12.87307 
 4  10.30657 -10.91559 -2.659983 -14.29175 -12.34265 
 5  16.75175 -4.411089 -7.534568 -20.77671 -13.87898 
 6  16.55199  3.716254 -3.362451 -20.89064 -19.30865 
 7  15.85911 -5.175259 -4.695045 -23.42330 -17.97000 
 8  21.79946 -3.873108 -8.110607 -27.74178 -20.72304 
 9  19.17072 -1.637803 -3.262610 -27.03481 -24.22475 
 10  19.42719 -5.565572 -5.793708 -30.22037 -22.70521 
One standard deviation innovations 
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The impulse response result presented in Table 5.45 indicates that the total value of all listed 
shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) responds negatively to four out of 
the five institutional variables under consideration. In specific, the total value of all listed 
shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) responds positively and 
explosively too, to one standard deviation innovations shock on rule of law (LAWRULE) 
from the second period through to the last period in the study. In the second period, one 
standard deviation innovations shock on rule of law results in 14 per cent increase in EQCAP.  
The incremental improvement in EQCAP over the periods is not without occasional breaks. 
For instance, there is a brief break in the systematic incremental pattern of the trend in the 
fourth period, seventh period and the ninth period. However, one can deduce from the trend 
that the speed of adjustment is slow. One important lesson from the analysis is that rule of 
law plays an important role in the development of equity market, especially the platforms for 
listing and trading. To that extent, it is suggested that complementary development policies 
be initiated to support the existing ones.  
 Further, the impulse response of total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a 
percentage of GDP (EQCAP) to one standard deviation innovations shock on polity score 
begins positively for the first two periods, before turning negative in the fourth period. At the 
initial stage, EQCAP responds positively to the innovations shock on polity score (POLITY), 
but the response turns negative from the fourth period and the negative response continues 
throughout the period under consideration, except for period six that experiences a positive 
response. 
One can therefore suggest that the policy intervention that is aimed at improving the 
behaviour of this institutional variable should be cautiously orchestrated, given its rapid 
speed of adjustment.  Further, the intermittent positive response of EQCAP to the innovations 
shock suggests that the equity market is very sensitive to impulses from the region’s polity. 
Another variable of interest in the impulse response analysis for equation 6 in Southern 
Africa is annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION). According to Table 
5.45, the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) 
responds negatively and explosively too, to one standard deviation innovations shock on the 
annual percentage change in consumer prices (INLFATION). Through an uneven pattern and 
unstable trend, the impulse response of EQCAP to INFLATION demonstrates the need to 
intervene through policy initiatives, to reduce the effects of INFLATION on the equity 
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market, especially EQCAP. With the slow speed of adjustment, government may easily adopt 
various approaches to curb the negative effects of INFLATION on this important component 
of capital market in Southern Africa. 
Further, the response of EQCAP to one standard deviation innovations shock on regulatory 
quality (QLEGAL) is negative, but more importantly, systematically incremental and 
explosive. From 885 per cent decrease in the second period, the effects reaches 2089 per cent 
in period six and ended up at 3022 per cent in period 10. The intensity of the response 
sensitises the need to urgently improve regulatory quality in the region, especially 
considering the potential impacts of its deficiency on the equity platform. 
Corruption is the last institutional variable under consideration here. According to Table 5.45, 
the response pattern of EQCAP to CORRUPTION is very similar to the way EQCAP 
responds to QLEGAL. Beginning with 304 per cent decrease in EQCAP in the second period, 
the response grows to 1931 in the sixth period and ended up at 2271 in the last period. The 
policy implication and possible suggestions are therefore aligned with those offered above in 
the case of INFLATION. 
West Africa 
Table 5.46: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 6 (1980-2012): 
West Africa Regional data (Response of EQCAP to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  1.219516  0.312688 -0.165269  0.439643  1.239574 
 3 -2.185249  0.580558  0.488169  5.783404  2.591076 
 4  0.166172 -0.026188 -0.032691  2.904951  3.103906 
 5  1.478211 -0.263505 -0.572329  0.493545  1.141671 
 6  0.717867 -0.269882  0.659037  1.052397  1.538025 
 7  0.349637 -0.167775  0.415005  0.847454  2.874772 
 8  0.647322 -0.051525 -0.217057  1.674689  2.978721 
 9 -0.012271 -0.268570  0.561751  2.973524  2.603210 
 10  0.789740 -0.379155  0.406441  1.811264  2.681888 
One standard deviation innovations 
 
 
The impulse response analysis for West Africa begins with the investigation of how the total 
value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) respond to one 
standard deviation innovations shock on rule of law (LAWRULE). From the result contained 
in table 5.46, it is evident that the equity capital variable responds more positively than 
negatively to the institutional variables used in this study. 
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From the second period, EQCAP responds to innovations shock on LAWRULE positively and 
in an explosive manner. In the third period, the response turned the tide to negative that is 
also explosive. From the fourth period, the responses become positive till the end of the 
period under study, but not without the one per cent decrease in EQCAP in period nine. The 
bumpy nature of the trend is a clear indication of rapid speed of adjustment, which will be an 
indictment on policy intervention. The fact that the response is comprised of intermittent 
positive and negative reactions suggests that any policy intervention in this regard has to be 
carefully thought through.   
Looking at the reaction of EQCAP to POLITY, it is interesting to note that the response 
begins positively in the second period as innovations shock on polity contributes 31 per cent 
to EQCAP, and the improvement reaches 58 per cent in the third period, before the response 
turns negative in the fourth period. The negative response gains momentum between the 
fourth and the sixth periods, and it grows further from seventh period onward.  
With this chaotic reaction and high speed of adjustment, it is suggested that policy initiatives 
toward improving the performance of total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a 
percentage of GDP (EQCAP) through institutional framework needs to be given adequate 
attention because EQCAP may respond negatively and rapidly too, to any policy 
misjudgement.  
Another important impulse response analysis is the one that looks at the response of total 
value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) on one standard 
deviation innovations shock on annual percentage increase in consumer prices. From Table 
5.46, it is clear that EQCAP responds negatively on four instances, as compared to five 
positive responses to innovations shock on INFLATION. In specific, the response begins with 
a negative response on the second period and the response reduces EQCAP by 17 per cent. 
This is reversed rapidly in period three with 49 per cent increase in the value of EQCAP. The 
fourth and fifth period witnesses negative responses, just like period nine. However, 
irrespective of the intermittent negative responses, the positive response in period 10 suggest 
that the variable responds more positively than negatively to annual percentage change in 
consumer prices (INFLATION).    
To that extent, one may opine that the response of equity market to consumer price changes is 
an indication that the institutional variable is an important determinant of the development of 
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the equity trading platform, and by extension, a determinant of the attractiveness of the region 
to inflow of FDI (judging from the results contained in Table 5.7).  
The last institutional variable of interest here is corruption perception. According to Table 
5.46, evidence suggests that there is a strong positive relationship between corruption 
perception and the performance of the equity trading platform. More importantly, the 
response is explosive from the second period and the momentum is sustained till the fourth 
period before a temporary shock sets in in the fifth period. The systematic increment begins 
again in the sixth period and it continues unabated till the final period.  
Given the extent and strength of the responses to the innovations shock on the institutional 
variable, it becomes logical to observe a possible trend of insider trading and other forms of 
opportunistic behaviour in the equity platform. In order to advance the performance of the 
equity platform and to improve the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI, it is 
important to manage incidence of corruption in that region.  
East Africa 
Table 5.47: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 6 (1980-2012): 
East Africa Regional data (Response of EQCAP to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2 -0.273701  2.772917  4.366493  2.303186  4.226819 
 3  1.513067  3.847979  6.122239  4.346511  7.922135 
 4  2.708637  2.470518  4.304898  3.224734  5.511739 
 5  3.440270  1.755947  4.797170  5.232510  2.383467 
 6  2.425006  1.371025  6.574181  9.125325  2.588212 
 7  1.704554  1.794921  5.363023  8.554814  4.294812 
 8  1.702996  2.562667  4.273245  4.724798  4.427118 
 9  2.139234  2.929394  4.770764  3.847024  4.376951 
 10  2.805408  2.368602  5.150096  5.647208  4.316562 
One standard deviation innovations 
 
The East African impulse response result for equation 6 is quite interesting. The response of 
equity capital to the institutional variables is all positive, except for the second period where 
EQCAP begins its response to rule of law in the negative territory, but it recovers 
immediately and the response becomes positive. It is also important to note that all the 
responses, except for negative response to rule of law in the second period, are also explosive 
in nature.   
Looking at the response of total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of 
GDP (EQCAP) to one standard deviation innovations shock on rule of law (LAWRULE) in 
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East Africa, it is interesting to note that the response begins with a 27 per cent reduction in 
EQCAP in the second period. Thereafter, the response changes to positive and it becomes 
explosive continuously. The explosive positive response grows till period five and it 
regresses thereon till period eight, after which it begins to grow again. 
With this kind of response, it is evident that innovations shock on rule of law plays a 
significant deterministic role on the response of the total value of all listed shares in a stock 
market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP). It therefore calls for a more robust approach to 
improve the institutional precincts of rule of law continuously. Although, such an 
intervention may send a panicky signal at the beginning, the negative effects will not last for 
a long time but it should be reminded that the speed of adjustment of this variable is high and 
the response of equity market listing platform to unfavourable policy intervention could be 
instantaneous. 
The next response of interest is the response of total value of all listed shares in a stock 
market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP) to one standard deviation innovations shock on 
polity score (POLITY). The response grows from 277per cent in the second period to 385 per 
cent in the third period, and it regresses to 247 per cent in the third year. Although, the trend 
picks again from the sixth period till the end of the period under consideration, the trend is 
simply uneven. 
Although, the speed of adjustment if low, it is important to note that policy intervention that 
is aimed at improving the polity score of East Africa will most like improve the performance 
of the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP). 
Also, given that this variable is an important component of capital market and by extension, a 
strong determinant of the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI; it becomes important 
to initiate policies that are capable of improving its development.  
Although, the response of total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of 
GDP (EQCAP) to one standard deviation innovations shock on the annual percentage change 
in consumer prices (INFLATION) is positive, the response is characterised by uneven 
explosive trend. The fact that chaotic explosive trend reposes in the positive territory 
indicates that the speed of adjustment is low and policy intervention in that regard could 
benefit from extensive leeway before arriving at the most optimal option.  
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Further, looking at the response of total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a 
percentage of GDP (EQCAP) to one standard deviation innovations shock on regulatory 
quality (QLEGAL), it becomes obvious that the trend is systematically incremental from the 
second period till the sixth period. Although, the gap between the sixth and the seventh 
period is high, the trend assumes an incremental pattern thereafter till the end of the period 
under investigation. This is an important finding because, although the trend is uneven at a 
point, the swing reverts back to the positive incremental pattern immediately. Policy 
intervention towards improving regulatory quality as an institutional framework should be 
tamed with caution. 
The response of total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP 
(EQCAP) to corruption perception is positive from the second period to the end of the period 
under study. However, the trend is uneven, and chaotic. Beginning with 422 per cent increase 
in the second period, the response grows to 792 per cent in the third period before regressing 
to 551 per cent in the fourth period. Although, the trend suggests an upward swing between 
fifth and eight periods, the last two periods are stable. It becomes important therefore, to 
ensure policy intervention that is capable of stimulating stability in the response of the equity 
market variable in order to improve investor confidence in the equity market continuously.  
A good lesson from these results for East Africa is that we are able to establish strong 
response relationships between the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a 
percentage of GDP (EQCAP) and the institutional variables. As such, policy intervention that 
will enhance positive response from equity platforms is encouraged in order to improve the 
development of equity platforms in the region.  
Having concluded the impulse response analysis for equation 6, we now proceed to equation 
7. The same pattern and technique that is followed in equations 3 to 6 will also be followed 
here. We begin with the pooled estimation for all the sampled African countries, and then 
proceed to the regional analysis. The results of those analyses will be presented in the 
paragraphs that follow.   
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Pooled Estimation  
Table 5.48: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 7 (1980-2012): 
Pooled data (Response of TURNOVER to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2 -0.395172  0.144899 -0.125949 -0.402671  0.036391 
 3 -0.509359  0.515972 -0.469862 -0.995633  0.125163 
 4 -0.469696  1.210939 -1.143441 -1.417827  0.091464 
 5 -0.232170  2.023641 -1.907641 -1.723796  0.059341 
 6  0.017562  2.733046 -2.628534 -1.845760  0.007632 
 7  0.299373  3.276291 -3.215114 -1.869001 -0.047760 
 8  0.528450  3.645626 -3.630007 -1.797884 -0.097105 
 9  0.708118  3.850346 -3.875430 -1.689646 -0.135319 
 10  0.819623  3.912850 -3.974670 -1.565192 -0.160574 
One standard deviation innovations 
 
The result for impulse response analysis conducted for the sampled African countries in the 
pooled data indicates that the total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a percentage 
of GDP (TURNOVER) responds both positively and negatively to the institutional variables, 
except in the case of combined polity score, where the response is exclusively positive and in 
the case of annual percentage increase in consumer prices as well as regulatory quality, the 
responses are negative.  
Looking at the response of TURNOVER to individual institutional variables, and beginning 
with rule of law (LAWRULE), it is observed that TURNOVER begins its impulse response to 
one standard deviation innovations shock on LAWRULE negatively with a 40 per cent 
reduction in the value of TURNOVER in the second period. The response decreased further to 
51 per cent in the third period and decreasing returns is experienced in the trend of the 
response between the fourth and fifth periods. 
The response switches to positive direction in the sixth period and the trend of that response 
becomes systematically incremental, starting from barely two per cent increase in the sixth 
period through to 82 per cent increase in period 10. The result of the analysis contained in 
Table 5.48 suggests that policy intervention toward improving the functionality of rule of law 
must be tamed with utmost caution, especially because of the high speed of adjustment that is 
exhibited by the response variable.  
Further, the total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP 
(TURNOVER) responds positively to one standard deviation innovations shock on polity 
score (POLITY) from the second period through to the last period under investigation. It is 
important to note that the positive response is incremental throughout the period under 
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investigation. This trend suggests that the speed of adjustment in this instance is slow. 
Although, policy intervention may be conceived to further the positive effect of POLITY on 
TURNOVER, there is no critical need for such an intervention judging from the trend.  
Looking at the impulse response of total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a 
percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) to one standard deviation innovations shock on the annual 
percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION), it is observed that the response is 
converse to the response to POLITY. The response begins in the second period with a 13 per 
cent reduction in the value of TURNOVER; the reduction grows to 191 per cent in the fifth 
period and reaches its peak in period 10 at 397 per cent. This trend suggests that a policy 
intervention is required, and urgently too, to address the negative impulse reactions of 
TURNOVER to INFLATION. One can arguably observe that inflation is indeed, a problem in 
the sampled African countries. 
The impulse response of total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a percentage of 
GDP (TURNOVER) to one standard deviation innovations shock on regulatory quality 
(QLEGAL) reflects an explosive negative response as recorded for POLITY and INFLATION. 
However in this instance, the trend is not smooth. The negative reaction begins with 40 per 
cent in the second period, and it regresses further to 172 per cent in the fifth period before 
reaching its peak in the 10
th
 period.  
Looking at the pattern of the response, one would suggest that policy intervention is urgently 
required to improve the response of TURNOVER to QLEGAL in the sampled African 
countries. The obvious reality from the result is that regulatory quality as regards trading on 
the African platforms is generally weak. As such, institutional intervention towards reversing 
the current situation is highly advocated.   
The last institutional variable in this aspect of the impulse response analysis is corruption 
perception (CORRUPTION). Here, we investigate the impulse response of total value of all 
traded shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) to one standard 
deviation innovations shock on corruption perception (CORRUPTION). The result of the 
analysis contained in Table 5.48 indicates that the response of TURNOVER to 
CORRUPTION begins positively and it becomes negative from period seven. 
More specifically, the impulse response of TURNOVER begins in the second period with four 
per cent increase in the value of TURNOVER. This increase reaches a peak of nine per cent in 
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the fourth period, and it starts to regress thereafter. It is however noticeable that the negative 
response is incremental from the onset till the end of the period under investigation. One 
important observation from the result is the high speed of adjustment. To that extent, any 
policy intervention towards improving the response should be tamed with caution in order not 
to further upset the edgy trading platform.   
Looking at the results of impulse response for equation 7 in the pooled estimation, it is 
evident that POLITY is the only variable that generates absolute positive response from 
TURNOVER, while INFLATION and QLEGAL generates absolute negative responses. 
Further, the speeds of adjustment of LAWRULE and CORRUPTION are high thereby 
suggesting cautionary policy-related interventionist approach.  
Having looked at the impulse response outcome of the pooled estimation for equation 7, we 
now proceed to the regional analysis. The results of the impulse response analysis for the 
regions are presented in the paragraphs that follow, beginning with the North African 
analysis. 
North Africa  
Table 5.49: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 7 (1980-2012): 
North Africa Regional data (Response of TURNOVER to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2 -2.331737  0.445282  0.019975 -0.148323 -0.461154 
 3 -4.544215  0.154326 -0.204249 -0.790561 -0.323185 
 4 -4.177737  0.462457 -1.058459 -1.007563  0.211484 
 5 -1.797793  0.984874 -1.275856 -1.045789  0.569642 
 6  0.220755  1.161637 -0.908228 -0.890830  0.510534 
 7  0.536318  0.912741 -0.535419 -0.758417  0.165244 
 8 -0.476442  0.613283 -0.430369 -0.830409 -0.092291 
 9 -1.611159  0.514881 -0.613038 -0.996373 -0.078293 
 10 -1.910771  0.631080 -0.875732 -1.129787  0.104384 
One standard deviation innovations 
The impulse response analysis for North Africa as presented in Table 5.49 indicates a series 
of mixed negative and positive responses. In exception of POLITY that records positive 
response to TURNOVER, the response of this capital market variable to all institutional 
variables generates mixed reactions. Looking at the reaction of total value of all traded shares 
in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) to one standard deviation 
innovations shock on rule of law (LAWRULE), it is observed that the response begins with an 
explosive 233 per cent negative reaction that regresses further until the fourth period.  
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The 22 per cent and 54 per cent positive responses recorded in the sixth and seventh period 
did not last as negative reactions set in again in an incremental manner from the eighth period 
till the end of the period under investigation. From the results presented in table 5.49, it is 
evident that policy intervention is required to improve regulatory quality in North Africa. 
However, the policy intervention should be embraced with carefulness given the high speed 
of adjustment that is pertinent to this response.   
Looking at the impulse response of total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a 
percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) to one standard deviation innovations shock on polity 
score (POLITY), it is observed that this response is the only one in the North African analysis 
that generates positive reaction. The reaction is positive from the beginning (second period) 
through to the last period under investigation. However, the trend of the response is uneven 
as it is characterised by intermittent high and low trends. Although, policy intervention is 
required in order to improve the score of the region on polity, this should be done with 
caution in order not to trigger negative reaction from the equity trading platform. 
The impulse response of total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a percentage of 
GDP (TURNOVER) to one standard deviation innovations shock on annual percentage 
change in consumer prices (INFLATION) begins in the second period in a positive territory 
(two per cent), but it inverts immediately and becomes negative in the third period with a 20 
per cent decrease in the value of TURNOVER, decreases further to 128 per cent in the fifth 
period before reducing gently to 91 per cent in the sixth period. The trend becomes 
incremental from the eighth period till the end of the period studied.   
Given the uneven trend in the pattern of the responses, especially with the swift reversal from 
positive to negative reactions, it is reasonable to suggest a rapid speed of adjustment. As 
such, the drive to ensure adequate institutional improvement to INFLATION in North African 
region should not be adopted without cautionary notes on the rapid speed of adjustment of the 
equity trading platform to this macroeconomic force.  
Looking at the impulse response of total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a 
percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) to one standard deviation innovations shock on regulatory 
quality (QLEGAL), it is observed that  the response is negative from the beginning of the 
period under investigation till the end of the period considered in the study. From a low 15 
per cent negative response in the second period, the response decreases to 105 in the fifth 
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period and increases to 89 per cent in the sixth period. The response grows further in the 
negative territory from the seventh period till the end of the period under study.   
Looking at the pattern of the response, it is evident that the response is deeply rooted in the 
negative territory with occasional explosive reactions.  Further, the fact that the response is 
irreversibly rooted in the negative territory suggests that policy intervention is required 
urgently to redress the negative trend. This is essentially so because the total value of all 
traded shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) is an important 
component of the capital market and it is found in Table 5.7 to be an important determinant 
of the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI. As such, policy intervention towards 
improving the regulatory quality in the region may enhance the development of capital 
market, thereby improving the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI. 
The impulse response of total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a percentage of 
GDP (TURNOVER) to one standard deviation innovations shock on corruption perception 
(CORRUPTION) generates mixed responses. The response begins negatively at 46 per cent in 
the second period and reduces to 32 per cent in the third period. The response changes rapidly 
to 21 per cent in the fourth period and further to 57 per cent in the fifth period before 
reducing to 51 per cent and 17 per cent in the sixth and seventh periods respectively. The 
negative responses recorded in the eighth and ninth periods are regressive at an average of 9 
per cent, while the positive response recorded in the 10
th
 period is as high as 10 per cent 
increase in the value of TURNOVER.  
From the result contained in 5.49, it is clear that the speed of adjustment of the variable to 
equilibrium point is high. Further, with the uneven trend, it is evident that response to anti-
corruption innovations will yield more positive than negative reactions. However, there is a 
stringent need to accommodate the possibility of intermittent swings in the reaction of equity 
platforms to those policy initiatives.   
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Southern Africa 
Table 5.50: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 7 (1980-2012): 
Southern Africa Regional data (Response of TURNOVER to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  2.433725 -1.788324 -2.960782  5.619635  3.824028 
 3  6.277915 -2.141884 -4.208684  5.282410  3.419285 
 4  7.498113 -5.221345 -7.494967  11.40670  7.797723 
 5  8.345492 -5.452623 -6.031137  7.988525  5.672684 
 6  9.236091 -6.647635 -7.181602  10.19577  6.938326 
 7  8.159853 -4.950222 -5.751282  8.376845  6.040464 
 8  7.895901 -5.203052 -5.150926  6.431185  4.704439 
 9  6.880766 -4.925525 -4.773124  7.383792  5.453197 
 10  6.432485 -3.628766 -3.457566  3.692523  3.022628 
One standard deviation innovations 
 
The impulse response analysis for equation 7 as contained in Table 5.50 demonstrates that the 
total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) 
responds more positively than negatively to one standard deviation innovations shock on the 
institutional variables. In fact the positive responses are absolute for three variables 
(LAWRULE, QLEGAL and CORRUPTION), while the two absolute negative reactions are 
recorded on POLITY and INFLATION.  
In specific, the total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP 
(TURNOVER) responds to one standard deviation innovations shock on rule of law 
(LAWRULE) positively from the second period, and the positive reaction continues until the 
10
th
 period. The reaction begins in an explosive manner in the second period, becomes 
incremental and reaches its maximum in the sixth period. The period thereafter records 
regressive trend but still in explosive manner.  
Looking at the response of total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a percentage of 
GDP (TURNOVER) to one standard deviation innovations shock on POLITY, it is observed 
that the response begins strongly in the negative territory in the second period and remains in 
the negative region throughout the period under investigation. However, the trend is 
incremental in nature from the second period till period six. Afterwards, the trend becomes 
erratic.  
The deeply-rooted negative reaction of TURNOVER to POLITY is an impetus for an urgent 
policy intervention to improve the polity score of the region. Although, the trend of the 
response is uneven at a point, the strength of the reaction in the negative territory is a clear 
testimonial to the slow speed of adjustment of the variable to the point of equilibrium. This 
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slow speed of adjustment thus allows for flexibility in the institutional approach to 
reinforcing the polity score of the Southern Africa region.  
The next variable of interest in the Southern Africa regional impulse response estimation for 
equation 7 is annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION). Looking at the 
impulse response of total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP 
(TURNOVER) to one standard deviation innovations shock on annual percentage change in 
consumer prices (INFLATION), it is observed that TURNOVER responds negatively and 
explosively too, to innovations shock on INFLATION. Although, the response is incremental 
between the second and the fourth periods, the trend from period six is regressive in nature 
and the wobbly pattern continues till the end of the period studied.  
Judging from the result that is presented in Table 5.50, it is clear that urgent policy 
intervention is required to curb the unchequered effects of INFLATION on the equity trading 
platform. The rigid abrasion of TURNOVER in the negative territory is a clear testimony in 
this regard.  
In addition to the above, the impulse response of total value of all traded shares in a stock 
market as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) to one standard deviation innovations shock on 
regulatory quality (QLEGAL) is absolutely positive and explosive throughout the period 
under consideration. With erratic swings between the second and the fifth periods, the trend 
becomes systematically retrogressive from the sixth period till the end of the period; 
although, it remains strong in the positive territory. 
A good lesson from this result is that the current policy initiatives are evidently supportive to 
the equity trading platform in Southern Africa; any possible improvement in the existing 
policy would most probably yield better response, especially given the slow speed of 
adjustment and the inelasticity of the response in the positive territory. 
The last institutional variable of interest in this section is corruption perception 
(CORRUPTION). From the result contained in Table 5.50, it is evident that the total value of 
all traded shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) responds to one 
standard deviation innovations shock on corruption perception (CORRUPTION) positively 
from the second period through to the last period under study. Beginning with 382 per cent 
increase in the second period, the response grows to 780 in the fourth period, before sliding to 
302 in the last period. However, the trend is uneven and the pattern is unstable.  
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 Although, the reaction is rigidly in the positive territory, the trend is not devoid of sporadic 
swings. From the result, while the response is positive, there are always rooms for policy 
improvement, especially the regulatory environment of the capital market. Government can 
thus benefit from slow speed of adjustment in the policy formulation and implementation 
process. 
West Africa 
Table 5.51: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 7 (1980-2012): 
West Africa Regional data (Response of TURNOVER to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2 -0.076576  0.041305  0.049094  0.452100  0.024844 
 3 -1.081529  0.127804  0.132823  2.229735  0.192404 
 4 -1.515633  0.141451  0.055277  2.758412  0.554877 
 5 -0.422651  0.050012 -0.107818  1.028770  0.403715 
 6  0.902170 -0.100137 -0.182638 -1.160101 -0.150959 
 7  1.360942 -0.105076 -0.063422 -1.983380 -0.210155 
 8  0.318708  0.015671  0.151027 -0.072418  0.212700 
 9 -2.078832  0.112102  0.241312  3.958326  0.564487 
 10 -3.182704  0.134888  0.110882  5.567812  0.719627 
One standard deviation innovations 
 
The impulse response analysis for equation 7 for West Africa generates interplay of positive 
and negative reactions from total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a percentage 
of GDP (TURNOVER) to institutional variables. Starting with the reaction of TURNOVER to 
one standard deviation innovations shock on rule of law (LAWRULE), it is observed that the 
response begins in the second period from a negative territory (eight per cent decrease in 
TURNOVER). With an incremental and explosive pattern between the third and fourth 
periods, the response slackens to 42 per cent in the fifth period. The sixth, seventh and eighth 
periods witness positive responses (90, 136 and 32 per cent perspective). However, the trend 
ended in the negative territory in the ninth and 10
th
 periods. 
The results presented in Table 5.51 indicate a high speed of adjustment to innovations shock. 
The swings from negative response in period five to positive response in period six, as well 
as the swing from positive in period eight to negative in period nine clearly buttresses the 
argument in support of high speed of adjustment and the need to tame policy interventions 
with restraint.  
Looking at the response of total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a percentage of 
GDP (TURNOVER) to one standard deviation innovations shock on polity score (POLITY), 
absolute positive response is evident, in exception of a negative response that is recorded in 
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the seventh period. Except for the incremental trend that is recorded between the second and 
fourth periods, the trend of the rest responses is uneven and chaotic.  
Judging from the possible impact of the high speed of adjustment that is pertinent to this 
result, it is expedient to suggest a cautionary policy formulation and implementation 
approach in order not to exacerbate the spontaneity that characterises this interaction between 
the equity trading platform and polity score.    
The response of total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP 
(TURNOVER) to one standard deviation innovations shock on annual percentage increase in 
consumer prices (INFLATION) is of important consideration. The response begins in the 
second period with five per cent positive increase in the value of TURNOVER. The response 
grows to 13 per cent in the third period and reduces to six per cent in the fourth period. The 
period between fifth and seventh periods generated negative responses and the response 
switches to the positive territory in in the eighth period, where it reposes till the end of the 
period under study.  
The simple lesson from this analysis is that policy intervention is required to ensure stability 
in the relationship between these variables. Given that the outcome of the innovations shock 
would generate a high speed of adjustment, such a policy intervention should be cautiously 
orchestrated in order not to upset the trading platform of the equity market.  
The next variable of interest in this section is regulatory quality (QLEGAL). According to 
Table 5.51, the response of total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a percentage 
of GDP (TURNOVER) to one standard deviation innovations shock on regulatory quality 
(QLEGAL) is positive for most of the instances, with three negative responses in the sixth, 
seventh and eight periods.  
The trend of the response is incremental between the second and the fourth period, reduces in 
the fifth period and enters negative territory in the sixth period. The trend only reverts back to 
the positive territory in the ninth period, and the positive swing is incremental in pattern. This 
result indicates that although regulatory intervention will yield both negative and positive 
results, the intensity of the positive responses are stronger than the negative ones. Further, 
careful attention should be paid to the high speed of adjustment when orchestrating policy 
intervention in order not to upset the trading platform on the equity market.  
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The last variable of interest in this section is corruption perception (CORRUPTION). From 
the result presented in Table 5.51, it is evident that total value of all traded shares in a stock 
market as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) will react to one standard deviation 
innovations shock more positively than negatively. In specific, out of the nine periods under 
consideration, TURNOVER will react positively to innovations shock on CORRUPTION 
seven times as compared to two negative responses.  
Beginning with a positive response of two per cent in the second period, the positive reaction 
grows to 55 per cent in the fourth period. Thereafter, the response reduced to 40 per cent 
increase in the value of TURNOVER in the fifth period, before entering the negative territory 
in the sixth and seventh periods. The periods between the eighth and the last period under 
investigation witnesses incremental positive responses.  
From the result, it is clear that innovations shock will trigger some instability in the equity 
market, but the resultant responses will be more positive than negative. However, policy 
makers should be wary of the high speed of adjustment and the high susceptibility of the 
equity trading platform to volatility.  
East Africa      
Table 5.52: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 7 (1980-2012): 
East Africa Regional data (Response of TURNOVER to Institutional Variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.220343 -0.114240  0.393916  0.279222  0.544374 
 3  0.366994 -0.292809  0.811603  0.807944  1.076318 
 4  0.415636 -0.378198  0.954608  0.997213  1.078758 
 5  0.296511 -0.229614  0.553640  0.775772  0.449084 
 6  0.037316 -0.017560 -0.157130  0.219182 -0.355417 
 7 -0.113447  0.191403 -0.634399 -0.312268 -0.696999 
 8 -0.039483  0.161960 -0.377344 -0.368829 -0.223138 
 9  0.238987 -0.109517  0.495504  0.259605  0.865402 
 10  0.539285 -0.467926  1.381880  1.153168  1.749029 
One standard deviation innovations 
 
The last regional impulse response analysis for equation 7 is done for East Africa and the 
result is presented in Table 5.52.  According to Table 5.52, the response of total value of all 
traded shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) to one standard 
deviation innovations shock on the institutional variables generates a mixture of negative but 
more positive responses. 
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Looking at the impulse response of total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a 
percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) to one standard deviation innovations shock on rule of law 
(LAWRULE), it is observed that although the response is a combination of both negative and 
positive reactions, the response is more positive than negative. Beginning with a positive 22 
per cent increase in the value of TURNOVER in the second period, the increasing response 
continues until the fourth period at 42 per cent.  
The response slides to 30 per cent in the fifth period and further to four per cent in the sixth 
period before the response becomes negative in the seventh and eight periods. The positive 
response recorded in the ninth and 10
th
 periods are incremental from 24 per cent in the ninth 
period to 54 per cent in period 10.  One can therefore opine that innovative shocks on rule of 
law will generate positive response from the trading platform in the equity market. However, 
the impuissance of the innovation would lie in the high speed of adjustment that characterises 
the response.    
Looking at the impulse response of total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a 
percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) to one standard deviation innovations shock on polity 
score (POLITY), it is observed that the response begins in the negative territory in the second 
period through a reduction of 11 per cent in TURNOVER, and it decreases further to 29 and 
38 per cent in the third and fourth periods. However, the intensity of the negative response 
reduces from the fifth period to the seventh period. Despite the overwhelming negative 
response, positive responses are observed in the seventh and eight periods, and the negative 
reactions generated from the ninth to the 10
th
 periods are incremental in nature.  
From the result, it is clear that the responses are dominated by negative reactions, but the two 
positive responses are of significance as they establish high speed of adjustment of the 
variable to the point of equilibrium. Further, the fact that response is characterised by uneven 
trend buttresses the fear of sporadic reactions that has to be carefully considered when 
orchestrating the policy intervention. 
Further to the results presented above, we look at the response of total value of all traded 
shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) to one standard deviation 
innovations shock on the annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION). The 
result indicates that TURNOVER responds to the innovations shock positively and 
progressively from the second period (40 per cent) to the fourth period (95 per cent). After 
sliding to 55 per cent in the fifth period, the reaction becomes negative in the sixth period and 
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the negative reaction only ended in the eighth period. Periods nine and 10 show incremental 
positive reaction.   
The result indicates that TURNOVER will respond more positively than negatively to 
innovations shock on INFLATION in East Africa. While policy intervention to curb negative 
influence of INFLATION on TURNOVER is desirable, attention should be paid to the high 
speed of adjustment and its consequential implication on the trading platform of the equity 
market.  
The response of total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP 
(TURNOVER) to one standard deviation innovations shock on regulatory quality (QLEGAL) 
yields responses that are overwhelmingly dominated by positive responses than negative 
responses. From the second period though to the fourth period, the positive response 
increases from 28 per cent to 100 per cent. The response slid from 78 per cent in the fifth 
period to 22 per cent in the sixth period, before reversing to negative territory in the seventh 
and eighth periods. The response becomes positive again in the ninth period and the trend is 
incremental till the 10
th
 period.  
The result suggests that innovations shock on regulatory quality will result in improvement in 
investor confidence in the platform; thereby improving the performance of the trading 
platform, which may ultimately improve the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI 
(judging from the result presented in Table 5.7). However, the issue of high speed of 
adjustment has to be considered when formulating the policy; such that the trading platform 
on the stock market is not bristled.   
The last variable of interest in this section is corruption perception (CORRUPTION). We 
investigate the impulse response of total value of all traded shares in a stock market as a 
percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) to one standard deviation innovations shock on corruption 
perception (CORRUPTION) and discover incremental positive responses from the second 
period (54 per cent) till the fourth period (108 per cent). Thereafter, the response reduces to 
45 per cent in the fifth period before entering negative period in the sixth, seventh and eighth 
periods. The positive responses generated in the ninth period (87 per cent) and the 10
th
 period 
(175 per cent) is incremental in trend.  
It is clear from the result that anti-corruption policy intervention will enhance the 
performance of the trading platform of the equity market (TURNOVER), thereby justifying 
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the need for such an interventionist approach. With the speedy alternation of positive and 
negative responses, any policy intervention should be carefully implemented in order not to 
unsettle the trading platform in the equity market.   
Having investigated the impulse response of capital market variables (dependent variables) to 
innovations shock on institutional variables (the explanatory variables, it is considered 
important to proceed to the causality test. However, it is important to first determine the long 
run relationship among the variables. As such, we first perform cointegration tests before the 
causality test.    
5.4.6 Cointegration tests for equations 3 to 7 
Having analysed the speed of adjustment of the variables, we now proceed to the test of 
causality. However, it is essential to establish cointegration among the variables before a 
reliable causality test can be ran (as done for equation 2). The same method of cointegration 
test that is applied for equation 2 is also applied here (in the cointegration regression).  The 
result of the cointegration test is presented in Table 5.53.  
Table 5.53: Cointegration Regression for equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012): Pooled Data 
Institution Framework on Capital Market Development 
(Dependent – Capital Market Development Variables) 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 
  BANK PRIVY NONFIN EQCAP TURNOVER 
LAWRULE -36.60960 
(0.567047)*** 
-29.82095 
(9.011966)*** 
20.00138 
(3.948701)*** 
-56.98173 
(28.76873)** 
-32.95201  
(13.88936)** 
POLITY 0.764181 
(0.127158)*** 
0.982096 
(0.250915)*** 
-0.579677 
(0.109941)*** 
3.568395 
(0.617508)*** 
1.499542 
(0.386714)*** 
INFLATION -0.297018 
(0.052991)*** 
-0.452429 
(0.104566)*** 
0.164043 
(0.045817)*** 
-0.783342 
(0.283380)*** 
-0.192054 
(0.161158)*** 
QLEGAL 2.223509 
(4.642042)* 
5.936373 
(9.159950)* 
-4.707583 
(4.013543)* 
22.77786 
(0.71018)* 
27.69409 
(14.11744)** 
CORRUPTION -2.439727 
(1.604944)* 
-6.040708 
(3.166970)** 
-0.996265 
(1.387646)* 
-30.85355 
(0.457633)*** 
-18.34082 
(4.880977)*** 
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 
Number of countries 6 6 6 6 6 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Method: Panel Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares 
(FMOLS). First-stage residuals use heterogeneous long-run coefficients. Long-run covariance estimates (Prewhitening with 
lags = 1, Bartlett Kernel, Integer Newey-West fixed bandwidth). 
In the cointegration regression contained in Table 5.53, our estimates are based on pooled 
estimation using only a constant as the cross-section specific trend regressor. In our 
coefficient covariance matrix computation, we computed an estimator of the long-run 
variance using a Bartlett Kernel and fixed Newey-West bandwidth. We report results based 
on robust standard errors. As indicated by their p-values, the results of the cointegration tests 
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for the pooled sampled African countries suggest that we reject the Null of no cointegration. 
Although in some instances, this decision-making is tamed with caution. For example, the 
decision criteria to reject the Null hypothesis of no cointegration are weaker for domestic 
credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP (PRIVY) and quality of legal framework 
(QLEGAL), but these two variables are still cointegrated at 10 per cent error levels. The same 
condition applies to QLEGAL and BANK, CORRUPTION and BANK, QLEGAL and NONFIN 
as well as CORRUPTION and NONFIN.   
5.4.7 Granger causality test for equations 3 to 7  
Having tested for cointegration among the variables, we now proceed to examine if there 
exists causality relationship among the variables. The results of the Granger causality test are 
presented in Table 5.54.  
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Pooled Estimation  
Table 5.54: Granger Causality Test for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012):  
Pooled Data (lag of 2) 
F-statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
From Table 5.54, there is only one unidirectional causal relationship between an institutional 
variable (LAWRULE) and a capital market development variable (BANK) for equation 3. This 
causal relationship suggests that an improvement in the rule of law may reinforce the 
confidence level of domestic banks to increase their financial support for the private sector. 
This may imply that default rate is high in the sampled African capital markets, thereby 
raising the risk profile of the private sector, and ultimately leading to adverse selection and 
credit rationing.  
Direction of causality 
 
Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6 Equation 7 
BANK LAWRULE PRIVY LAWRULE NONFIN LAWRULE EQCAP LAWRULE TURNOVER LAWRULE 
 
(0.67495) 
 
 
(0.23961) 
 
(0.45792) 
 
(1.02123) 
 
(0.44585) 
LAWRULE BANK LAWRULE PRIVY LAWRULE NONFIN LAWRULE EQCAP LAWRULE TURNOVER 
 
(2.56900)** 
 
 
(1.35684) 
 
(0.38619) 
 
(1.11991) 
 
(1.82375) 
BANK  POLITY PRIVY POLITY NONFIN POLITY EQCAP POLITY TURNOVER POLITY 
 
(1.81689) 
 
 
(3.09766)* 
 
(1.01303) 
 
(3.03060)** 
 
(0.82352) 
POLITY BANK POLITY PRIVY POLITY NONFIN POLITY EQCAP POLITY TURNOVER 
 
(1.23510) 
 
 
(0.98276) 
 
(0.24320) 
 
(1.02228) 
 
(1.33714) 
BANK  INFLATION PRIVY INFLATION NONFIN INFLATION EQCAP INFLATION TURNOVER INFLATION 
 
(3.55020)** 
 
 
(2.10837) 
 
(8.06930)*** 
 
(0.13800) 
 
(0.18972) 
INFLATION BANK INFLATION PRIVY INFLATION NONFIN INFLATION EQCAP INFLATION TURNOVER 
 
(0.31271) 
 
 
(1.62788) 
 
(1.94291) 
 
(0.01448) 
 
(0.20419) 
BANK  QLEGAL PRIVY QLEGAL NONFIN QLEGAL EQCAP QLEGAL TURNOVER QLEGAL 
 
(1.47234) 
 
 
(2.31879)* 
 
(0.35151) 
 
(0.70342) 
 
(0.13499) 
QLEGAL  BANK QLEGAL PRIVY QLEGAL NONFIN QLEGAL EQCAP QLEGAL TURNOVER 
 
(2.05354) 
 
 
(2.09335) 
 
(0.77691) 
 
(1.31094)* 
 
(1.92144) 
BANK CORRUPTI PRIVY CORRUPTI NONFIN CORRUPTI EQCAP CORRUPTI TURNOVER CORRUPTI 
 
(1.35765) 
 
 
(2.36952)* 
 
(0.73655) 
 
(0.32212) 
 
 
(1.63717) 
CORRUPTI BANK CORRUPTI PRIVY CORRUPTI NONFIN CORRUPTI EQCAP CORRUPTI TURNOVER 
 
(1.58507) 
 
 
(0.58942) 
 
(0.38176) 
 
(0.68465) 
 
(0.35155) 
Observation 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 
Number of 
countries 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
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Arguably, the ownership structure of most of the banks in Africa has the tendency to propel a 
regulatory environment that is investor-friendly, but these financial institutions are weakly 
regulated. The weak institutional framework (especially in respect of the rule of law) has 
been singled out as the major culprit for the lingering adverse selection and moral hazards 
that characterise most of African banks (Cronje & Roux, 2010). Still on Table5.54, some 
capital market variables show reverse causal relationships with a few of the institutional 
variables under consideration. In equation 3, the financial resources provided to the private 
sector by domestic money banks as a share of GDP (BANK) has a reverse causal relationship 
with annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION). This may imply that the 
more funds is channelled to the private sector by the commercial banks, the more the money 
in circulation and ultimately the more susceptible the economy is to inflation.  
Further in equation 4, domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP (PRIVY) is 
seen to have reverse causal relationships with polity score (POLITY), regulatory quality 
(QLEGAL) and corruption perception (CORRUPTION). In all these instances, PRIVY is seen 
to have direct causal effect on these institutional variables. To that extent, PRIVY is seen to be 
causing improvement in polity score and an improvement in the regulatory quality.  
However surprisingly, PRIVY is also seen to be causing corruption. This may imply that a 
larger portion of such funds is channelled towards the business interests of political affiliates. 
Examples of policy initiatives such as Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment 
(BBBEE) in South Africa, the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy 
(NEEDS I & II), as well as the State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies 
(SEEDS) programmes in Nigeria readily comes to mind. The staunch business interest of the 
military in Egypt is another relevant example. According to literature, there is no documented 
study yet that tests the causality between institutional framework and capital market 
development on the African capital markets and more importantly, on regional basis. 
Amongst others, this forms an important contribution of this study to the body of existing 
literature.  
In equation 5, claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a 
percentage of GDP (NONFIN) is also found to be causing annual percentage change in 
consumer prices (INFLATION). While the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as 
a percentage of GDP is seen to be causing improvement to polity score of the sampled 
countries in equation 6, the quality of regulatory environment is also observed to be causing 
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the development of total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP. 
No causal relationship (either direct or reverse) is established in equation 7.  
Having looked at the casual relationship between the capital market variables and the 
institutional variables in pooled equitation, we now investigate regional dynamics in this 
regard. The results of the regional causality tests are presented in the paragraphs that follow, 
beginning with North Africa.  
North Africa  
Table 5.55: Granger Causality Test for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012): 
North Africa (lag of 2) 
F-statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Direction of causality 
 
Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6 Equation 7 
BANK LAWRULE PRIVY LAWRULE NONFIN LAWRULE EQCAP LAWRULE TURNOVER LAWRULE 
 
(0.94386) 
 
 
(0.77515) 
 
(0.50487) 
 
(4.61666)** 
 
(1.11255) 
LAWRULE BANK LAWRULE PRIVY LAWRULE NONFIN LAWRULE EQCAP LAWRULE TURNOVER 
 
(0.56841) 
 
 
(0.22734) 
 
(0.35511) 
 
(0.77037) 
 
(11.2786)*** 
BANK  POLITY PRIVY POLITY NONFIN POLITY EQCAP POLITY TURNOVER POLITY 
 
(2.84355)* 
 
 
(0.95769) 
 
(0.66360) 
 
(0.55442) 
 
(0.85887) 
POLITY BANK POLITY PRIVY POLITY NONFIN POLITY EQCAP POLITY TURNOVER 
 
(2.43473)* 
 
 
(1.07071) 
 
(0.62423) 
 
(0.14954) 
 
(0.95429) 
BANK  INFLATION PRIVY INFLATION NONFIN INFLATION EQCAP INFLATION TURNOVER INFLATION 
 
(1.19533)  
 
 
(0.53801) 
 
(5.94683)*** 
 
(0.69519) 
 
(0.17902) 
INFLATION BANK INFLATION PRIVY INFLATION NONFIN INFLATION EQCAP INFLATION TURNOVER 
 
(1.74749) 
 
 
(0.54562) 
 
(1.34180) 
 
(0.99339) 
 
(0.11994) 
BANK  QLEGAL PRIVY QLEGAL NONFIN QLEGAL EQCAP QLEGAL TURNOVER QLEGAL 
 
(0.72061) 
 
 
(1.60845) 
 
(1.83258) 
 
(0.41492) 
 
(1.48006) 
QLEGAL  BANK QLEGAL PRIVY QLEGAL NONFIN QLEGAL EQCAP QLEGAL TURNOVER 
 
(0.14490) 
 
 
(0.22911) 
 
(3.84960)** 
 
(5.49886)*** 
 
(3.31188)** 
BANK CORRUPTI PRIVY CORRUPTI NONFIN CORRUPTI EQCAP CORRUPTI TURNOVER CORRUPTI 
 
(0.04535) 
 
 
(0.11752) 
 
(0.96859) 
 
(0.14392) 
 
(0.90076) 
CORRUPTI BANK CORRUPTI PRIVY CORRUPTI NONFIN CORRUPTI EQCAP CORRUPTI TURNOVER 
 
(0.22122) 
 
 
(1.76424) 
 
(0.79589) 
 
(2.37021)* 
 
(2.35525)* 
Observation 93 93 93 93 93 
Number of 
countries 
3 3 3 3 3 
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From Table 5.55, there is one direct causal relationship between polity score (POLITY and 
the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a 
percentage of GDP (BANK), which is equation 3. This causal relationship suggests that 
POLITY does influence BANK in North Africa, thereby suggesting possible innovations 
shock in this regard. Lucky enough, the result of such an innovation is more likely going to 
yield positive result as contained in the impulse response results that were presented in Table 
5.29. Further in the same equation, there is one reverse causality – running from BANK to 
POLITY. This suggests that an improvement in the private sector by domestic money banks 
as a percentage of GDP (BANK) will result in improving the polity score of the region. No 
causal relationship is recorded for equation 4.  
For equation 5, quality of regulatory framework (QLEGAL) is seen to have causal effect on 
the claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a percentage of GDP 
(NONFIN). By implication, an improvement in regulatory framework would augment the 
development of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a 
percentage of GDP (NONFIN). As suggested by the impulse response result that is presented 
in Table 5.39, innovations shock on QLEGAL would trigger negative reaction, but the speed 
of adjustment is low thereby ascertaining resilience in case of policy miscalculation.  
Conversely, there is a reverse causal relationship between NONFIN and INFLATION. In 
specific, the development of claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank 
as a percentage of GDP (NONFIN) would trigger an increase in the annual percentage change 
in consumer prices. This furthers the argument of BANK’s featherbedding that is advanced in 
the pooled estimation above.  
For equation 6, the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP 
(EQCAP) is seen to have reverse causal effect on regulatory quality (QLEGAL). By 
implication, this result suggests that a developed equity market is capable of forcing 
improvement on regulatory environment in the region. This improvement may possibly come 
through integration with more developed equity markets that have well-established regulatory 
standards. These global organisations largely demand conformity to those regulations. 
Disclosure policies, listing requirements and arbitration procedures that are prerequisite for 
becoming members of global stock market associations are good examples.  
Further, regulatory quality (QLEGAL) is seen to have direct causal effect on the total value of 
all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP). Although, an 
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improvement in the regulatory environment may be desirable, the result of impulse response 
contained in Table 5.44 suggests that EQCAP will react negatively to innovations on 
QLEGAL. To that extent, caution should be taken as regards regulatory reforms in the region.     
In addition, corruption perception (CORRUPTION) is observed to have direct causal effect 
on the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP). 
This finding buttresses the observation of insider trading that has been alleged in some North 
African countries in the past. To curb the effects of corruption on the equity market, policy 
intervention may be necessary. However, the result of impulse response estimation that is 
presented in Table 5.44 suggests that EQCAP will react negatively to innovations shock on 
regulatory quality (QLEGAL).  
For equation 7, three institutional variables (LAWRULE, QLEGAL and CORRUPTION) are 
found to have direct causal effects on the total value of all traded shares in a stock market 
exchange as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER). In the first instance, rule of law 
(LAWRULE) is found to have direct causal effect on the total value of all traded shares in a 
stock market exchange as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER). This suggests that an 
improvement in the application of rule of law in the region will enhance the development of 
the equity market. However, the speed of adjustment in the impulse response analysis 
contained in Table 5.49 hints on the need to tame policy intervention with caution.  
The quality of regulatory environment (QLEGAL) is also observed to have a direct causal 
effect on the total value of all traded shares in a stock market exchange as a percentage of 
GDP (TURNOVER). By implication, the better the regulatory environment the more 
developed the TURNOVER. This finding therefore hints on the need for policy intervention to 
improve the regulatory environment of the equity market. However, the impulse response 
result contained in Table 5.49 suggest that such an innovation may generate negative 
response from TURNOVER, but the incidence of slow speed of adjustment allays the fear of 
inflexibility in varying institutional response in this regard.  
Still on equation 7, corruption perception (CORRUPTION) is observed to have direct causal 
effects on the total value of all traded shares in a stock market exchange as a percentage of 
GDP (TURNOVER). This result indicates that anti-corruption policy intervention may 
enhance the development of the equity market. However, the impulse response result that is 
presented in Table 5.49 suggests that innovations shock on regulatory quality (QLEGAL) will 
unsettle the total value of all traded shares in a stock market exchange as a percentage of 
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GDP (TURNOVER). With the high speed of adjustment, policy intervention should be 
carefully orchestrated in order not to upset the skittish equity market.  
Table 5.56: Granger Causality Test for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012): 
Southern Africa (lag of 2) 
F-statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The causality tests presented in Table 5.56 depicts at least one causal relationship in each of 
the equations. For equation 3, there are two direct causal relationships between the 
institutional variables and the capital market variable (BANK). However, there are three 
reverse causal relationships running from the capital market variable (BANK) to the 
institutional variables. In the first instance, annual percentage increase in consumer prices 
(INFLATION) has a direct causal effect on BANK, suggesting that higher percentage change 
Direction of causality 
 
Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6 Equation 7 
BANK LAWRULE PRIVY LAWRULE NONFIN LAWRULE EQCAP LAWRULE TURNOVER LAWRULE 
 
(0.30510) 
 
 
(0.79171) 
 
(1.12180) 
 
(0.61159) 
 
(0.24596) 
LAWRULE BANK LAWRULE PRIVY LAWRULE NONFIN LAWRULE EQCAP LAWRULE TURNOVER 
 
(0.85880) 
 
 
(1.99861) 
 
(0.06294) 
 
(2.39096)* 
 
(1.25397) 
BANK  POLITY PRIVY POLITY NONFIN POLITY EQCAP POLITY TURNOVER POLITY 
 
(3.56911)* 
 
 
(4.12657)** 
 
(0.88549) 
 
(2.18722) 
 
(2.18658) 
POLITY BANK POLITY PRIVY POLITY NONFIN POLITY EQCAP POLITY TURNOVER 
 
(1.18502) 
 
 
(0.05384) 
 
(1.15474) 
 
(0.85720) 
 
(0.47486) 
BANK  INFLATION PRIVY INFLATION NONFIN INFLATION EQCAP INFLATION TURNOVER INFLATION 
 
(3.46692)* 
 
 
(3.50076)* 
 
(2.45280)* 
 
(0.09915) 
 
(0.16354) 
INFLATION BANK INFLATION PRIVY INFLATION NONFIN INFLATION EQCAP INFLATION TURNOVER 
 
(3.81265)* 
 
 
(0.99496) 
 
(0.50547) 
 
(2.04839) 
 
(2.39970)* 
BANK  QLEGAL PRIVY QLEGAL NONFIN QLEGAL EQCAP QLEGAL TURNOVER QLEGAL 
 
(1.05399) 
 
 
(0.44075) 
 
(0.34461) 
 
(1.39263) 
 
(0.75617) 
QLEGAL  BANK QLEGAL PRIVY QLEGAL NONFIN QLEGAL EQCAP QLEGAL TURNOVER 
 
(1.13598) 
 
 
(1.07241) 
 
(0.41279) 
 
(1.44665) 
 
(3.43058)* 
BANK CORRUPTI PRIVY CORRUPTI NONFIN CORRUPTI EQCAP CORRUPTI TURNOVER CORRUPTI 
 
(10.5265)*** 
 
 
(4.05611)** 
 
(1.26529) 
 
(1.04935) 
 
(17.9987)*** 
CORRUPTI BANK CORRUPTI PRIVY CORRUPTI NONFIN CORRUPTI EQCAP CORRUPTI TURNOVER 
 
(4.30812)** 
 
 
(1.25202) 
 
(1.27588) 
 
(3.78447)* 
 
(2.62799)* 
Observation 31 31 31 31 31 
Number of 
countries 
1 1 1 1 1 
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in consumer prices would enhance the development of financial resources provided to the 
private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK).  
However, the result of the impulse response presented in Table 5.30 indicates that 
innovations shock on polity score (POLITY) will generate positive reactions from the 
financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of 
GDP (BANK). Given the slow speed of adjustment that characterises such an innovations 
shock, the possibility of policy flexibility is higher and success rate of such a policy 
intervention is also high, thereby making it desirable.  
In addition, corruption perception (CORRUPTION) is also seen to have direct causal effect 
on the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a 
percentage of GDP (BANK). This may imply that proceeds of corruption are deposited into 
commercial banks, which eventually make such monies available to the private sector. The 
impulse response result presented in Table 5.30 reinforces the observed positive relationship 
between BANK and CORRUPTION, where the result of a possible innovations shock on 
corruption yield absolute positive result.  
Still in equation 3, the financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money 
banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) is seen to have reverse causality on polity score 
(POLITY). This may be interpreted that a developed BANK would enforce some regulatory 
intervention that will ultimately improve the polity score of the region. The financial 
resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP 
(BANK) is also observed to have causal effect on annual percentage change in consumer 
prices (INFLATION). This may suggest that most of the funds provided to the private sector 
are consumed directly and immediately. The funds do not appear to be invested in capital 
assets. In addition, BANK is also seen to strongly influence corruption. This result hints on 
the possibility of inefficient financial deepening whereby access to finance is a sole province 
of a few favoured private firms. 
Looking at the causal relationship between the institutional variables and the domestic credit 
to private sector as a percentage of GDP (PRIVY), it is observed that the three causal 
relationships that exist between these variables are reverse causality – running from PRIVY to 
the institutional variables. 
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In specific, causality runs from PRIVY to POLITY, suggesting that the more financial 
resources are directed to the private sector, the more the polity score of the region would 
improve. Similar causality is established by BANK in equation 3. Further, PRIVY is seen to 
have causal effect on INFLATION, buttressing the proposition of inefficient financial 
deepening observed in equation 3. Further, PRIVY is seen to have causal effect on 
CORRUPTION. This finding suggests that certain class of people benefit from such funding 
arrangement in an illegitimate manner, thereby buttressing the proposition of inefficient 
financial deepening that has been advanced above.  
For equation 5, there is only one causal relationship and it runs from claims on domestic real 
nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a percentage of GDP (NONFIN) to annual 
percentage increase in consumer prices (INFLATION). This result suggests that such funds 
are directed into immediate consumption and are not invested in long-term investment or 
directed towards future-orientated capital formation.  
Causality test for equation 6 yields two direct causal relationships from rule of law 
(LAWRULE) to the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP 
(EQCAP) as well as from corruption perception (CORRUPTION) to the total value of all 
listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP). In the first instance, an 
improvement in the respect for rule of law would cause an improvement in investor 
confidence to list on the stock market platform. Given that the impulse response result that is 
presented in Table 5.45 suggests an absolute positive reaction from EQCAP to innovations 
shock on LAWRULE, such a policy intervention would be valuable. 
Further, corruption perception is found to have causal effect on EQCAP. The possible 
interpretation would be that there are incidences of corrupt practices that dissuade 
organisations from getting listed on the equity platform. If so, the possibility of curbing some 
of those corruption-related practices would increase investor confidence in getting listed on 
the platform. In addendum, the result of impulse response analysis presented in Table 5.45 
suggests an absolute negative reaction from EQCAP if anti-corruption innovations shock is 
applied, thereby making such an intervention precarious.   
The causality test conducted for equation 7 yields three direct causal relationships and one 
reverse causality. For instance, annual percentage increase in consumer prices (INFLATION) 
is found to have direct causal effect on the total value of all traded shares in a stock market 
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exchange as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER). This is very practical in that the value of 
the listed shares will be inflated as the value of the domestic currency reduces.  
Also, regulatory quality (QLEGAL) is seen to have causal effect on the total value of all 
traded shares in a stock market exchange as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER). The result 
suggests that the more the regulatory quality improves, the more the listing platform will be 
attractive to investors to commit to the equity market. This finding is in line with previous 
studies such as the one conducted by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (2000).  
However, the result of impulse response contained in Table 5.50 hints on the possibility of 
absolute positive reaction from the equity platform if there are innovations shock on 
regulatory quality. This therefore, makes any such policy intervention expedient. The impulse 
response result also suggests slow speed of adjustment, which further hints on improbable 
negative response to policy intervention in the short run.  
In addition, corruption perception (CORRUPTION) is also seen to have causal effect on the 
total value of all traded shares in a stock market exchange as a percentage of GDP 
(TURNOVER). This may imply that some degree of insider trading or other related 
opportunistic behaviour may be happening in the equity market. The fact that the causality is 
only significant at 10 per cent error level may indicate a low probability of such occurrence, 
and thereby not necessarily send a red alert in this regard. Further, the impulse response 
analysis contained in Table 5.50 indicates an absolute positive reaction to anti-corruption 
innovations, thereby motivating for such a possible intervention.  
The only reverse causality runs from the total value of all traded shares in a stock market 
exchange as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) to corruption perception (CORRUPTION). 
This result indicates that the more capitalised the stock market becomes, the more the 
possibility of corrupt practices. The fact that this causal relationship is highly statistically 
significant should be worrying, but the result of the impulse response that suggests absolute 
necessity for such an intervention should ally our fears on the possible outcome.  
In the Southern Africa causality tests, out of the possible five instances, corruption is found to 
have causal effects on the capital market variables in three instances. This is a signal that 
corruption is a serious problem and it retards the development of the capital market in the 
region. Given that the impulse response analysis supports such interventions, it becomes 
expedient to engage such possibilities.  
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West Africa        
Table 5.57: Granger Causality Test for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012):  
West Africa (lag of 2) 
F-statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
In the West Africa causality tests and in equation 3, two institutional variables (LAWRULE 
and CORRUPTION) are found to have causal effects on the financial resources provided to 
the private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK). In the first 
instance, rule of law (LAWRULE) is seen to have direct causal effect on the financial 
resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP 
(BANK).  
Direction of causality 
 
Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6 Equation 7 
BANK LAWRULE PRIVY LAWRULE NONFIN LAWRULE EQCAP LAWRULE TURNOVER LAWRULE 
 
(0.18305) 
 
 
(0.32116) 
 
(0.75563) 
 
(1.14698) 
 
(0.47765) 
LAWRULE BANK LAWRULE PRIVY LAWRULE NONFIN LAWRULE EQCAP LAWRULE TURNOVER 
 
(5.97089)*** 
 
 
(0.92232) 
 
(1.67349) 
 
(4.07555)** 
 
(1.12390) 
BANK  POLITY PRIVY POLITY NONFIN POLITY EQCAP POLITY TURNOVER POLITY 
 
(0.16460) 
 
 
(0.24451) 
 
(3.97511)* 
 
(1.34128) 
 
(0.57171) 
POLITY BANK POLITY PRIVY POLITY NONFIN POLITY EQCAP POLITY TURNOVER 
 
(1.24500) 
 
 
(0.61160) 
 
(0.37190) 
 
(0.55709) 
 
(1.09604) 
BANK  INFLATION PRIVY INFLATION NONFIN INFLATION EQCAP INFLATION TURNOVER INFLATION 
 
(0.52331) 
 
 
(1.01163) 
 
(5.18363)** 
 
(1.01674) 
 
(0.61960) 
INFLATION BANK INFLATION PRIVY INFLATION NONFIN INFLATION EQCAP INFLATION TURNOVER 
 
(0.17339) 
 
 
(0.71652) 
 
(0.90521) 
 
(0.40403) 
 
(0.21048) 
BANK  QLEGAL PRIVY QLEGAL NONFIN QLEGAL EQCAP QLEGAL TURNOVER QLEGAL 
 
(1.30115) 
 
 
(1.39232) 
 
(0.44590) 
 
(1.40058) 
 
(1.53953) 
QLEGAL  BANK QLEGAL PRIVY QLEGAL NONFIN QLEGAL EQCAP QLEGAL TURNOVER 
 
(0.79474) 
 
 
(1.14006) 
 
(0.62889) 
 
(0.02332) 
 
(0.95618) 
BANK CORRUPTI PRIVY CORRUPTI NONFIN CORRUPTI EQCAP CORRUPTI TURNOVER CORRUPTI 
 
(0.07164) 
 
 
(0.31881) 
 
(3.83376)* 
 
(0.57498) 
 
(1.04621) 
CORRUPTI BANK CORRUPTI PRIVY CORRUPTI NONFIN CORRUPTI EQCAP CORRUPTI TURNOVER 
 
(6.27018)*** 
 
 
(5.16030)** 
 
(0.37044) 
 
(6.07232)*** 
 
(11.0193)*** 
Observation 31 31 31 31 31 
Number of 
countries 
1 1 1 1 1 
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That is, the more effective the rule of law, the more the commercial banks will have the 
confidence to channel funds to the private sector. This result hints on the possibility of high 
default rate and extensive protection of debtors, which calls for policy intervention. The fact 
that the impulse response analysis points to the possibility of absolute positive response 
further reinforces the justification for policy intervention and the surety that the outcome of 
the intervention will be desirable.   
The second causal effect comes from corruption perception (CORRUPTION) to the financial 
resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP 
(BANK). This result may suggest that proceeds of corruption are channelled to BANK. 
However, looking at the impulse response analysis contained in Table 5.31, anti-corruption 
policy intervention is justified on the basis of potential absolute positive response from BANK 
to such an innovations shock, and the slow speed of adjustment further hints on policy 
flexibility.  
The causality test for equation 4 only turns one causal relationship that runs from corruption 
perception (CORRUPTION) to the domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP 
(PRIVY). This result indicates that proceeds of corruption are directed to PRIVY and the more 
corrupt the financial system is, the more funds are directed to PRIVY. Once again, the 
impulse response result contained in Table 5.36 suggests an absolute positive response from 
PRIVY to innovations shock on CORRUPTION, thereby justifying policy intervention in that 
regard.  
The causality test conducted for equation 5 suggests three reverse causalities, namely from 
NONFIN to POLITY, INFLATION and CORRUPTION. These results suggest that the claims 
on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a percentage of GDP (NONFIN) 
causes improvement to polity score of the region. By implication, the more developed 
NONFIN is, the more the polity environment improves.  
Further, annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION) is another variable that 
is directly influenced by NONFIN. The fact that NONFIN is found to cause INFLATION is an 
indication that these funds are consumed immediately and they fuel the stock of money in 
circulation. In addition, the claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank 
as a percentage of GDP (NONFIN) are observed to cause CORRUPTION. From the result, 
apart from the inefficient financial deepening that is advanced above, these funds are also 
found not to be directed into capital formation or any form of long-term investment.  
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The results of causality tests conducted for equation 6 indicate two direct causal effects from 
the institutional variables (LAWRULE and CORRUPTION) on EQCAP. By implication, 
improvement in the application and respect for rule of law is important to improve investor 
confidence in the equity trading platform. Judging from the result of impulse response that is 
presented in Table 5.46, the reaction of EQCAP to innovations shock on LAWRULE may 
yield mixed reactions and the speed of adjustment is high. As such, policy intervention 
should be tamed with caution. 
Further, CORRUPTION is also found to influence the total value of all listed shares in a stock 
market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP). This may reinforce the possibility of corrupt 
practices within the stock market. In practice, the largest equity market in West Africa was 
accused of insider trading during 2010 and 2011, and that allegation seriously affected the 
capitalisation of the stock market at the time. The result of the impulse response presented in 
Table 5.46 suggests that EQCAP will react absolutely positively to innovations shock on 
CORRUPTION, thereby reinforcing the justification for policy intervention in that regard.   
For equation 7, corruption perception (CORRUPTION) is also seen to have direct causal 
effect on the total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP 
(EQCAP). The practical implication is similar to the one observed above in the case of 
EQCAP. However, the result of the impulse response analysis presented in Table 5.51 
indicates that equity market is very responsive to innovations shock from CORRUPTION and 
the speed of adjustment is very high, thereby cautioning on optimal interventionist approach.  
The general observation from the West African causality tests is that CORRUPTION is 
indeed, a serious deterrent to capital market development in that region. Among other 
institutional variables, corruption perception stands out as the main hindrance to capital 
market development as the institutional variable exhibits direct causal effects on four of the 
five capital market variables (except for NONFIN).  
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East Africa 
Table 5.58: Granger Causality Test for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012):  
East Africa (lag of 2) 
F-statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The causality tests for East Africa, especially for equation 3 as presented in Table 5.57, 
indicates that there are two reverse causalities from BANK to INFLATION and to QLEGAL. 
Just like the pooled African causality test (Table 5.54) as well as Southern African (Table 
5.56) causality tests, the East African causality test reflects that the financial resources 
provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a percentage of GDP (BANK) do 
directly influence the annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION). This may 
Direction of causality 
 
Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6 Equation 7 
BANK LAWRULE PRIVY LAWRULE NONFIN LAWRULE EQCAP LAWRULE TURNOVER LAWRULE 
 
(1.13426) 
 
 
(1.41987) 
 
(0.55020) 
 
(0.61825) 
 
(1.26216) 
LAWRULE BANK LAWRULE PRIVY LAWRULE NONFIN LAWRULE EQCAP LAWRULE TURNOVER 
 
(0.08985) 
 
 
(2.27689) 
 
(1.49340) 
 
(1.61062) 
 
(0.02873) 
BANK POLITY PRIVY POLITY NONFIN POLITY EQCAP POLITY TURNOVER POLITY 
 
(1.10525) 
 
 
(2.15594) 
 
(0.75313) 
 
(1.28560) 
 
(0.92017) 
POLITY BANK POLITY PRIVY POLITY NONFIN POLITY EQCAP POLITY TURNOVER 
 
(2.14677) 
 
 
(0.29196) 
 
(5.70186)*** 
 
(6.04520)*** 
 
(4.69643)** 
BANK INFLATION PRIVY INFLATION NONFIN INFLATION EQCAP INFLATION TURNOVER INFLATION 
 
(4.55040)** 
 
 
(4.76009)** 
 
(5.69072)*** 
 
(0.19695) 
 
(0.24539) 
INFLATION BANK INFLATION PRIVY INFLATION NONFIN INFLATION EQCAP INFLATION TURNOVER 
 
(0.96016) 
 
 
(0.58329) 
 
(1.85881) 
 
(0.83959) 
 
(0.54638) 
BANK QLEGAL PRIVY QLEGAL NONFIN QLEGAL EQCAP QLEGAL TURNOVER QLEGAL 
 
(2.93621)* 
 
 
(3.41865)* 
 
(3.95345)** 
 
(1.67207) 
 
(8.44555)*** 
QLEGAL BANK QLEGAL PRIVY QLEGAL NONFIN QLEGAL EQCAP QLEGAL TURNOVER 
 
(1.07606) 
 
 
(0.43894) 
 
(3.62089)** 
 
(4.30405)** 
 
(12.7611)*** 
BANK CORRUPTI PRIVY CORRUPTI NONFIN CORRUPTI EQCAP CORRUPTI TURNOVER CORRUPTI 
 
(2.38470) 
 
 
(6.04218)*** 
 
(0.31106) 
 
(0.67925)  
 
(0.52331) 
CORRUPTI BANK CORRUPTI PRIVY CORRUPTI NONFIN CORRUPTI EQCAP CORRUPTI TURNOVER 
 
(0.26341) 
 
 
(1.34382) 
 
(0.50129) 
 
(1.44352) 
 
(0.40935) 
Observation 31 31 31 31 31 
Number of 
countries 
1 1 1 1 1 
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connote that the funds that are channelled through commercial banks to the private sectors are 
not invested into long-term usage by the recipients.  
In addition, the reverse causality from BANK to regulatory quality (QLEGAL) hints that the 
advancement in financial deepening though BANK would precipitate an improvement in the 
regulatory quality. This is probably an indication that efficient BANK would create more 
middle class that are enlightened and relentless about regulatory entreaty, thereby influencing 
improvement in the regulatory quality.  
In equation 4, PRIVY is also seen to influence INFLATION and QLEGAL as in equation 3. In 
addition, PRIVY is also seen to influence CORRUPTION. This result is also similar to the one 
obtained for the pooled African estimation as well as Southern Africa result. As suggested in 
the previous instances, it could be inferred from this result that the beneficiaries of funds 
generated through domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP (PRIVY) do not 
apply the fund to capital formation or long-term investment.  
In equation 5, there are two bidirectional causalities between POLITY and NONFIN as well 
as between NONFIN and QLEGAL. In both instances, the statistical significance of the 
causalities is the same. In the first instance, POLITY is found to influence NONFIN. The 
argument may be that an improved polity score for the region would precipitate an 
improvement in the claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a 
percentage of GDP (NONFIN). As the NONFIN fund develops, it would further improve the 
polity score of the region. This finding is in line with the studies of Demetriades and Hussein 
(1996), as well as the work of Shan and Jianhong (2006).  
Further, QLEGAL is observed to have direct causal effect on NONFIN and there is also an 
observation of reverse causality from NONFIN to QLEGAL. The argument here falls in line 
with the one presented above in the instance of NONFIN and POLITY, which is supported in 
literature.  
For equation 6, two institutional variables (POLITY and QLEGAL) have direct causal effects 
on EQCAP. In the case of POLITY, an improvement in the region’s polity score is seen as 
capable of improving investor confidence in the equity market. Further, the quality of 
regulatory environment influences the attractiveness of the equity market to investment, 
thereby justifying the need for policy intervention to improve the efficiency of these 
institutional variables.  
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According to the impulse response results presented in Table 5.47, the impulse response of 
EQCAP to innovations shock on both variables is absolutely positive, suggesting that policy 
intervention would be desirable. Further, the fact that the speed of adjustment is slow in both 
instances allows for some degree of policy manoeuvring.  
The results of causality test for equation 7 proposes that POLITY does have a direct causal 
effect on TURNOVER. That is, an improvement in the polity score of the region would 
ultimately improve investor confidence in the equity market, thereby enhancing trading on 
the equity platform. However, the impulse response result that is presented in Table 5.52 
depicts mixed reaction from TURNOVER when POLITY experiences innovations shock. In 
addition, the high speed of adjustment that is espoused by the impulse response results, 
further cautions on the process of the policy intervention. 
Further, there is an indication of bidirectional causal relationship between QLEGAL and 
TURNOVER. While an improved regulatory quality is seen as a direct determinant of the 
behaviour of the equity trading market, the market is also observed to have the same 
deterministic effect on QLEGAL. As such, the findings of Demetriades and Hussein (1996), 
as well as the work of Shan and Jianhong (2006) are relevant points of reference here.  
In the East African causality tests, it is observed that regulatory quality and polity score are 
important institutional determinants of the efficiency of capital market in that region. Given 
that the impulse response results are in support of policy intervention, it will be desirable to 
improve these institutional frameworks in order to improve the development of capital market 
in the region and ultimately, to improve the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI.              
5.5 Part C: Model specification for institutional efficiency and 
inflow of FDI to Africa  
As indicated in chapter four under research methodology, the same estimation technique is 
used throughout this study. This is considered essential in order to ensure reliability and to 
achieve consistency. As done in the previous Parts (A and B), each estimation is preceded by 
the descriptive statistics. However, it must be recalled that the descriptive statistics conducted 
in Part B for equations 3 to 7 (Table 5.16) contained the descriptive statistics for equation 8 
as well. Given that the only difference between equations 3 to 7 and equation 8 are the 
dependent variables, merging the descriptive statistics for both Parts is considered expedient. 
The regional effects of the descriptive statistics are also presented in Appendix A2-1 to A2-4. 
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The same reason holds for not representing unit root test for this Part, given that all the 
variables used in this Part has already been tested for unit root in Parts A and B.  
5.5.1 Vector error correction estimates for equation 8 
Having advanced arguments for the need not to represent both descriptive statistics and unit 
root tests here, we now proceed to the vector error correction estimation as done in the 
preceding Parts, using the same estimation technique that is used in Parts A and B. The 
results of the vector error correction estimation are presented in the following tables: 
Pooled Estimation 
Table 5.59: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 8 (1980-2012): 
Pooled data (Dependent variable – inflow of FDI - FDINFL) 
 Error correction estimation results 
 FDINFL LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 -1.650600 
(0.76573) 
[-2.15560]** 
-0.136559 
(0.04527) 
[-3.01631]*** 
-0.039536 
(0.02590) 
[-1.52672] 
4.929467 
(0.95135) 
[ 5.18155]*** 
-0.439426 
(0.31665) 
[-1.38773] 
Differenced -0.452565 
(0.07409) 
[-6.10870]*** 
-0.002546 
(0.00426) 
[-0.59774] 
0.157626 
(0.11843) 
[ 1.33090] 
-0.357770 
(0.53096) 
[-0.67382] 
-0.000339 
(0.00531) 
[-0.06372] 
-0.027448 
(0.01155) 
[-2.37653]* 
Differenced in 
lag 1 
-0.132632 
(0.07954) 
[-1.66750]* 
-2.324570 
(1.44035) 
[-1.61389]* 
0.006520 
(0.04693) 
[ 0.13895] 
0.004849 
(0.01047) 
[ 0.46335] 
0.372452 
(1.21208) 
[ 0.30728] 
-0.024569 
(0.51284) 
[-0.04791] 
Differenced in 
lag 2 
0.039525 
(0.07031) 
[ 0.56217] 
-1.121479 
(1.51887) 
[-0.73836] 
-0.021979 
(0.04712) 
[-0.46643] 
0.034473 
(0.01047) 
[ 3.29259]*** 
1.708497 
(1.15245) 
[ 1.48249] 
-1.085068 
(0.51411) 
[-2.11058]** 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 {Emphasis are placed on *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05} 
 
For equation 8 in the pooled African data, out of 1080 total system (balanced) observations, 
only 180 observations are included in the systems p-value determinant estimation. The 
Durbin-Watson that ranges between 1.9 and 2.12 alludes to the stability of the model. From 
the OLS p-value determinant estimation, 12 out of the possible 84 combinations are 
statistically significant and nine of those statistically significant variables appear in Table 
5.59.      
According to the error correction model for the pooled data as contained in Table 5.59, 
inflow of FDI (FDINFL) is statistically significant in first difference. Further, the rule of law 
(LAWRULE) is statistically significant in lag 1 and the coefficient is negative but explosive 
suggesting a massive adjustment to equilibrium with the first year. POLITY is similarly 
statistically significant in lag 1 but the negative coefficient indicates that just about 14 per 
cent of the disequilibrium will be corrected within the first year. Further, INFLATION is 
statistically significant when differenced in lag 2. This indicates that barely three per cent of 
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the disequilibrium in the interaction of the variable with FDINFL will be corrected in the 
second year; however, structural change (such as policy intervention) would be keen to the 
speed of error correction.   
Still on Table 5.59, QLEGAL is statistically significant in lag 1, with an explosive positive 
coefficient, while CORRUPTION is statistically significant when differenced in lag 2, with an 
explosive negative coefficient. This result indicates that the speed of adjustment to 
equilibrium will be high in the second period, but structural anti-corruption policy reforms 
will be keen to that recovery. 
North Africa   
Table 5.60: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 8 (1980-2012): 
North Africa Regional effects (Dependent variable – inflow of FDI - FDINFL) 
 Error correction estimation results 
 FDINFL LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 1.167287 
(1.97756) 
[ 0.59027] 
-0.378007 
(0.13453) 
[-2.80979]*** 
-0.020303 
(0.04528) 
[-0.44841] 
0.056450 
(2.15799) 
[ 0.02616] 
0.286941 
(0.35334) 
[ 0.81208] 
Differenced -0.656805 
(0.12490) 
[-5.25868]*** 
-0.004255 
(0.00697) 
[-0.61009] 
-0.101926 
(0.06519) 
[-1.56361] 
0.186849 
(0.34391) 
[ 0.54331] 
0.011033 
(0.00855) 
[ 1.28995] 
-0.038748 
(0.01966) 
[-1.97136]** 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
0.163843 
(0.12934) 
[ 1.26678] 
-2.164521 
(2.11858) 
[-1.02169] 
-0.022369 
(0.23821) 
[-0.09390] 
0.048179 
(0.03944) 
[ 1.22147] 
-0.591222 
(1.69695) 
[-0.34840] 
-0.312853 
(0.73067) 
[-0.42817] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
0.319134 
(0.11669) 
[ 2.73485]** 
0.300626 
(2.39168) 
[ 0.12570] 
-0.053137 
(0.31969) 
[-0.16621] 
0.058899 
(0.03627) 
[ 1.62389]* 
0.433236 
(1.63168) 
[ 0.26552] 
-1.377696 
(0.72693) 
[-1.89523]** 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 {Emphasis are placed on *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05} 
 
According to the p-value determinant estimation for North Africa in equation 8, it is observed 
that the Durbin-Watson statistics ranges from 1.9 to 2.11, thereby lending credence to the 
stability of the model. Further, from 540 total system (balanced) observations, 90 were 
included in the systems. In addition, 13 out of a possible 84 combinations are statistically 
significant and six of those statistically significant variables feature in Table 5.60. 
Looking at individual variables, FDINFL is statistically significant in first difference, with a 
coefficient that suggests that 66 per cent of the disequilibrium in the variable would be 
corrected through structural improvement. Further, the variable is also statistically significant 
when differenced in lag 2, with a coefficient that suggests that about 32 per cent of the 
disequilibrium expressed by the variable will be corrected by the second period through 
structural change. This finding hints that reversal in disequilibrium experienced by this 
variable will be speedy, provided appropriate structural reforms are engaged.  
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Further, POLITY is statistically significant in lag 1, with a coefficient that indicates 38 per 
cent reversal in the variable’s disequilibrium within the first year. Moreover, CORRUPTION 
is statistically significant in the first difference with a negative coefficient that suggests 
barely four per cent of reversal in the disequilibrium expressed by the variable though 
structural reforms. The variable is also statistically significant when difference in lag 2 with 
an explosive negative coefficient that suggests a speedy reversal to equilibrium. It must be 
pointed out that these statistically significant variables are important determinants of the 
behaviour of FDINFL in the models specified.      
Southern Africa   
Table 5.61: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 8 (1980-2012): 
Southern Africa Regional effects (Dependent variable – inflow of FDI - FDINFL) 
 Error correction estimation results 
 FDINFL LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
Lag 1 1.000000 514.9658 
(19.8015) 
[ 26.0065]*** 
0.163557 
(0.14030) 
[ 1.16573] 
0.946565 
(0.14881) 
[ 6.36110]*** 
11.15451 
(5.72597) 
[ 1.94805]** 
4.818874 
(3.49390) 
[ 1.37923] 
Differenced 0.084628 
(0.02903) 
[ 2.91555]*** 
-0.004795 
(0.00078) 
[-6.12440]*** 
-0.010281 
(0.11774) 
[-0.08732] 
0.075109 
(0.05362) 
[ 1.40083] 
-0.002073 
(0.00142) 
[-1.46193] 
0.003200 
(0.00439) 
[ 0.72851] 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
-0.488417 
(0.17482) 
[-2.79382]*** 
-32.28763 
(11.7029) 
[-2.75895]*** 
0.034130 
(0.05507) 
[ 0.61980] 
-0.068858 
(0.12979) 
[-0.53052] 
-8.254485 
(3.25230) 
[-2.53804]** 
0.753123 
(1.90954) 
[ 0.39440] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.588288 
(0.16385) 
[-3.59044]*** 
-24.35295 
(7.99956) 
[-3.04429]*** 
-0.019395 
(0.05398) 
[-0.35931] 
-0.056902 
(0.07294) 
[-0.78013] 
-0.104271 
(4.30142) 
[-0.02424] 
-3.705066 
(2.55510) 
[-1.45007] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 {Emphasis are placed on *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05} 
 
The stability of the p-value determinant estimation for Southern Africa in equation 8 is 
established through the Durbin-Watson statistics that ranges from 1.8 to 2.2, thereby lending 
credence to the stability of the model. Further, from 180 total system (balanced) observations, 
30 were included in the systems. In addition, 24 out of a possible 84 combinations are 
statistically significant and 10 of those statistically significant variables feature in Table 5.61. 
Looking at individual variables, FDINFL is statistically significant in first difference (0.08), 
differenced in lag 1 (-0.49), as well as differenced in lag 2 (-0.59). The coefficients of the 
variables suggest that eight per cent of the deviation of the variable from equilibrium will be 
corrected through structural reforms. In addition, the coefficients also indicate that 49 per 
cent of the deviations from equilibrium will be corrected within the first year through 
structural reforms and 59 per cent of those variations will be corrected within two years 
through structural reforms.  
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Looking at rule of law (LAWRULE), the variable is statistically significant in lag 1 with an 
explosive positive coefficient. The statistical significance of the variable in first difference 
yields a coefficient that is less than one per cent, whereas the variable is statistically 
significant when differenced in lag 1 as well as when differenced in lag 2 bearing explosive 
negative coefficients in both instances. These explosive coefficients are indications of high 
speed of adjustment to equilibrium. In lag 1, INFLATION is found to be statistically 
significant with a positive coefficient that suggests 95 per cent reversal of the variable to 
equilibrium within the first year. Further, QLEGAL is observed to be statistically significant 
in lag 1 with an explosive positive coefficient, while the same variable is statistically 
significant in first difference in lag 1 with an explosive negative coefficient. These explosive 
coefficients are indications of high speed of adjustment in the variation expressed by the 
variable. 
West Africa       
Table 5.62: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 8 (1980-2012): 
West Africa Regional effects (Dependent variable – inflow of FDI - FDINFL) 
 Error correction estimation results 
 FDINFL LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTIO
N 
Lag 1 1.000000 4.615056 
(2.84834) 
[ 1.62026]* 
0.092298 
(0.02367) 
[ 3.89891]*** 
-0.086228 
(0.00811) 
[-10.6322] 
10.83577 
(2.02599) 
[ 5.34838]*** 
-6.244486 
(0.44710) 
[-13.9667]*** 
Differenced -0.611754 
(0.25676) 
[-2.38261]** 
-0.038526 
(0.01656) 
[-2.32628]** 
0.063301 
(0.71177) 
[ 0.08893] 
-4.044983 
(4.63976) 
[-0.87181] 
-0.095274 
(0.01860) 
[-5.12101]*** 
-0.089894 
(0.03520) 
[-2.55381]*** 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
-0.301114 
(0.19326) 
[-1.55806] 
3.285061 
(3.68428) 
[ 0.89164] 
0.070912 
(0.09511) 
[ 0.74557] 
-0.017607 
(0.02275) 
[-0.77396] 
0.536404 
(3.18363) 
[ 0.16849] 
-0.313454 
(2.07379) 
[-0.15115] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.123549 
(0.14576) 
[-0.84762] 
4.442969 
(3.52417) 
[ 1.26071] 
0.045302 
(0.09513) 
[ 0.47622] 
0.036172 
(0.01739) 
[ 2.07972]** 
-0.949351 
(2.66738) 
[-0.35591] 
-2.764151 
(1.55232) 
[-1.78065]* 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 {Emphasis are placed on *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05} 
 
The stability of the p-value determinant estimation for West Africa in equation 8 is 
established through the Durbin-Watson statistics that ranges from 1.7 to 2.4, thereby lending 
credence to the stability of the model. Further, from 180 total system (balanced) observations, 
30 were included in the systems. In addition, 25 out of a possible 84 combinations are 
statistically significant and 11 of those statistically significant variables feature in Table 5.62. 
Looking at the individual variables, FDINFL is statistically significant in first difference, 
with a negative coefficient that suggests 61 per cent reversal of the disequilibrium expressed 
by the variable trough structural reforms. In addition, LAWRULE is statistically significant in 
first difference but the negative coefficient is low at four per cent. As for POLITY, the 
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variable is statistically significant in lag 1 but the coefficient is low as well (barely nine per 
cent).  
A look at INFLATION suggests that the variable is statistically significant in lag 1 with a 
negative coefficient that is in single digit. The variable is also statistically significant when 
differenced in lag 2 but the coefficient is also small. This results point to the possibility of 
low reversal of INFLATION to equilibrium but the variable remains an important determinant 
of the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI.  
Looking at the QLEGAL, the variable is statistically significant in lag 1 with an explosive 
positive coefficient. This explosive coefficient suggests that the variation in the variable will 
be corrected within the first year in a speedy manner. The variable is also statistically 
significant in first difference but the negative coefficient is barely 10 per cent. The low 
coefficient here is an indication that very little reversal will be made by the variation 
expressed in the variable through structural reform. Here, time is observed to be of essence to 
the recovery of the variable back to the point of equilibrium.   
CORRUPTION is seen to be statistically significant in lag 1 and the negative coefficient is 
explosive in nature. The variable is also statistically significant in first difference but the low 
negative coefficient suggests that barely nine per cent of the variation in the variable will be 
corrected through structural reforms. The explosive coefficient is an indication of speedy 
recovery from the point of disequilibrium that is experienced by the variable, especially 
through period effects.  
East Africa 
Table 5.63: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 8 (1980-2012): 
East Africa Regional effects (Dependent variable – inflow of FDI - FDINFL) 
 Error correction estimation results 
 FDINFL LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTIO
N 
Lag  1.000000 17.23005 
(3.24267) 
[ 5.31353]*** 
-0.585039 
(0.05864) 
[-9.97677]*** 
0.064676 
(0.02672) 
[ 2.42080]** 
48.33187 
(5.84262) 
[ 8.27230]*** 
-14.80211 
(3.51370) 
[-4.21268]*** 
Differenced -0.076476 
(0.13902) 
[-0.55012] 
-0.009628 
(0.01316) 
[-0.73170] 
1.198126 
(0.27217) 
[ 4.40212]*** 
2.008865 
(1.46256) 
[ 1.37352] 
-0.004427 
(0.00729) 
[-0.60712] 
0.001044 
(0.02752) 
[ 0.03793] 
Differenced 
in lag 1 
-0.610908 
(0.26030) 
[-2.34696]** 
3.493940 
(3.11202) 
[ 1.12272] 
-0.045863 
(0.09379) 
[-0.48898] 
0.046879 
(0.02546) 
[ 1.84143]* 
14.80574 
(8.45829) 
[ 1.75044]* 
0.582894 
(2.40663) 
[ 0.24220] 
Differenced 
in lag 2 
-0.292037 
(0.22387) 
[-1.30447] 
0.922173 
(3.09311) 
[ 0.29814] 
0.126791 
(0.10218) 
[ 1.24089] 
-0.010036 
(0.02992) 
[-0.33538] 
5.545816 
(5.60137) 
[ 0.99008] 
0.198954 
(2.04888) 
[ 0.09710] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 {Emphasis are placed on *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05} 
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According to the p-value determinant estimation for East Africa in equation 8, it is observed 
that the Durbin-Watson statistics ranges from 1.6 to 2.20, thereby lending credence to the 
stability of the model. Further, from 180 total system (balanced) observations, 30 were 
included in the systems. In addition, 13 out of a possible 84 combinations are statistically 
significant and nine of those statistically significant variables feature in Table 5.60. 
Looking at individual variables, FDINFL is statistically significant when differenced in lag 1. 
The negative coefficient suggests that more than 60 per cent of the variation expressed by the 
variable will be corrected during the first year; however, structural reform will also be keen to 
realise that reversal.  Further, LAWRULE is found to be statistically significant in lag 1 and 
the coefficient is positively explosive thereby suggesting a speedy recovery back to the point 
of equilibrium through period.  
Looking at POLITY, the variable is statistically significant in lag 1 and the negative 
coefficient suggests that 59 per cent of the variation expressed by the variable will be 
corrected within the first year. The variable is also statistically significant in first difference 
with an explosive coefficient that suggests a speedy recovery back to the point of 
equilibrium.  
INFLATION is also seen to be statistically significant when differenced in lag 1; however, the 
coefficient is low thereby suggesting slow speed of correction to the deviation of the variable 
from equilibrium. Further, QLEGAL is found to be statistically significant in lag 1 with an 
explosive positive coefficient that suggests speedy reversal of the deviation expressed by the 
variable in the first year, without any attention being paid to structural reforms. In addition, 
CORRUPTION is found to be statistically significant in lag 1 with an explosive negative 
coefficient that suggests speedy reversal of the deviation from equilibrium by the variable to 
be corrected within the first year. In the East African error correction estimation, it is clear 
that all the statistically significant variables are important determinants of FDI inflow to the 
East African region.  
5.5.2 Dynamic panel estimation for equation 8 
Having determined the error terms in equation 8, we now proceed to the regression analysis. 
As suggested earlier in this chapter, the same method of analysis that is adopted in the 
previous Parts will also be adopted here, using exactly the same set of techniques. This said, 
we now present the results of the regression analysis in Table 5.64: 
259 
 
Pooled Estimation 
Table 5.64: The Pooled GMM Panel Regression for Equation 8 (1980-2012) 
Institutional Framework on Inflow of FDI (Dependent Variable – Inflow of FDI) 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cross-section weights instrument weighting matrix and         
Convergence was achieved after 1 weight iterations. Cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f.  correction). 
   Maximum lags of dependent and predetermined variables for use as instruments are limited to 1.  
     Period fixed (dummy variables) applied in the estimation 
In Table 5.64, columns I, II, III, IV and V shows the output for each of the institutional 
variables, namely LAWRULE, POLITY, INFLATION, QLEGAL, and CORRUPTION as 
regressed on FDINFL. According to Table 5.64, only two institutional variables (LAWRULE 
and CORRUPTION) are statistically significant at one per cent error level and they bear 
negative coefficients. However, QLEGAL is statistically significant at five per cent error level 
but with a positive coefficient.  
The remaining two variables bear positive coefficients with the dependent variable but they 
are not statistically significant. More specifically, the negative coefficient borne by 
LAWRULE and CORRUPTION signal that the rule of law (LAWRULE) and corruption 
perception (CORRUPTION) both negatively affect the attractiveness of the sample countries 
to inflow of FDI, thereby suggesting improvement to these institutional mechanisms. Given 
that corruption is statistically significant in the estimation could suggest that the higher the 
 I II III IV V 
 
LAWRULE 
-1.405324 
(1.061886)*** 
    
 
ENFORCE 
0.592872 
(0.314056)* 
    
Sargan Test  
(Prob >chi2) 
 
0.139 
    
 
POLITY 
 0.022590 
(0.023912) 
   
 
ENFORCE 
 0.540096 
(0.321346)* 
   
Sargan Test  
(Prob >chi2) 
  
0.753 
   
 
INFLATION  
  0.019298 
(0.013180) 
  
 
ENFORCE 
  0.663190 
(0.308592)* 
  
Sargan Test  
(Prob >chi2) 
   
0.763 
  
 
QLEGAL 
   2.170225 
(6.115357)** 
 
 
ENFORCE 
   0.427533 
(0.321822) 
 
Sargan Test  
(Prob >chi2) 
    
0.465 
 
 
CORRUPTION 
    -1.210333 
(0.400422)*** 
 
ENFORCE 
    0.934569 
(0.327002)* 
Sargan Test  
(Prob >chi2) 
     
0.236 
Observation 192 192 192 192 192 
Number of countries 6 6 6 6 6 
Orthogonal Deviation Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
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level and prevalence of corruption in these sampled countries; the more discouraged are 
foreign investors to commit on long-term basis (FDI) to those economies. The level of 
statistical significance of this variable (1%) suggests that corruption is a major deterrent to 
FDI inflow to the sampled African countries. the same interpretation could be offered for 
LAWRULE.  
Furthermore, out of the remaining three variables of institutional framework that bear 
positive relationships with the dependent variable, only quality of legal framework 
(QLEGAL) is statistically significant (5%). This indicates that the stronger the rule of law, the 
higher the probability of the sampled African countries attracting more inflow of FDI. The 
dynamic panel estimation is also conducted to investigate the regional effects. The result of 
the regional estimates is provided in Table 5: 65 below: 
Regional GMM Estimation 
 
Table 5.65: The Regional-Effect GMM panel Regression for equation 8 (1980-2012) 
Institutional Framework on Inflow of FDI (Dependent Variable – Inflow of FDI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cross-section weights instrument weighting matrix and 
Convergence was achieved after 1 weight iterations. Cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction). 
Maximum lags of dependent and predetermined variables for use as instruments are limited to 1. 
From Table 5.65, columns I, II, III and IV represent North, Southern, West and East African 
regions respectively. In all the estimations, the Sargan Tests are statistically insignificant. 
 I II III IV 
 
LAWRULE 
-0.941305 
(1.485864)*** 
-5.042377 
(5.078222)*** 
-0.960253 
(0.226554)*** 
-0.791149 
(0.315873)*** 
 
ENFORCE 
1.285910 
(0.970767) 
0.331073 
(0.155006)** 
0.523775 
(0.059244)*** 
-0.042377 
(0.071252) 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.1433 0.2634 0.949462 0.694260 
 
POLITY 
0.408484 
(0.114463)*** 
0.130069 
(0.054614)** 
-0.162739 
(0.085733)*** 
0.017693 
(0.004686)*** 
 
ENFORCE 
0.764807 
(0.860712) 
0.015173 
(0.093441) 
0.874699 
(0.070095)*** 
0.125190 
(0.008717)*** 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.3121 0.1491 0.794744 0.582930 
 
INFLATION  
-0.010907 
(0.030276) 
-0.145305 
(0.035468)*** 
0.034255 
(0.010711)*** 
0.024068 
(0.011100)** 
 
ENFORCE 
1.496864 
(0.717976)** 
0.63378 
(0.122137)*** 
0.670315 
(0.041769)*** 
0.074781 
(0.032331)** 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.5062 0.09135 0.934655 0.009911 
 
QLEGAL 
2.426604 
(1.638575)* 
3.954251 
(2.185000)*** 
-0.601781 
(0.526093)* 
1.461623 
(0.664041)** 
 
ENFORCE 
1.334564 
(0.888133) 
-0.282334 
(0.276013) 
0.656320 
(0.087384)*** 
0.212858 
(0.026315)** 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.7424 0.1405 0.664653 0.242236 
 
CORRUPTION 
-1.639814 
(0.613480)*** 
-1.381918 
(0.544432)*** 
0.192985 
(0.570771) 
0.410660 
(0.197269)** 
 
ENFORCE 
1.256534 
(0.862177) 
1.949757 
(0.654096)** 
0.674754 
(0.235038)*** 
-0.069350 
(0.097408) 
Sargan Test (Prob >chi2) 0.3311 0.00132 0.417756 0.932186 
Observation 96 33 33 33 
Number of countries 3 1 1 1 
Orthogonal Deviation Yes No No No 
Newey-West (HAC) No Yes Yes Yes 
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Although, the Sargan test is statistically significant in the case of Southern Africa, but we still 
accept the result as being stable as conditioned on robust standard error.  
North Africa 
The result of the dynamic panel estimation presented in Table 5.65 for the regions indicate 
that LAWRULE, POLITY, QLEGAL and CORRUPTION are statistically significant in North 
Africa estimation. While LAWRULE and CORRUPTION bear negative coefficients, the other 
two statistically significant variables bear positive coefficients. Looking at the relationship 
between FDINFL and LAWRULE, it is observed that the lack of respect for rule of law is 
hindering the attractiveness of that region to inflow of FDI. To improve the attractiveness of 
the region to inflow of FDI, policy reforms that reinforces respect for rule of law is required.   
Further, a look at the relationship between inflow of FDI and POLITY suggests that POLITY 
improves the attractiveness of North Africa to inflow of FDI and about 41 per cent of FDI 
inflow to the region is influenced by this institutional variable. It is suggested, therefore, that 
improvement to polity score in the region will further enhance the attractiveness of the region 
to inflow of FDI.  
A look at positive coefficient that is borne by regulatory quality suggests that an 
improvement to regulatory quality in the region will further the attractiveness of the region to 
inflow of FDI. More importantly, the explosive nature of the coefficient is a clear indication 
that policy reforms that are targeted towards reinforcing regulations and its implementation 
would highly influence the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI.   
Corruption perception (CORRUPTION) is also seen as an important determinant of FDI 
inflow to the North African region.  With an explosive negative coefficient, it is observed that 
corruption increases the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI. This finding should not 
be surprising, given the observation of Africa Progress Report (2013) where corruption is 
seen as a too that is popularly used in negotiation by many foreign investors that venture into 
a number of the resource-rich African countries (and regions).   
Southern Africa    
The dynamic panel estimation for Southern Africa indicates that all the institutional variables 
play significant role in determining the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI. Starting 
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with the rule of law (LAWRULE), the variable is statistically significant at one per cent error 
level, and it bears an explosive negative coefficient. This suggests that the current state of 
rule of law in the region does negatively affect the attractiveness of the region to inflow of 
FDI.  
In addition, polity score (POLITY) is found to be statistically significant but the positive 
coefficient is low in explanatory power (13 per cent). However, the positive coefficient does 
indicate that polity score in Southern Africa region does enhance the attractiveness of the 
region to inflow of FDI. For INFLATION, the variable bears a negative coefficient with the 
dependent variable but the explanatory power of the coefficient is low (15 per cent).  
Moreover, the relationship between QLEGAL and inflow of FDI is positive and the 
coefficient is explosive. This relationship suggests that regulatory quality does highly 
enhance the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI. Conversely, CORRUPTION shares 
a negative relationship with inflow of FDI and the coefficient is explosive in nature. This 
kind of relationship suggests that CORRUPTION does negatively affect the attractiveness of 
the region to inflow of FDI.  
It can be reasonably suggested that the attractiveness of Southern African region to inflow of 
FDI is significantly influenced by the institutional variables used in this study. The fact that 
Southern Africa region is the only region in Africa that currently attracts FDI inflow in 
almost all important sectors of the real economy would reinforce the strategic importance of 
institutional framework, which is important to safeguard long-term investors’ interests.  
West Africa 
For West Africa, all the institutional variables are statistically significant except for 
CORRUPTION.  In the case of rule of law (LAWRULE), it is observed that the institutional 
variable is a strong determinant of FDI inflow to the region. The variable is statistically 
significant at one per cent error level and the negative coefficient suggests that the variable 
most likely accounts for about 96 per cent of divestment that occur in the region. Although, 
polity score (POLITY) is statistically significant in the estimation, its negative coefficient is 
somehow negligible, suggesting that the variable is responsible for about 16 per cent of 
divestment that occurs in that region. It may be suggested that an improvement in these two 
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variables would enhance the attractiveness of the region to inflow of new FDI investments 
while help to retain the existing ones.  
Annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION) is another variable of interest in 
the estimation. According to the result, it is observed that this variable contributes positively 
(about three per cent) to inflow of FDI to the West African region.  The quality of regulatory 
framework (QLEGAL) is another variable of interest in this study. The variable shares 
negative coefficient with the dependent variable, thereby suggesting that poor regulatory 
quality is possibly responsible for about 60 per cent of the divestment that occur in the 
region.  
The dynamic panel estimation for West Africa in equation 8 indicates that most of the 
institutional variables examined have strong deterministic effects on inflow of FDI to the 
region. In specific, LAWRULE, POLITY and QLEGAL exhibit negative influences on inflow 
of FDI and the effects of the negative coefficients are stronger in the case of LAWRULE and 
QLEGAL. Although, the negative effect of POLITY is low, the variable is also statistically 
significant at one per cent error level thereby making it an important determinant of the 
attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI.  
East Africa 
 The dynamic panel estimation for East Africa indicates that the entire institutional variables 
are important determinants of the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI. Beginning 
with the rule of law (LAWRULE), this variable is statistically significant at one per cent error 
level and its negative coefficient suggests that the variable is responsible for about 79 per 
cent of possible divestments from the region. It must be pointed out that this is the only 
variable that bears a negative coefficient in the East African estimation.  
POLITY is another institutional variable of strategic importance in the East African dynamic 
panel estimation. According to Table 5.65, the variable is statistically significant at one per 
cent error level and its coefficient suggests that the variable contributes about 18 per cent to 
inflow of FDI to the region. Annual percentage increase in consumer prices (INFLATION) is 
also found to be statistically significant in the estimation. At five per cent error level, the 
statistical significance of the variable indicates that the variable contributes about two per 
cent to inflow of FDI to the region.  
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Further, regulatory quality (QLEGAL) is also found to be statistically significant at five per 
cent error level in the estimation and the variable bears a positive coefficient that proposes an 
explosive increase to inflow of FDI to the region through an improved regulatory 
intervention. Further, corruption perception (CORRUPTION) does influence the flow of FDI 
to the region as suggested by the high statistical significance of the variable (five per cent 
error level). With the coefficient that suggests the possibility of 41 per cent increase in inflow 
of FDI to the region, this variable is considered an important determinant of inflow of FDI to 
the region.  
In the East African dynamic panel estimation, it is observed that all the institutional variables 
used in the estimation prove to contribute significantly to explaining the variations expressed 
by the inflow of FDI in the region. Having reported the results of the dynamic panel 
estimation, we now proceed to investigate the speed of adjustment of FDI inflow to the 
region as a result of innovation shocks on these institutional variables. The result of these 
impulse response estimations is presented in the following paragraphs.    
5.5.3 Impulse response analyses for equation 8 
Having estimated equation 8 using the dynamic panel approach, we now look at the impulse 
response of the dependent variable (FDINFL) to one standard deviation innovations shock on 
the institutional variables. The results of the impulse response are presented in the tables 
below: 
Pooled Estimation 
 Table 5.66: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 8 (1980-2012): 
Pooled data (Response of FDINFL to Institutional variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2 -0.123507  0.148708  0.221911 -0.181449  0.036997 
 3 -0.029762  0.164429  0.436619 -0.041633 -0.204135 
 4 -0.020467  0.235194  0.151286 -0.259123  0.017760 
 5  0.049534  0.245981  0.130498 -0.199162  0.019360 
 6  0.066697  0.229026  0.244022 -0.284362  0.039691 
 7  0.078208  0.229266  0.169866 -0.240253  0.034927 
 8  0.095618  0.251622  0.165914 -0.279920  0.060794 
 9  0.098206  0.243905  0.180130 -0.266279  0.056639 
 10  0.102394  0.243446  0.172603 -0.279841  0.062847 
One standard deviation innovations 
From Table 5.66, inflow of FDI responds both negatively and positive to one standard 
deviation innovations shock on the rule of law. This result indicates that innovations shock on 
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rule of law (LAWRULE) will generate both negative and positive response from inflow of 
FDI (FDINFL). Beginning in the second period, FDINFL begins its response in a negative 
territory with a coefficient that suggests a reduction of about 12 per cent in inflow of FDI to 
the sampled African countries as a result of the innovations shock on rule of law.  
The negative response continues in the third period with a coefficient that suggests about 
three per cent reduction in inflow of FDI to the sampled countries on the continent and a 
further two per cent reduction in the fourth period. Inflow of FDI to the sampled countries 
reverted to positive territory in the fifth period with a coefficient that suggests an increase in 
inflow of FDI to Africa to the tune of five per cent and the trend becomes incremental 
thereafter till the end of the period under consideration. In period 10, the positive influence of 
rule of law (LAWRULE) on inflow of FDI climbs to 10 per cent.  
Some of the important lessons from this result are that the speed of adjustment by FDI inflow 
to innovations shock on rule of law is rapid. As such, it is important to be cautious when 
designing the innovations shock. Further, the fact that inflow of FDI responds both negatively 
and positive to innovations shock on rule of law indicate that the variable is an important 
determinant of inflow of FDI to the sampled African countries.  
The response of FDI inflow to one standard deviation innovations shock on polity score 
(POLITY) returns an absolute positive record. From the second period through to the last 
period, the response of FDI inflow to innovations shock on POLITY yields positive result that 
is incremental in trend till period five. From 15 per cent increase in inflow of FDI in period 
two, the increase grows to 25 per cent in the fifth period. Thereafter, the trend becomes 
unstable, however, it remains positive. This absolute positive response suggests that policy 
intervention towards improving the ranking of the sampled countries will attract more FDI to 
the African countries. The slow speed of adjustment allows for possible manoeuvring 
towards achieving optimal policy framework.  
A look at the response of inflow of FDI to innovations shock on annual percentage change in 
consumer prices (INFLATION) suggests an absolute positive reaction just as in the case of 
POLITY. However, the trend is more chaotic here that in the previous estimation. The 
coefficient of the variable suggests that one standard deviation innovations shock on 
INFLATION would generate an increase of 22 per cent in inflow of FDI in the second period, 
and this increase will grow to 44 per cent in the third period, before it slides back to 15 per 
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cent in the fourth period. Although, the response reaches a maximum of 24 per cent in the 
sixth period, it ended up at 17 per cent in the 10
th
 period.  
The response of FDI inflow to innovations shock on regulatory quality (QLEGAL) yields an 
absolute negative reaction; however, the trend is uneven. From the second period, inflow of 
FDI to the sampled countries reversed by 18 per cent, but the reduction is barely four per cent 
in the third period. By the fourth period, the reduction grows to 26 per cent and reversed to 20 
per cent in the fifth period. The trend continues to be uneven till the end of the period under 
investigation in the study.  
Looking at the response of inflow of FDI to innovations shock on corruption perception 
(CORRUPTION), it is observed that the response is absolutely positive, except for the 
negative response that is recorded in the third period. From period one, inflow of FDI 
responds positively to one standard deviation innovations shock on corruption perception. 
The coefficient of the response suggests that corruption perception would increase inflow of 
FDI to the sampled countries by four per cent.  
However, the positive response changes to negative in the third period that interprets a 
possible divestment of about 20 per cent from the sampled countries as a result of the 
innovations shock. The response changes again to positive in the fourth period, and it 
suggests about two per cent increase in flow of FDI. The response continues to be positive till 
the end of the period under investigation, but the trend remains uneven. The high speed of 
adjustment of inflow of FDI to innovations shock on corruption perception suggests that 
although, the variable will most likely respond positively, the possibility of rapid negative 
response should not be ruled out. As done in the previous Parts, the regional analysis will 
now be presented in the paragraphs that follow.  
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North Africa 
Table 5.67: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 8 (1980-2012): 
North Africa Regional data (Response of FDINFL to Institutional variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2 -0.237533  0.171105  0.245807 -0.062440 -0.114492 
 3 -0.057262  0.184883  0.246895  0.058415 -0.346220 
 4 -0.181702  0.258318  0.112429 -0.021525 -0.074721 
 5 -0.080466  0.294844  0.040343  0.021833 -0.202646 
 6 -0.074129  0.283141  0.060336  0.010126  0.004069 
 7 -0.086490  0.278300 -0.008737  0.035058 -0.058254 
 8 -0.034494  0.259831  0.019764  0.013520 -0.003365 
 9 -0.085071  0.254275  0.026651  0.029249 -0.021740 
 10 -0.048544  0.240784  0.031976  0.017150 -0.037446 
One standard deviation innovations 
 
The result of impulse response for North Africa as presented in Table 5.67 depicts mixed 
reaction from inflow of FDI to innovations shock on the institutional variables. Looking at 
the response of inflow of FDI to one standard deviation innovations shock on rule of law, we 
observe an absolute negative response from the first period through to the last period. It must 
be pointed out, however, that the trend is uneven. In the first period, the coefficient of the 
response suggests that the innovations shock would result in about 24 per cent divestment in 
North Africa.  
However, the level of the potential divestment reduced to six per cent in the third period 
before jumping to 18 per cent in the fourth period. The negative reaction continues subtly till 
period 10 but the trend is irregular. From the analysis, it is obvious that the reaction is subtle 
and the speed of adjustment is low, this suggests that policy intervention that would improve 
the functionality of rule of law in the region should be carefully considered due to the 
unstable speed of adjustment that characterises the innovations shock.   
From Table 5.67, the reaction of inflow of FDI to one standard deviation innovations shock 
on POLITY generates an absolute positive response, and the trend is systematically 
incremental until the fifth period. From 17 per cent increase in inflow of FDI to North Africa 
in the second period, the increase grows to 18 per cent in the third period, 26 per cent in the 
fourth period and 29 per cent in the fifth period. The trend recedes from the sixth period and 
it continues until period 10. The result indicates a slow speed of adjustment that corroborates 
possible policy manipulation towards achieving the optimal solution.  
One standard deviation innovations shock on annual percentage change in consumer prices 
(INLFATION) generates an absolute response, but for the only negative change that is 
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recorded in the seventh period. From the second period, inflow of FDI responds to the 
innovations shock with a coefficient that suggests an increase of about 25 per cent increase in 
inflow of FDI to the region through the innovations shock. The response remains at 25 per 
cent increase in the third period, before decreasing to 11 per cent in the fourth period. The 
response averages five per cent between the fifth and sixth period before becoming negative 
in the seventh period but the coefficient suggests less than one per cent divestment in the 
seventh period. 
Inflow of FDI to North Africa responds more positively to one innovations shock in 
regulatory quality (QLEGAL) except for two negative reactions that are recorded in the first 
two periods with coefficients that suggest about six per cent divestment from the region. The 
coefficient of the negative reaction that is recorded in the fourth period also suggests about 
two per cent reduction in inflow of FDI (or divestment) to the region. The positive response 
observed in the third period hints on the possibility of increasing inflow of FDI to the region 
by six per cent, while the response thereafter till the end of the period under investigation 
suggests less than four per cent increase in inflow of FDI to the region; and the trend of the 
response is patchy.  
The switch between positive and negative values in the result hints on a high speed of 
recovery and the need to entertain caution when embarking on quality-related regulatory 
reforms. Further, it must be pointed out that this variable is an important determinant of 
inflow of FDI to North Africa and any possible innovations shock on QLEGAL will most 
probably improve the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI.  
The reaction of inflow of FDI to corruption perception (CORRUPTION) yields absolute 
negative reaction. From the second period, the response of FDI inflow to one standard 
deviation innovations shock on corruption perception leads to 11 per cent divestment from 
North Africa. In the third period, the divestment reaches 35 per cent, but it reduces to seven 
per cent in the fourth period before jumping to 20 per cent in the fifth period. The response 
thereafter becomes low and the maximum percentage is recorded in period 10 (four per cent).  
The North Africa impulse response analysis indicates that policy intervention towards 
improving the institutional environment of the region will yield mixed results. While some 
will be absolute positive (POLITY), others may be absolute negative (LAWRULE and 
CORRUPTION), and the possibility of a mixture terrain (INFLATION and QLEGAL) cannot 
be ruled out. The Southern Africa analysis is presented next. 
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Southern Africa         
Table 5.68: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 8 (1980-2012): 
Southern Africa Regional data (Response of FDINFL to Institutional variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.341754  0.218300  0.023309 -0.400664  0.197071 
 3  0.595298  0.054882  0.075516  0.044848 -0.004975 
 4  0.386219 -0.088479  0.112518 -0.178500 -0.345134 
 5  0.316101 -0.255062  0.082212  0.074055  0.876780 
 6  0.134995 -0.038608 -0.129134 -0.213879 -0.033025 
 7  0.253525 -0.019003  0.103612  0.096204  0.468199 
 8  0.514429  0.047283  0.022225 -0.132142 -0.341655 
 9  0.322910 -0.032408  0.122762 -0.043823  0.430832 
 10  0.234437 -0.208166 -0.055967 -0.057321  0.197748 
One standard deviation innovations 
 
The impulse response analysis for Southern Africa returns one variable with absolute positive 
response (LAWRULE) and the other four institutional variables are pervaded with mixture of 
positive and negative reactions. The response of inflow of FDI to one standard deviation 
innovations shock on rule of law (LAWRULE) returns an absolute positive response, with 
patchy trend. In the second period, the impulse response suggests that inflow of FDI to 
Southern Africa will probably increase by 37 per cent through the innovations shock on rule 
of law, and the positive response increases to 60 per cent in the third period. 
The response in the fourth period is a bit lower than the one obtained in the third period (37 
per cent) and the decrease continues until the sixth period. The positive response grows from 
25 per cent in the seventh period to 51 per cent in the eighth period and ended at 23 per cent 
in the 10th period. Although, the variable is observed to be an important determinant of 
inflow of FDI to Southern Africa, the speed of adjustment is low and the trend is unsteady. 
The positive response recorded through the innovations shock is an encouragement to 
embrace policy intervention towards improving the institutional province of rule of law in 
Southern Africa.  
The response of inflow of FDI to one standard deviation innovations shock on polity score 
(POLITY) generates a mixture of positive and negative responses. In the second period, the 
response is positive, with a coefficient that indicates about 22 per cent increase in inflow of 
FDI. In the third period, the intensity of the growth decreases to five per cent and the 
response becomes negative in the fourth period with a coefficient that suggests a reduction of 
about nine per cent in inflow of FDI to the region.  
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The trend of the divestment grows to 26 per cent in the fifth period and it declines thereafter 
to one per cent in the seventh period. The trend reverts swiftly back to positive in the eighth 
period with a coefficient that suggests five per cent increase in inflow of FDI to the region, 
but the ninth and 10
th
 periods recorded negative response that grows from three per cent in 
the ninth period to 21 per cent in period 10.  Although, the innovations shock is observed to 
generate some positive responses, the significance of the negative response is far stronger. 
Further, the high speed of adjustment indicates that policy intervention should be pervaded 
with caution of negative consequence.    
Furthermore, the impulse response of FDI inflow to one standard deviation innovations shock 
on annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION) suggests that inflow of FDI in 
Southern Africa responds positively to innovations shock on INFLATION for most of the 
periods under investigation and records two negative responses on the sixth and the 10
th
 
periods. From the second period, inflow of FDI grows by two per cent, increases to eight per 
cent in the third period, and grows further to 11 per cent in the fourth period. The growth 
diminishes to eight per cent in the fifth period and the trend enters negative territory in the 
sixth period, with a coefficient that suggests about 13 per cent divestment.  
The trend becomes positive again in the seventh period with a percentage increase of 10 per 
cent to inflow of FDI. The trend to 12 per cent in the ninth period before it becomes negative 
again in the 10
th
 period, suggesting about six per cent reduction in inflow of FDI to the 
region. From the analysis contained in Table 5.68, it is obvious that the reaction of inflow of 
FDI to innovations shock on annual percentage change in consumer prices exhibit high speed 
of adjustment, which should caution policy makers when considering policy intervention.  
The response of FDI inflow to one standard deviation innovations shock on regulatory quality 
(QLEGAL) is pervaded with intermittent negative and positive responses. The chaotic 
response begins in the second period when 40 per cent divestment is observed. The response 
turned positive immediately after that and suggests a growth of four per cent in inflow of FDI 
to the region. In the fourth period, the response is negative again, with a coefficient that 
suggests 18 per cent divestment from the region. With a seven per cent growth in inflow of 
FDI in the fifth period, the response becomes negative in the sixth period with a coefficient 
that indicates 21 per cent divestment from the region. 
The response records a positive reaction in the seventh period, indicating about 10 per cent 
increase in inflow of FDI to the region. From the eighth period till the last period, the 
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response is negative and the coefficients are between 13, four and six for the eighth, ninth and 
10
th
 periods respectively. Apart from the fact that the variables are important determinants of 
inflow of FDI to the Southern Africa region, their high speed of adjustment indicates that 
policy intervention should be entertained with caution, because the outcome cannot be 
reliably predicted. 
West Africa 
Table 5.69: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 8 (1980-2012): 
West Africa Regional data (Response of FDINFL to Institutional variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.040094  0.053916  0.854874 -0.594251  0.647133 
 3 -0.056973 -0.048431  1.514825 -0.502566 -0.009178 
 4 -0.155980 -0.132027  0.435238 -0.302035  0.276924 
 5 -0.186312 -0.146285  0.564386 -0.323869  0.509451 
 6  0.002917 -0.204813  0.718128 -0.491332  0.282149 
 7  0.104911 -0.163414  0.950673 -0.426659  0.146484 
 8 -0.228601 -0.144383  0.821929 -0.275645  0.288234 
 9 -0.111131 -0.102355  0.587281 -0.403813  0.400382 
 10  0.011309 -0.168779  0.712923 -0.462919  0.282359 
One standard deviation innovations 
 
The impulse response of FDI inflow to one standard deviation innovations shock on rule of 
law (LAWRULE) generates a mixed reaction. With a coefficient that suggests four per cent 
increase in inflow of FDI to West Africa in the second period, the reaction enters negative 
territory in the third period and the coefficient suggests about six per cent FDI divestment 
from West Africa. The divestment grows to 16 per cent and 19 per cent in the fourth and fifth 
periods respectively. By the sixth period, the reaction suggests an increase of less than one 
per cent, but the increase grows to 10 per cent in the seventh period.  
The eighth and ninth periods experiences negative reactions that suggest 23 and 11 per cent 
FDI divestments from the region, but the 10
th
 period changes to positive and about one per 
cent increase is observed. With the uneven trend and this high speed of adjustment, it is 
obvious that policy intervention should be carefully considered in order not to trigger 
divestment in the region.   
Looking at the response of FDI inflow to one standard deviation innovations shock on polity 
score (POLITY), it is observed that inflow of FDI responds positively to the innovations 
shock in the second period with an increase of four per cent. However, the third period, 
through to the last period, experiences negative responses. In the third period, the response 
hints of about five per cent divestment from the region and the divestment grows to 20 per 
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cent in the fifth period. The divestment becomes slower in the seventh period with a response 
that shows 16 per cent divestment and it reduces further to 10 per cent in the ninth period, but 
got worse in the 10
th
 period with 17 per cent divestment. The uneven trend, coupled with high 
speed of adjustment, hints that policy makers should be careful when reformulating the 
polity-related interventions such that further upset is avoided.    
Looking at the reaction of FDI inflow to one standard deviation innovations shock on annual 
percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION), it is observed that the response is an 
absolute positive one. From as high as 85 per cent increase in inflow of FDI in the second 
period, the increase becomes explosive in the third period but reduces to 44 per cent in the 
fourth period. The period between fourth and seventh period witnesses continuous increase in 
FDI inflow. From 95 per cent increase in the seventh period, the growth reduces to 82 per 
cent in the eighth period and further to 59 per cent in the ninth period. The growth ended at 
71 per cent in the 10
th
 period.  
Although, the trend of the response is uneven, the statistical relevance of these institutional 
variables towards explaining the behaviour of FDI inflow in West Africa cannot be 
disregarded. Further, the fact that inflow of FDI will respond positively towards these 
institutional variables suggests that policy makers can manoeuvre various exploits before 
arriving at the optimal one. 
The impulse response of FDI inflow to one standard deviation innovations shock on 
regulatory quality (QLEGAL) indicates an absolute negative response. From 59 per cent 
divestment recorded in the second period, the reduction in inflow of FDI to the region 
becomes lower in the third period, recording 50 per cent reduction. In the fourth period, the 
response reduces further to 30 per cent, but grows to 32 per cent in the fifth period. The 
periods between the sixth (49 per cent) and the eighth (28 per cent) witness some noticeable 
reactions in the trend of the decrease. However, it is observed that the trend begins to pick 
again from the eighth period to the 10
th
 period (46 per cent).  
It is thus observed that regulatory quality is an important determinant of the reaction of 
inflow of FDI (FDINFL) to West Africa region. Although, the reaction is absolutely negative, 
policy makers can still manoeuvre policy permutation given the slow speed of adjustment 
exhibited by the variable. However, it must be noted that any policy that will change the 
negative tide has to be investor-friendly. 
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The response of FDI inflow to corruption perception (CORRUPTION) is mostly positive, but 
with a negative response that is less than one per cent in the third period. In the second 
period, inflow of FDI responds to one standard deviation innovations shock on 
CORRUPTION through an increase of 65 per cent in inflow of FDI. In the fourth period, the 
growth reduces to 28 per cent, but climbs to 51 per cent in fifth period. The uneven trend 
continues until the last period under investigation, which records 28 per cent increase in 
inflow of FDI to the region. The fact that inflow of FDI responds positively to corruption 
perception is worrying. This suggests that FDI will flow more to the region if corrupt 
practices are encouraged.  
The West African impulse response analysis demonstrates that an improvement in 
institutional framework will further the attractiveness of the region to inflow of FDI. 
However, CORRUPTION is found to be an exception in that regard.     
East Africa 
Table 5.70: Impulse Response Estimates for Equation 8 (1980-2012): 
East Africa Regional data (Response of FDINFL to Institutional variables) 
 Period LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUPTION 
 1  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.162056 -0.001727  0.347077  0.458408  0.267106 
 3 -0.177925  0.120326 -0.066229  0.060528  0.103127 
 4  0.039910  0.042201  0.049667  0.085181  0.191637 
 5  0.076009  0.019829  0.262830  0.213434  0.154708 
 6  0.004222  0.043423  0.089863  0.234302  0.070650 
 7 -0.037820  0.013712  0.035016  0.199496  0.092868 
 8  0.036367  0.028616  0.125968  0.167235  0.128272 
 9  0.024803  0.049299  0.153664  0.190264  0.137971 
 10 -0.023359  0.052829  0.044302  0.159183  0.136716 
One standard deviation innovations 
 
 
The impulse response analysis for East Africa indicates that most of the responses of inflow 
of FDI to institutional variables were positive. For rule of law (LAWRULE), inflow of FDI to 
East Africa responds positively to one standard deviation innovations shock on rule of law 
(LAWRULE). The coefficient of the response indicates 16 per cent increase in inflow of FDI 
to the region. The third period experiences a reduction of 18 per cent in inflow of FDI to the 
region. In the fourth period, the inflow grows to four per cent, and later to eight per cent in 
the fifth period. In the sixth period, the growth is barely one per cent, but the trend becomes 
negative in the seventh period and the coefficient suggests about four per cent reduction in 
inflow of FDI to the region.  
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The positive response recorded in the eighth period suggests barely four per cent increase 
while the increase in the ninth period is about two per cent. In the 10
th
 period, the response is 
negative and the coefficient suggests about two per cent divestment. This result indicates that 
policy intervention towards improving the polity score of the region should be considered 
with care in order not to upset the investment environment.  
Looking at the response of inflow of FDI to the region regarding one standard deviation 
innovations shock on POLITY, it is observed that inflow of FDI responds positively to the 
innovations shock in exception of the third period when a reduction of seven per cent is 
recorded on FDI inflow to the region. In the third period, the response becomes positive and 
the coefficient is at its peak and it suggests about 12 per cent increase in inflow of FDI to the 
region. Thereafter, the responses are positive and the highest coefficient between the fourth 
and the last period is recorded in the 10
th
 period (five per cent).  
Still on Table 5.70, the response of inflow of FDI to one standard deviation innovations 
shock on annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION) is positive, but for the 
third period that record the only negative response and the coefficient indicates about seven 
per cent reduction in inflow of FDI to the region at the time. In the second period, the 
coefficient of the response indicates that inflow of FDI to the region increases by 35 per cent, 
it reduced to five per cent in the fourth period, and it increases to 26 per cent in the fifth 
period.  
The increase grows from four per cent in the seventh period to 15 per cent in the ninth period, 
before reducing to four per cent in the 10
th
 period. This trend, apart from being uneven, also 
indicates high speed of adjustment that needs to be considered very carefully by policy 
makers when orchestrating policy intervention. The trend suggests that unguarded policy 
intervention may unnerve skittish investors to divest from the region. 
One standard deviation innovations shock on regulatory quality (QLEGAL) is observed to 
cause an absolute positive reaction from inflow of FDI. In the second period, inflow of FDI 
grows by 46 per cent as a result of the innovations shock on QLEGAL, but the growth reduces 
to six per cent in the third period. In the fourth period, the growth increases gently to nine per 
cent and the increase grows to 21, 23 and 20 per cent in the fifth, sixth and seventh periods 
respectively. The positive response ended up at 16 per cent in the 10
th
 period.  
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It must be pointed out that the trend of the response is rutted. This trend notwithstanding, the 
speed of adjustment of the variable is low, thereby offering policy involvement some 
flexibility to further enhance the mechanisms of rule of law in the region. 
The last variable of interest in this impulse response analysis is corruption perception 
(CORRUPTION). The response of inflow of FDI to one standard deviation innovations shock 
on CORRUPTION yields an absolute positive response. However, the trend of the reaction 
suggests intermittent growth. In the second period, an innovation shock on CORRUPTION 
increases inflow of FDI to East Africa by 27 per cent. The increase slides to 10 per cent in the 
third period, but it grows to 19 per cent in the fourth period. In the fifth period, the surge 
declines to 15 per cent and later to nine per cent in the seventh period; the response later 
increase to 14 per cent in the 10
th
 period.  
The East African impulse response analysis suggests that these institutional variables play 
very important deterministic roles on inflow of FDI to the region. Further, it is suggested that 
appropriate policy interventions will yield positive results, and the attractiveness of the region 
to inflow of FDI will be enhanced.  
Having concluded the impulse response analysis, we now look at the cointegration test for 
equation 8. The result of the analysis is presented in table 5.71 and the explanation of the 
result follows thereafter.      
5.5.4 Cointegration tests for equation 8 
After the impulse response analyses, we now proceed to the cointegration test. The results of 
the cointegration tests are presented in Table 5.71.    
Table 5.71: Cointegration Regression for equation 8 (1980-2012): Pooled Data 
  FDINFL 
LAWRULE -1.553771 
(0.951054)* 
POLITY 0.037815 
(0.026480)* 
INFLATION 0.026096 
(0.011035)** 
QLEGAL 2.631616 
(0.966671)*** 
CORRUPTION -0.597912 
(0.334218)* 
Observations 192 
Number of countries 6 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Method: Panel Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares 
(FMOLS). First-stage residuals use heterogeneous long-run coefficients. Long-run covariance estimates (Prewhitening with 
lags = 1, Bartlett Kernel, Integer Newey-West fixed bandwidth). F-statistics are on top and coefficients in parenthesis.  
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In Table 5.71, the cointegration regression is done using the same technique that is adopted in 
the previous Parts. We have discussed the technique used, and the justification for using those 
techniques in the previous cointegration analyses. It is considered unnecessary to repeat 
similar material here again. As such, we proceed to the discourse of the statistical relevance 
of the test that is contained in Table 5.71. It must be noted, however, that a single 
cointegration test is presented here (as in the other Parts). This decision is premised on the 
fact that cointegrating series share common generic characteristics as long as the same set of 
variables are retained in the estimation under the same estimation conditions - be it pooled or 
regional datasets.  
In Table 5.71, the t-Statistics are high, coupled with p-values that range between 1% and 
10%). This is an indication that we reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. It should be 
emphasised that the technique used to conduct the cointegration regression test of long-run 
equilibrium on these variables is reliable. In specific, the Newey-West fixed bandwidth 
selection and Bartlett Kernel techniques that are built into the regression technique cater for 
autocorrelation in residuals if it exists in the estimation. An overall conclusion can thus be 
made that the residuals are well distributed and the error terms are not correlated with the 
estimated variables.  
5.5.5 Granger causality tests for equation 8 
Having established cointegration among these variables, we now look at the causal 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The result of the causality test 
is presented in Table 5.72.  
Table 5.72: Granger Causality Test for Equation 8 (1980-2012):  
Pooled Data (lag of 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F-statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Direction of causality  Statistical 
significance  
LAWRULE FDINFL (1.02458) 
FDINFL LAWRULE (0.17756) 
POLITY FDINFL (0.06161) 
FDINFL POLITY (0.05668) 
INFLATION  FDINFL (1.13158) 
FDINFL INFLATION (0.45006) 
QLEGAL FDINFL (4.22984)** 
FDINFL QLEGAL (1.57187) 
CORRUPTION FDINFL (0.89638) 
FDINFL CORRUPTION (2.77080)* 
Observation  186 
Number of countries  6 
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According to Table 5.72, only one institutional variable (QLEGAL) is seen to influence 
inflow of FDI. This simply suggests that the quality of regulatory environment is capable of 
influencing inflow of FDI into the sampled African countries. With a statistical significance 
of 5%, this causal relationship is statistically significant enough to suggest an improvement to 
the present quality of legal framework in the sampled countries as an institutional process 
towards attracting more FDI.   
Still on Table 5.72, FDI inflow exhibits a reverse influence on one of the variables of 
institutional framework (CORRUPTION). Looking at the statistical significance of this causal 
relationship, one may cautiously suggest a possibility that inflow of FDI could precipitate 
corruption in the sampled African countries. In line with this finding, the Africa Progress 
Report (2013) accuses quite a number of foreign companies that operates in Africa of 
corruption. According to this report, “The combination of complexity, different disclosure 
requirements and limited regulatory capacity is at the heart of many of the problems 
discussed in this report. It facilitates aggressive tax planning, tax evasion and corruption” 
(Africa Progress Report, 2013:51).  
The finding of the causality test in this study thus suggests that attracting inflow of FDI has to 
be premised on the improvement of the quality of regulatory framework in the host countries 
(countries in Africa). Having discussed the pooled causality test for equation 8, we now 
investigate the regional causality dynamics. The results of the Granger causality tests for the 
regions are presented in Table 5.73 below:  
Table 5.73: Granger Causality Test for Equation 8 (1980-2012)  
Regional analysis (lag of 2) 
F-statistics are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Direction of causality  North Africa Southern 
Africa 
West Africa East Africa 
 
 
Statistical 
significance 
Statistical 
significance 
Statistical 
significance 
Statistical 
significance 
LAWRULE FDINFL (1.55137) (1.85811) (0.08222) (0.14988) 
FDINFL LAWRULE (0.78158) (0.52986) (0.24734) (0.65891) 
POLITY FDINFL (2.30531)* (2.16887) (0.69442) (1.06571) 
FDINFL POLITY (0.37501) (1.59579) (0.56546) (0.17068) 
INFLATION  FDINFL (0.30203) (5.40682)*** (6.74712)*** (0.52647) 
FDINFL INFLATION (1.65866) (1.68575) (0.16351) (0.54261) 
QLEGAL FDINFL (1.40321) (5.01969)*** (0.00561) (1.08178) 
FDINFL QLEGAL (2.81166)* (1.11068) (0.32687) (1.51077) 
CORRUPTION FDINFL (0.01541) (2.36363) (0.37205) (0.51082) 
FDINFL CORRUPTION (3.11975)** (3.73798)** (0.08939) (0.45405) 
Observation 93 31 31 31 
Number of countries 3 1 1 1 
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From Table 5.73, the causality tests suggest that policy score (POLITY) have causal effect on 
inflow of FDI to North Africa. As such, an improvement in polity score of the region will 
possibly improve the attractiveness of the region to inflow FDI. Further, two variables are 
found to have reverse causality with FDI inflow. In the first instance, inflow of FDI improves 
the quality of regulatory environment in the region. This suggests that an increase in the flow 
of FDI to the region will enhance the quality of regulatory framework. Surprisingly, inflow of 
FDI is observed to cause corruption perception (CORRUPTION). This result further 
buttresses the observation of corrupt practices by some foreign investors that is highlighted in 
Part B. 
In Southern Africa analysis, annual percentage change in consumer prices (INFLATION) is 
found to cause inflow of FDI to the region. By implication, inflow of FDI to the region can 
only improve in the period of high inflation. Further, regulatory quality (QLEGAL) is also 
found to influence inflow of FDI. This finding buttresses the findings of La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000). Ito (1999) also found similar result; again, just as in the 
case of North Africa, inflow of FDI is also found to intensify CORRUPTION. This result 
buttresses the findings of Africa Progress Report (2013) that quite a number of foreign 
investors in Africa engage in corrupt practices.  
The West Africa causality test suggests that annual percentage change in consumer prices in 
the only variable that influences inflow of FDI to the region. This result is similar to the one 
obtained in Southern Africa analysis. For East Africa, none of the institutional variables 
appears to have causal effect on inflow of FDI and there is no reverse causality from inflow 
of FDI to the institutional variables either.    
5.6 Lessons from the analysis 
The analysis contained in this chapter (chapter five) is evaluated briefly in order to present 
the golden thread that links the analysis with the research questions and research hypotheses. 
Although, each research question and hypothesis are directly linked to the econometric 
models that are specified in Parts A, B and C as indicated in chapter four under research 
methodology, and by extension, in the analysis contained in this chapter, it is still considered 
important to recap these analyses and their suggested policy implications. The synopsis of 
these analyses will also be presented in the same order in which the statistical analyses were 
presented (Parts A, B and C).  
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5.6.1 Part A: Capital Market Development and Inflow of FDI 
The result of the analysis of equation 2, as contained in Tables 5.1 to 5.15, reinforces the 
hypothesis of the direct influence of capital market development on inflow of FDI in the 
sampled African countries. More specifically, the result of the descriptive statistics (Tables 
5.1 and 5.2) show that inflow of FDI to Africa has been fluctuating and the extent of the 
fluctuation has been noticeable (from a high of 9.4 per cent of GDP recorded by North Africa 
in 2006 compared to a divestment of -1.2 per cent of GDP recorded by West Africa in 1980). 
This is really a cause for concern for a continent that yearns to achieve rapid economic 
development, which has been proven to be achievable through inflow of FDI.  
It is also noteworthy that capital market development has been fluctuating in the same way, 
as inflow of FDI. The strong relationship that subsists between these macroeconomic 
indicators lends credence to the observed fact that inflow of FDI is strongly influenced by 
capital market development in Africa. In addition, the result of the error correction 
estimations that appear on Tables 5.3 and 5.4 indicate suggests that capital market 
development influences the attractiveness of African countries to inflow of FDI. The results 
generated through the dynamic panel regression analysis (Tables 5.6 and 5.7) are in the 
affirmation of the role of capital market development as a strong determinant of inflow of 
FDI to Africa.  
The dynamic panel regression analysis suggests a strong relationship between four of the five 
capital market development variables used in this study, and inflow of FDI. In exception of 
claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP 
(NONFIN) in the pooled analysis, all other capital market development variables show strong 
deterministic influence on inflow of FDI. The regional estimations are also in the affirmative 
of the roles played by capital market development in attractiveness of African countries to 
inflow of FDI.  
Just as in the case of the impulse response analysis (Tables 5.8 to 5.12) where the role of 
capital market as strong determinant of inflow of FDI is emphasised, the Granger causality 
test (Table 5.14 and 5.15) also corroborate this proposition, albeit weakly. More specifically, 
the pooled causality test hints that there is a direct causal relationship between the total value 
of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP (EQCAP), the total value of all 
traded shares in a stock market exchange as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER) and the 
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financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a share of 
GDP (BANK). The regional analysis corroborates this proposition except for West Africa.   
This finding corroborates the findings of earlier studies (Caves, 1974, 82, 99, 2007; Chousa, 
Valdlamannati & Tamazian, 2008; Hailu, 2010) that emphasise the importance of capital 
market development as a prerequisite to attracting inflow of FDI. This said, this study is able 
to demonstrate the need to initiate policy interventions that are capable of developing capital 
markets in Africa as a strategic way of attracting inflow of FDI. It must be recalled that quite 
a number of studies (such as the studies of Bencivenga, Smith and Starr, 1996; Akinkugbe, 
2005; Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2005; Adams, 2009) reviewed in chapters two and three 
identify inflow of FDI as an important growth driver, especially in the developing countries 
(an economic grouping where many countries in Africa belongs). If achieved, capital market 
development will enhance the attractiveness of African countries to inflow of FDI and the 
cyclical effects of this system will further enhance the growth of domestic capital market.  
On the regional basis, the descriptive statistics suggests that Southern Africa boasts a better 
capital market development as compared to the remaining three regions. However, the 
standard deviation statistics also indicate that the region’s capital market is a lot more volatile 
than those of the other regions. The error correction estimation, specifically, the impulse 
response analysis signals to the speed of adjustment of these variables to innovations shock, 
thereby suggesting cautionary approach to policy intervention.  
The regional dynamic panel regression (Table 5.7) corroborates the results of the pooled 
analysis (Table 5.6).  
The regional analysis lends credence to the fact that all the capital market variables (except 
for NONFIN) enhance inflow of FDI to the sampled African countries. The Granger causality 
tests conducted for the regions shows that the development of equity capital is an important 
determinant of inflow of FDI to two of the regions (except for West and East Africa), this 
presupposition does not hold for the PRIVY across the regions (except for Southern Africa). 
More importantly, the regional analysis points out that none of the capital market 
development variables have any causal (be it direct or reverse) relationship with inflow of 
FDI in the case of West Africa.       
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5.6.2 Part B: Institutional Framework and Capital market development  
The analyses contained in equations 3 to 7 evaluate the postulation that institutional 
framework influences capital market development. The results of the descriptive statistics 
presented in Tables 5.16 to 5.14 (as well as the appendix A2-1 to A2-4) reveal a mixed result. 
The descriptive statistics suggests that the sampled African countries suffer strongly from 
institutional adequacy. Most of the countries in Africa are ranked very low on various counts 
of institutional efficiency (such as POLITY, LAWRULE and QLEGAL).  
In specific, all the African countries performed below global average in corruption 
(CORRUPTION). Furthermore, the error correction model as well as findings of the 
regression analysis points to the statistical significance of annual percentage change in 
consumer prices (INFLATION), rule of law (LAWRULE), polity score (POLITY) and quality 
of legal framework (QLEGAL) on the capital market variables used in this study. The results 
of the dynamic panel estimation (Table 5.23 to 5.27) as well as the impulse response 
estimation (Table 5.28 to 5.52) indicate that these institutional variables are particularly 
important to the performance of all the capital market variables, except for the total value of 
all traded shares in a stock market exchange as a percentage of GDP (TURNOVER). The 
Granger causality test presented in Tables 5.54 to 5.58 further reinforces the specific 
importance of the rule of law and corruption on private credit by deposit money banks and 
other financial institutions as a percentage of GDP (BANK) as well as equity trading 
platforms. Although, the institutional variables are observed to strongly influence the 
development of capital market in the regions, capital market development variables are also 
seen to be capable of influencing POLITY, INFLATION and CORRUPTION.     
5.6.3 Part C: Institutional framework and inflow of FDI  
Based on the error correction estimates (Tables 5.59 to 5.63), the dynamic panel analysis 
(Tables 5.64 and 5.65) as well as the impulse response analysis (5.66 to 5.70) conducted for 
equation 8, evidence suggests that two of the variables used in measuring institutional 
efficiency in this study (QLEGAL and CORRUPTION) play significant roles in determining 
the attractiveness of Africa to inflow of FDI.  
The analysis establishes that the quality of legal framework exert a significant pressure on the 
attractiveness of Africa to inflow of FDI.  The results of the regional analysis also emphasises 
the implication of institutional inadequacy on investor lethargy towards the African regions. 
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Further, the Granger causal analysis suggests that the quality of legal framework (QLEGAL) 
plays statistically significant role in determining the attractiveness of African countries to 
inflow of FDI.  
Conversely, there is a reverse causal relationship between inflow of FDI (FDINFL) and 
corruption (CORRUPTION).  The regional causal analysis indicates that polity does influence 
inflow of FDI to North Africa, while annual percentage change in consumer prices affects 
inflow of FDI to Southern and West Africa. Regulatory quality also surfaces as an important 
determinant of inflow of FDI to Southern Africa. However, there is reverse causality from 
inflow of FDI to corruption in North and Southern Africa while West and Southern Africa 
experiences reverse causality from annual percentage change in consumer prices to inflow of 
FDI.   
In summary, the impulse response analysis contained in Tables 5.9 to 5.12 clearly indicate 
that inflow of FDI respond significantly to all the capital market variables not only in the  
short run, but in the long run as well. In the North African estimation for instance, inflow of 
FDI responds negatively in the short run to innovations shock on BANK, but the response of 
the dependent variable became positive in the long run. Conversely, while the response of 
inflow of FDI to NONFIN was negative in the short run, it became positive in the long run. 
The error correction estimates also reveals the same response pattern, given that the response 
patterns of differenced variables differ to the lagged forms of the same variable. The same 
response pattern is evident throughout the estimation.  
5.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the analyses of the econometric models that are constructed in chapter 
four under research methodology. As indicated in this chapter, descriptive analyses are 
conducted to understudy the behaviour of the dataset. The measures of association as well 
measures of dispersion are examined and the implications of these divergences are discussed, 
especially as relates to the normal distribution of the data. In this chapter, we applied the 
diagnostic techniques that were proposed in chapter four. Other necessary diagnostic 
techniques were identified, justified and applied in order to achieve estimation validity and 
reliability by controlling for various estimation biases and errors.  
Some semblances were drawn between the findings presented in the descriptive tables, the 
error correction models and those relationships expressed in the regression analyses and the 
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impulse response estimations. To establish the direction of the relationship, the Granger 
causality tests were conducted. The causality tests suggest that there is strong causal 
relationship between capital market development and attractiveness of Africa to inflow of 
FDI (Hypothesis 1: 1.1 to 1.5). The analysis hints that capital market development is capable 
of acting as a pull factor for inflow of FDI to Africa. The regional analysis also corroborates 
the findings of the pooled estimation, except in the case of West Africa where no caulity was 
observed. 
Further, hypothesis two (2.1 to 2.5) postulates a relationship between institutional framework 
and capital market development. The findings of this study corroborate the stated hypothesis. 
The finding of this study points to the importance of some of the institutional variables 
(especially LAWRULE, QLEGAL and CORRUPTION as important determinants of capital 
market development in Africa. The last hypothesis that tests the relationship between 
institutional efficiency and the attractiveness of Africa to inflow of FDI (hypotheses 3.1 to 
3.5) indicates that institutional efficiency does affect the attractiveness of Africa to inflow of 
FDI.  
Having tested the research hypotheses and having answered the research questions, the policy 
implication of the findings of this study and possible policy intervention (recommendation) 
are presented in the next chapter (chapter six). Chapter six also draws conclusion based on 
the findings of the study and suggest possible areas of future research. 
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Chapter six 
Summary of findings, policy implications, recommendation and 
conclusion  
6.1 Introduction 
This study aimed at establishing a relationship between capital market development and 
inflow of FDI to Africa. The research further proposed to uncover the impact of institutional 
adequacy on the capital market development as well as the impact of institutional framework 
on the attractiveness of Africa to inflow of FDI. Having done the analysis and presented the 
result, this chapter presents the synopsis of the findings, highlights the policy implications of 
the results, makes some recommendations based on the findings, and concludes the study.  
Chapter five presented the analysis of the econometric models that were specified in chapter 
four. Descriptive statistics were presented for each of the models, followed by diagnostic 
measures and various estimations. Efforts were also made in chapter five to draw inferences 
from the analysis as regards the stated research hypotheses. The findings of the analyses 
indicate that we cannot reject the Null of the stated research hypotheses. In this chapter 
(chapter five), the major findings of the research will be encapsulated, their policy 
implications will be discussed and possible intervention initiatives/mechanism will be 
proposed. Based on the findings of the study, conclusions will be drawn and areas of possible 
future research will be suggested. 
6.2 Summary of findings and policy implication 
The summary of the findings of this study will be presented in the same order as they 
featured in the analyses. This order also conforms to that of research objectives and the test of 
research hypotheses. Each research objective will be presented again, and the answer 
provided by the analysis will be aligned with the question. The same pattern will be followed 
for the research hypotheses. It must be highlighted that a brief analyses of the findings 
regarding the research hypotheses have been presented in section 5.5. However, the approach 
used in this chapter is different in that each hypothesis will be presented and the finding of 
the study will be weighed against the specific research hypothesis.  
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6.2.1 Research objectives 
As stated in section 1.5, the main objective of this study was to establish the possible 
relationship between capital market development in Africa and the attractiveness of the 
continent to inflow of FDI. The sub-objectives were presented as follows: 
 To analyse the causal relationship between Africa’s capital market 
development and inflow of foreign direct investment to the continent, 
 To analyse the causal relationship between institutional framework and capital 
market development in Africa, 
 To analyse the impact of institutional framework on the attractiveness of 
Africa to inflow of FDI.  
In order to achieve the stated objectives, some research questions were raised. According to 
section 1.4 (in chapter 1), the main questions raised in this study revolves around the extent 
of the explanatory powers of capital market variables as they influence inflow of FDI to 
Africa. The sub-research questions were stated as follows: 
1 To what extent does capital market development influence the inflow of foreign direct 
investment to Africa? 
2 What are the institutional factors that militate against capital market development in 
Africa? 
3 What are the impacts of institutional framework on the attractiveness of Africa to 
inflow of FDI? 
The regression analyses conducted and presented in chapter five (specifically in Tables 5.5 
and 5.6) were able to answer the first research question (and sub-question), and ultimately 
achieve the main research objective as well as the first sub-objective. In specific terms, the 
regression analyses found that capital market development does influence the attractiveness 
of African countries to inflow of FDI. Except for claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector 
by the Central Bank as a share of GDP (NONFIN), all the capital market variables used are 
statistically significant at one per cent level (both in the pooled and regional estimations).  
The Granger causality tests contained in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 lends credence to the causal 
relationship between stock market development and inflow of FDI both at pooled and 
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regional levels. Stock market development indicators (EQCAP and TURNOVER) were found 
to be capable of influencing inflow of FDI in the pooled estimation and in all the regions in 
exception of West Africa. In addition, one of the most important components of the capital 
market (BANK)) is also found to directly Granger cause the inflow of FDI to Africa. These 
results are able to achieve the first research objective/sub-objective.  
The second research sub-question is also answered and the second sub-objective is achieved 
as informed by the analyses. The regression analyses contained in Table 5.12 found that 
institutional framework plays an important role in determining the extent of capital market 
development in Africa. Some variables of institutional framework were found to be important 
determinants of capital market development in Africa. Measurable indicators such as the rule 
of law (LAWRULE), crafty management of public affairs (POLITY), annual percentage 
change in consumer price index (INFLATION) and quality of the regulatory framework 
(QLEGAL) were found to be important determinants to capital market development in Africa. 
These sets of findings were able to answer the second sub-research question. The result of the 
Granger causality tests presented in Table 5.14 suggests that rule of law (LAWRULE) plays a 
significant deterministic role on capital market development in Africa. This finding is able to 
achieve the second research objective.  
The last sub-research question that focuses of the impact of institutional framework on the 
attractiveness of Africa to inflow of FDI is also answered. The output of the dynamic panel 
regression presented in Table 5.15 indicates that the quality of legal framework (QLEGAL) 
and corruption (CORRUPTION) are major deterrents to inflow of FDI to Africa. We achieved 
the last research sub-objective with the finding contained in the Granger causality test 
presented in Table 5.17. According to that Table, the quality of legal framework (QLEGAL) 
is found to have a causal relationship with inflow of FDI.   
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6.2.2 Research hypotheses 
Table 6.1: Proposed Research Hypotheses and Actual Effects 
Model Specification  Determinants Hypothesised effects Actual effects (causal) 
 PART A   
 
 
Dependent variable 
Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDINFL) 
 
Stock market capitalisation to 
GDP (%) (EQCAP) 
Positive positive 
Stocks traded, total value (% of 
GDP) (TURNOVER) 
Positive positive 
Domestic credit provided by 
banking sector (% of GDP) 
(BANK) 
Positive  positive 
Domestic credit to private 
sector (% of GDP) (PRIVY) 
Positive nil 
The ratio of total claims on the 
nonfinancial private sector (% 
of GDP) (NONFIN) 
Positive nil 
 PART B   
Dependent variables 
Capital Market 
Development (EQCAP; 
TURNOVER; BANK; 
PRIVY; NONFIN) 
Rule of Law (estimate) 
(LAWRULE) 
Positive  positive 
Combined polity score 
(POLITY) 
Positive Reverse positive  
Inflation, consumer prices 
(annual %) (INFLATION) 
Negative Reverse negative 
Regulatory Quality (estimate) 
(QLEGAL) 
Positive  nil 
Corruption Perceptions Index 
(score) 
(CORRUPTION) 
Negative Reverse negative 
 PART C   
Dependent variable 
FDINFL 
Rule of Law (estimate) 
(LAWRULE) 
Positive  Positive  
Combined polity score 
(POLITY) 
Positive nil 
Inflation, consumer prices 
(annual %) (INFLATION) 
Negative nil 
Regulatory Quality (estimate) 
(QLEGAL) 
Positive  nil 
Corruption Perceptions Index 
(score) (CORRUPTION) 
Negative Reverse negative 
Source: Author’s proposition and findings 
From the analyses contained in chapter five, it is found that most of the hypotheses do not fall 
in the region of rejection. More specifically, we were able to establish statistical significant 
relationship between capital market development and inflow of FDI to Africa. The Granger 
causality test further reinforces the strength of this hypothesis as direct causality is 
established between three of the five capital market variables and inflow of FDI. As such, it 
could be said that hypothesis 1 holds, especially sub-hypotheses 1.1, 1.4 and 1.5.  These set 
of hypotheses hold for not only the selected African countries, but the regions as well.  
The second hypothesis also holds true. The analyses indicate that institutional framework 
influences capital market development in Africa. The stock market appears to be the more 
brittle of the two sectors. As suggested by the analyses, institutional framework plays a 
crucial role in the development of the stock market (especially equity capitalisation and stock 
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turnover rate. However, the reverse causality expressed by all the capital market variables 
(except for stock turnover rates) can be interpreted that well-developed capital markets are 
capable of influencing the institutional framework in the long-run.    
The third hypothesis also holds as institutional framework is found to play a significant role 
on inflow of FDI to Africa. More specifically, the quality of legal system (QLEGAL) stands 
out as a variable that plays a significant role in determining the attractiveness of Africa to 
inflow of FDI. Conversely, corruption (CORRUPTION) is found to have a reverse causal 
relationship with inflow of FDI. This may suggest that corrupt countries are more likely to 
attract FDI. Alternatively, inflow of FDI may precipitate or enhance corrupt practices. This is 
in line with the previous studies (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2000; 
Azman-Saini, Law & Ahmad, 2010; Ayaydin & Baltaci, 2013).   
From the on-going, one could modify the hypotheses presented in Table 4.1in order to 
suggest an optimal tabular presentation of the relationship that exists among the main 
variables of this study. This modification gives rise to Table 6.1. The Table depicts the 
specific capital market development variables that are capable of driving inflow of FDI to 
Africa. Further, the Table indicates the variables of institutional framework that have direct 
influence on capital market development. The concluding part of the Table contains 
information on the variables of institutional framework that influences the attractiveness of 
Africa to inflow of FDI.  
6.3 Policy implications 
The findings contained in this study points to the need to develop Africa’s capital market in 
order to attract FDI.  As informed by the analyses contained in this study, there is strong 
evidence to suggest that Africa is currently not attracting a significant portion of global flow 
of FDI. Currently, the developed economies (topped by the United States) attract the bulk of 
global flow of FDI, which may contribute in explaining why those economies are sustainably 
developed. An argument could be advanced that if the most developed economies 
continuously strive to attract as much FDI as possible; the developing countries (especially 
countries in Africa) are expected to initiate possible policy interventions to further make 
Africa attractive to inflow of FDI.  
The findings of this study suggest that Africa will be able to attract more foreign investment 
as a continent and at regional levels as well, by improving the efficiency of the capital market 
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– all of which hinge on institutional efficiency.  As suggested by previous studies conducted 
in the advanced economies and Latin America, the development of domestic capital market is 
found to be a significant determinant of the attractiveness of a host country to inflow of FDI. 
As suggested by previous studies in Ghana and southern Africa, apart from attracting FDI, 
the level of development of the domestic capital market also influences the extent to which a 
country could benefit from the spillover effects of FDI.  
From the on-going, it thus becomes apparent that the development of domestic capital market 
is an important determinant for any country to benefit from FDI. Of all the factors of 
institutional efficiency studied, the quality of legal framework, respect for the rule of law, 
political peacefulness, as well as corruption are seen as the most crucial deterrents to both 
capital market development and the attractiveness of the continent at large, and the major 
regional groupings in specific, to inflow of FDI. Practical evidence from the largest African 
countries corroborates the findings of this study. For instances, cases of corruption has been 
lunched against top political official in countries such as Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya, 
especially between 2010 and 2013 and no conviction is secured in most of the cases. This 
may explain why Africa continues to rank poorly on the global corruption index.  
More specifically, the quality of legal framework (QLEGAL), the quality of rule of law 
(LAWRULE), and the combined polity score (POLITY), as well as fiscal policy (INFLATION) 
play prominent deterministic role in adjudging Africa’s institutional inefficiency in relation to 
developing its capital market in a way that would attract inflow of FDI. While a few countries 
like South Africa is known for efficient legal framework, there has been reported cases of 
contempt of court among top political officials between 2009 and 2014. Being the largest 
economy on the continent, continued disrespect for the rule of law may ultimately weaken the 
judicial system of the country. If that happens, poor legal framework may further unnerve 
flappable capital market participants, hinder capital market development and discourage the 
flow of FDI to Africa.  The same fate of lack of respect of the rule of law has been 
demonstrated in Egypt during the 2012 and 2013 anti-military protests and Tunisia was not 
spared in this imbroglio as well.  
Although, inflation has been managed properly for the past few years on the continent, it still 
remains a fiscal problem that requires attention. Many countries in Africa are still vulnerable 
to macroeconomic instabilities and inflation may be triggered by some of those instabilities. 
For instance, most of the large economies on Africa continue to experience high volumes of 
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trade deficit (year-on-year). This does not augur well for economic stability and 
macroeconomic peacefulness. The increasing volume of budget deficits is also of concern in 
order to maintain a reasonable level of fiscal balance in a way that may put inflation in check. 
Although, the inflation targeting policy adopted in some of the largest economies on the 
continent (in countries such as Nigeria and South Africa) may be effective in keeping 
inflation in check, those initiatives have to be supported by good governance, respect for the 
rule of law and strong administrative discipline in order to ensure their effectiveness.  
6.4 Contributions to knowledge 
As indicated in the preceding sections in this chapter, this study successfully achieve its 
targeted objectives by answering the research questions. The research hypotheses are also 
tested successfully. In a nutshell, this study contributes to the body of existing literature and 
enriches our understanding of salient issues on Africa’s capital market dynamics and FDI 
behaviour in that regard. In more specific terms, some of the contributions of this study to 
existing knowledge are highlighted below: 
6.4.1 The use of pooled data 
This study uses pooled data in various estimations to answer the research questions, test the 
research hypotheses, and ultimately, achieve the stated research objectives. The pooled data 
are generated for the selected African countries over a period that runs between 1980 and 
2012. The application of pooled data allows us to test the impact of large number of 
explanatory variables that are used in this study in relation to the observed changes expressed 
by the dependent variables. It must be pointed out that this form of data mining technique 
enables us to conduct various estimations and apply numerous statistical instruments that are 
considered important to achieve the research objectives, especially within the multivariate 
analysis framework. By so doing, we are able to capture not only the variation that 
characterise temporal or cross-section but the simultaneous occurrences along the two 
dichotomies as well.   
6.4.2 Data generation technique 
 It is a known fact that studies on Africa’s capital market are always problematic to conduct. 
The main source of concern in conducting such studies is the availability of useful data. This 
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study is not an exception. Most of the series are pervaded with incomplete data as explained 
in chapter four. To overcome associated problems with incomplete data, especially omission 
data in dependent variables, it becomes important to generate data for the missing units. We 
relied extensively on the use of various statistical techniques to achieve this daunting task. 
Our ability to make available some datasets that were hitherto non-existent is considered a 
significant contribution to knowledge.  
6.4.3 Regional analysis 
For the first time in studies of this nature, we bring to light a single study that incorporates 
the major economies on the continent, as well as the largest (and most developed) capital 
markets on the continent. This study does not only unveil the dynamics of Africa’s capital 
market, but the role of institutional framework as well. The study also juxtaposes the 
intricacies of capital market development and FDI behaviour across the major economies on 
the continent, while exposing the role of institutional adequacy on FDI behaviour 
concomitantly.   
Although, the representation of the regions is limited, it is imperative to note that a wider 
coverage would not have been necessary because of data shortage. The most important 
rationale is that the sample size used in this study represents countries that account for more 
than 80 per cent of the GDP of the entire continent, apart from being the largest and most 
viable capital markets on the continent. In addition, the capitalisation of the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) and the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) account for more than 70 per 
cent of the entire continent’s capitalisation.   
6.4.4 Estimation techniques 
This study adopts various estimation techniques and statistical tools to answer the stated 
research questions, test the proposed research hypotheses, and ultimately, achieve the stated 
research objectives. The descriptive statistics is employed to establish the distribution pattern 
of the dataset, and the error correction estimates (VECM) are used to ascertain the 
importance of the identified error terms. The unit root test is used to unveil the behaviour of 
the data, while the GMM approach is adopted not only to ascertain relationship among the 
variables but to allay our fears about endogeneity as well.  
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The impulse response approach is employed extensively in order to ascertain the short and 
long run reactions of the explanatory variables to any possible innovations shock on the 
dependent variables. These are very crucial for policy purposes on the continent. The 
causality test helps to ascertain the direction of causality among the variables. This is 
extremely germane for policy purposes as the understanding that is created through this study 
points to, clearly, where policy intervention should be directed and the possible multiplier 
effects of such interventions on the larger FDI behaviour and capital market development 
nexus.       
6.5 Recommendations  
Following from the analysis, evidence emerged that Africa has the potential to increase her 
share of global stock of FDI in a sustainable way. To achieve this, a new growth-path needs 
to be channelled, essentially through the development of domestic capital market – both at 
continental and regional levels. One of the possible initiatives to drive capital market 
development is by improving the institutional framework on the continent. Although, studies 
reported noticeable improvement in the institutional framework of Africa in recent years, 
more still needs to be done to improve the attractiveness of the continent to inflow of FDI.    
This study corroborates Caves’ (2007) hypothesis on investors’ behaviour on the role of 
capital market in the host country to meet financial needs of foreign investors, especially in 
the African context. As suggested in a series of studies conducted by Caves (1974, 1982, 
1996, 2007) on the behaviour of multinational corporations, emphasises was placed on the 
relevance of the intermediation role of the host country’s capital market (especially the equity 
market and bank sector) in funding future expansion of the investments. In addition, meeting 
risk diversification motives of foreign investors by providing financial platforms that are 
capable of generating low-cost credit facility to support the financial need of the investment 
is important (Jeffus, 2004). To that extent, this study emphasises the need to develop Africa’s 
capital market, especially capital market components such as equity markets and the banking 
sector.  
Although, the political climate in Africa has improved considerably through increasing 
democratisation processes, more efforts is still required to strengthen the legal framework on 
the continent. As suggested by this study, respect for the rule of law and quality of legal 
framework play very important roles on the development of Africa’s capital market as well as 
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on the attractiveness of the continent to inflow of FDI. To that extent, concerted efforts are 
required to improve the legal framework on Africa. More importantly, poor investor 
protection (as informed by weak regulatory framework) may further unnerve skittish 
investors. Even in the region that is regarded as having the best regulatory system (southern 
Africa), concerns are emerging that political elites are compromising the established judicial 
systems.    
The findings of this study point strongly to the negative influence of corruption on capital 
market development, and its effect on the kind of FDI that is attracted to Africa is 
emphasised. The regional analysis in this study indicates that most of the countries in Africa 
are corrupt, and this social vice influences efficient allocation of financial support to the 
private sector (PRIVY). By implication, lack of objectivity in channelling funds to the private 
sector may discourage innovativeness and economic development may thus be compromised. 
As suggested by Schumpeter (1934), financial institutions (especially banks) should be able 
to perform intermediation roles in a way that enhances innovativeness that can lead to 
technological advancement and application of innovative ideas.  
The literature as cited in this study and elsewhere, establishes the importance of capital 
market development on the attractiveness of countries to inflow of FDI. In the same vein, the 
importance of institutional framework in developing the capital market as well as 
attracting/sustaining inflow of FDI are also emphasised in literature. For Africa to be 
attractive to inflow of FDI, it is critical, from the analysis contained in this study, that 
perceptions of corruption must change, the political environment must improve and the rule 
of law needs to improve. These are critical recommendations emanating from this study. 
Governance issues also stand out as being important. It is therefore essential that African 
countries should ensure efficiency in the management of the macro-economy. This is 
important as the inflation variable clearly shows through its negative association with capital 
market development as well as inflow of FDI both in the pooled estimations as well as the 
regional analyses.  
Further, given the time dynamic of the responses generated in this study (specifically through 
the error correction estimates and the impulse response analyses), it is suggested that policy 
intervention should be carefully monitored and necessary implementation and control 
mechanism should be deployed to ensure that deviations from the expected outcomes are 
corrected timeously. Further, strategic flexibility should be built into the formulation process 
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and adequate reward system should be enshrined in the innovations policy in order to 
motivate efficient and effective participation and ultimately, targeted positive outcomes.       
6.6 Conclusion   
The literature review conducted in this study established relationship between inflow of FDI 
and economic growth, capital market development and inflow of FDI, and institutional 
efficiency and capital market development.  From the literature review, a viable capital 
market is found to be pivotal to financial deepening, which is capable of precipitating 
sustainable economic growth and entrepreneurial development. Capital market efficiency is 
also found to be necessary to attract inflow of FDI. Evidence from the literature identified 
institutional efficiency as the bedrock of capital market development (which is confirmed by 
this study). A fledgling capital market is largely inefficient, and highly susceptible to market 
failure, and capable of further enervating skittish foreign investors especially in the face of 
preponderant market failures in the developing world.    
The empirical evidence, as suggested by the analyses contained in this study, corroborates 
most of the previous findings. For example, the Townsend’s (1979) Costly-State-Verification 
hypothesis, as modified later by Froot and Stein (1991), holds for Africa. As suggested by the 
statistical analyses, there is a relationship between capital market development and FDI 
inflow, suggesting that “the more efficient a market becomes, the lesser the cost of capital, 
and the more attractive the market becomes for investment”. This also corroborates the study 
of Caves (2007), which emphasises that investors are only willing to commit to an offshore 
market only if the domestic capital market is developed.  
It could thus be concluded from the findings of this study that there is the need for a change 
in the perception of African leaders about the socio-political and economic importance of 
capital market. Efforts should be made to embrace the development of capital markets on the 
continent, essentially by improving the institutional framework. The challenges posed by 
globalisation, especially in relation to national competitive advantage, suggests that African 
leaders need to adopt a more hearty approach that is capable of furthering sustainable 
competitiveness of the continent to foreign investment through capital market development 
and improvement to institutional framework. 
In addition, the issue of corruption should be addressed. Corruption has been identified as 
glowing amber that illuminates a people to moral bankruptcy. It eats into the moral fibres of 
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the society and destroys the integrity of its perpetrators in the same way as the victims. To 
ascertain a functioning system on a sustainable basis, efforts need to be made to strengthen 
existing anti-corruption regulations, modify the existing regulations, and uphold the 
principles of rule of law. The law enforcement process should also be strengthened to uphold 
the honour and dignity of that noble professional. It is found that only a well-functioning 
institution is capable of ensuring capital market efficiency, attracting FDI inflow and growing 
the economy in a way that is capable of reducing poverty in Africa. It could thus be 
concluded from the findings of this study that consorted efforts need to be made to develop 
African capital markets as a way of lifting the continent out of its current economic squalor. 
6.7 Suggestion for further study 
This study investigated the roles of capital market development as a pull factor for inflow of 
FDI. The study also looked at the effects of institutional framework on capital market 
development, as well as the roles played by institutional framework on the attractiveness of 
Africa to inflow of FDI. The findings of the study suggest that capital market development 
hinges on institutional adequacy, and the hindrances crated by corruption, legal framework as 
well as lack of respect for the rule of law were highlighted.  
However, given the limitations inherent in the dataset used in this study, especially those used 
to analyse capital market efficiency, it is essential to conduct a further empirical research in 
this regard. It is hoped that a longitudinal field survey may yield different result, especially 
on the impact of institutional framework. Further studies on the effects of institutional 
framework on both capital market development and inflow of FDI at the regional level may 
also contribute to our understanding of the regional dynamics.  
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Appendix A 
List of African Stock Markets and Exchanges  
Name of Exchange Country Year established Study Sample 
West African regional 
stock exchange - Bourse 
Régionale des Valeurs 
Mobilières - BRVM 
Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal, Togo, Guinea 
Bissau 
1998  
Bourse des Valeurs 
Mobilieres d'Alger 
Algeria 1997  
Botswana Stock 
Exchange 
Botswana 1989  
Cameroon - Douala 
Stock  
Cameroon 2011  
Bolsa de Valores de 
Cabo Verde 
Cape Verde 2005  
The Egyptian Exchange Alexandria Stock 
Exchange 
1883 X 
The Cairo Stock Exchange 1903 
Ghana Stock Exchange Ghana 1989  
Nairobi Stock Exchange Kenya 1954 X 
Libyan Stock Exchange  Libya 2007  
Malawi Stock Exchange  Malawi 1995  
Mauritius Stock 
Exchange 
Mauritius  1988  
Casablanca Stock 
Exchange  
Morocco 1929 X 
Mozambique Stock 
Exchange 
Mozambique 1999  
Namibia Stock Exchange  Namibia 1992  
Nigerian Stock Exchange Nigeria 1960 X 
Sierra Leone Stock 
Exchange 
Sierra Leone 2009  
Rwanda Stock Exchange Rwanda 2005  
Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange 
South Africa 1887 X 
Khartoum Stock 
Exchange 
Sudan 1995  
Swaziland Stock 
Exchange 
Swaziland 1990  
Dar es Salaam Stock 
Exchange 
Tanzania 1996  
Bourse de Tunis 
 
Tunisia 1969 X 
Uganda Securities 
Exchange 
Uganda 1997  
Lusaka Stock Exchange Zambia 1994  
Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange  
Zimbabwe 1993  
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Appendix A2-1 
Descriptive Statistics for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012) – Regional Dynamics  
(North Africa) 
 BANK PRIVY NONFIN EQCAP TURNOVER LAWRULE POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUP 
 Mean  41.48241  44.91465  13.90870  20.21174  5.246296 -0.018675 -5.67677 6.88695 -0.18496 3.87824 
 Median  47.63822  47.69861  7.251865  10.56272  1.221997 0.0032598 -6.000 5.600000 -0.17365 3.66034 
 Maximum  74.52475  75.46774  50.52455  88.73975  39.98322 0.240165 -2.000 31.1381 0.15103 5.3 
 Minimum  14.03905  13.18058  0.128763  2.288972  0.106007 -0.418912 -9.000 -0.60443 -0.6192 2.8 
 Std. Dev.  15.78512  16.69079  15.72227  21.81706  9.398273 0.1414181 1.7369 5.293021 0.1361 0.7778 
 Skewness -0.135291 -0.153291  0.932259  1.665245  2.332043 -0.19677 0.28176 1.41873 -0.4112 0.56287 
 Kurtosis  1.891789  1.703534  2.459205  4.937608  7.454047 2.090669 2.1671 6.29078 4.12265 1.75622 
 Jarque-Bera  5.368054  7.321124  15.54666  61.24174  171.5679 4.04981 4.17156 77.88161 7.988 11.609 
 Probability  0.068288  0.025718  0.000421  0.000000  0.000000 0.00132 0.001242 0.0000 0.0184 0.00301 
 Observations  99  99  99  99  99 99 99 99 99 99 
 
Appendix A2-2 
Descriptive Statistics for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012) – Regional Dynamics  
(Southern Africa) 
 BANK EQCAP NONFIN PRIVY TURNOVER LAWRUL POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUP 
 Mean  58.39585  153.3293  1.822736  111.5909  40.21759 0.08408 6.21212 11.0428 0.49776 4.87501 
 Median  57.00336  136.6658  1.822456  116.2357  14.32826 0.0798906 9 9.5940 0.47786 5.02304 
 Maximum  78.32955  265.6193  4.244845  167.5360  142.6287 0.227998 9 24.91463 0.7783813 5.2 
 Minimum  37.96843  99.00165  0.408235  55.60003  4.621268 -0.01142 -8 5.44468 0.267171 4.08028 
 Std. Dev.  10.77237  52.36949  1.079900  33.85756  42.53460 0.0377697 4.342793 4.569769 0.11057 0.26489 
 Skewness  0.152182  0.755784  0.648451 -0.143402  1.005191 1.2773 -2.10831 0.94914 0.73563 -1.440512 
 Kurtosis  2.066522  2.221569  2.508091  1.736706  2.829811 8.92270 7.518778 3.54674 3.34471 4.15392 
 Jarque-Bera  1.325527  3.974841  2.645405  2.307482  5.597080 57.2061 52.52378 5.3657 3.13974 13.244 
 Probability  0.515425  0.137048  0.266414  0.315455  0.060899 0.04564 0.0032 0.06836 0.0080 0.00133 
 Observations  33  33  33  33  33 33 33 33 33 33 
 
Appendix A2-3 
Descriptive Statistics for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012) – Regional Dynamics   
 (West Africa) 
 BANK EQCAP NONFIN PRIVY TURNOVER LAWRUL POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUP 
 Mean  15.08456  10.54057  12.54557  17.06116  1.298276 -1.281298 -0.090909  20.56975 -0.908927  1.724531 
 Median  12.57826  7.853700  13.81913  13.23590  0.120569 -1.287688  4.000000  16.21316 -0.902224  1.542018 
 Maximum  35.39296  35.99110  29.05323  63.11585  9.259680 -1.096805  7.000000  83.62289 -0.685240  2.700000 
 Minimum  8.377203  3.745239  1.971889  8.934061  0.017788 -1.521641 -7.000000 -5.550901 -1.322868  1.000000 
 Std. Dev.  6.687729  8.557656  7.586334  10.67929  2.372455  0.097005  5.507742  19.80373  0.141698  0.420059 
 Skewness  1.570344  1.674051  0.187904  2.857302  2.185845 -0.115905 -0.193021  1.226054 -1.214003  1.082854 
 Kurtosis  4.782273  5.276576  2.163717  11.96714  6.628339  3.605130  1.259515  4.474859  4.762527  3.265452 
 Jarque-Bera  17.93058  22.53981  1.155827  155.4660  44.38020  0.577388  4.370183  11.25856  12.37736  6.546043 
 Probability  0.000128  0.000013  0.561068  0.000000  0.000000  0.749241  0.112467  0.003591  0.002053  0.037892 
 Observations  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33 
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Appendix A2-4 
Descriptive Statistics for Equations 3 to 7 (1980-2012) – Regional Dynamics   
 (East Africa) 
 BANK EQCAP NONFIN PRIVY TURNOVER LAWRUL POLITY INFLATION QLEGAL CORRUP 
 Mean  0.560148  23.11599  17.46739  6.923350  29.73786 -0.991572 -0.909091  10.09860 -0.270250  2.162729 
 Median  0.402865  23.43907  11.89643  7.005947  29.40222 -0.996954 -5.000000  9.253576 -0.304946  2.179430 
 Maximum  2.676694  33.58402  46.97015  16.47278  38.14996 -0.858237  8.000000  41.98877 -0.089636  2.700000 
 Minimum  0.004721  17.30457  5.143699  2.296972  24.60027 -1.194529 -7.000000  0.933206 -0.374362  1.900000 
 Std. Dev.  0.603192  4.137148  13.56683  3.772697  3.063780  0.075246  6.409776  7.630808  0.066426  0.141177 
 Skewness  2.394649  0.401307  0.780813  0.543985  0.592204 -0.271838  0.533403  2.447316  0.966572  1.665746 
 Kurtosis  8.714689  2.657654  2.110777  2.477474  3.233902  3.194912  1.480673  10.68839  3.135562  8.709889 
 Jarque-Bera  76.44319  1.046910  4.440414  2.002981  2.004107  0.458664  4.738841  114.2195  5.163709  60.08979 
 Probability  0.000000  0.592470  0.108587  0.367331  0.367125  0.795064  0.093535  0.000000  0.075634  0.000000 
 Observations  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33 
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Appendix B1: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 2 (1980-2012): 
Pooled data (Alternative combinations)  
Variables  D(BANK) D(NONFIN) D(PRIVY) D(EQCAP) D(TURNOVER) 
D(BANK(-1))  0.127752 -0.141251 -0.309765 -0.071172 -0.094089 
  (0.11176)  (0.08571)  (0.25707)  (0.35928)  (0.18458) 
 [ 1.14311] [-1.64807] [-1.20499] [-0.19810] [-0.50975] 
      
D(BANK(-2))  0.134004  0.081293  0.543076  0.634973 -0.234618 
  (0.10366)  (0.07949)  (0.23843)  (0.33323)  (0.17120) 
 [ 1.29278] [ 1.02265] [ 2.27772] [ 1.90550] [-1.37047] 
      
D(NONFIN(-1)) -0.040029  0.461517  0.067965 -0.041450  0.074342 
  (0.10225)  (0.07841)  (0.23519)  (0.32871)  (0.16887) 
 [-0.39149] [ 5.88573] [ 0.28898] [-0.12610] [ 0.44024] 
      
D(NONFIN(-2)) -0.126799 -0.176226 -0.224043 -0.000621  0.120228 
  (0.10153)  (0.07786)  (0.23353)  (0.32638)  (0.16768) 
 [-1.24894] [-2.26340] [-0.95937] [-0.00190] [ 0.71702] 
      
D(PRIVY(-1))  0.066872  0.046986 -0.074748  0.149197  0.203980 
  (0.05253)  (0.04029)  (0.12084)  (0.16888)  (0.08676) 
 [ 1.27296] [ 1.16630] [-0.61859] [ 0.88344] [ 2.35104] 
      
D(PRIVY(-2)) -0.050640  0.031851 -0.268733 -0.524687  0.247045 
  (0.05071)  (0.03889)  (0.11665)  (0.16303)  (0.08375) 
 [-0.99858] [ 0.81900] [-2.30381] [-3.21840] [ 2.94964] 
      
D(EQCAP(-1))  0.041268 -0.032592  0.089279  0.205418  0.100909 
  (0.02559)  (0.01963)  (0.05887)  (0.08228)  (0.04227) 
 [ 1.61237] [-1.66043] [ 1.51646] [ 2.49653] [ 2.38716] 
      
D(EQCAP(-2))  0.080673 -0.013727  0.054610 -0.241187 -0.134474 
  (0.02721)  (0.02087)  (0.06260)  (0.08748)  (0.04494) 
 [ 2.96450] [-0.65773] [ 0.87241] [-2.75690] [-2.99199] 
      
D(TURNOVER(-1))  0.157356  0.025540  0.368262  0.595816  0.932621 
  (0.06752)  (0.05178)  (0.15531)  (0.21706)  (0.11151) 
 [ 2.33051] [ 0.49323] [ 2.37113] [ 2.74489] [ 8.36320] 
      
D(TURNOVER(-2)) -0.194688 -0.076159 -0.370570 -0.742678 -0.179381 
  (0.06900)  (0.05291)  (0.15871)  (0.22181)  (0.11395) 
 [-2.82173] [-1.43933] [-2.33494] [-3.34826] [-1.57417] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B2: Regional Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 2 (1980-2012): 
North Africa (Alternative combinations) 
Variables  D(BANK) D(PRIVY) D(NONFIN) D(EQCAP) D(TURNOVER) 
D(BANK(-1))  0.082713  0.031904 -0.088758 -0.197358  0.101876 
  (0.16405)  (0.24229)  (0.11701)  (0.27748)  (0.17439) 
 [ 0.50421] [ 0.13168] [-0.75858] [-0.71126] [ 0.58418] 
      
D(BANK(-2))  0.302614  0.703474  0.228245  0.106758 -0.292308 
  (0.16908)  (0.24972)  (0.12059)  (0.28599)  (0.17974) 
 [ 1.78980] [ 2.81701] [ 1.89267] [ 0.37329] [-1.62627] 
      
D(PRIVY(-1))  0.133537 -0.038913  0.078705  0.023165 -0.096046 
  (0.09847)  (0.14544)  (0.07023)  (0.16656)  (0.10468) 
 [ 1.35613] [-0.26756] [ 1.12063] [ 0.13908] [-0.91752] 
      
D(PRIVY(-2)) -0.079896 -0.241497 -0.019422  0.118671  0.011020 
  (0.10002)  (0.14773)  (0.07134)  (0.16918)  (0.10633) 
 [-0.79878] [-1.63472] [-0.27224] [ 0.70143] [ 0.10364] 
      
D(NONFIN(-1))  0.088591  0.059115  0.604654  0.498838  0.153634 
  (0.16433)  (0.24272)  (0.11721)  (0.27796)  (0.17470) 
 [ 0.53909] [ 0.24355] [ 5.15870] [ 1.79461] [ 0.87943] 
      
D(NONFIN(-2)) -0.230025 -0.139356 -0.192396 -0.122687 -0.109443 
  (0.16982)  (0.25082)  (0.12112)  (0.28725)  (0.18053) 
 [-1.35452] [-0.55560] [-1.58842] [-0.42712] [-0.60623] 
      
D(EQCAP(-1))  0.154968  0.181024 -0.098911  0.333423  0.141379 
  (0.08359)  (0.12347)  (0.05962)  (0.14140)  (0.08887) 
 [ 1.85383] [ 1.46619] [-1.65894] [ 2.35808] [ 1.59093] 
      
D(EQCAP(-2))  0.179264  0.026509  0.087926 -0.162914  0.499008 
  (0.09170)  (0.13544)  (0.06541)  (0.15511)  (0.09749) 
 [ 1.95481] [ 0.19572] [ 1.34427] [-1.05028] [ 5.11869] 
      
D(TURNOVER(-1)) -0.211521 -0.042795  0.019679  0.999038  0.311618 
  (0.19204)  (0.28364)  (0.13697)  (0.32483)  (0.20415) 
 [-1.10145] [-0.15088] [ 0.14367] [ 3.07557] [ 1.52641] 
      
D(TURNOVER(-2)) -0.317057 -0.359169 -0.314001 -0.816140 -1.186697 
  (0.18107)  (0.26744)  (0.12915)  (0.30628)  (0.19249) 
 [-1.75099] [-1.34298] [-2.43128] [-2.66468] [-6.16488] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B3: Regional Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 2 (1980-2012): 
Southern Africa (Alternative combinations) 
Variables  D(BANK) D(PRIVY) D(NONFIN) D(EQCAP) D(TURNOVER) 
D(BANK(-1)) -0.049738  0.503749  0.150617  1.305177  0.367902 
  (0.53934)  (2.54941)  (0.08493)  (3.51803)  (1.98003) 
 [-0.09222] [ 0.19759] [ 1.77350] [ 0.37100] [ 0.18581] 
      
D(BANK(-2)) -0.399991  0.514474  0.114813  3.751952  0.447321 
  (0.42356)  (2.00212)  (0.06669)  (2.76281)  (1.55497) 
 [-0.94435] [ 0.25696] [ 1.72146] [ 1.35802] [ 0.28767] 
      
D(PRIVY(-1))  0.055654 -0.579479 -0.049502 -1.109777 -0.038691 
  (0.15200)  (0.71847)  (0.02393)  (0.99145)  (0.55801) 
 [ 0.36615] [-0.80655] [-2.06828] [-1.11935] [-0.06934] 
      
D(PRIVY(-2))  0.038384 -0.553653 -0.036643 -2.502856 -0.070316 
  (0.13723)  (0.64867)  (0.02161)  (0.89512)  (0.50380) 
 [ 0.27971] [-0.85353] [-1.69578] [-2.79611] [-0.13957] 
      
D(NONFIN(-1))  0.027179 -6.907413  0.317059 -21.87528 -8.072102 
  (1.15224)  (5.44645)  (0.18143)  (7.51579)  (4.23007) 
 [ 0.02359] [-1.26824] [ 1.74753] [-2.91058] [-1.90827] 
      
D(NONFIN(-2)) -0.938089  8.325868  0.328975  26.22611  7.761492 
  (1.57122)  (7.42692)  (0.24741)  (10.2487)  (5.76822) 
 [-0.59705] [ 1.12104] [ 1.32969] [ 2.55896] [ 1.34556] 
      
D(EQCAP(-1)) -0.041860  0.278899  0.036576  1.274226  0.419668 
  (0.09339)  (0.44146)  (0.01471)  (0.60920)  (0.34287) 
 [-0.44821] [ 0.63176] [ 2.48714] [ 2.09165] [ 1.22399] 
      
D(EQCAP(-2))  0.024432 -0.005563  0.008534  0.054676 -0.158844 
  (0.04698)  (0.22205)  (0.00740)  (0.30641)  (0.17246) 
 [ 0.52010] [-0.02505] [ 1.15371] [ 0.17844] [-0.92107] 
      
D(TURNOVER(-1))  0.193577  0.665927  0.002721  1.550173  1.236413 
  (0.09029)  (0.42678)  (0.01422)  (0.58893)  (0.33146) 
 [ 2.14400] [ 1.56036] [ 0.19137] [ 2.63220] [ 3.73017] 
      
D(TURNOVER(-2)) -0.071151 -0.855288 -0.063431 -2.692539 -0.566074 
  (0.16116)  (0.76176)  (0.02538)  (1.05118)  (0.59163) 
 [-0.44150] [-1.12278] [-2.49965] [-2.56144] [-0.95680] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B4: Regional Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 2 (1980-2012): 
West Africa (Alternative combinations) 
Variable  D(BANK) D(PRIVY) D(NONFIN) D(EQCAP) D(TURNOVE
R) 
D(BANK(-1))  0.398296 -0.292563  0.487295 -0.999626 -0.190427 
  (0.76933)  (1.35751)  (1.05629)  (1.37121)  (0.31150) 
 [ 0.51772] [-0.21551] [ 0.46133] [-0.72901] [-0.61132] 
      
D(BANK(-2))  0.785527  1.724076  0.470149 -0.226460  0.155990 
  (0.53641)  (0.94652)  (0.73649)  (0.95607)  (0.21719) 
 [ 1.46442] [ 1.82149] [ 0.63836] [-0.23686] [ 0.71821] 
      
D(PRIVY(-1)) -0.311833  0.338519 -0.769341  0.385218  0.116116 
  (0.53897)  (0.95104)  (0.74001)  (0.96064)  (0.21823) 
 [-0.57857] [ 0.35594] [-1.03963] [ 0.40100] [ 0.53208] 
      
D(PRIVY(-2)) -0.468773 -1.173362 -0.196878 -0.016064 -0.111961 
  (0.49478)  (0.87307)  (0.67934)  (0.88188)  (0.20034) 
 [-0.94743] [-1.34395] [-0.28981] [-0.01822] [-0.55886] 
      
D(NONFIN(-1)) -0.263886 -0.004583  0.053388  0.253368  0.043201 
  (0.29412)  (0.51898)  (0.40382)  (0.52422)  (0.11909) 
 [-0.89722] [-0.00883] [ 0.13221] [ 0.48332] [ 0.36276] 
      
D(NONFIN(-2)) -0.208352 -0.323724 -0.392839 -0.256927 -0.084874 
  (0.29041)  (0.51245)  (0.39874)  (0.51762)  (0.11759) 
 [-0.71743] [-0.63172] [-0.98520] [-0.49636] [-0.72179] 
      
D(EQCAP(-1)) -0.188662 -1.183244 -0.404776  0.720943  0.093779 
  (0.36276)  (0.64010)  (0.49807)  (0.64656)  (0.14688) 
 [-0.52008] [-1.84852] [-0.81269] [ 1.11504] [ 0.63846] 
      
D(EQCAP(-2))  0.345603  0.897441 -0.019117  0.268635  0.132415 
  (0.46575)  (0.82185)  (0.63948)  (0.83014)  (0.18859) 
 [ 0.74203] [ 1.09198] [-0.02989] [ 0.32360] [ 0.70215] 
      
D(TURNOVER(-1))  1.449634  7.734882 -0.489809 -3.319680  0.067066 
  (2.31659)  (4.08773)  (3.18069)  (4.12899)  (0.93799) 
 [ 0.62576] [ 1.89222] [-0.15399] [-0.80399] [ 0.07150] 
      
D(TURNOVER(-2)) -2.226146 -5.523283 -2.879697  1.116710 -0.867649 
  (1.70929)  (3.01613)  (2.34687)  (3.04657)  (0.69210) 
 [-1.30238] [-1.83125] [-1.22704] [ 0.36655] [-1.25365] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B5: Regional Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 2 (1980-2012): 
East Africa (Alternative combinations) 
Variables D(BANK) D(PRIVY) D(NONFIN) D(EQCAP) D(TURNOVE
R) 
D(BANK(-1))  0.095074 -0.034444 -0.092782 -0.090381 -0.107357 
  (0.33291)  (0.37418)  (0.23302)  (0.91457)  (0.11399) 
 [ 0.28559] [-0.09205] [-0.39818] [-0.09882] [-0.94185] 
      
D(BANK(-2))  0.186627  0.520880 -0.178243 -0.336151 -0.010416 
  (0.33573)  (0.37735)  (0.23499)  (0.92233)  (0.11495) 
 [ 0.55588] [ 1.38037] [-0.75850] [-0.36446] [-0.09061] 
      
D(PRIVY(-1)) -0.052797  0.358985 -0.186086 -1.756019 -0.148291 
  (0.24493)  (0.27530)  (0.17144)  (0.67288)  (0.08386) 
 [-0.21556] [ 1.30400] [-1.08543] [-2.60969] [-1.76825] 
      
D(PRIVY(-2)) -0.027350  0.316767  0.115244  0.395921 -0.008234 
  (0.23955)  (0.26925)  (0.16767)  (0.65810)  (0.08202) 
 [-0.11417] [ 1.17649] [ 0.68731] [ 0.60161] [-0.10038] 
      
D(NONFIN(-1)) -0.178605 -0.231364  0.423990  0.470119  0.146748 
  (0.28769)  (0.32335)  (0.20137)  (0.79034)  (0.09850) 
 [-0.62083] [-0.71552] [ 2.10556] [ 0.59483] [ 1.48979] 
      
D(NONFIN(-2))  0.067773 -0.167406 -0.294226  0.283249  0.114062 
  (0.26705)  (0.30015)  (0.18692)  (0.73364)  (0.09144) 
 [ 0.25378] [-0.55773] [-1.57407] [ 0.38608] [ 1.24746] 
      
D(EQCAP(-1))  0.200442  0.458050  0.129154  0.482631 -0.066911 
  (0.12225)  (0.13741)  (0.08557)  (0.33586)  (0.04186) 
 [ 1.63955] [ 3.33347] [ 1.50931] [ 1.43700] [-1.59848] 
      
D(EQCAP(-2)) -0.080733 -0.021090 -0.116195 -0.908800 -0.105592 
  (0.16872)  (0.18963)  (0.11809)  (0.46351)  (0.05777) 
 [-0.47851] [-0.11121] [-0.98392] [-1.96070] [-1.82786] 
      
D(TURNOVER(-1)) -2.366350 -4.086407 -0.945818  1.425548  1.735861 
  (1.16348)  (1.30771)  (0.81437)  (3.19633)  (0.39837) 
 [-2.03386] [-3.12487] [-1.16141] [ 0.44600] [ 4.35745] 
      
D(TURNOVER(-2))  1.513425 -1.779645  1.687777  9.777680  1.123505 
  (2.19986)  (2.47256)  (1.53979)  (6.04351)  (0.75322) 
 [ 0.68797] [-0.71976] [ 1.09611] [ 1.61788] [ 1.49161] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B6: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 3 (1980-2012): 
Pooled data (Alternative combinations)  
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.444158  0.065343 -13.06777 -0.150719  0.016023 
  (0.08133)  (2.24769)  (9.62246)  (0.10292)  (0.22491) 
 [-5.46139] [ 0.02907] [-1.35805] [-1.46439] [ 0.07124] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.077645 -0.339572  4.917390 -0.020906  0.610603 
  (0.08527)  (2.35678)  (10.0895)  (0.10792)  (0.23582) 
 [ 0.91053] [-0.14408] [ 0.48738] [-0.19372] [ 2.58923] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.001896  0.024186 -0.035494 -0.000798 -0.001101 
  (0.00276)  (0.07625)  (0.32644)  (0.00349)  (0.00763) 
 [-0.68731] [ 0.31718] [-0.10873] [-0.22856] [-0.14424] 
      
D(POLITY(-2)) -0.000979 -0.244324  0.105858 -0.003119 -0.004403 
  (0.00273)  (0.07556)  (0.32349)  (0.00346)  (0.00756) 
 [-0.35807] [-3.23334] [ 0.32723] [-0.90139] [-0.58226] 
      
D(INFLATION(-
1)) 
 0.000518 -0.041423 -0.288712  0.001405 -0.001921 
  (0.00077)  (0.02118)  (0.09066)  (0.00097)  (0.00212) 
 [ 0.67653] [-1.95594] [-3.18440] [ 1.44860] [-0.90627] 
      
D(INFLATION(-
2)) 
-0.000519 -0.014773 -0.257217 -0.000846  0.001333 
  (0.00065)  (0.01801)  (0.07711)  (0.00082)  (0.00180) 
 [-0.79651] [-0.82013] [-3.33552] [-1.02599] [ 0.73976] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.125166 -0.197392  9.049219 -0.463068  0.140260 
  (0.06351)  (1.75541)  (7.51498)  (0.08038)  (0.17565) 
 [ 1.97066] [-0.11245] [ 1.20416] [-5.76089] [ 0.79852] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.037676 -0.417435  4.561205  0.019816 -0.044154 
  (0.06288)  (1.73779)  (7.43955)  (0.07957)  (0.17389) 
 [ 0.59920] [-0.24021] [ 0.61310] [ 0.24903] [-0.25392] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
1)) 
 0.028816  0.471335 -5.370420 -0.021640 -0.420909 
  (0.02936)  (0.81143)  (3.47377)  (0.03716)  (0.08119) 
 [ 0.98147] [ 0.58087] [-1.54599] [-0.58240] [-5.18403] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
2)) 
 0.037118  0.129793  1.176977  0.019453 -0.061829 
  (0.03012)  (0.83245)  (3.56374)  (0.03812)  (0.08330) 
 [ 1.23235] [ 0.15592] [ 0.33026] [ 0.51032] [-0.74228] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B7: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 3 (1980-2012): 
North Africa (Alternative combinations)  
Variables D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.442850 -0.291930 -8.691739 -0.193657 -0.464721 
  (0.12262)  (1.07887)  (5.78077)  (0.14799)  (0.35195) 
 [-3.61161] [-0.27059] [-1.50356] [-1.30854] [-1.32042] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.183689  0.176477  1.809676 -0.118790  0.523755 
  (0.13706)  (1.20597)  (6.46178)  (0.16543)  (0.39341) 
 [ 1.34018] [ 0.14634] [ 0.28006] [-0.71807] [ 1.33131] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.006913 -0.296697 -0.447875  0.010326  0.047778 
  (0.01370)  (0.12050)  (0.64568)  (0.01653)  (0.03931) 
 [-0.50472] [-2.46213] [-0.69365] [ 0.62465] [ 1.21537] 
      
D(POLITY(-2)) -0.014712 -0.169250 -0.074744  0.024882 -0.020808 
  (0.01806)  (0.15893)  (0.85155)  (0.02180)  (0.05185) 
 [-0.81449] [-1.06497] [-0.08777] [ 1.14134] [-0.40135] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.003750  0.024289 -0.432003  0.003717 -0.002955 
  (0.00235)  (0.02070)  (0.11093)  (0.00284)  (0.00675) 
 [ 1.59360] [ 1.17318] [-3.89432] [ 1.30893] [-0.43747] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2))  0.000902  0.013581 -0.230317  0.001019  0.008197 
  (0.00207)  (0.01826)  (0.09782)  (0.00250)  (0.00596) 
 [ 0.43477] [ 0.74394] [-2.35457] [ 0.40692] [ 1.37640] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.033009  1.837825  13.03282 -0.472516  0.137390 
  (0.10788)  (0.94923)  (5.08615)  (0.13021)  (0.30966) 
 [ 0.30596] [ 1.93611] [ 2.56242] [-3.62883] [ 0.44368] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2)) -0.062220  1.017313  6.586430 -0.059314  0.071044 
  (0.09369)  (0.82435)  (4.41698)  (0.11308)  (0.26892) 
 [-0.66410] [ 1.23409] [ 1.49116] [-0.52453] [ 0.26418] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
1)) 
 0.016417  0.370459  0.868629 -0.094634 -0.531172 
  (0.04194)  (0.36899)  (1.97710)  (0.05062)  (0.12037) 
 [ 0.39146] [ 1.00398] [ 0.43934] [-1.86964] [-4.41274] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
2)) 
-0.040679  0.260800 -1.353066 -0.035684 -0.140277 
  (0.04284)  (0.37693)  (2.01965)  (0.05171)  (0.12296) 
 [-0.94957] [ 0.69191] [-0.66995] [-0.69013] [-1.14081] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B8: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 3 (1980-2012): 
Southern Africa (Alternative combinations)  
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTI
ON) 
D(LAWRULE(-1))  0.192145  41.79696 -24.02135  0.290990 -0.570696 
  (0.45082)  (33.6207)  (16.6575)  (0.59621)  (1.22044) 
 [ 0.42621] [ 1.24319] [-1.44207] [ 0.48807] [-0.46762] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.139503  15.10766 -8.464973  1.233827 -1.230486 
  (0.35721)  (26.6394)  (13.1986)  (0.47241)  (0.96702) 
 [ 0.39053] [ 0.56712] [-0.64135] [ 2.61178] [-1.27245] 
      
D(POLITY(-1))  0.001872  0.047893 -0.083826  0.003774 -0.016872 
  (0.00304)  (0.22695)  (0.11245)  (0.00402)  (0.00824) 
 [ 0.61520] [ 0.21103] [-0.74548] [ 0.93775] [-2.04798] 
      
D(POLITY(-2)) -0.001999 -0.292805 -0.081112 -0.005906 -0.009981 
  (0.00280)  (0.20898)  (0.10354)  (0.00371)  (0.00759) 
 [-0.71349] [-1.40114] [-0.78340] [-1.59376] [-1.31579] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.001787  0.213270 -0.812424  0.002179 -0.023048 
  (0.00676)  (0.50407)  (0.24974)  (0.00894)  (0.01830) 
 [ 0.26441] [ 0.42310] [-3.25304] [ 0.24381] [-1.25960] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2))  0.000131 -0.075388 -0.346887  0.002694 -0.003364 
  (0.00352)  (0.26239)  (0.13000)  (0.00465)  (0.00952) 
 [ 0.03737] [-0.28731] [-2.66828] [ 0.57902] [-0.35321] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1)) -0.152148 -1.006882  1.643948 -0.518530  0.643717 
  (0.13226)  (9.86313)  (4.88673)  (0.17491)  (0.35803) 
 [-1.15041] [-0.10209] [ 0.33641] [-2.96460] [ 1.79792] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2)) -0.032068 -5.683250 -3.493405  0.837814  0.062025 
  (0.17948)  (13.3851)  (6.63172)  (0.23736)  (0.48588) 
 [-0.17867] [-0.42459] [-0.52677] [ 3.52966] [ 0.12765] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1)) -0.182188  8.524841  0.235403 -0.595396  0.327720 
  (0.11737)  (8.75278)  (4.33660)  (0.15522)  (0.31773) 
 [-1.55229] [ 0.97396] [ 0.05428] [-3.83591] [ 1.03145] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2))  0.045289  7.924080 -1.364955  0.124102  0.263150 
  (0.11405)  (8.50572)  (4.21419)  (0.15084)  (0.30876) 
 [ 0.39708] [ 0.93162] [-0.32389] [ 0.82276] [ 0.85228] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B9: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 3 (1980-2012): 
West Africa (Alternative combinations)  
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.172859  11.83064 -56.65644  1.421056  0.710702 
  (0.25381)  (13.2981)  (94.2748)  (0.37727)  (0.73614) 
 [-0.68105] [ 0.88965] [-0.60097] [ 3.76670] [ 0.96545] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.412234  2.562313 -33.55859  1.116243  2.017069 
  (0.25224)  (13.2156)  (93.6900)  (0.37493)  (0.73157) 
 [ 1.63431] [ 0.19389] [-0.35819] [ 2.97722] [ 2.75718] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -4.82E-05  0.138511  0.492351  0.003948 -0.006101 
  (0.00457)  (0.23958)  (1.69845)  (0.00680)  (0.01326) 
 [-0.01054] [ 0.57815] [ 0.28988] [ 0.58089] [-0.46002] 
      
D(POLITY(-2))  0.005233  0.106631  0.689971  0.007233 -0.001705 
  (0.00451)  (0.23655)  (1.67702)  (0.00671)  (0.01309) 
 [ 1.15908] [ 0.45077] [ 0.41143] [ 1.07771] [-0.13022] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.000352 -0.032830 -0.435673  0.001194 -0.000706 
  (0.00064)  (0.03343)  (0.23696)  (0.00095)  (0.00185) 
 [ 0.55189] [-0.98220] [-1.83856] [ 1.25874] [-0.38147] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -0.000207 -0.006197 -0.504860 -0.000244  0.000813 
  (0.00067)  (0.03503)  (0.24834)  (0.00099)  (0.00194) 
 [-0.30992] [-0.17691] [-2.03293] [-0.24516] [ 0.41948] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.247509  0.263366  36.48934 -0.466029 -0.173567 
  (0.13321)  (6.97915)  (49.4776)  (0.19800)  (0.38634) 
 [ 1.85809] [ 0.03774] [ 0.73749] [-2.35369] [-0.44926] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.113216  0.167902  27.34614 -0.255701 -0.342123 
  (0.14327)  (7.50640)  (53.2155)  (0.21296)  (0.41553) 
 [ 0.79023] [ 0.02237] [ 0.51388] [-1.20071] [-0.82334] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1)) -0.021866 -3.405540 -37.00262 -0.294407 -0.223393 
  (0.08892)  (4.65900)  (33.0293)  (0.13218)  (0.25791) 
 [-0.24589] [-0.73096] [-1.12030] [-2.22738] [-0.86618] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2))  0.143605 -4.618989  5.099230 -0.243746 -0.403224 
  (0.08557)  (4.48307)  (31.7821)  (0.12719)  (0.24817) 
 [ 1.67830] [-1.03032] [ 0.16044] [-1.91647] [-1.62480] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B10: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 3 (1980-2012): 
East Africa (Alternative combinations)  
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1))  0.113282 -23.10464 -48.49936 -0.042694 -0.340651 
  (0.27998)  (7.47500)  (40.1941)  (0.19503)  (0.61668) 
 [ 0.40461] [-3.09092] [-1.20663] [-0.21891] [-0.55240] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2)) -0.017546 -5.963527  16.42319  0.042169 -0.351275 
  (0.22799)  (6.08707)  (32.7310)  (0.15882)  (0.50218) 
 [-0.07696] [-0.97970] [ 0.50176] [ 0.26552] [-0.69951] 
      
D(POLITY(-1))  0.003152  0.084425 -0.778562 -0.007857  0.012444 
  (0.00744)  (0.19870)  (1.06846)  (0.00518)  (0.01639) 
 [ 0.42350] [ 0.42488] [-0.72868] [-1.51550] [ 0.75911] 
      
D(POLITY(-2))  0.001651  0.217889  0.850908 -0.001808  0.007246 
  (0.00730)  (0.19503)  (1.04872)  (0.00509)  (0.01609) 
 [ 0.22598] [ 1.11719] [ 0.81138] [-0.35526] [ 0.45031] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1)) -0.001003 -0.069543 -0.339108  0.000996  0.001939 
  (0.00216)  (0.05765)  (0.31002)  (0.00150)  (0.00476) 
 [-0.46470] [-1.20619] [-1.09384] [ 0.66234] [ 0.40768] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -0.004188 -0.096055 -0.400781 -0.000670  0.012763 
  (0.00185)  (0.04948)  (0.26607)  (0.00129)  (0.00408) 
 [-2.25959] [-1.94119] [-1.50628] [-0.51883] [ 3.12647] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.370663 -24.50687  14.31867  0.112872 -2.134342 
  (0.63090)  (16.8442)  (90.5736)  (0.43948)  (1.38962) 
 [ 0.58752] [-1.45492] [ 0.15809] [ 0.25683] [-1.53592] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.155124 -33.32437  14.16232 -0.265805 -0.164263 
  (0.40519)  (10.8181)  (58.1704)  (0.28226)  (0.89248) 
 [ 0.38284] [-3.08043] [ 0.24346] [-0.94171] [-0.18405] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1)) -0.036490  2.848192 -21.50456  0.009832 -0.169143 
  (0.12906)  (3.44565)  (18.5278)  (0.08990)  (0.28426) 
 [-0.28274] [ 0.82660] [-1.16067] [ 0.10937] [-0.59502] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2)) -0.035613  0.207435  6.116548 -0.103430  0.212694 
  (0.13532)  (3.61295)  (19.4273)  (0.09427)  (0.29806) 
 [-0.26317] [ 0.05741] [ 0.31484] [-1.09721] [ 0.71359] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
335 
 
Appendix B11: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 4 (1980-2012): 
Pooled data (Alternative combinations)  
Variables D(LAWRULE
) 
D(POLITY) D(INFLATIO
N) 
D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTI
ON) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.432547  0.743096 -13.20058 -0.146687 -0.027415 
  (0.08128)  (2.16838)  (10.1748)  (0.10198)  (0.22175) 
 [-5.32200] [ 0.34270] [-1.29737] [-1.43840] [-0.12363] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.091346  0.573604  4.572980  0.007007  0.555447 
  (0.08627)  (2.30173)  (10.8006)  (0.10825)  (0.23538) 
 [ 1.05879] [ 0.24921] [ 0.42340] [ 0.06473] [ 2.35974] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.001582  0.059524  0.189207 -0.000209 -0.004022 
  (0.00278)  (0.07412)  (0.34781)  (0.00349)  (0.00758) 
 [-0.56928] [ 0.80305] [ 0.54400] [-0.05987] [-0.53056] 
      
D(POLITY(-2)) -0.000361 -0.197180  0.382758 -0.003811 -0.008169 
  (0.00278)  (0.07411)  (0.34776)  (0.00349)  (0.00758) 
 [-0.13004] [-2.66058] [ 1.10064] [-1.09349] [-1.07779] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.000400 -0.020347 -0.540345  0.000256 -0.002522 
  (0.00059)  (0.01576)  (0.07395)  (0.00074)  (0.00161) 
 [ 0.67731] [-1.29107] [-7.30675] [ 0.34484] [-1.56500] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -0.000690 -0.010608 -0.374325 -0.001288  0.001439 
  (0.00059)  (0.01577)  (0.07399)  (0.00074)  (0.00161) 
 [-1.16707] [-0.67274] [-5.05919] [-1.73743] [ 0.89268] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.116839 -0.701031  8.139161 -0.447063  0.174453 
  (0.06385)  (1.70341)  (7.99302)  (0.08011)  (0.17420) 
 [ 1.82998] [-0.41155] [ 1.01828] [-5.58050] [ 1.00147] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.036759 -0.696772  5.516448  0.005380 -0.032569 
  (0.06320)  (1.68608)  (7.91171)  (0.07930)  (0.17243) 
 [ 0.58164] [-0.41325] [ 0.69725] [ 0.06785] [-0.18889] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1))  0.028798  0.948166 -4.333348 -0.028963 -0.450489 
  (0.02940)  (0.78450)  (3.68118)  (0.03690)  (0.08023) 
 [ 0.97937] [ 1.20862] [-1.17716] [-0.78501] [-5.61521] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2))  0.037780  0.555412  1.869297  0.000404 -0.089875 
  (0.02975)  (0.79372)  (3.72444)  (0.03733)  (0.08117) 
 [ 1.26990] [ 0.69975] [ 0.50190] [ 0.01082] [-1.10724] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B12: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 4 (1980-2012): 
North Africa (Alternative combinations)  
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.292096  1.091506 -11.52663 -0.178064 -0.204772 
  (0.12265)  (1.19943)  (6.33932)  (0.15431)  (0.36934) 
 [-2.38152] [ 0.91002] [-1.81828] [-1.15392] [-0.55443] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.259759  0.837733 -0.168960 -0.076332  0.807446 
  (0.12914)  (1.26292)  (6.67488)  (0.16248)  (0.38889) 
 [ 2.01140] [ 0.66333] [-0.02531] [-0.46979] [ 2.07631] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.009151 -0.130879 -0.245724 -0.000667  0.010742 
  (0.01359)  (0.13289)  (0.70236)  (0.01710)  (0.04092) 
 [-0.67338] [-0.98487] [-0.34986] [-0.03902] [ 0.26251] 
      
D(POLITY(-2)) -0.022774 -0.076185  0.371644  0.044079  0.006986 
  (0.01786)  (0.17463)  (0.92295)  (0.02247)  (0.05377) 
 [-1.27536] [-0.43627] [ 0.40267] [ 1.96201] [ 0.12992] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.004783  0.013025 -0.548066  0.002572 -0.000311 
  (0.00211)  (0.02066)  (0.10919)  (0.00266)  (0.00636) 
 [ 2.26393] [ 0.63047] [-5.01932] [ 0.96757] [-0.04886] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2))  0.001479  0.007534 -0.291872  0.001862  0.011978 
  (0.00196)  (0.01915)  (0.10120)  (0.00246)  (0.00590) 
 [ 0.75531] [ 0.39348] [-2.88419] [ 0.75597] [ 2.03161] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.072112  0.696478  6.303695 -0.564876  0.327709 
  (0.08855)  (0.86598)  (4.57694)  (0.11141)  (0.26666) 
 [ 0.81434] [ 0.80427] [ 1.37727] [-5.07016] [ 1.22895] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2)) -0.048985  0.424687  3.090593 -0.089737  0.186986 
  (0.08425)  (0.82387)  (4.35438)  (0.10599)  (0.25369) 
 [-0.58145] [ 0.51548] [ 0.70977] [-0.84662] [ 0.73706] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1)) -0.002440 -0.158081  1.113246 -0.072250 -0.520678 
  (0.04032)  (0.39429)  (2.08391)  (0.05073)  (0.12141) 
 [-0.06051] [-0.40093] [ 0.53421] [-1.42429] [-4.28856] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2)) -0.046371 -0.132743 -1.883343 -0.097465 -0.156947 
  (0.04006)  (0.39172)  (2.07037)  (0.05040)  (0.12062) 
 [-1.15763] [-0.33887] [-0.90967] [-1.93395] [-1.30115] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B13: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 4 (1980-2012): 
Southern Africa (Alternative combinations)  
Variables D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1))  1.419831 -48.05147  0.997160  1.069099 -0.152981 
  (0.22812)  (37.6498)  (22.3976)  (0.70898)  (1.71801) 
 [ 6.22395] [-1.27627] [ 0.04452] [ 1.50794] [-0.08905] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.705030 -19.80700  3.044369  1.424674 -0.996460 
  (0.15377)  (25.3779)  (15.0972)  (0.47789)  (1.15802) 
 [ 4.58505] [-0.78048] [ 0.20165] [ 2.98117] [-0.86048] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.002380  0.031334 -0.001230 -6.25E-05 -0.001287 
  (0.00117)  (0.19243)  (0.11447)  (0.00362)  (0.00878) 
 [-2.04161] [ 0.16284] [-0.01074] [-0.01724] [-0.14662] 
      
D(POLITY(-2)) -0.008260 -0.299855  0.027891 -0.008666  0.001896 
  (0.00119)  (0.19720)  (0.11731)  (0.00371)  (0.00900) 
 [-6.91278] [-1.52059] [ 0.23776] [-2.33365] [ 0.21074] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1)) -9.94E-05 -0.361785 -0.518059  0.000888 -0.013568 
  (0.00230)  (0.37913)  (0.22554)  (0.00714)  (0.01730) 
 [-0.04329] [-0.95425] [-2.29696] [ 0.12441] [-0.78427] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2))  2.69E-06 -0.197269 -0.286169  0.000968 -0.001132 
  (0.00141)  (0.23230)  (0.13820)  (0.00437)  (0.01060) 
 [ 0.00191] [-0.84918] [-2.07073] [ 0.22131] [-0.10682] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.065402 -3.647207  0.122196 -0.401286  0.342327 
  (0.06263)  (10.3367)  (6.14922)  (0.19465)  (0.47167) 
 [ 1.04425] [-0.35284] [ 0.01987] [-2.06159] [ 0.72577] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.133683 -9.710537 -4.365078  0.761879 -0.128250 
  (0.07591)  (12.5281)  (7.45292)  (0.23592)  (0.57167) 
 [ 1.76108] [-0.77510] [-0.58569] [ 3.22943] [-0.22434] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1)) -0.126116  6.746589  0.301013 -0.370212  0.037428 
  (0.03942)  (6.50548)  (3.87007)  (0.12250)  (0.29685) 
 [-3.19951] [ 1.03706] [ 0.07778] [-3.02203] [ 0.12608] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2))  0.198498 -4.449817  1.576914  0.294447  0.043218 
  (0.04762)  (7.85858)  (4.67502)  (0.14798)  (0.35860) 
 [ 4.16873] [-0.56624] [ 0.33731] [ 1.98971] [ 0.12052] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B14: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 5 (1980-2012): 
West Africa (Alternative combinations)  
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.265516  7.998652 -81.75431  1.194706  0.765744 
  (0.27440)  (12.9887)  (86.2628)  (0.40680)  (0.67735) 
 [-0.96762] [ 0.61581] [-0.94774] [ 2.93683] [ 1.13050] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.293299 -0.523618 -61.23408  0.864879  1.986629 
  (0.27397)  (12.9683)  (86.1267)  (0.40616)  (0.67628) 
 [ 1.07056] [-0.04038] [-0.71098] [ 2.12941] [ 2.93757] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.001143  0.093072  0.516541 -0.001758 -0.008670 
  (0.00511)  (0.24175)  (1.60557)  (0.00757)  (0.01261) 
 [-0.22370] [ 0.38499] [ 0.32172] [-0.23212] [-0.68766] 
      
D(POLITY(-2))  0.003081  0.064484  0.675261  0.002471 -0.004726 
  (0.00506)  (0.23940)  (1.58992)  (0.00750)  (0.01248) 
 [ 0.60926] [ 0.26936] [ 0.42471] [ 0.32961] [-0.37853] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.000548 -0.037478 -0.358178  0.000528 -0.000547 
  (0.00077)  (0.03641)  (0.24183)  (0.00114)  (0.00190) 
 [ 0.71232] [-1.02926] [-1.48111] [ 0.46334] [-0.28822] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -0.000582 -0.006956 -0.421036 -0.000812  0.000466 
  (0.00074)  (0.03518)  (0.23362)  (0.00110)  (0.00183) 
 [-0.78279] [-0.19776] [-1.80224] [-0.73721] [ 0.25425] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.160221 -1.517570  43.19833 -0.686922 -0.376479 
  (0.15688)  (7.42582)  (49.3175)  (0.23257)  (0.38725) 
 [ 1.02131] [-0.20436] [ 0.87592] [-2.95357] [-0.97218] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.042388 -0.514206  45.33621 -0.383162 -0.502743 
  (0.17471)  (8.27007)  (54.9244)  (0.25901)  (0.43128) 
 [ 0.24262] [-0.06218] [ 0.82543] [-1.47931] [-1.16571] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
1)) 
 0.019665 -2.948055 -36.64667 -0.339974 -0.293831 
  (0.11406)  (5.39922)  (35.8581)  (0.16910)  (0.28156) 
 [ 0.17240] [-0.54602] [-1.02199] [-2.01048] [-1.04357] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
2)) 
 0.211175 -3.951333 -2.876219 -0.204760 -0.410016 
  (0.10678)  (5.05433)  (33.5676)  (0.15830)  (0.26358) 
 [ 1.97770] [-0.78177] [-0.08568] [-1.29350] [-1.55557] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B15: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 5 (1980-2012): 
East Africa (Alternative combinations)  
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.305688 -23.43895 -13.11830 -0.189534  0.248627 
  (0.27370)  (3.91692)  (31.9552)  (0.13561)  (0.48766) 
 [-1.11686] [-5.98402] [-0.41052] [-1.39764] [ 0.50984] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2)) -0.088422 -10.25567  17.90417 -0.031097  0.007096 
  (0.26562)  (3.80121)  (31.0112)  (0.13160)  (0.47325) 
 [-0.33289] [-2.69800] [ 0.57735] [-0.23629] [ 0.01499] 
      
D(POLITY(-1))  0.004303  0.035107  0.348351 -0.005967  0.020460 
  (0.00926)  (0.13258)  (1.08165)  (0.00459)  (0.01651) 
 [ 0.46450] [ 0.26479] [ 0.32205] [-1.29984] [ 1.23948] 
      
D(POLITY(-2))  0.004175 -0.076799  0.470683 -0.001202  0.012024 
  (0.00838)  (0.11989)  (0.97808)  (0.00415)  (0.01493) 
 [ 0.49842] [-0.64058] [ 0.48123] [-0.28948] [ 0.80559] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1)) -0.002523 -0.216843 -0.556551 -0.001351  0.002196 
  (0.00342)  (0.04891)  (0.39903)  (0.00169)  (0.00609) 
 [-0.73823] [-4.43336] [-1.39475] [-0.79757] [ 0.36066] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -0.004323 -0.160166 -0.257406 -0.001671  0.014323 
  (0.00229)  (0.03278)  (0.26740)  (0.00113)  (0.00408) 
 [-1.88754] [-4.88656] [-0.96262] [-1.47271] [ 3.50983] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.152237 -44.19445 -45.80756 -0.049158 -1.698581 
  (0.76667)  (10.9717)  (89.5096)  (0.37986)  (1.36597) 
 [ 0.19857] [-4.02805] [-0.51176] [-0.12941] [-1.24350] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2)) -0.019461 -43.06412 -19.36456 -0.453579 -0.192909 
  (0.50720)  (7.25850)  (59.2166)  (0.25130)  (0.90368) 
 [-0.03837] [-5.93292] [-0.32701] [-1.80493] [-0.21347] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1)) -0.091229  6.913960 -12.69567 -0.005874 -0.004318 
  (0.16858)  (2.41259)  (19.6825)  (0.08353)  (0.30037) 
 [-0.54114] [ 2.86578] [-0.64502] [-0.07033] [-0.01438] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2)) -0.008010  0.027869  8.301707 -0.127956  0.263243 
  (0.15843)  (2.26722)  (18.4966)  (0.07849)  (0.28227) 
 [-0.05056] [ 0.01229] [ 0.44882] [-1.63012] [ 0.93260] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B16: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 5 (1980-2012): 
Pooled data (Alternative combinations) 
 D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.426971  0.583018 -10.31239 -0.125049 -0.055355 
  (0.08304)  (2.31929)  (9.30832)  (0.10535)  (0.22985) 
 [-5.14205] [ 0.25138] [-1.10787] [-1.18701] [-0.24084] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.081261  0.132439  2.954688 -0.004083  0.595174 
  (0.08639)  (2.41294)  (9.68418)  (0.10960)  (0.23913) 
 [ 0.94065] [ 0.05489] [ 0.30510] [-0.03726] [ 2.48895] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.001314  0.008794  0.230423 -0.000128 -0.001388 
  (0.00268)  (0.07481)  (0.30026)  (0.00340)  (0.00741) 
 [-0.49039] [ 0.11755] [ 0.76741] [-0.03777] [-0.18724] 
      
D(POLITY(-2)) -0.001395 -0.273260  0.275769 -0.002798 -0.003525 
  (0.00270)  (0.07532)  (0.30231)  (0.00342)  (0.00746) 
 [-0.51727] [-3.62775] [ 0.91220] [-0.81772] [-0.47219] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.001327 -0.016252 -0.217519  0.001646 -0.004247 
  (0.00082)  (0.02304)  (0.09247)  (0.00105)  (0.00228) 
 [ 1.60893] [-0.70535] [-2.35219] [ 1.57258] [-1.86002] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -0.000199 -0.007402 -0.218219 -0.000733  4.33E-05 
  (0.00066)  (0.01851)  (0.07431)  (0.00084)  (0.00183) 
 [-0.29957] [-0.39978] [-2.93668] [-0.87119] [ 0.02362] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.120738 -0.287612  6.354329 -0.478265  0.177849 
  (0.06458)  (1.80370)  (7.23902)  (0.08193)  (0.17875) 
 [ 1.86971] [-0.15946] [ 0.87779] [-5.83756] [ 0.99496] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.039178 -0.530649  4.564228  0.008644 -0.028920 
  (0.06368)  (1.77876)  (7.13892)  (0.08080)  (0.17628) 
 [ 0.61520] [-0.29833] [ 0.63934] [ 0.10698] [-0.16406] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1))  0.013988  0.074333 -5.972709 -0.026372 -0.380859 
  (0.02832)  (0.79112)  (3.17509)  (0.03593)  (0.07840) 
 [ 0.49387] [ 0.09396] [-1.88111] [-0.73388] [-4.85783] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2))  0.023559 -0.014942 -0.365810  0.012918 -0.033406 
  (0.02881)  (0.80464)  (3.22936)  (0.03655)  (0.07974) 
 [ 0.81779] [-0.01857] [-0.11328] [ 0.35345] [-0.41893] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B17: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 5 (1980-2012): 
North Africa (Alternative combinations)  
Variables D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.442727 -0.150778 -8.261535 -0.223325 -0.492638 
  (0.11772)  (1.12654)  (5.12994)  (0.14789)  (0.35179) 
 [-3.76097] [-0.13384] [-1.61046] [-1.51010] [-1.40037] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.186987  0.085858 -0.348397 -0.160109  0.507852 
  (0.13260)  (1.26897)  (5.77855)  (0.16659)  (0.39627) 
 [ 1.41016] [ 0.06766] [-0.06029] [-0.96112] [ 1.28158] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.002831 -0.144770  0.451699  0.015386  0.018390 
  (0.01278)  (0.12228)  (0.55683)  (0.01605)  (0.03819) 
 [-0.22159] [-1.18392] [ 0.81120] [ 0.95851] [ 0.48161] 
      
D(POLITY(-2)) -0.012184 -0.005971  0.828308  0.027523 -0.032052 
  (0.01740)  (0.16648)  (0.75811)  (0.02186)  (0.05199) 
 [-0.70037] [-0.03586] [ 1.09259] [ 1.25936] [-0.61653] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.007188  0.005508 -0.210530  0.002860 -0.008424 
  (0.00274)  (0.02624)  (0.11949)  (0.00344)  (0.00819) 
 [ 2.62161] [ 0.20992] [-1.76188] [ 0.83030] [-1.02805] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2))  0.002367  0.000434 -0.147088  0.000502  0.004934 
  (0.00220)  (0.02104)  (0.09581)  (0.00276)  (0.00657) 
 [ 1.07656] [ 0.02062] [-1.53524] [ 0.18169] [ 0.75097] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1)) -0.023422  0.611147 -1.226893 -0.569189  0.471485 
  (0.10333)  (0.98888)  (4.50307)  (0.12982)  (0.30880) 
 [-0.22667] [ 0.61802] [-0.27246] [-4.38460] [ 1.52682] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2)) -0.066470  0.682002  2.638204 -0.096178  0.232816 
  (0.09273)  (0.88746)  (4.04124)  (0.11650)  (0.27713) 
 [-0.71678] [ 0.76849] [ 0.65282] [-0.82555] [ 0.84009] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
1)) 
 0.006558 -0.005550 -1.443094 -0.090516 -0.485762 
  (0.03908)  (0.37400)  (1.70310)  (0.04910)  (0.11679) 
 [ 0.16780] [-0.01484] [-0.84733] [-1.84360] [-4.15922] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
2)) 
-0.039583 -0.083662 -2.483055 -0.050896 -0.045140 
  (0.03880)  (0.37129)  (1.69077)  (0.04874)  (0.11595) 
 [-1.02025] [-0.22532] [-1.46859] [-1.04420] [-0.38932] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
342 
 
Appendix B18: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 5 (1980-2012): 
Southern Africa (Alternative combinations)  
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION
) 
D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1))  0.964220  19.32026 -33.03562  0.585970  0.011379 
  (0.32478)  (41.5933)  (16.6785)  (0.67222)  (1.67035) 
 [ 2.96888] [ 0.46450] [-1.98073] [ 0.87170] [ 0.00681] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.441356  10.91977 -12.95770  1.158460 -0.678152 
  (0.21632)  (27.7041)  (11.1091)  (0.44774)  (1.11257) 
 [ 2.04027] [ 0.39416] [-1.16641] [ 2.58733] [-0.60954] 
      
D(POLITY(-1))  0.000317 -0.043511 -0.048357  0.002098 -0.003846 
  (0.00195)  (0.24989)  (0.10020)  (0.00404)  (0.01004) 
 [ 0.16260] [-0.17412] [-0.48260] [ 0.51951] [-0.38327] 
      
D(POLITY(-2)) -0.003260 -0.478335  0.057144 -0.005725  0.000221 
  (0.00170)  (0.21741)  (0.08718)  (0.00351)  (0.00873) 
 [-1.92018] [-2.20013] [ 0.65547] [-1.62934] [ 0.02534] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.004094 -0.194568 -0.871900  0.004328 -0.022277 
  (0.00448)  (0.57327)  (0.22987)  (0.00926)  (0.02302) 
 [ 0.91461] [-0.33940] [-3.79294] [ 0.46710] [-0.96764] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2))  0.001623 -0.125168 -0.469197  0.002756 -0.005655 
  (0.00280)  (0.35810)  (0.14359)  (0.00579)  (0.01438) 
 [ 0.58055] [-0.34954] [-3.26753] [ 0.47617] [-0.39322] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.267879  7.998107 -6.648000 -0.264685  0.236799 
  (0.12179)  (15.5971)  (6.25430)  (0.25208)  (0.62637) 
 [ 2.19956] [ 0.51279] [-1.06295] [-1.05002] [ 0.37805] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.230450  10.24373 -8.573388  0.894756 -0.268738 
  (0.12990)  (16.6362)  (6.67096)  (0.26887)  (0.66810) 
 [ 1.77404] [ 0.61575] [-1.28518] [ 3.32785] [-0.40224] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1))  0.029800  0.537236 -3.117658 -0.311234 -0.000879 
  (0.06283)  (8.04687)  (3.22671)  (0.13005)  (0.32316) 
 [ 0.47428] [ 0.06676] [-0.96620] [-2.39317] [-0.00272] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2))  0.210821  3.828726 -3.265744  0.308717 -0.024420 
  (0.07824)  (10.0203)  (4.01804)  (0.16194)  (0.40241) 
 [ 2.69447] [ 0.38210] [-0.81277] [ 1.90631] [-0.06068] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B19: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 5 (1980-2012): 
West Africa (Alternative combinations)  
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.467986  1.447782 -55.29273  0.098078  0.040472 
  (0.26269)  (9.37509)  (57.8323)  (0.27164)  (0.50900) 
 [-1.78148] [ 0.15443] [-0.95609] [ 0.36106] [ 0.07951] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.034004  0.014270 -21.74358  0.357454  1.490115 
  (0.25862)  (9.22986)  (56.9364)  (0.26743)  (0.50112) 
 [ 0.13148] [ 0.00155] [-0.38189] [ 1.33662] [ 2.97360] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.000122 -0.012744  0.977482  0.000684 -0.016893 
  (0.00678)  (0.24184)  (1.49184)  (0.00701)  (0.01313) 
 [-0.01806] [-0.05270] [ 0.65522] [ 0.09758] [-1.28656] 
      
D(POLITY(-2))  0.001811  0.049890 -0.010625  0.002949 -0.012687 
  (0.00679)  (0.24234)  (1.49493)  (0.00702)  (0.01316) 
 [ 0.26676] [ 0.20587] [-0.00711] [ 0.41994] [-0.96429] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.000233 -0.032123 -0.391431  0.001046  0.000802 
  (0.00103)  (0.03680)  (0.22699)  (0.00107)  (0.00200) 
 [ 0.22576] [-0.87297] [-1.72442] [ 0.98117] [ 0.40148] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -3.26E-05 -0.013475 -0.427387 -0.000295  0.000419 
  (0.00094)  (0.03337)  (0.20586)  (0.00097)  (0.00181) 
 [-0.03489] [-0.40380] [-2.07609] [-0.30549] [ 0.23140] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.395680 -1.129659  58.22396  0.442110 -0.137836 
  (0.25425)  (9.07371)  (55.9732)  (0.26291)  (0.49264) 
 [ 1.55627] [-0.12450] [ 1.04021] [ 1.68162] [-0.27979] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.206474 -1.142442  17.24074  0.244922 -0.379719 
  (0.20024)  (7.14638)  (44.0840)  (0.20706)  (0.38800) 
 [ 1.03111] [-0.15986] [ 0.39109] [ 1.18284] [-0.97866] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1)) -0.039666  1.057337 -48.85012 -0.373313 -0.060911 
  (0.13582)  (4.84702)  (29.8999)  (0.14044)  (0.26316) 
 [-0.29206] [ 0.21814] [-1.63379] [-2.65816] [-0.23146] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2))  0.123598 -0.318560  5.063683 -0.294170 -0.178057 
  (0.12798)  (4.56722)  (28.1739)  (0.13233)  (0.24797) 
 [ 0.96579] [-0.06975] [ 0.17973] [-2.22295] [-0.71807] 
      
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B20: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 5 (1980-2012): 
East Africa (Alternative combinations)  
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.455056 -20.73394 -6.811633 -0.274745  0.614181 
  (0.26910)  (4.14848)  (30.9102)  (0.15294)  (0.58959) 
 [-1.69103] [-4.99796] [-0.22037] [-1.79645] [ 1.04172] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2)) -0.008839 -7.024618 -3.018760  0.023930 -0.124888 
  (0.27669)  (4.26544)  (31.7816)  (0.15725)  (0.60621) 
 [-0.03195] [-1.64687] [-0.09498] [ 0.15218] [-0.20602] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.000104 -0.071025  0.148802 -0.009542  0.011035 
  (0.00843)  (0.12995)  (0.96825)  (0.00479)  (0.01847) 
 [-0.01231] [-0.54656] [ 0.15368] [-1.99174] [ 0.59751] 
      
D(POLITY(-2))  0.004959 -0.190622  0.629281 -0.001827  0.007944 
  (0.00925)  (0.14255)  (1.06210)  (0.00526)  (0.02026) 
 [ 0.53630] [-1.33727] [ 0.59249] [-0.34772] [ 0.39211] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.002314 -0.214442 -0.749706  0.001318  0.000590 
  (0.00328)  (0.05051)  (0.37635)  (0.00186)  (0.00718) 
 [ 0.70633] [-4.24556] [-1.99207] [ 0.70799] [ 0.08214] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -0.003053 -0.174784 -0.431228 -0.001116  0.010840 
  (0.00249)  (0.03837)  (0.28589)  (0.00141)  (0.00545) 
 [-1.22682] [-4.55520] [-1.50834] [-0.78880] [ 1.98780] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.063479 -34.87483  10.60055 -0.167955 -0.843872 
  (0.73284)  (11.2976)  (84.1783)  (0.41650)  (1.60563) 
 [ 0.08662] [-3.08691] [ 0.12593] [-0.40326] [-0.52557] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.083068 -19.42305 -12.28740 -0.297621  0.221439 
  (0.44024)  (6.78689)  (50.5688)  (0.25021)  (0.96456) 
 [ 0.18869] [-2.86185] [-0.24298] [-1.18951] [ 0.22958] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1)) -0.041967  17.49414 -24.18794  0.084289 -0.234173 
  (0.23097)  (3.56073)  (26.5308)  (0.13127)  (0.50605) 
 [-0.18169] [ 4.91308] [-0.91169] [ 0.64211] [-0.46274] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2))  0.078221  9.160112 -11.22433 -0.025172  0.007833 
  (0.18361)  (2.83064)  (21.0910)  (0.10435)  (0.40229) 
 [ 0.42600] [ 3.23605] [-0.53219] [-0.24122] [ 0.01947] 
      
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B21: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 6 (1980-2012): 
Pooled data (Alternative combinations)  
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.437503  0.409541 -8.782731 -0.140682  0.012443 
  (0.08189)  (2.25659)  (9.91807)  (0.10404)  (0.22418) 
 [-5.34274] [ 0.18149] [-0.88553] [-1.35217] [ 0.05550] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.085775 -0.440710  8.768758 -0.006766  0.637326 
  (0.08568)  (2.36123)  (10.3780)  (0.10887)  (0.23458) 
 [ 1.00106] [-0.18664] [ 0.84494] [-0.06215] [ 2.71694] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -1.37E-05  0.047878  0.446933  0.000758 -0.002161 
  (0.00282)  (0.07779)  (0.34189)  (0.00359)  (0.00773) 
 [-0.00487] [ 0.61549] [ 1.30725] [ 0.21139] [-0.27968] 
      
D(POLITY(-2))  0.000138 -0.212870  0.557410 -0.002556 -0.009148 
  (0.00284)  (0.07834)  (0.34432)  (0.00361)  (0.00778) 
 [ 0.04868] [-2.71723] [ 1.61888] [-0.70764] [-1.17539] 
      
D(INFLATION(-
1)) 
 0.000535  0.001837 -0.354780  0.000802 -0.003981 
  (0.00074)  (0.02043)  (0.08981)  (0.00094)  (0.00203) 
 [ 0.72114] [ 0.08990] [-3.95044] [ 0.85094] [-1.96134] 
      
D(INFLATION(-
2)) 
-0.000439  0.005609 -0.265246 -0.001094  0.000419 
  (0.00064)  (0.01764)  (0.07755)  (0.00081)  (0.00175) 
 [-0.68592] [ 0.31792] [-3.42042] [-1.34531] [ 0.23886] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.132776 -0.069076  8.120531 -0.460848  0.135248 
  (0.06352)  (1.75042)  (7.69336)  (0.08070)  (0.17389) 
 [ 2.09033] [-0.03946] [ 1.05552] [-5.71032] [ 0.77776] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.048744 -0.080503  3.709382  0.021910 -0.067940 
  (0.06274)  (1.72906)  (7.59948)  (0.07972)  (0.17177) 
 [ 0.77687] [-0.04656] [ 0.48811] [ 0.27484] [-0.39552] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
1)) 
 0.022988  0.224254 -3.139422 -0.022243 -0.411555 
  (0.02843)  (0.78357)  (3.44389)  (0.03613)  (0.07784) 
 [ 0.80847] [ 0.28620] [-0.91159] [-0.61568] [-5.28698] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
2)) 
 0.025607  0.002993  1.146091  0.013924 -0.062612 
  (0.02886)  (0.79536)  (3.49571)  (0.03667)  (0.07901) 
 [ 0.88721] [ 0.00376] [ 0.32786] [ 0.37971] [-0.79241] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
346 
 
Appendix B22: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 6 (1980-2012): 
North Africa (Alternative combinations) 
Variables D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.450914 -0.185566 -5.309490 -0.155614 -0.463148 
  (0.11160)  (1.14421)  (5.83475)  (0.14932)  (0.36565) 
 [-4.04060] [-0.16218] [-0.90998] [-1.04219] [-1.26663] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.171696 -0.037851  1.984021 -0.068820  0.474153 
  (0.12573)  (1.28911)  (6.57367)  (0.16822)  (0.41196) 
 [ 1.36561] [-0.02936] [ 0.30181] [-0.40910] [ 1.15097] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.003856 -0.174742 -0.206838  0.012286  0.023903 
  (0.01152)  (0.11814)  (0.60243)  (0.01542)  (0.03775) 
 [-0.33468] [-1.47915] [-0.34334] [ 0.79694] [ 0.63315] 
      
D(POLITY(-2)) -0.017859 -0.007331  0.307837  0.017451 -0.028756 
  (0.01592)  (0.16324)  (0.83241)  (0.02130)  (0.05217) 
 [-1.12177] [-0.04491] [ 0.36981] [ 0.81923] [-0.55125] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.005894  0.005338 -0.396995  0.001732  0.000895 
  (0.00220)  (0.02260)  (0.11526)  (0.00295)  (0.00722) 
 [ 2.67371] [ 0.23616] [-3.44420] [ 0.58730] [ 0.12388] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2))  0.001987  0.004991 -0.207433 -0.000189  0.010282 
  (0.00191)  (0.01963)  (0.10011)  (0.00256)  (0.00627) 
 [ 1.03789] [ 0.25420] [-2.07201] [-0.07373] [ 1.63893] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.168330  0.325782  10.44680 -0.594382  0.393305 
  (0.09158)  (0.93902)  (4.78845)  (0.12254)  (0.30008) 
 [ 1.83798] [ 0.34694] [ 2.18167] [-4.85053] [ 1.31065] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.022675  0.374701  6.558396 -0.155306  0.229914 
  (0.08675)  (0.88945)  (4.53564)  (0.11607)  (0.28424) 
 [ 0.26139] [ 0.42127] [ 1.44597] [-1.33804] [ 0.80887] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
1)) 
 0.051112 -0.027338  1.117681 -0.089071 -0.471639 
  (0.03640)  (0.37321)  (1.90316)  (0.04870)  (0.11927) 
 [ 1.40419] [-0.07325] [ 0.58728] [-1.82886] [-3.95447] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
2)) 
-0.040240  0.006832 -1.572307 -0.064196 -0.029697 
  (0.03606)  (0.36973)  (1.88538)  (0.04825)  (0.11815) 
 [-1.11592] [ 0.01848] [-0.83395] [-1.33055] [-0.25134] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B23: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 6 (1980-2012): 
Southern Africa (Alternative combinations) 
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1))  0.652978 -15.14766 -24.01583  0.745624  3.638416 
  (0.64488)  (61.1568)  (29.1181)  (0.80536)  (1.52524) 
 [ 1.01256] [-0.24769] [-0.82477] [ 0.92582] [ 2.38547] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.365266 -9.556597 -12.52379  1.645810  1.843728 
  (0.49204)  (46.6626)  (22.2171)  (0.61449)  (1.16376) 
 [ 0.74234] [-0.20480] [-0.56370] [ 2.67832] [ 1.58429] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.002245  0.004917  0.018345  0.003904 -0.001186 
  (0.00254)  (0.24051)  (0.11451)  (0.00317)  (0.00600) 
 [-0.88515] [ 0.02044] [ 0.16020] [ 1.23269] [-0.19767] 
      
D(POLITY(-2)) -0.007274 -0.432634  0.137645 -0.006965 -0.019777 
  (0.00343)  (0.32557)  (0.15501)  (0.00429)  (0.00812) 
 [-2.11886] [-1.32883] [ 0.88796] [-1.62453] [-2.43568] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1)) -0.004191 -0.165361 -0.526563 -0.003765 -0.006813 
  (0.00476)  (0.45167)  (0.21505)  (0.00595)  (0.01126) 
 [-0.87999] [-0.36611] [-2.44859] [-0.63301] [-0.60486] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -0.001690 -0.088398 -0.299857 -0.001240  0.000102 
  (0.00297)  (0.28139)  (0.13398)  (0.00371)  (0.00702) 
 [-0.56965] [-0.31415] [-2.23813] [-0.33453] [ 0.01460] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.102071 -3.864970 -6.185154 -0.245421  1.416944 
  (0.20895)  (19.8156)  (9.43461)  (0.26095)  (0.49420) 
 [ 0.48850] [-0.19505] [-0.65558] [-0.94050] [ 2.86717] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.151073 -2.291325 -12.23322  0.961308  0.885726 
  (0.23370)  (22.1627)  (10.5521)  (0.29186)  (0.55273) 
 [ 0.64644] [-0.10339] [-1.15931] [ 3.29377] [ 1.60245] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1)) -0.218604  2.949713  4.742450 -0.447597 -0.177479 
  (0.10541)  (9.99664)  (4.75962)  (0.13164)  (0.24931) 
 [-2.07381] [ 0.29507] [ 0.99639] [-3.40005] [-0.71187] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2))  0.078936  1.028489  0.120756  0.234061  0.368539 
  (0.09897)  (9.38554)  (4.46866)  (0.12360)  (0.23407) 
 [ 0.79760] [ 0.10958] [ 0.02702] [ 1.89375] [ 1.57446] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
348 
 
Appendix B24: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 6 (1980-2012): 
West Africa (Alternative combinations) 
Error Correction: D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.724778 -7.087542  54.73242 -1.016610 -1.378400 
  (0.49477)  (21.2037)  (144.908)  (0.76433)  (1.07793) 
 [-1.46487] [-0.33426] [ 0.37770] [-1.33007] [-1.27874] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2)) -0.457610 -6.908473  135.2758 -0.096988  0.242514 
  (0.47218)  (20.2355)  (138.292)  (0.72943)  (1.02871) 
 [-0.96914] [-0.34140] [ 0.97819] [-0.13296] [ 0.23574] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -4.36E-05  0.102970  0.167008 -0.000447 -0.005548 
  (0.00583)  (0.24991)  (1.70793)  (0.00901)  (0.01270) 
 [-0.00748] [ 0.41202] [ 0.09778] [-0.04958] [-0.43672] 
      
D(POLITY(-2))  0.001626  0.068510  0.949159  0.002832 -0.005518 
  (0.00569)  (0.24372)  (1.66562)  (0.00879)  (0.01239) 
 [ 0.28583] [ 0.28110] [ 0.56985] [ 0.32232] [-0.44536] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.000397 -0.049038 -0.530471 -0.000274 -0.001324 
  (0.00079)  (0.03370)  (0.23031)  (0.00121)  (0.00171) 
 [ 0.50541] [-1.45510] [-2.30325] [-0.22519] [-0.77288] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -2.32E-05 -0.011252 -0.495408 -0.001431  0.000968 
  (0.00082)  (0.03496)  (0.23890)  (0.00126)  (0.00178) 
 [-0.02838] [-0.32188] [-2.07374] [-1.13546] [ 0.54480] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.302662  6.732155 -49.27744  0.662331  0.792469 
  (0.36713)  (15.7333)  (107.523)  (0.56713)  (0.79983) 
 [ 0.82441] [ 0.42789] [-0.45830] [ 1.16786] [ 0.99079] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.405926  3.380265 -66.42242  0.234622  0.504488 
  (0.29476)  (12.6319)  (86.3275)  (0.45534)  (0.64217) 
 [ 1.37716] [ 0.26760] [-0.76942] [ 0.51527] [ 0.78560] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1))  0.116466 -0.877353 -2.907608 -0.117052 -0.063006 
  (0.13201)  (5.65746)  (38.6637)  (0.20393)  (0.28761) 
 [ 0.88223] [-0.15508] [-0.07520] [-0.57397] [-0.21907] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2))  0.254082 -1.958712  25.39329 -0.043612 -0.275257 
  (0.09912)  (4.24761)  (29.0286)  (0.15311)  (0.21594) 
 [ 2.56351] [-0.46113] [ 0.87477] [-0.28484] [-1.27471] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B25: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 6 (1980-2012): 
East Africa (Alternative combinations) 
Error Correction: D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.300099 -20.06207  4.474713 -0.218112  0.233373 
  (0.25772)  (5.95634)  (29.0458)  (0.15852)  (0.58732) 
 [-1.16445] [-3.36819] [ 0.15406] [-1.37593] [ 0.39736] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.020738 -2.139275  8.978276  0.034728 -0.336141 
  (0.23914)  (5.52691)  (26.9517)  (0.14709)  (0.54497) 
 [ 0.08672] [-0.38707] [ 0.33312] [ 0.23610] [-0.61680] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.002258  0.053623 -0.014960 -0.009488  0.016618 
  (0.00791)  (0.18291)  (0.89195)  (0.00487)  (0.01804) 
 [-0.28532] [ 0.29317] [-0.01677] [-1.94909] [ 0.92139] 
      
D(POLITY(-2))  0.002040  0.029500  1.172483  7.55E-05  0.008417 
  (0.00871)  (0.20126)  (0.98142)  (0.00536)  (0.01984) 
 [ 0.23432] [ 0.14658] [ 1.19468] [ 0.01410] [ 0.42414] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.001310 -0.053681 -0.598396  0.001185 -0.001736 
  (0.00212)  (0.04897)  (0.23882)  (0.00130)  (0.00483) 
 [ 0.61808] [-1.09610] [-2.50562] [ 0.90920] [-0.35955] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -0.003764 -0.107230 -0.252204 -0.000663  0.010423 
  (0.00226)  (0.05224)  (0.25473)  (0.00139)  (0.00515) 
 [-1.66527] [-2.05277] [-0.99008] [-0.47712] [ 2.02363] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.249568 -38.27184  73.65285 -0.088436 -2.251567 
  (0.76213)  (17.6143)  (85.8955)  (0.46878)  (1.73683) 
 [ 0.32746] [-2.17277] [ 0.85747] [-0.18865] [-1.29636] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.096868 -34.24270  45.22459 -0.281423 -0.130446 
  (0.48677)  (11.2502)  (54.8612)  (0.29941)  (1.10931) 
 [ 0.19900] [-3.04374] [ 0.82435] [-0.93993] [-0.11759] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1)) -0.176377  9.330675 -16.86113  0.030219  0.156897 
  (0.17813)  (4.11686)  (20.0757)  (0.10956)  (0.40594) 
 [-0.99017] [ 2.26646] [-0.83988] [ 0.27581] [ 0.38651] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2))  0.014374  5.977765 -7.301474 -0.038433  0.259495 
  (0.16336)  (3.77561)  (18.4116)  (0.10048)  (0.37229) 
 [ 0.08799] [ 1.58326] [-0.39657] [-0.38249] [ 0.69703] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B26: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 7 (1980-2012): 
Pooled data (Alternative combinations) 
Error Correction: D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.451092  0.234097 -12.69856 -0.147329  0.037135 
  (0.08191)  (2.27814)  (10.2061)  (0.10365)  (0.22068) 
 [-5.50731] [ 0.10276] [-1.24421] [-1.42143] [ 0.16828] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.081458 -0.625399  8.040180 -0.008483  0.555121 
  (0.08611)  (2.39488)  (10.7291)  (0.10896)  (0.23199) 
 [ 0.94603] [-0.26114] [ 0.74938] [-0.07785] [ 2.39292] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.000818  0.038911  0.107815 -0.000709 -0.003894 
  (0.00273)  (0.07581)  (0.33963)  (0.00345)  (0.00734) 
 [-0.30015] [ 0.51327] [ 0.31745] [-0.20542] [-0.53025] 
      
D(POLITY(-2)) -0.000799 -0.238284  0.212460 -0.003521 -0.004993 
  (0.00276)  (0.07679)  (0.34400)  (0.00349)  (0.00744) 
 [-0.28948] [-3.10321] [ 0.61761] [-1.00790] [-0.67130] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.000236 -0.034692 -0.518151  0.000954 -0.001566 
  (0.00061)  (0.01684)  (0.07543)  (0.00077)  (0.00163) 
 [ 0.38977] [-2.06052] [-6.86951] [ 1.24603] [-0.96040] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -0.000589 -0.014244 -0.356727 -0.001037  0.001579 
  (0.00060)  (0.01658)  (0.07429)  (0.00075)  (0.00161) 
 [-0.98871] [-0.85897] [-4.80188] [-1.37430] [ 0.98307] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.139134 -0.000155  8.277632 -0.465460  0.091030 
  (0.06377)  (1.77372)  (7.94629)  (0.08070)  (0.17182) 
 [ 2.18174] [-8.8e-05] [ 1.04170] [-5.76787] [ 0.52981] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.053031 -0.031622  3.079717  0.014915 -0.092312 
  (0.06306)  (1.75392)  (7.85757)  (0.07980)  (0.16990) 
 [ 0.84096] [-0.01803] [ 0.39194] [ 0.18690] [-0.54334] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
1)) 
 0.027517  0.058283 -4.259909 -0.025842 -0.426603 
  (0.02897)  (0.80564)  (3.60926)  (0.03665)  (0.07804) 
 [ 0.94999] [ 0.07234] [-1.18027] [-0.70501] [-5.46649] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
2)) 
 0.032899  0.057107  0.499656  0.010664 -0.063982 
  (0.02933)  (0.81587)  (3.65508)  (0.03712)  (0.07903) 
 [ 1.12157] [ 0.07000] [ 0.13670] [ 0.28729] [-0.80959] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B27: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 7 (1980-2012): 
North Africa (Alternative combinations) 
Variables D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.429612  0.512163 -14.28429 -0.209512 -0.275924 
  (0.12912)  (1.22255)  (6.05967)  (0.15547)  (0.37388) 
 [-3.32726] [ 0.41893] [-2.35727] [-1.34760] [-0.73801] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.220738  0.431710 -1.704040 -0.072526  0.505738 
  (0.14008)  (1.32635)  (6.57415)  (0.16867)  (0.40562) 
 [ 1.57578] [ 0.32549] [-0.25920] [-0.42998] [ 1.24683] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.003304 -0.141826 -0.387114  0.014509  0.031284 
  (0.01293)  (0.12243)  (0.60684)  (0.01557)  (0.03744) 
 [-0.25553] [-1.15842] [-0.63792] [ 0.93187] [ 0.83554] 
      
D(POLITY(-2)) -0.015761 -0.021272  0.142642  0.014530 -0.014007 
  (0.01775)  (0.16805)  (0.83295)  (0.02137)  (0.05139) 
 [-0.88803] [-0.12658] [ 0.17125] [ 0.67989] [-0.27256] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.003790  0.001004 -0.452947  0.003009 -0.004609 
  (0.00224)  (0.02119)  (0.10502)  (0.00269)  (0.00648) 
 [ 1.69358] [ 0.04740] [-4.31309] [ 1.11675] [-0.71132] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2))  0.000860  0.001417 -0.241713  0.000538  0.007575 
  (0.00202)  (0.01913)  (0.09482)  (0.00243)  (0.00585) 
 [ 0.42552] [ 0.07408] [-2.54931] [ 0.22118] [ 1.29495] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.015292  0.201863  12.48243 -0.598889  0.178593 
  (0.10291)  (0.97444)  (4.82988)  (0.12392)  (0.29800) 
 [ 0.14859] [ 0.20716] [ 2.58442] [-4.83293] [ 0.59931] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2)) -0.081168  0.180755  7.203783 -0.158080  0.091441 
  (0.09620)  (0.91087)  (4.51479)  (0.11583)  (0.27856) 
 [-0.84373] [ 0.19844] [ 1.59560] [-1.36471] [ 0.32827] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
1)) 
 0.019143 -0.005769  0.932277 -0.077922 -0.531527 
  (0.03914)  (0.37063)  (1.83708)  (0.04713)  (0.11335) 
 [ 0.48903] [-0.01557] [ 0.50748] [-1.65322] [-4.68941] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
2)) 
-0.041551 -0.120074 -1.400557 -0.048830 -0.070643 
  (0.03942)  (0.37320)  (1.84982)  (0.04746)  (0.11413) 
 [-1.05417] [-0.32174] [-0.75713] [-1.02887] [-0.61896] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B28: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 7 (1980-2012): 
Southern Africa (Alternative combinations) 
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1))  0.038154  18.15576  1.722847 -0.149657 -0.281076 
  (0.32497)  (29.7650)  (14.1523)  (0.50042)  (0.38268) 
 [ 0.11741] [ 0.60997] [ 0.12174] [-0.29906] [-0.73450] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2)) -0.333448  2.758709  10.21612  0.718710 -0.699767 
  (0.24011)  (21.9924)  (10.4567)  (0.36974)  (0.28275) 
 [-1.38875] [ 0.12544] [ 0.97700] [ 1.94381] [-2.47489] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.001293 -0.048761 -0.005359  0.000590  0.000515 
  (0.00243)  (0.22270)  (0.10588)  (0.00374)  (0.00286) 
 [-0.53164] [-0.21896] [-0.05062] [ 0.15759] [ 0.18002] 
      
D(POLITY(-2)) -0.004073 -0.522813  0.037266 -0.006037  0.004905 
  (0.00237)  (0.21685)  (0.10311)  (0.00365)  (0.00279) 
 [-1.72039] [-2.41095] [ 0.36144] [-1.65596] [ 1.75950] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1)) -0.003413 -0.128592 -0.516696 -0.001621 -0.014183 
  (0.00491)  (0.44987)  (0.21390)  (0.00756)  (0.00578) 
 [-0.69494] [-0.28584] [-2.41559] [-0.21428] [-2.45209] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -0.000711 -0.044373 -0.318510  0.000266 -0.005148 
  (0.00312)  (0.28536)  (0.13568)  (0.00480)  (0.00367) 
 [-0.22820] [-0.15550] [-2.34752] [ 0.05534] [-1.40323] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1)) -0.037767  4.832539 -0.433181 -0.460453 -0.515887 
  (0.15369)  (14.0768)  (6.69306)  (0.23666)  (0.18098) 
 [-0.24574] [ 0.34330] [-0.06472] [-1.94561] [-2.85052] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.087211  8.456511 -6.783955  0.718012 -1.396650 
  (0.19080)  (17.4765)  (8.30953)  (0.29382)  (0.22469) 
 [ 0.45707] [ 0.48388] [-0.81641] [ 2.44371] [-6.21593] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
1)) 
 0.059034  4.873821 -1.654198 -0.278945 -0.533222 
  (0.11785)  (10.7948)  (5.13257)  (0.18148)  (0.13878) 
 [ 0.50091] [ 0.45150] [-0.32229] [-1.53701] [-3.84209] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
2)) 
 0.252434  8.508920 -1.719428  0.268905 -0.877858 
  (0.15165)  (13.8901)  (6.60431)  (0.23352)  (0.17858) 
 [ 1.66460] [ 0.61259] [-0.26035] [ 1.15151] [-4.91577] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B29: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 7 (1980-2012): 
West Africa (Alternative combinations) 
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -2.629366  17.78299 -395.2111 -5.668654  7.487937 
  (1.09136)  (54.9329)  (370.398)  (1.76555)  (2.33759) 
 [-2.40925] [ 0.32372] [-1.06699] [-3.21069] [ 3.20327] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2)) -0.947161  6.101420 -84.45399 -1.754891  4.483222 
  (0.51895)  (26.1209)  (176.126)  (0.83953)  (1.11154) 
 [-1.82516] [ 0.23358] [-0.47951] [-2.09033] [ 4.03335] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.002021  0.083634  0.372288 -0.003694 -0.010095 
  (0.00493)  (0.24832)  (1.67436)  (0.00798)  (0.01057) 
 [-0.40956] [ 0.33680] [ 0.22235] [-0.46279] [-0.95531] 
      
D(POLITY(-2))  0.001360  0.072942  0.900983  0.001735 -0.004299 
  (0.00488)  (0.24582)  (1.65747)  (0.00790)  (0.01046) 
 [ 0.27845] [ 0.29673] [ 0.54359] [ 0.21960] [-0.41099] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  6.40E-05 -0.043959 -0.554421  0.000193 -0.000782 
  (0.00066)  (0.03298)  (0.22237)  (0.00106)  (0.00140) 
 [ 0.09770] [-1.33296] [-2.49328] [ 0.18179] [-0.55739] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -0.000263 -0.013007 -0.386898 -0.000352 -0.000935 
  (0.00072)  (0.03633)  (0.24497)  (0.00117)  (0.00155) 
 [-0.36476] [-0.35801] [-1.57940] [-0.30110] [-0.60480] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  1.667356 -11.37454  253.6924  3.531862 -5.256160 
  (0.73863)  (37.1786)  (250.685)  (1.19493)  (1.58208) 
 [ 2.25735] [-0.30594] [ 1.01200] [ 2.95571] [-3.32230] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.830155 -5.768036  77.96507  1.311729 -2.355722 
  (0.35336)  (17.7859)  (119.926)  (0.57164)  (0.75685) 
 [ 2.34935] [-0.32430] [ 0.65011] [ 2.29467] [-3.11252] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
1)) 
-0.216790  3.338720 -71.37081 -0.725429  1.221841 
  (0.18011)  (9.06574)  (61.1278)  (0.29137)  (0.38578) 
 [-1.20365] [ 0.36828] [-1.16757] [-2.48968] [ 3.16720] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
2)) 
 0.124167  0.484779 -10.58063 -0.294621  0.499913 
  (0.11099)  (5.58646)  (37.6680)  (0.17955)  (0.23772) 
 [ 1.11875] [ 0.08678] [-0.28089] [-1.64088] [ 2.10291] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B30: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 7 (1980-2012): 
East Africa (Alternative combinations) 
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.467959 -18.83193 -9.533353 -0.065155  0.116622 
  (0.29548)  (7.83120)  (41.0693)  (0.14446)  (0.62164) 
 [-1.58370] [-2.40473] [-0.23213] [-0.45102] [ 0.18760] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2)) -0.063892 -5.192304 -4.165467  0.128574 -0.326693 
  (0.27932)  (7.40272)  (38.8222)  (0.13656)  (0.58763) 
 [-0.22874] [-0.70140] [-0.10730] [ 0.94155] [-0.55595] 
      
D(POLITY(-1))  0.002443 -0.467582 -0.595818 -0.007160  0.011478 
  (0.00923)  (0.24469)  (1.28323)  (0.00451)  (0.01942) 
 [ 0.26464] [-1.91091] [-0.46431] [-1.58616] [ 0.59094] 
      
D(POLITY(-2))  0.003153  0.124447  0.247214  0.003067 -0.001343 
  (0.00857)  (0.22706)  (1.19079)  (0.00419)  (0.01802) 
 [ 0.36801] [ 0.54807] [ 0.20760] [ 0.73235] [-0.07450] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  8.75E-06 -0.004998 -0.687755  0.001790  0.000225 
  (0.00209)  (0.05544)  (0.29075)  (0.00102)  (0.00440) 
 [ 0.00418] [-0.09014] [-2.36543] [ 1.74998] [ 0.05103] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -0.003174 -0.044321 -0.502787 -0.000426  0.010577 
  (0.00208)  (0.05511)  (0.28899)  (0.00102)  (0.00437) 
 [-1.52664] [-0.80429] [-1.73980] [-0.41897] [ 2.41789] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1)) -0.411566 -13.90837 -16.91550  0.043003 -1.351668 
  (0.68361)  (18.1176)  (95.0146)  (0.33421)  (1.43818) 
 [-0.60205] [-0.76767] [-0.17803] [ 0.12867] [-0.93985] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2)) -0.113696 -22.80549 -0.258510 -0.170975 -0.360445 
  (0.45822)  (12.1443)  (63.6883)  (0.22402)  (0.96401) 
 [-0.24812] [-1.87788] [-0.00406] [-0.76321] [-0.37390] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1))  0.013123 -3.315182 -24.99150  0.104826 -0.345483 
  (0.14904)  (3.94988)  (20.7144)  (0.07286)  (0.31354) 
 [ 0.08805] [-0.83931] [-1.20648] [ 1.43868] [-1.10187] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2))  0.143563 -4.461085 -13.48416  0.002132 -0.039161 
  (0.16634)  (4.40837)  (23.1189)  (0.08132)  (0.34994) 
 [ 0.86309] [-1.01196] [-0.58325] [ 0.02622] [-0.11191] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
355 
 
Appendix B31: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 8 (1980-2012): 
Pooled data (Alternative combinations) 
Error Correction: D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.446921  0.611520 -14.94123 -0.141884 -0.102708 
  (0.08282)  (2.30259)  (10.3227)  (0.10329)  (0.22455) 
 [-5.39613] [ 0.26558] [-1.44741] [-1.37368] [-0.45739] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.089320 -0.002172  4.802712  0.028374  0.524702 
  (0.08734)  (2.42811)  (10.8854)  (0.10892)  (0.23679) 
 [ 1.02270] [-0.00089] [ 0.44121] [ 0.26051] [ 2.21590] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.001204  0.025640  0.210373  0.000135 -0.002645 
  (0.00270)  (0.07502)  (0.33631)  (0.00337)  (0.00732) 
 [-0.44617] [ 0.34179] [ 0.62553] [ 0.04012] [-0.36153] 
      
D(POLITY(-2)) -0.001200 -0.261543  0.347823 -0.002780 -0.004680 
  (0.00271)  (0.07533)  (0.33772)  (0.00338)  (0.00735) 
 [-0.44296] [-3.47190] [ 1.02992] [-0.82262] [-0.63700] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.000257 -0.018975 -0.581414  0.000790 -0.003218 
  (0.00060)  (0.01673)  (0.07501)  (0.00075)  (0.00163) 
 [ 0.42724] [-1.13415] [-7.75158] [ 1.05296] [-1.97242] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -0.000633 -0.004387 -0.388614 -0.001171  0.000641 
  (0.00060)  (0.01674)  (0.07503)  (0.00075)  (0.00163) 
 [-1.05138] [-0.26213] [-5.17913] [-1.55970] [ 0.39251] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.151411 -0.994092  11.67321 -0.451671  0.324032 
  (0.06970)  (1.93767)  (8.68678)  (0.08692)  (0.18896) 
 [ 2.17243] [-0.51303] [ 1.34379] [-5.19648] [ 1.71480] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.043890 -0.940147  5.769701 -0.002176  0.062155 
  (0.06627)  (1.84234)  (8.25939)  (0.08264)  (0.17967) 
 [ 0.66232] [-0.51030] [ 0.69856] [-0.02633] [ 0.34595] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1))  0.016335  0.331735 -4.389417 -0.017458 -0.437435 
  (0.02949)  (0.81985)  (3.67545)  (0.03678)  (0.07995) 
 [ 0.55393] [ 0.40463] [-1.19425] [-0.47470] [-5.47124] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2))  0.026101  0.159834  1.418670  0.018804 -0.067468 
  (0.02956)  (0.82187)  (3.68452)  (0.03687)  (0.08015) 
 [ 0.88293] [ 0.19448] [ 0.38504] [ 0.51005] [-0.84179] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B32: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 8 (1980-2012): 
North Africa (Alternative combinations) 
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.430446  0.219079 -7.225844 -0.215839 -0.454105 
  (0.11830)  (1.10571)  (5.83345)  (0.14508)  (0.33340) 
 [-3.63858] [ 0.19813] [-1.23869] [-1.48773] [-1.36203] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.209042  0.440509  3.316974 -0.125706  0.393191 
  (0.13355)  (1.24824)  (6.58543)  (0.16378)  (0.37638) 
 [ 1.56526] [ 0.35290] [ 0.50368] [-0.76752] [ 1.04466] 
      
D(POLITY(-1)) -0.011094 -0.234599 -0.225620  0.012350  0.036679 
  (0.01330)  (0.12433)  (0.65592)  (0.01631)  (0.03749) 
 [-0.83399] [-1.88696] [-0.34398] [ 0.75708] [ 0.97842] 
      
D(POLITY(-2)) -0.018872 -0.075049 -0.021515  0.018094 -0.001097 
  (0.01785)  (0.16685)  (0.88026)  (0.02189)  (0.05031) 
 [-1.05716] [-0.44980] [-0.02444] [ 0.82649] [-0.02181] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.004147  0.009843 -0.511144  0.002655 -0.003347 
  (0.00220)  (0.02059)  (0.10861)  (0.00270)  (0.00621) 
 [ 1.88278] [ 0.47815] [-4.70634] [ 0.98284] [-0.53920] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2))  0.001470  0.005707 -0.261789  0.000879  0.007819 
  (0.00203)  (0.01893)  (0.09987)  (0.00248)  (0.00571) 
 [ 0.72574] [ 0.30146] [-2.62132] [ 0.35388] [ 1.36994] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.068323  0.760936  6.175353 -0.601063  0.438259 
  (0.09476)  (0.88565)  (4.67251)  (0.11621)  (0.26705) 
 [ 0.72103] [ 0.85918] [ 1.32164] [-5.17236] [ 1.64110] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2)) -0.049737  0.663752  2.364642 -0.149652  0.255991 
  (0.09111)  (0.85159)  (4.49279)  (0.11174)  (0.25678) 
 [-0.54589] [ 0.77943] [ 0.52632] [-1.33932] [ 0.99693] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1))  0.028523  0.019461  0.917229 -0.065191 -0.563226 
  (0.04080)  (0.38134)  (2.01189)  (0.05004)  (0.11499) 
 [ 0.69909] [ 0.05103] [ 0.45590] [-1.30287] [-4.89817] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2)) -0.032183 -0.179577 -1.690127 -0.034059 -0.082095 
  (0.04059)  (0.37939)  (2.00158)  (0.04978)  (0.11440) 
 [-0.79287] [-0.47333] [-0.84440] [-0.68419] [-0.71763] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B33: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 8 (1980-2012): 
Southern Africa (Alternative combinations) 
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1))  1.321067  10.67244 -21.25128  0.592165  0.721187 
  (0.31569)  (47.4717)  (21.6172)  (0.57174)  (1.77082) 
 [ 4.18468] [ 0.22482] [-0.98307] [ 1.03573] [ 0.40726] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.703120  5.826210 -8.111743  1.475601 -0.679635 
  (0.21579)  (32.4495)  (14.7766)  (0.39081)  (1.21046) 
 [ 3.25832] [ 0.17955] [-0.54896] [ 3.77571] [-0.56147] 
      
D(POLITY(-1))  0.000180 -0.027570 -0.022516  0.000266 -0.003265 
  (0.00149)  (0.22337)  (0.10172)  (0.00269)  (0.00833) 
 [ 0.12124] [-0.12342] [-0.22136] [ 0.09873] [-0.39181] 
      
D(POLITY(-2)) -0.003680 -0.515835  0.026767 -0.006596 -0.000236 
  (0.00146)  (0.21896)  (0.09971)  (0.00264)  (0.00817) 
 [-2.52731] [-2.35586] [ 0.26845] [-2.50107] [-0.02895] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.005286 -0.121210 -0.654688 -0.000785 -0.010903 
  (0.00350)  (0.52650)  (0.23975)  (0.00634)  (0.01964) 
 [ 1.50973] [-0.23022] [-2.73068] [-0.12381] [-0.55513] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2))  0.001584 -0.071221 -0.349783  0.000772 -0.002410 
  (0.00197)  (0.29587)  (0.13473)  (0.00356)  (0.01104) 
 [ 0.80523] [-0.24072] [-2.59614] [ 0.21664] [-0.21839] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.096628  1.655421 -3.237782 -0.428993  0.393184 
  (0.08773)  (13.1927)  (6.00756)  (0.15889)  (0.49212) 
 [ 1.10139] [ 0.12548] [-0.53895] [-2.69995] [ 0.79895] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.204435  4.510085 -6.860759  0.849064  0.020958 
  (0.11603)  (17.4484)  (7.94547)  (0.21014)  (0.65087) 
 [ 1.76187] [ 0.25848] [-0.86348] [ 4.04040] [ 0.03220] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1)) -0.042406  0.319668 -0.259243 -0.419443  0.124264 
  (0.05151)  (7.74587)  (3.52724)  (0.09329)  (0.28894) 
 [-0.82324] [ 0.04127] [-0.07350] [-4.49615] [ 0.43006] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2))  0.224744  2.857480 -0.958207  0.229422  0.162435 
  (0.06893)  (10.3646)  (4.71972)  (0.12483)  (0.38663) 
 [ 3.26070] [ 0.27570] [-0.20302] [ 1.83791] [ 0.42013] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B34: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 8 (1980-2012): 
West Africa (Alternative combinations) 
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.429988  1.794254 -59.46325  0.183529  0.163785 
  (0.23764)  (10.2133)  (66.5768)  (0.26696)  (0.50509) 
 [-1.80943] [ 0.17568] [-0.89315] [ 0.68747] [ 0.32427] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.086107 -2.742442  20.51740  0.455714  1.577519 
  (0.22731)  (9.76950)  (63.6835)  (0.25536)  (0.48314) 
 [ 0.37881] [-0.28071] [ 0.32218] [ 1.78460] [ 3.26512] 
      
D(POLITY(-1))  0.004061  0.075087  0.931094  0.009293  0.002298 
  (0.00613)  (0.26366)  (1.71871)  (0.00689)  (0.01304) 
 [ 0.66203] [ 0.28478] [ 0.54174] [ 1.34848] [ 0.17628] 
      
D(POLITY(-2))  0.006008  0.055359  0.953781  0.012049  0.004272 
  (0.00614)  (0.26371)  (1.71900)  (0.00689)  (0.01304) 
 [ 0.97916] [ 0.20993] [ 0.55485] [ 1.74810] [ 0.32756] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1)) -0.002718 -0.041094 -0.838467 -0.006454 -0.008144 
  (0.00147)  (0.06306)  (0.41108)  (0.00165)  (0.00312) 
 [-1.85261] [-0.65164] [-2.03968] [-3.91533] [-2.61121] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -0.002051 -0.008955 -0.616390 -0.005816 -0.003684 
  (0.00112)  (0.04821)  (0.31429)  (0.00126)  (0.00238) 
 [-1.82806] [-0.18573] [-1.96120] [-4.61458] [-1.54519] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.504727 -1.339856  51.97797  0.275004  0.410907 
  (0.20535)  (8.82548)  (57.5299)  (0.23068)  (0.43646) 
 [ 2.45794] [-0.15182] [ 0.90350] [ 1.19212] [ 0.94146] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.230680 -0.196632  16.01781  0.112740 -0.075736 
  (0.17205)  (7.39436)  (48.2009)  (0.19328)  (0.36568) 
 [ 1.34080] [-0.02659] [ 0.33231] [ 0.58331] [-0.20711] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-1)) -0.185298  1.232821 -44.02917 -0.467555 -0.565080 
  (0.13376)  (5.74885)  (37.4745)  (0.15027)  (0.28430) 
 [-1.38530] [ 0.21445] [-1.17491] [-3.11152] [-1.98758] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-2))  0.076085 -0.372746  6.135858 -0.174414 -0.511879 
  (0.10013)  (4.30326)  (28.0513)  (0.11248)  (0.21281) 
 [ 0.75990] [-0.08662] [ 0.21874] [-1.55061] [-2.40529] 
Estimated coefficients on the first line, standard errors in parenthesis (); and t-statistics in brackets []. 
The results are computed separately for each equation using the appropriate residuals 
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Appendix B35: Vector Error Correction Estimates for Equation 8 (1980-2012): 
East Africa (Alternative combinations) 
Variables  D(LAWRULE) D(POLITY) D(INFLATION) D(QLEGAL) D(CORRUPTION) 
D(LAWRULE(-1)) -0.330190 -20.77885 -27.04745 -0.182599  0.544121 
  (0.29456)  (6.09281)  (32.7410)  (0.16322)  (0.61613) 
 [-1.12094] [-3.41039] [-0.82610] [-1.11871] [ 0.88313] 
      
D(LAWRULE(-2))  0.029190 -4.621222 -22.61295  0.096928 -0.107043 
  (0.29277)  (6.05578)  (32.5420)  (0.16223)  (0.61238) 
 [ 0.09970] [-0.76311] [-0.69489] [ 0.59747] [-0.17480] 
      
D(POLITY(-1))  0.000521 -0.174979 -0.071881 -0.009210  0.011348 
  (0.00888)  (0.18363)  (0.98676)  (0.00492)  (0.01857) 
 [ 0.05873] [-0.95290] [-0.07285] [-1.87231] [ 0.61111] 
      
D(POLITY(-2))  0.006322  0.055798 -0.548727  0.001036  0.006660 
  (0.00967)  (0.20005)  (1.07499)  (0.00536)  (0.02023) 
 [ 0.65363] [ 0.27892] [-0.51045] [ 0.19332] [ 0.32925] 
      
D(INFLATION(-1))  0.001422 -0.034186 -0.874976  0.002134  0.001619 
  (0.00241)  (0.04984)  (0.26784)  (0.00134)  (0.00504) 
 [ 0.59019] [-0.68588] [-3.26679] [ 1.59840] [ 0.32120] 
      
D(INFLATION(-2)) -0.002605 -0.115625 -0.503124 -0.000154  0.011718 
  (0.00283)  (0.05859)  (0.31482)  (0.00157)  (0.00592) 
 [-0.91983] [-1.97361] [-1.59813] [-0.09807] [ 1.97799] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-1))  0.298454 -13.00875 -131.3897  0.189554 -1.060971 
  (0.80061)  (16.5599)  (88.9880)  (0.44363)  (1.67459) 
 [ 0.37278] [-0.78556] [-1.47649] [ 0.42728] [-0.63357] 
      
D(QLEGAL(-2))  0.241697 -19.64932 -47.01706 -0.119256  0.383289 
  (0.53019)  (10.9665)  (58.9309)  (0.29379)  (1.10897) 
 [ 0.45587] [-1.79175] [-0.79783] [-0.40593] [ 0.34562] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
1)) 
-0.121856  12.59904 -5.657413 -0.012947 -0.191938 
  (0.22780)  (4.71178)  (25.3197)  (0.12623)  (0.47647) 
 [-0.53493] [ 2.67395] [-0.22344] [-0.10257] [-0.40283] 
      
D(CORRUPTION(-
2)) 
 0.048896  5.247821 -0.276225 -0.054622  0.096514 
  (0.19393)  (4.01136)  (21.5559)  (0.10746)  (0.40564) 
 [ 0.25213] [ 1.30824] [-0.01281] [-0.50829] [ 0.23793] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
360 
 
Appendix C1: Raw E-Views output Table for p-value determinant 
System: UNTITLED   
Estimation Method: Least Squares  
Date: 05/07/14   Time: 10:54  
Sample: 1983 2012   
Included observations: 180   
Total system (balanced) observations 1080  
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C(1) -0.118678 0.047912 -2.477026 0.0134 
C(2) -0.383916 0.083362 -4.605435 0.0000 
C(3) -0.036352 0.079369 -0.458015 0.6470 
C(4) -0.023846 0.057989 -0.411215 0.6810 
C(5) -0.032173 0.053785 -0.598183 0.5499 
C(6) 0.027279 0.053054 0.514172 0.6072 
C(7) 0.058018 0.052679 1.101341 0.2710 
C(8) -8.95E-05 0.027258 -0.003284 0.9974 
C(9) 0.001122 0.026313 0.042650 0.9660 
C(10) 0.018113 0.013281 1.363881 0.1729 
C(11) 0.017858 0.014120 1.264713 0.2063 
C(12) 0.069659 0.035035 1.988272 0.0471 
C(13) -0.087406 0.035801 -2.441456 0.0148 
C(14) -0.014512 0.092337 -0.157160 0.8752 
C(15) -0.141696 0.160656 -0.881983 0.3780 
C(16) -0.149361 0.152962 -0.976456 0.3291 
C(17) 0.127752 0.111758 1.143111 0.2533 
C(18) 0.134004 0.103655 1.292784 0.1964 
C(19) -0.040029 0.102247 -0.391491 0.6955 
C(20) -0.126799 0.101525 -1.248942 0.2120 
C(21) 0.066872 0.052532 1.272963 0.2033 
C(22) -0.050640 0.050711 -0.998585 0.3182 
C(23) 0.041268 0.025595 1.612365 0.1072 
C(24) 0.080673 0.027213 2.964503 0.0031 
C(25) 0.157356 0.067520 2.330509 0.0200 
C(26) -0.194688 0.068996 -2.821725 0.0049 
C(27) -0.090312 0.070812 -1.275369 0.2025 
C(28) 0.025488 0.123207 0.206869 0.8362 
C(29) 0.078412 0.117306 0.668436 0.5040 
C(30) -0.141251 0.085707 -1.648074 0.0997 
C(31) 0.081293 0.079493 1.022647 0.3067 
C(32) 0.461517 0.078413 5.885725 0.0000 
C(33) -0.176226 0.077859 -2.263399 0.0238 
C(34) 0.046986 0.040287 1.166301 0.2438 
C(35) 0.031851 0.038890 0.818999 0.4130 
C(36) -0.032592 0.019628 -1.660432 0.0971 
C(37) -0.013727 0.020870 -0.657727 0.5109 
C(38) 0.025540 0.051781 0.493225 0.6220 
C(39) -0.076159 0.052913 -1.439334 0.1504 
C(40) 0.012229 0.212394 0.057575 0.9541 
C(41) -0.440779 0.369545 -1.192762 0.2332 
C(42) -0.261483 0.351847 -0.743173 0.4576 
C(43) -0.309765 0.257069 -1.204990 0.2285 
C(44) 0.543076 0.238430 2.277721 0.0230 
C(45) 0.067965 0.235191 0.288980 0.7727 
C(46) -0.224043 0.233530 -0.959374 0.3376 
C(47) -0.074748 0.120836 -0.618589 0.5363 
C(48) -0.268733 0.116647 -2.303809 0.0214 
C(49) 0.089279 0.058873 1.516458 0.1297 
C(50) 0.054610 0.062596 0.872411 0.3832 
C(51) 0.368262 0.155311 2.371133 0.0179 
C(52) -0.370570 0.158707 -2.334937 0.0197 
C(53) -0.895302 0.296844 -3.016067 0.0026 
C(54) 1.244464 0.516479 2.409515 0.0162 
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C(55) 1.353861 0.491744 2.753183 0.0060 
C(56) -0.071172 0.359281 -0.198095 0.8430 
C(57) 0.634973 0.333231 1.905503 0.0570 
C(58) -0.041450 0.328705 -0.126102 0.8997 
C(59) -0.000621 0.326384 -0.001903 0.9985 
C(60) 0.149197 0.168881 0.883444 0.3772 
C(61) -0.524687 0.163027 -3.218401 0.0013 
C(62) 0.205418 0.082282 2.496528 0.0127 
C(63) -0.241187 0.087485 -2.756899 0.0059 
C(64) 0.595816 0.217064 2.744893 0.0062 
C(65) -0.742678 0.221810 -3.348264 0.0008 
C(66) 0.391491 0.152502 2.567129 0.0104 
C(67) -0.397965 0.265337 -1.499843 0.1340 
C(68) -0.182847 0.252630 -0.723773 0.4694 
C(69) -0.094089 0.184578 -0.509754 0.6103 
C(70) -0.234618 0.171195 -1.370473 0.1708 
C(71) 0.074342 0.168870 0.440235 0.6599 
C(72) 0.120228 0.167677 0.717022 0.4735 
C(73) 0.203980 0.086761 2.351040 0.0189 
C(74) 0.247045 0.083754 2.949645 0.0033 
C(75) 0.100909 0.042272 2.387161 0.0172 
C(76) -0.134474 0.044945 -2.991992 0.0028 
C(77) 0.932621 0.111515 8.363198 0.0000 
C(78) -0.179381 0.113953 -1.574165 0.1158 
Determinant residual covariance 2358320.   
Equation: D(FDINFL) = C(1)*( FDINFL(-1) - 0.00512130747606*BANK(-1)  
- 0.0382520945127*NONFIN(-1) - 0.0466856343261*PRIVY(-1)  
        + 0.049631940144*EQCAP(-1) - 0.132252226667*TURNOVER(-1)) 
         + C(2)*D(FDINFL(-1)) + C(3)*D(FDINFL(-2)) + C(4)*D(BANK(-1))  
        + C(5)*D(BANK(-2)) + C(6)*D(NONFIN(-1)) + C(7)*D(NONFIN(-2))  
        + C(8)*D(PRIVY(-1)) + C(9)*D(PRIVY(-2)) + C(10)*D(EQCAP(-1))  
        + C(11)*D(EQCAP(-2)) + C(12)*D(TURNOVER(-1)) + C(13)*D(TURNOVER(-2)) 
Observations: 180   
R-squared 0.267767     Mean dependent var 0.052360 
Adjusted R-squared 0.215151     S.D. dependent var 1.688016 
S.E. of regression 1.495442     Sum squared resid 373.4698 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.059970    
     
Equation: D(BANK) = C(14)*( FDINFL(-1) - 0.00512130747606*BANK( -1)  
- 0.0382520945127*NONFIN(-1) - 0.0466856343261*PRIVY(-1)  
        + 0.049631940144*EQCAP(-1) - 0.132252226667*TURNOVER(-1)) 
        + C(15)*D(FDINFL(-1)) + C(16)*D(FDINFL(-2)) + C(17)*D(BANK(-1)) 
        + C(18)*D(BANK(-2)) + C(19)*D(NONFIN(-1)) + C(20) 
        *D(NONFIN(-2)) + C(21)*D(PRIVY(-1)) + C(22)*D(PRIVY(-2)) + 
        C(23)*D(EQCAP(-1)) + C(24)*D(EQCAP(-2)) + C(25) 
        *D(TURNOVER(-1)) + C(26)*D(TURNOVER(-2)) 
Observations: 180   
R-squared 0.220546     Mean dependent var 0.656821 
Adjusted R-squared 0.164538     S.D. dependent var 3.153104 
S.E. of regression 2.882052     Sum squared resid 1387.139 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.928784    
     
Equation: D(NONFIN) = C(27)*( FDINFL(-1) - 0.00512130747606*BANK(-1)  
- 0.0382520945127*NONFIN(-1) - 0.0466856343261*PRIVY(-1)  
        + 0.049631940144*EQCAP(-1) - 0.132252226667*TURNOVER(-1)) 
       + C(28)*D(FDINFL(-1)) + C(29)*D(FDINFL(-2)) + C(30)*D(BANK(-1)) 
        + C(31)*D(BANK(-2)) + C(32)*D(NONFIN(-1)) + C(33) 
        *D(NONFIN(-2)) + C(34)*D(PRIVY(-1)) + C(35)*D(PRIVY(-2)) + 
        C(36)*D(EQCAP(-1)) + C(37)*D(EQCAP(-2)) + C(38) 
        *D(TURNOVER(-1)) + C(39)*D(TURNOVER(-2)) 
Observations: 180   
R-squared 0.213243     Mean dependent var -0.350235 
Adjusted R-squared 0.156709     S.D. dependent var 2.406850 
S.E. of regression 2.210232     Sum squared resid 815.8157 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.037272    
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Equation: D(PRIVY) = C(40)*( FDINFL(-1) - 0.00512130747606*BANK(-1) 
         - 0.0382520945127*NONFIN(-1) - 0.0466856343261*PRIVY(-1)  
        + 0.049631940144*EQCAP(-1) - 0.132252226667*TURNOVER(-1)) 
        + C(41)*D(FDINFL(-1)) + C(42)*D(FDINFL(-2)) + C(43)*D(BANK(-1)) 
         + C(44)*D(BANK(-2)) + C(45)*D(NONFIN(-1)) + C(46) 
        *D(NONFIN(-2)) + C(47)*D(PRIVY(-1)) + C(48)*D(PRIVY(-2)) + 
        C(49)*D(EQCAP(-1)) + C(50)*D(EQCAP(-2)) + C(51) 
        *D(TURNOVER(-1)) + C(52)*D(TURNOVER(-2)) 
Observations: 180   
R-squared 0.084852     Mean dependent var 1.127544 
Adjusted R-squared 0.019093     S.D. dependent var 6.693563 
S.E. of regression 6.629357     Sum squared resid 7339.378 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.894007    
     
Equation: D(EQCAP) = C(53)*( FDINFL(-1) - 0.00512130747606*BANK(-1) 
        - 0.0382520945127*NONFIN(-1) - 0.0466856343261*PRIVY(-1)  
        + 0.049631940144*EQCAP(-1) - 0.132252226667*TURNOVER(-1)) 
         + C(54)*D(FDINFL(-1)) + C(55)*D(FDINFL(-2)) + C(56)*D(BANK(-1)) 
         + C(57)*D(BANK(-2)) + C(58)*D(NONFIN(-1)) + C(59) 
        *D(NONFIN(-2)) + C(60)*D(PRIVY(-1)) + C(61)*D(PRIVY(-2)) + 
        C(62)*D(EQCAP(-1)) + C(63)*D(EQCAP(-2)) + C(64) 
        *D(TURNOVER(-1)) + C(65)*D(TURNOVER(-2)) 
Observations: 180   
R-squared 0.233926     Mean dependent var 1.447206 
Adjusted R-squared 0.178879     S.D. dependent var 10.22476 
S.E. of regression 9.265242     Sum squared resid 14336.06 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.925884    
     
Equation: D(TURNOVER) = C(66)*( FDINFL(-1) - 0.00512130747606 
        *BANK(-1) - 0.0382520945127*NONFIN(-1) - 0.0466856343261 
        *PRIVY(-1) + 0.049631940144*EQCAP(-1) - 0.132252226667 
        *TURNOVER(-1) ) + C(67)*D(FDINFL(-1)) + C(68)*D(FDINFL(-2))  
        + C(69)*D(BANK(-1)) + C(70)*D(BANK(-2)) + C(71)*D(NONFIN(-1)) 
         + C(72)*D(NONFIN(-2)) + C(73)*D(PRIVY(-1)) + C(74) 
        *D(PRIVY(-2)) + C(75)*D(EQCAP(-1)) + C(76)*D(EQCAP(-2)) + 
        C(77)*D(TURNOVER(-1)) + C(78)*D(TURNOVER(-2)) 
Observations: 180   
R-squared 0.503529     Mean dependent var 0.609631 
Adjusted R-squared 0.467855     S.D. dependent var 6.525103 
S.E. of regression 4.759950     Sum squared resid 3783.740 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.560932    
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i
 The regression assumptions as suggested by Baltagi (2008) are: 
1. Model is linear in parameters 
2. The data are a random sample of the population. In essence, the errors are statistically independent 
from one another 
3. The expected value of the errors is always zero 
4. The independent variables are not too strongly collinear 
5. The independent variables are measured precisely  
6. The residuals have constant variance 
7. The errors are normally distributed.  
 
According to this author, if assumptions 1-5 are satisfied, then the regression estimation 
does not suffer from biases. If assumption 6 is also satisfied, then the regression estimator has 
minimum variance of all unbiased estimators. If assumption 7 is also satisfied, then we can 
do hypothesis testing using t and F tests. In this study, all the assumptions are satisfied as 
suggested by the diagnostic tests conducted.  
